active interference in the affairs of Afghanistan by the deputation of a high British officer, with or without a contingent, &c.' Now see what Lord Northbrook says:

Nothing is traceable among the records of the Government of India showing that the Ameer had ever expressed his readiness to agree to the presence of a British Agent at Herat. His Highness might have objections to such an arrangement, and yet those objections might not indicate disloyal intentions on his part towards the British Government.

A. But what objections could he possibly have? A diplomatic agent need not interfere with his affairs.

B. To discuss that thoroughly would make too much of a demand on your time. You will observe that Lord Salisbury himself says: 'I do not suggest any similar step with respect to Cabul, as I am sensible of the difficulties which are interposed by the fanatic violence of the people.' The presence of a resident Agent in the East is a sign that the nominal Prince is no longer his own master. That applies to other towns besides the capital. The Ameer could not afford to have it supposed that he was no longer master of Herat or Candahar. It would give a handle to his rivals, who could work upon the fanaticism and jealousy of the people, and persuade them that he had betrayed them. Again, a British Agent might be assassinated or murdered in a popular rising. The history of the East is full of examples of annexations brought about in that way. It was not disloyalty, but regard for his own safety and independence, that made the Ameer averse to British Agents.

A. But did he not consent at one time to receive them?

B. Lord Northbrook inquired thoroughly into that rumour. You have, on one side, the statement of Captain Grey, that he understood from the Ameer's envoy that he was willing to accept British residents. On the other side, you have the statements of everybody else who came in contact with the Ameer's officials that, as far as they could learn, the Ameer was not so willing. You have also Lord Mayo's despatch concerning the Umballa Conference (p. 131), saying, "We distinctly intimated to the Ameer that no European officers would be placed in his cities.' But that is a matter of detail. The event proved the Ameer's unwillingness, and there is not an iota of evidence of any disloyalty on his part to us.

A. Not his reception of a Russian Envoy?

B. That came much later, after Lord Lytton had insisted upon his receiving British residents. Besides, St. Petersburg and not Cabul was the quarter in which we had a right to complain of that.

A. But I want you to tell me this. How were we to know what was going on in Afghanistan without we had British residents there? How were we to know whether the Russians had or had not crossed the line you spoke of? What was the good of a pledge, if we could not tell whether it was being kept or broken? Answer me that, if you please, out of your Blue-books.

B. Yes, that can be answered out of these wonderful Blue-books, too. We had a native Agent at Cabul, and the Indian Government had information also through confidential agents, otherwise called spies. Lord Salisbury, as you have seen, complained that the information thus obtained was insufficient. The Indian Government, in answer to his complaints, declared that in their opinion it was sufficient, and as good as was practically necessary, and that nothing had escaped the Cabul diarist that it was material for them to know. A. How could they tell that?

B. Better, at least, than people in Downing Street. They probably could have given Lord Salisbury the information that he desired, if he had asked for it. But besides, we have in this white Blue-book, the Central Asian Correspondence, abundant illustrations of how well the system worked. We see there that the arrival of General Kaufmann's emissaries at Cabul was at once reported by the diarist to the nearest Indian official, who passed on the report to the GovernThe diarist communicated the movements of the emissaries, told whom they had interviews with, how the Ameer behaved to them, and even the contents of the letters they brought. Look, for The diarist makes mention of Kaufmann's letter, and promises that, God willing, he will send a complete copy in a day or two. Here (p. 77) is the complete translation.

example, at p. 76.

A. Bless me, so it is.

B. That is explained

How can he have got hold of it?

at p. 76. The Ameer showed Kaufmann's letter to him. That does not look like disloyalty to the British Government, does it?

A. But why didn't the Government put a stop to this sending of messages from Kaufmann? That was clearly outside their pledge. Beaconsfield would soon have put a stop to it.

B. Look at the date of Kaufmann's letter, February, 1876. Gladstone was not then in office.

A. Who was Viceroy at the time?

B. Northbrook when the letter was written; Lytton when it was delivered. The bearer of it was first turned back by the Ameer's officials at the Oxus, and did not reach Cabul till the beginning of June. Lord Lytton urged the Home Government to make representations at St. Petersburg in September. An answer to their representations came in the form of a telegram from Prince Gortschakoff to Count Schouvaloff démentez catégoriquement que Kaufmann agit à Cabul, soit par un agent, soit d'autre manière.'

A. That was a good one.

B. It was. But you will observe that the Government were in possession of a copy of Kaufmann's letter. That being so, do you think they were justified in accepting the answer of the Czar's ministers, when further pressed, that they would write to Kaufmann and inquire what he was doing? Our brave denouncers of Russian perfidy

1 Central Asian Correspondence, p. 81.

remained meekly content with this answer when they held the proof of Russian intrigue at Cabul in their hands. Compare this now with their firm attitude towards the bewildered ruler of Afghanistan-- the earthen pipkin,' as Lord Lytton instructed our native Agent to tell him, 'between two iron pots.'

A. But Lord Lytton never told the native Agent to repeat this to the Ameer.

B. Excuse me. You will find the expression in a memorandum of an interview between Lord Lytton and our Agent at Simla in the Afghanistan Blue-book, p. 183. If you turn to p. 179, Enclosure 16, you will find that the Agent was sent for in order that the Viceroy might explain to him frankly the views of the British Government for the information of the Ameer Let us pass over such details, however, and follow somewhat closely the course of the negotiations in the summer of 1876, for that is the only way to understand the effect of the new policy on the Ameer's mind. First, note how they were opened. At p. 149 you will find that Lord Salisbury wrote to Lord Northbrook as follows:

The first step, in establishing our relations with the Ameer upon a more satisfactory footing, will be to induce him to receive a temporary embassy in his capital. It need not be publicly connected with the establishment of a permanent Mission within his dominions. There would be many advantages in ostensibly directing it to some object of smaller political interest, which it will not be difficult for your Excellency to find, or if need be, create.

A. But how does that bear upon the point? Lord Northbrook did not carry out Lord Salisbury's instructions.

B. No. At p. 151 you will find that Northbrook objected to the astute plans of the Secretary of State, and pointed out to him, what he seemed to have forgotten, that the rest of his fellow-creatures were not all unsuspicious children:

If a Mission is to be sent to Cabul, the most advisable course would be to state frankly and fully to the Ameer the real purpose of the Mission, and to invite him to enter cordially into those closer relations with the British Government which the Mission is to endeavour to establish. The Ameer and his advisers are shrewd enough to understand that only matters of grave political importance could induce us to send a special mission to His Highness' court. If the Mission were ostensibly directed to objects of minor political importance, the Ameer and his officials would be incredulous. He might then decline to discuss the weightier questions brought forward by our Envoy, and in all probability his confidence in us would be shaken, especially as the proposal to establish British Agents in Afghanistan is, as we pointed out in our despatch of the 7th of June, a departure from the understanding arrived at between Lord Mayo and the Ameer at the Umballa conferences of 1869.

A. But I still fail to see what that has got to do with what took place in Lord Lytton's time.

B. It is interesting as a prediction of what then took place, and an illustration of the mischief that may be done by a closet diplomatist imposing a course of action after the best Machiavellian model

upon men in possession of the living details of a situation. In the despatch beginning at p. 156, you will find that Lord Salisbury, no ways out of conceit with his plan, in spite of the protest of men experienced in Oriental diplomacy and acquainted with the situation in Afghanistan, gave the same instructions to Lord Lytton. Lord Lytton was told to send a Mission to the Ameer to notify his assumption of the Viceregal office, and the Queen's assumption of the title of Empress in relation to her Indian subjects. On the 5th of May, 1876, the Commissioner of Peshawur (p. 174) intimated to Shere Ali that the Mission was to be sent, and desired him to say where he would like to receive it. As Lord Northbrook foresaw, the Ameer's suspicions were at once roused. Sir Lewis Pelly, you will observe, was the Envoy chosen, the same who had superintended the deposition of the Gaekwar of Baroda. The Ameer (p. 175) desired to know, before receiving the Mission, the things concealed in the generous heart of the English Government.' The intimation had been discussed for three or four days continuously in the Ameer's Council before this reply was sent.

A. But why could he not accept the Mission at once?

B. At p. 181 you will find the most potent reasons:

His Highness feared that the Mission might merge into one of a permanent character, and that the Envoy, like our political Agents at the courts of the native Indian States, might become a referee for discontented Afghan subjects; that in any case, the permanent presence of a Mission would embarrass His Highness in his internal administration, causing annoyance to the patriotic party and raising the hopes of the disaffected.

You will observe that Lord Lytton made no reply to this objection, his instructions being to insist on the reception of permanent Agents, without regard to consequences.

A. Ah, but I see another objection made:

His Highness was under the impression that after all that had occurred in 1873 and since that time, no practical result would follow the Mission, and that he entertained no hope of an improvement.

I find the Ameer also saying that he had fully explained his wishes. in 1873; and as the British Government would not then concede what he wanted, there was no use in reopening negotiations. So it was Gladstone's Government that was to blame after all.

B. I will concede that they were to blame if we find that Beaconsfield's Government were at all more disposed to concede what the Ameer wanted. Were they willing to bind themselves to assist the Ameer against Russia without reserving the right to decide whether he had given grounds for attack? Were they willing to bind themselves to protect Shere Ali and his dynasty unconditionally on the throne of Cabul? We shall see. Lord Lytton's proposed concessions are to be found at p. 184. The second of these is worded thus,- In the event of unprovoked aggression upon Afghanistan.

Vo L. V.-No. 23.

L

from without, assistance shall be afforded in men, money, and arms.' The third is, "That Abdullah Jan shall be recognised as the Ameer's successor.' There is not a word about protecting his dynasty unconditionally, not a word about assisting him against Russia, leaving him judge of the occasion. This was what the Ameer wanted. No British Government in its senses could have made such a concession. Lord Beaconsfield's Government was as far as Mr. Gladstone's from giving the Ameer what he wanted.

A. But that is only the Duke of Argyll's account of what Shere Ali wanted.

B. Pardon me. If you turn to p. 165 you will find that this is also Lord Lytton's account of what he wanted. After a little experience, Lord Lytton discovered that what Lord Northbrook had said about the Ameer was true, though Lord Salisbury, in his study in London, thought he knew better. In Lord Lytton's despatch, of date 13th of May, 1877, p. 165, you see this sentence:

All the recent conduct and language of this Prince had pointed to the conclusion that he cared little, or nothing, for such eventual protection of his country or as our political necessities might oblige us in any case to afford it against foreign aggression, and that what he really did care to obtain from us was some unconditional pledge of personal and dynastic support to himself and family. This was the protection which, as a year's experience convinced Lord Lytton, the Ameer desired. Mr. Gladstone's Government would not give it to him. Finding that, as you will see a hundred times repeated, he desired to be let alone. Mr..Gladstone's Government, advised by their Indian officials, let him alone, and secured the interests of India by obtaining an engagement from Russia upon which they could act when circumstances demanded. Lord Beaconsfield's Government also declined to give the Ameer what he wanted. But they would not let him alone. Further, when circumstances demanded their claiming from Russia the fulfilment of the engagement, they shrank from doing so.

A. Not a bit of it. They made representations.

B. And were content with representations in return, which they knew to be contrary to fact. Observe that they first received certain knowledge of Russian emissaries being at Cabul in 1876. Russian emissaries continued to be sent, to their knowledge, for two years afterwards. Why did they tamely acquiesce in this while it was going on, and in the end accept the excuse that it had been done as a precautionary measure when the maintenance of peace between England and Russia seemed uncertain? Not only did they accept this excuse, but the Blue-books show they made no attempt to have the limits of the engagement clearly defined, although they continued to receive reports that Russian agents were still at Cabul. Within the last two months, after being taunted with their dereliction from their plain duty, they have waxed bold and declared that they will permit no tampering with Cabul. Why were they not bolder before