have read it I think you will admit that when the Times said that the one thing which the Blue-books tell us is that the official mind in India was blind to the advance of Russia in Central Asia, there must have been some mistake. As you see for yourself, the one thing which this Blue-book tells us about the period prior to 1874 is that the official mind in India, of all ranks and degrees, had given the most anxious and complete consideration to the advance of Russia in Central Asia.

A. But, after all, their advice amounted to this, that we should do-nothing.

B. Pardon me-nothing beyond the frontier, nothing in the way of interference with the Ameer. Masterly inactivity beyond the frontier, and masterly activity in strengthening our power within the frontier. You will see, too, if you look at the conclusion of the despatch, that though Lord Lawrence proposed that the Ameer should be let alone, writing to Mr. Gladstone's Government, he repeated the proposal which he had made to Mr. Disraeli's Government, as to putting ourselves in direct relation with Russia:

The following are the only fresh measures we can bring ourselves to recommend:-We think that endeavours might be made to come to some clear understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg as to its projects and designs in Central Asia, and that it might be given to understand, in firm but courteous language, that it cannot be permitted to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan, or in those of any State which lies contiguous to our frontier. We are aware that this subject was pressed on Sir Stafford Northcote in the despatches from us, which were all reviewed by him in his letter of the 26th of December, 1867, No. 15, but without any result. The subject, however, is of such paramount importance, that we think ourselves justified in again pressing it on Her Majesty's Government. The truth appears to us to be, that the advances of Russia, coupled with the constant allusions made in the newspapers to her progress as compared with what is called the inaction of the British Government, have produced in the minds of Europeans and natives what we believe to be an exaggerated opinion of her resources and power. A mutual good understanding between the two Powers, though difficult of attainment, would enable us to take means to counteract unfounded rumours and to prevent unnecessary alarms.

...

With these remarks we would suggest further that opportunity be taken by Her Majesty's Government to lay down a course of action, which will avoid the perpetual recurrence to these exciting topics.

A. When was that despatch written, did you say?

B. In January, 1869.

A. Then it was addressed to Mr. Gladstone's Government. We all know what they did. They were not the men to give Russia to understand anything disagreeable in firm but courteous language.' Imagine Gladstone telling Russia that she cannot be permitted to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan! In my opinion the whole lot of the Liberals and Radicals would rather lose India than give any offence at St. Petersburg.

B. That may be so; still if you look at the books, the fact is not to be disputed that Mr. Gladstone's Government did what Mr. Dis

raeli's Government, on the ground that they saw no reason for any uneasiness or for any jealousy' in the proceedings of Russia, and that the conquests she had made, and apparently was still making, in Central Asia appeared to them to be the natural result of the circumstances in which she found herself placed,' declined to do.

A. I am prepared to believe a good deal, but where do you find that? If you can show me that in black and white

B. Pray don't commit yourself to anything rash. You will find a summary of what was done by Mr. Gladstone's Government in a despatch from the Indian Government in this drab Blue-book, p. 103, and the story of our negotiations with the Court of St. Petersburg about Afghanistan is told at length in this other Blue-book, which happens to be white. Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet at once set about doing what Lord Lawrence had recommended. It was an affair of time, because boundaries in Central Asia are not very clearly marked, and there was some difficulty in fixing the line beyond which our interests could not permit Russia to advance. But at last Earl Granville succeeded in obtaining from Prince Gortschakoff a distinct pledge that Russia would regard Afghanistan as lying beyond the sphere within which she was called upon to exercise influence.' The boundaries of Afghanistan were defined in one despatch, and accepted in another. I would ask you to observe that Kokand, where Russia was paramount in 1867, and which she formally annexed in 1876, as Mr. Disraeli's Cabinet professed to foresee in 1867, when they declined to take any action, is not two thousand miles from Cabul, but the immediately neighbouring centre of government.

A. But what was the good of obtaining assurances' from Russia? Nobody would dream of turning loose a bear from a menagerie on his simple word of honour that he would behave like a gentleman.

B. True, or a lion. But apart from figures of speech, if Russia broke her engagements, she could be called to account like any other Power. What, however, I wish to make clear to you from these documents before we go further is, how things stood when the present Government took office. Their predecessors, at the instance of Lord Lawrence, had obtained a pledge from Russia that she would respect the northern boundaries of Afghanistan. They informed the Ameer, through Lord Northbrook, of the provision they had made for the security of his territories against Russian aggression, and removed the fears which, as you will see if you turn to p. 113, he entertained lest the new arrangement should interfere with the independence of his internal administration. Carrying strictly out the advice of Lord Lawrence and his Council, they carefully avoided entangling relations with the Ameer. They made him presents of money and arms, but abstained from binding themselves to him by any engagements. In 1873, on the ground that the pledge given to Lord Granville was not sufficient protection to him against Russian aggression, he wished them to conclude an offensive-defensive alliance

with him, and to guarantee his dynasty on the throne of Cabul. Under such an alliance as the Ameer desired, he might have driven his subjects into revolt by misgovernment: we should have been bound to aid him in putting them down. He might have provoked attack from Russia: we should have been bound to back him with all our power. I think you will admit that no Government in its senses could have consented to take such an Old Man of the Sea on its shoulders. The British Government declined. The utmost they would agree to do was to promise him assistance against Russia, if he consented to be guided absolutely by their advice in any relations with the tribes beyond his frontier. The Ameer was dissatisfied, and sulked. Lord Northbrook allowed him to sulk, and meantime went on, still observing the lines of the policy sketched in Lord Lawrence's despatch of 1869, strengthening our hold on India by wise and righteous government, improving our military position by the construction of railways, and aiming at the development of its resources by these and other public works. Every penny that could be spared from the heavily burdened finances of the country was spent upon this work of internal consolidation, which a succession of English Governments, Conservative and Liberal, had pursued as the only sound way of maintaining our hold on India. It was in order that this work might be pursued with the necessary absence of disquietude that Lord Lawrence had urged upon the Home Government the expediency of coming to an understanding with Russia about her proceedings in Central Asia. If you turn back to his despatch, you will see that he urged the necessity of fixing a course of action in order to avoid the recurrence of these exciting topics.' The course of action was fixed, as you have seen, in accordance with the unanimous advice of Lord Lawrence and his Council. I think the way is now clear for considering from the Blue-books in what respects and for what reasons it was disturbed by the present Government.

A. Stop, stop! You are going too fast. They deny, some of them at least, that they have disturbed it.

B. They cannot deny that the 'exciting topics' which Lord Lawrence deprecated have been raised throughout the length and breadth of India.

A. But that was not their fault. It was forced upon them by the movements of Russia.

B. If you turn back to the despatches of 1868 and 1869, you will see that Russia had made no movement which was not taken into account when the settled course of action was resolved upon. Her dealings with the three Khanates of Turkestan had all, as you have seen, been anticipated, even in 1867, when Mr. Disraeli's Cabinet spoke of viewing the conquests which Russia had made, and was still making, 'without uneasiness or jealousy.' Russia had not crossed the line which had been agreed upon as the limit of her extension.

A. But she was threatening to cross.

B. Not more than before, not more than had been anticipated. Turn now to the despatch, p. 128, in which Lord Salisbury first intimated a desire to depart from the settled course of action, and you will see that he was not acting from any definite suspicion that Russia was inclined to break her engagements:

Her Majesty's Government have followed with anxious attention the progress of events in Central Asia, and on the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan. Though no immediate danger appears to threaten the interests of Her Majesty in these regions, the aspect of affairs is sufficiently grave to inspire solicitude and to suggest the necessity of timely precaution.

This despatch is dated the 22nd of January, 1875, and was addressed to Lord Northbrook. Lord Salisbury, you will observe, speaks of the necessity of timely precaution,' which seems to imply that he was dissatisfied with the precautions involved in the course of action settled by his predecessors.

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A. Yes, but he also says that the aspect of affairs is sufficiently grave to inspire solicitude.'

B. Pardon me for again troubling you to refer to Lord Lawrence's despatches. You will observe that Lord Lawrence, foreseeing what must be the aspect of affairs in 1875, had urged timely solicitude and precaution upon Her Majesty's Government, and had advised a settled course of action to prevent that solicitude from extending to the Ameer and the natives of India, and so endangering our Empire. If you now read the rest of Lord Salisbury's despatch, you will see why he hazarded bringing upon our Empire the dangerous agitation which Lord Lawrence was anxious to avoid. Precisely the same causes for solicitude were recognised in 1867 as in 1875; to prevent exciting uncertainty and confused apprehension, they had been put at their worst, and a way of meeting them at their worst had been settled after anxious deliberation. Lord Salisbury had not been a year in office when he and his colleagues unsettled everything that had been settled before. Now let us see why.

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that more exact and constant information is necessary to the conduct of a circumspect policy at the present juncture. The disposition of the people in various parts of Afghanistan, the designs and intrigues of its chiefs, the movement of nomad tribes upon its frontiers, the influence which foreign Powers may possibly be exerting within and without its borders, are matters of which a proper account can only be rendered to you by an English Agent residing in the country. There are many details, moreover, a knowledge of which it is natural that the military authorities should possess, and with respect to which it is not to be expected that a Native Agent would be either able or willing to collect for your Government trustworthy information.

I have therefore to instruct you to take measures, with as much expedition as the circumstances of the case permit, for procuring the assent of the Ameer to the establishment of a British Agency at Herat. When this is accomplished, it may be desirable to take a similar step with regard to Candahar. I do not suggest any similar step with respect to Cabul, as I am sensible of the difficulties which are interposed by the fanatic violence of the people.

From this it would appear that the risk of setting India on fire was run by Her Majesty's Government for the purpose of enlightening Lord Salisbury about Afghanistan.

A. Oh, come, come, that is most unfair. It is obviously of the utmost consequence that everybody should know such points as Lord Salisbury wished to have cleared up. The Government would be acting in the dark if they did not know them.

B. But why, if they simply wished for information, did they not apply in the first instance to the Government of India, to see whether they could throw any light upon points which seemed doubtful to Lord Salisbury, after his ten months' study of the papers of his office? It was surely a rash thing for a man upon the basis of a few months' cram to rush into Indian politics, and insist upon the disturbance of a course of action which had been settled by a Viceroy, deliberating from the active experience of a lifetime, with the assistance of a body of equally experienced officers.

A. Well, but another experienced Viceroy with experienced officers did what Lord Salisbury recommended.

B. Lord Salisbury gave orders, not recommendations. And, if you look at the despatches from Lord Northbrook which follow, you will see that the Viceroy expostulated with all his might, and backed up his objections with the opinions of all the chief officers of the North-west frontier. A year was spent in communications between Lord Salisbury and the Indian Government, and the consultation of Indian officials, and Lord Northbrook went out of office without having carried out Lord Salisbury's instructions. He has since stated that he would have resigned rather than do what in the opinion of himself and his Council was so prejudicial to the interests of our Empire. Lord Salisbury's instructions were carried out by a new Viceroy, Lord Lytton, who before his appointment had not even a superficial acquaintance with Indian affairs, and they were carried out in defiance of the protests of three members of his Council.

A. Well, well, but after all there is nothing like bringing a fresh mind to bear upon things. Officials may know too much, you know. But look here, here is a passage in Lord Salisbury's first despatch which you haven't read:

The Ameer has more than once in former years expressed his readiness to permit the presence of an Agent at Herat, and it is therefore not possible that, if his intentions are still loyal, he will make any serious difficulty now.

What do you say to that? It was no disturbance of Lawrence's policy after all, only doing what the Ameer had been willing for before. If he was unwilling now, it was a fair inference that Russia had got hold of him.

B. You will find Northbrook's answer to that further down on the same page, and in subsequent pages. But first turn back to Lawrence's statement of his policy, where he says, 'We object to any