A LAW GRAMMAR; OR, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE. T CHAPTER THE FIRST. INTRODUCTIO N. HE Laws of England, like thofe of every other civilized community, are established upon the primitive relations which fubfifted among mankind in a state of nature, independent of human inftitutions. The general foundation of the fyftem from which Burlamaqui, thefe primitive relations arife, is the nature of MAN 1. vol. 37.158. confidered under three feveral circumstances of his existence. FIRST, With refpect to God, as the creature of an all-wife, all-powerful, and benefi B. cent cent Creator, from whom he has received his life, his reafon, his liberty, and every other advantage which he enjoys. SECONDLY, With refpect to himfelf, as a being compofed of an organized body and a rational foul, endowed with many different faculties, prone to felf-love, and neceffarily defiring his own felicity. THIRDLY, With refpect to fociety, as forming part of the fpecies, and placed on earth near feveral other beings of a fimilar nature, with whom he is not only inclined, but obliged, by the condition of his nature, to live in continual intercourse. These three modes of existence embrace all the particular relations of man; and impose upon his conduct, through every part of life, three great and effential duties, towards his God, himself, and his fellow-creatures. But human inftitutions modify the precepts of nature, and introduce fecondary relations among mankind. Thefe new relations arife from viewing the whole race of mankind, as divided into many feparate ftates, commonwealths, and nations, and confidering them with refpect to each other; or from viewing the aggregate body of individuals of which each community is compofed, and confidering them with refpect to the governors and the governed. To form, therefore, a just idea of the Rudiments of THE MUNICIPAL LAW of England, it will be previously neceffary to confider, in a fummary manner, the feveral kind of relations which accompany the establishment of Civil Societies in general; which we shall endeavour to do by giving particular definitions of the refpective laws to which thefe relations have given birth. CHAPTER FR CHAPTER THE SECOND. Definitions of Particular Laws. 3 Selden on For. ROM what has been already observed of the na- Taylor's El. of ture of man, and his connections with fociety, it C. L. 99. appears that all LAW is either natural or inftituted; and that the power or authority which gives it fanction, and may be called its efficient cause, is either the voice of God through natural reafon, or the voluntary and arbitrary pleasure of fome being or beings properly authorised for this purpose. But this will appear more diftinctly from the following defi nitions of 1. The Law of Nature in general. 5. The Political Law of Societies. §. 1. Of the General Law of Nature! C. 1. LAWS, in their moft general fignification, are the Montefq. Sp. neceffary relations arifing from the nature of things; of Laws, b. 1. and in this fenfe all beings have their laws, the Deity his laws, the material world its laws, the intelligences fuperior to man (a) their laws, the beafts their laws, (a) Cicero de and man his laws. The existence of a God, that is of a first, intelligent, and self-created being, on whom all things depend, as on their firft caufe, and who depends himfelf on no one, is one of thofe truths which fhew themselves to us at the first glance, by the many evident and fenfible proofs which furround us on every fide. We behold an infinite number of objects which form all together the affemblage we call the Univerfe: fomething, therefore, must have always exifted; for were we to fuppofe a time in which there B 2 Nat. Deo. 1. 2. 4 54. Cumberland's there was abfolutely nothing, it is evident that noLaw of Nat. thing could have ever exifted; because whatsoever Cumb. Prom. has a beginning, muft have a caufe of its existence, fince nothing can produce nothing. The chain thereMont. S. of L. fore and fubordination of caufes among themselves, Cumb. Eflys. which neceffarily admits a firft caufe; the admiBurlam. 128. rable structure, order, beauty, and regularity of the 129. 3. Paley's Philo fophy, 1. vol. p. 66. univerfe, which could not proceed from a blind fatality; and the existence of intelligent beings, which neither chance nor motion could ever have produced; are all fo many demonftrations, that there muft always have exifted a Father of fpiritual beings, an Eternal Mind, the Source from whence all other beings derive their existence. As foon as we have acknowledged a Creator, it becomes evident that he must have a fupreme right to prescribe fuch rules as he pleafes for the government of the univerfe he created; for having given exiftence to all things by his own will, he may likewife, at his pleasure, preferve, annihilate, or change them. But as the fcheme of creation was conceived by his wisdom, and executed by his power, fo alfo Montefq. Sp. is it preferved by his goodness: for being related to the universe as Creator, the rules by which he created all things are thofe by which he preferves them; he acts according to thefe rules, because he made them; and he made them because they are relative to his wisdom, his goodness, and his power. of Laws, 3. See the Intro duction to Blackstone's Commenta zies, 38, 39 Thefe rules will be found in the fixed and invariable relations which fubfift reciprocally among all parts of the univerfal fyftem. In bodies moved, the motion is received, increated, diminished, or loft, according to the relations of the quantity of matter and velocity which each of them poffefs; for when the Supreme Being formed the univerfe, and created matter out of nothing, he impreffed certain principles upon that matter from which it can never depart, and without which it would ceafe to be; and when he put that matter into motion, he established certain laws of motion to which all moveable bodies must conform. Vegetable |