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invoked without weakening the whole Anglo-American position in the matter of the Asiatic Exclusion acts, and stultifying their essential justification, which rests on economic, as distinct from racial, grounds.

Mr. Lloyd George has recently declared that the foreign policy of Great Britain, as a partly Asiatic empire, 'can never range itself in any sense upon the differences of race and civilization between East and West. would be fatal to the Empire. No greater calamity can overtake the world than any further accentuation of its divisions upon the lines of race. We look confidently to the Government and people of the United States for their understanding and sympathy in this respect. Friendly coöperation with the United States is for us a cardinal principle, dictated by what seems to us the proper nature of things, dictated by instinct quite as much as by reason and by common sense.'

Mr. Lloyd George's words undoubtedly express the sentiments of the great majority of his countrymen. Every discussion of the question of the AngloJapanese Alliance, by the Imperial Conference, in Parliament, and in the press, has served to emphasize the general opinion that the treaty should be renewed, but in a form that will give no umbrage, and evoke no misgivings, in the United States. The Australian Premier has declared that 'Australia's safety lies in a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and that it is her bounden duty to use every means at her disposal to effect such a modus vivendi as will secure it in a form agreeable to the United States.' On a later occasion, Mr. Hughes expressed the opinion (which has found wide support in the British press) that, in the event of a tripartite understanding being reached between America, Great Britain, and Japan, dealing with the Far

East and with disarmament, there would be no necessity for a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

II

As matters now stand, the first thing necessary, to remove the immediate difficulties and dangers of the Far Eastern situation, and to diminish the causes of friction between Japan and the United States, is the conclusion of an international agreement for the restoration, by concerted action, of the powers of law and order in China. Unless steps are taken, and that speedily, to this end, there can be no prospect of any permanent settlement of the Far Eastern question. American participation in such an agreement, and in an 'International Council' to carry it into effect, is a solution that presents obvious difficulties; nevertheless, it is the only one that affords practical means of carrying out the American idea of friendly coöperation, and the only way of putting an end to the chaos of misrule in China, in a spirit of genuine friendship for the Chinese people. Failing active American participation, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, renewed under conditions consistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations, would appear to offer the only alternative solution of the problem; the only one, at all events, that would provide England with the leverage necessary to secure the future maintenance of the Open Door for trade, a revision of the Shantung question, and the settlement of other points of difference in the Far East.

Assuming that the first desideratum for the Washington Conference is a spirit of harmony and helpfulness between the representatives of those powers, whose ultimate object is the limitation of armaments, the decision to invite China's participation in the Conference, though diplomatically and

theoretically sound, is calculated, in practice, to frustrate the ends desired. For there is already ample evidence in the press, here and in the United States, that China's representatives on this occasion will conform faithfully to their traditional policy of setting one barbarian against another, and will do everything in their power to make the Conference an arena of enmity and suspicion. All the undeniable eloquence and intelligence of that highly vocal element of Young China which professes its present belief in American institutions and ideals will be concentrated in an appeal to the chivalrous support of the American people, and this appeal will no doubt be powerfully supported by many of the missionary societies and the Y.M.C.A., which naturally sympathize with the aspirations of their pupils and protégés to become the dominant force in Chinese politics. There is already evidence that the public utterances of adroit diplomats and lawyers like Mr. Wellington Koo and Dr. Wang, and the press propaganda conducted by Putnam Weale, and other foreigners in Chinese pay, to which Professor Dewey's distinguished reputation lends additional force, have achieved considerable results in the direction indicated; that is to say, they have created an atmosphere of hostility toward Japan, and toward the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in the United States. Something of the effect of China's propaganda and appeals may even be discerned in the dispatches of the State Department that form part of the correspondence antecedent to the establishment of the International Financial Consortium last year.

Briefly stated, the object of the American Government, as expressed in these dispatches, was to eliminate all special claims in particular spheres of interest in China and to throw open the whole

country, including Manchuria and Mongolia, without reserve, to the combined activities of the Consortium. The British Government, at the outset, gave friendly support to this proposal; but inasmuch as it conflicted obviously with certain accomplished facts and recorded pacts, it was possible to do so only by concurring vaguely in the benevolent argument that, 'with the establishment of the Consortium, a new era was about to dawn, in which conditions have changed, and that the powers therefore propose henceforward to work together in harmonious and friendly coöperation, rather than in competition.'

The Japanese Ambassador's reply to the dispatch in which Lord Curzon supported this argument tactfully refrained from discussing the practical effects of the 'new era' upon international politics. He contented himself with reiterating his Government's reliance upon the British Government's explicit assurance that the powers would refuse to countenance any activities of the Consortium 'affecting the security of the economic life or the national defense of Japan,' a reservation capable of the widest application, and one which leaves the question of Japan's 'special interests' in the same nebulous condition as that in which it remained after the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917.

III

The line that China's representatives and advisers may be expected to adopt at Washington was clearly indicated some months ago by the Chinese Minister in London, Mr. Wellington Koo, well known in the United States. They will undoubtedly present a glowing picture of the Chinese Republic, successfully progressing toward Utopia by the development of liberal ideas and democratic institutions, all regardless

of the fact that these are as remote as the planet Mars from all the realities of the situation in China. They will make eloquent appeal to the sympathies of the civilized world, in the name of Democracy, on behalf of Young China's chimerical Republic, and of its splendid programme of purely imaginary reforms. In the typical words of Putnam Weale, they will 'claim their place in the family of nations, not only on terms of equality, but as representatives of Liberalism and subscribers to all those sanctions on which the civilization of peace rests.' They will continue to describe the social activities and academic theories of a few thousand 'Western-learning' students and journalists as truly representative of the political convictions and institutions of the Chinese people.

And all the while they will complacently ignore the lamentable and notorious facts of China's actual position, the utter demoralization and inevitable bankruptcy of the Peking Government, the lawlessness and insatiable greed of the military chieftains, whose rabble armies have devastated the country for the last ten years, and the untold sufferings of the defenseless people, more pitiful to-day than ever they were under the Manchus. Above all, they will carefully refrain from admission of the undeniable truth that the political and financial ascendancy which Japan has established at Peking, and the rapid advance of her 'peaceful penetration' in Manchuria and Mongolia, are direct results of the incorrigible money-lust of the mandarin class, more flagrantly displayed by the officials of the Republic than under the old régime. They will earnestly invoke the assistance of America and England against Japan, for the restoration of China's rights in Shantung, and of her unfettered sovereignty over the Northern dependencies; but they will say nothing of the

lamentable fact that, since the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai (1916), the several political factions that have struggled for mastery at Peking have vied with each other in mortgaging to Japan, in return for subsidies and loans, many rights, privileges, and concessions calculated to jeopardize their country's political independence.

Early this year, the Chinese Minister in London gave the Foreign Office an indication of the attitude to be adopted by China's representatives at the forthcoming Conference in regard to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. They desire to protest, in the first place, against any reference in the treaty, if renewed, to 'the preservation of the territorial integrity and political independence of China,' as an implication derogatory to the dignity of China as a sovereign State, and distasteful to the sentiment of her people.

Inasmuch as the first object of their presence at the Conference is to invoke assistance for the maintenance of China's sovereign rights, this initial protest may be regarded as a face-saving device, a mild bluff for the benefit of the gallery, based on the oldest traditions of Oriental statecraft. Next, they will ask for the abrogation of the 'twenty-one demands' agreement (signed by Yuan Shih-k'ai in May, 1915, under pressure of a Japanese ultimatum), and for the restoration of China's full sovereignty in Shantung. Here we reach a crucial point of the Far Eastern question. For it is undeniable that, in these twentyone demands, Japan availed herself of the opportunities created by the war in Europe and the demoralization of China, to regularize and consolidate her position at China's expense, in Shantung (as successor to Germany), and in Manchuria, Eastern Inner Mongolia, and on the coast of Fukhien province.

Now, it must be obvious that no satisfactory results are to be expected

from the Washington Conference, except upon the initial assumption that henceforward Japan, in concert with England and the United States, is prepared to coöperate loyally in practical measures for the restoration of law, order, trade, and sound finance, in China. This assumption implies, not only the definite cessation of the Japanese military party's activities in Peking, but the abandonment by Japan, as part of a general self-sacrificing agreement between the powers, of all claims to 'special interests' in any province of China proper, such as those which were created by the twenty-one demands in 1915, and subsequently by the secret 'military agreement,' concluded in March, 1918, with the corrupt clique then in power at Peking.

Having discussed these questions with many of the leading statesmen and publicists in Japan, I firmly believe that the Japanese Government is prepared to welcome an Anglo-AmericanJapanese understanding, having as its avowed object a common reconstructive policy in China. Even before the prospect of a limitation of armaments had emphasized the desirability of such an understanding, the Japanese Prime Minister had declared (1919) his Government's readiness to coöperate in the difficult task of restoring financial and administrative order in China, with due regard to her sovereign rights. Many things have happened in the last five years to lead the rulers of Japan to perceive that persistence in the aggressive 'forward' policy of the military party can lead only to a dangerous position of national isolation, besides involving the over-taxed people in further heavy expenditure. For these and other reasons, there appear to be valid grounds for expecting good results from the Conference, provided that responsible American opinion be not misled by the specious pleadings of China's repre

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In particular, the question of Shantung, though apparently simple enough in its broad moral aspect, will require delicate handling. China and the United States, not being parties to the Treaty of Versailles, may be justified in questioning the decision of the Allies, whereby Japan obtained the reversion of Germany's exclusive privileges in Shantung; but the fact must not be overlooked that America's representative and President was a consenting party to that decision; also that, because of it, Japan agreed to withdraw from discussion the thorny question of 'racial equality.' In originally raising that question, Japan practically claimed recognition of her right to equal opportunity in the matter of migration overseas; and President Wilson, unable to concede that claim, was fain to compromise it along the line of least resistance—that is, at China's expense.

As for the position of China in the matter, it is evident that the activities of her diplomats and publicists are inspired rather by the desire to create dissension between Japan and the United States than by genuine zeal for the integrity and independence of their country. For the men who strain so noisily at the Shantung gnat are the same as those who quietly swallowed the camel of the secret military agreement (to which I have already referred) -a pact concluded by their Government, of its own accord, with Japan, which made Peking, for all practical purposes, a subsidized dependency of Tokyo.

IV

Two fundamental facts must be faced at the outset by the Conference if the Far Eastern problem is to be solved

in a spirit of mutuality and helpfulness. First, that China's military weakness, financial chaos, and internecine strife now constitute the root-cause of the problem. This fact requires no demonstration for anyone who has studied the situation. Second, that Japan is impelled, by acute economic pressure, either to seek new outlets for her surplus population overseas, or to endeavor to secure such a position of economic advantage in the undeveloped regions of the Asiatic mainland, adjacent to her frontiers, as shall enable her to maintain and increase her industries, and thereby feed her people, at home.

Japan's imperative need of expansion is, indeed, an undeniable and constant factor in the Far Eastern problem. Morally speaking, and from the political idealist's point of view, it is, of course, lamentable that any race or nation should expand at the expense of another; nevertheless, pace the 'new-era' doctrine, the struggle for supremacy and survival between races has not ended with the Treaty of Versailles, and the ideal of self-determination must always prove to be an empty phrase when confronted with the ele mental instinct of self-preservation. Japan has expanded into Korea, and is thence expanding northward and westward, impelled by the same instincts and impulses as those which have peopled England's colonies and doubled the territory and number of the United States.

America's naval programme affords more convincing testimony to the realities of the situation than all the acts of the apostles of pacifism. The conflict between benevolent idealism and the stern facts of existence is as old as the hills; and despite humanitarians and vegetarians, the inexorable law remains that all life on this planet exists and persists at the cost of other lives. Charm they never so wisely, it

will need more than the eloquence of the idealists to convince responsible statesmen that this instinct and the economic pressure behind it can be exorcised by invoking a new era of universal altruism. The philosophers have not yet found the stone which will satisfy a people that cries for bread.

Considered in this light, the crux of the Far Eastern discussion will probably be found to lie in the question of Japan's claim to 'special interests' in Manchuria and Mongolia. In seeking the abrogation of the twenty-onedemands agreement of 1915, China asks, in fact, that Japan should vacate the 'leased' territory of the Liaotung peninsula, including Dairen and Port Arthur, at the date named in the original Russian lease (that is to say, in March, 1923), and that the ninetyyears' term-subsequently conceded in compliance with the twenty-onedemands ultimatum-should now be annulled. But no good purpose can be served by ignoring the truth that the original 'lease' of the Liaotung peninsula by China to Russia was never anything but a diplomatic fiction, a politic device whereby the face of Li HungChang was partially saved. Common sense, if not common justice, compels recognition of the lamentable truth, that China's sovereign rights in Manchuria and Mongolia were virtually doomed when Russian diplomacy concluded the original 'lease' compact with China's complaisant rulers. By that compact, Japan's economic existence and national security were threatened with dangers so imminent, that war between her and Russia became inevitable.

The development of a position of economic and political ascendancy by Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia euphemistically described in the Lansing-Ishii agreement as 'special' interests

became equally inevitable when,

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