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must be made in the exercise of our national sovereignty. . . . We have come to a new realization of our place in the world and a new appraisal of our nation by the world. The unselfishness of these United States is a thing proved, our devotion to. peace for ourselves and for the world is well established, our concern for preserved civilization has had its impassioned and heroic expression. There was no American failure to resist the attempted reversion of civilization; there will be no failure to-day or to-morrow.

Paraphrasing the language of Mr. Lincoln, I should say: Let this duty of the nation be breathed by every American mother to the lisping babe that prattles in her lap; let it be taught in schools, in seminaries, and in colleges; let it be written in primers, in spellingbooks, and in almanacs; let it be preached from the pulpit, proclaimed in legislative halls, and enforced in courts of justice. And, in short, let it become the political religion of the nation; and let the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the grave and the gay, of all sexes and tongues and colors and conditions, sacrifice unceasingly upon its altars.

The writer believes that the Harding Doctrine will do for the world at large what the Monroe Doctrine has done for the American continents. It will not prevent civil wars or small international wars; but it is an announcement to the world that we stand ready to join in crushing any bandit nation that attempts world-conquest. If taken by us at its full import, it will prevent a repetition of the World War, and it will lead to a large measure of disarmament. It will be what we make of it.

The nations need no additional machinery of government to preserve international peace. The world had sufficient organization to have averted war in 1914. What it needed then, and what it needs now, is enlightened policy, based upon a careful and searching

study of war and politics. Organization without spirit is an empty shell. When the spirit is right, organization adjusts itself to the needs of the hour.

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There are certain axiomatic principles in 'world-politics' that are of fundamental importance in the practical application of the Law of Mutual Aid. Several of these principles will now be considered.

Competition in land armaments between adjacent continental nations is not a mutual affair, as it is assumed to be in all discussions on disarmament: it is a one-sided phenomenon. A powerful nation, like Germany, arms to conquer a weaker neighbor, which, in turn, arms for defense. There is a vast difference between arming for offense and arming for defense, as every thoughtful reader of the daily press must have realized in the month of August, 1914. The defensive armaments of the weaker nation are not a menace to the stronger nation, which needs no great preponderance to assure itself against the attack of its weaker neighbor. War comes, not from armies and navies, but from the belligerent intentions of nations. The aggressors, the beginners of wars, the leaders in the so-called armament competitions, are the strong nations, not the weak. Excessive armaments in time of peace are a phenomenon of quite recent times, due to the ambition of Germany and one or two other states that have followed her example. Convince these states that the Law of Mutual Aid will be applied against them, that the fate of Germany awaits them if they attack their neighbors, and land armaments will automatically decline to the scale required in each state to maintain domestic peace, beyond which it is not desirable that they be reduced. Competition in naval armaments is

one of the effects of excessive land armaments. There is never any naval competition between countries that maintain small armies, however great their naval forces may be. This is a fact of supreme importance at the present time. Nations like Great Britain and the United States, which maintain strong navies, but comparatively weak skeleton armies raised by voluntary enlistment in time of peace, measure their naval strength, not by each other's naval strength, but by that of countries which have powerful conscript armies backed by trained reserves ready for instant mobilization.

Recent propaganda does not disprove the foregoing statement. For more than four centuries England has gauged her building programme by that of the most powerful navy of those European powers which maintained large armies. She will, beyond all doubt, continue the same policy for a period of time that can be measured only in centuries. If we are wise, we shall follow a somewhat similar policy, taking into account Asiatic as well as European neighbors, which maintain powerful conscript armies.

England has never considered the strength of the American navy in determining her two-power standard, not because blood is thicker than water, as some would have us believe, but because she has known full well that she has nothing to fear from the aggression of a country whose army does not greatly exceed the needs of domestic peace. And we have been indifferent about her navy for the same reason. Nations that depend upon naval power for defense never enter upon a war that can in any way be avoided. The English, like the Romans, have generally had wars thrust upon them, and, like the Romans, have generally begun their wars with disasters. As England and America have each a tremendous interest in the

peace of the civilized world, which can be threatened only by countries having large armies, each is vitally interested that the other shall not neglect its naval forces. Their navies are the mainstay of the peace forces of the world.

A strong naval power, which maintains a comparatively small army, is not a menace to any strong military power, unless the military power, by its aggressions, unites the world in a coalition against itself; in other words, England, which relied upon her navy as her first line of defense, would never have begun a war of aggression against Germany; and the United States, with its small army, will never begin a war of aggression against Japan, which keeps up a large and efficient army.

No nation ever attempts to gain a preponderance of armaments upon both land and sea unless it is actuated by aggressive purposes. The nation which, like Germany, attempts to gain such preponderance, brands itself as an international bandit.

The liberties of the nations will be at an end whenever any country which has the best army in the world gains command of the sea; or, vice versa, whenever any country which has the best navy in the world builds up the most formidable army. The hegemony of the ancient world soon passed to Rome, when that Republic, already possessed of an invincible army, wrested the command of the sea from Carthage. The defeat of the British fleet at Jutland would have placed the modern world in a similar position in regard to Germany, unless, indeed, the American fleet could have restored the command of the sea to the Allies.

The modern world is distinguished from the ancient chiefly by the fact that it has not been brought under the domination of a single nation. It has been saved from this fate by the fortunate fact that the strongest military

state has never been the strongest naval power, thanks to the insular situation of England, to her ability to command the sea, and to her inability to become the strongest military power. Herein lies the secret of the existence of the free commonwealths of the modern world. One of the ugliest aspects of our civilization was presented by the campaign in the press, prior to the World War, against the policy of England to maintain a two-power standard against the German navy.

The key to the international situation lies in the European-Asiatic continent, because Europe and Asia, if united under one strong, efficient, coercing state, would have ample land and naval forces to compel the rest of the world to accept the policy of the coercing state; and free government would be at an end. No such danger can come from any of the other continents, on account of their smaller size.

The establishment of republican government does not solve the problem of international peace. Hereditary autocracy has more often imperiled the world's liberties; but the dangers coming from republics and democracies have been more serious. Rome conquered as a republic, and, as an empire, combatted only for a choice of masters. At the beginning of the last century, republics seemed dangerous to Europe because Republican France threatened its liberties, which were defended by several hereditary autocrats. In 1914, autocratic Germany threatened worldstability, and the danger was ascribed to the form of government. Such theories are wrong. It is not the form of government but the act of aggression that is dangerous. Many good souls were troubled because autocratic Russia and Samurai-ridden Japan and feudal Serbia and Montenegro gave support to the Allied cause. But all great coalitions have contained auto

cratic governments. The Allies have fought against domination by a single state, not against any particular form of government. There is no instance in history of the defeat of a republican state by an autocratic state, both states being otherwise fairly matched; but history is replete with the defeat and overthrow of monarchies by republics in fair and open fight.

Absolute suppression of all trade with the bandit nation should be enforced in future wars, if, unfortunately, the history of the world continues to repeat itself. In the last war the Allies did not declare a blockade, in order, apparently, to avoid irritating neutrals, whose battles they were fighting. They preferred to follow an illegal practice, as measured by international-law standards, which attained the same ends and permitted the compensation of owners of ships and cargoes. The Second Peace Conference of 1907 stipulated that commercial and industrial relations between belligerents and neutrals should be especially protected and encouraged. This is the freedom of the seas which Germany desired-freedom from blockade, which was necessary to bring her to her knees and stop her aggressions. The international law of Grotius justifies the measures which the Allies enforced, or should have enforced, against Germany; indeed, if they had proclaimed the principles of the Father of International Law at the beginning of the war, they would have had a moral and intelligible code to follow. Truth is so delicate that, if we deviate ever so slightly from it, we fall into error. Grotius was a citizen of one of a number of small nations which were threatened by the German empire of the day, and he wrote as the citizen of an 'allied' country. Looking out upon a world much like our own, his thoughts are as fully applicable to our larger world as if they were written yesterday.

The greatest crime that a state can commit is to kindle a war, either by its own aggressions or by creating the belief that it will play an unworthy part. War is not the supreme evil. The supreme evil is the habit of regarding war as the supreme evil. No nation has more serious difficulties to encounter than one whose courage and firmness are doubted. What a bandit nation be lieves to be true is, so far as its action is concerned, the same as the truth.

A primary power with a fearless and efficient government rarely gets into war. Such a government does not attack its neighbors, and does not provoke war by its reputation for inefficiency and want of spirit. The administrations of James Monroe, Andrew Jackson, Grover Cleveland, and Theodore Roosevelt were eras of peace.

It is the duty of every nation to maintain such armed forces as are necessary to preserve domestic peace. Where free government prevails, the control

of these forces is in the hands of the representatives of a majority of the people, who have no interest in resorting to factious methods and no desire to support needless armaments.

The path to international peace lies, not in neutrality, or in World Confederation, or in arbitration, or in any particular form of government, but in the unfailing application of the Law of Mutual Aid. International peace is a problem of education. World wars will be averted and excessive armaments will vanish only when that law is so well understood and so sure in its application that ambitious nations will renounce the hope of conquering neighbors as little disposed to endure as to offer an injury.

Although the United States will not enter into formal guaranties, the events of the World War and the declarations of her political departments give assurance that she will join the world against any power that threatens disaster to free nations.

AN EX-ENEMY IN BERLIN TO-DAY

BY MAXWELL H. H. MACARTNEY

It is unfortunate that the opinion of the world at large on the conditions obtaining to-day in Berlin should so often be derived from persons falling into one of two classes.

The one class consists of those persons who put up at the most expensive hotels; eat at the most expensive restaurants; look in at the most expensive

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places of entertainment; and then, having naturally enjoyed, at comparatively low cost (for the mark stands at only about one twelfth of its pre-war value), much obsequious and by no means disinterested attention, rush away with the impression that the Germans are gay, charming, forgiving creatures, who are perhaps drinking too much (German)

champagne for a supposedly bankrupt nation, but are simply delighted to welcome all their ex-enemies back in their midst.

The second class is made up of those over-earnest travelers who, coming out to the country with their minds already made up, fall a facile prey to the propaganda of those Germans whose mission it is to convince the world of the utter ruin, material and intellectual, of the Fatherland.

From neither of these classes is it possible to get that true picture of an ex-enemy's life in Berlin to-day which can be given only after a long stay here, and after one has mingled with all classes of society. Even so, it is extremely hard for any one individual to paint a satisfactory picture, because the attitude of the German is not the same toward the American that it is toward the Englishman or the Frenchman; and this attitude again is apt to vary according as you are being dealt with in a private, a business, or an official capacity.

Of course, if one is asked simply, as I sometimes am on my rare visits back in England, whether things are made deliberately unpleasant for the ex-enemy private individual now resident in Germany, or whether it is safe to speak French or English in a restaurant, the reply is astonishingly simple. I say advisedly astonishingly simple,' because, as one who had spent some time in Germany before the war, I was fully prepared to meet with a considerable amount of passive ill-will, if not of active hostility, even in everyday life. Many of my German friends of those days had adopted toward me much the same attitude that the Walrus and the Carpenter adopted toward the oysters; and, upon the actual outbreak of war, this latent hostility, as we all know, was developed into a rabid yet calculated animosity, to which there was, at

VOL. 128-NO. 4

any rate at the outset, no true parallel on the side of the Entente.

In spite, however, of the result and length of the war, exhibitions of private ill-will are not very much more marked than they were before 1914. Very possibly, indeed, the result and length of the struggle have had their effect. A defeated Germany does not feel very safe in giving way to a too-unbridled exhibition of her true sentiments.

It may be, too, that the very length of the war has had its effect, quite apart from the result. Even if a short war, such as that such as that upon which Germany had reckoned, would have been over before the ingrained hatred marking the middle stages of the struggle had taken root in all our minds, the long-drawn-out hardships of four and one-half years of unintermittent fighting reacted upon the feelings of all but the most ferocious fire-eaters. Anyway, whatever the reasons may be, it is only the bare truth to say that, so long as the private individual of an ex-enemy nation behaves himself with ordinary restraint, he is very unlikely to have cause to complain of his treatment in the everyday affairs of existence, and may even be agreeably surprised.

I will give two personal experiences in support of this statement. The Armistice was not very many weeks old when I happened to be traveling in Germany on a very crowded train, the bulk of the passengers being soldiers from the notorious Ehrhardt brigade. Every seat in the train had long before been occupied, and I was compelled to clamber, with my valises and wraps, on to the couplings between two carriages, and to travel in this manner in the midst of a bunch of similarly adhesive soldiers. After we had gone a short distance, one of the soldiers who had been eyeing me curiously, inquired if I was a foreigner. I answered with a simple affirmative. He then inquired

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