tions, it is thought that about fifty per centum should be added to the amounts given in the estimates.

Eastport and Machias may be brought forward as places that will unquestionably be thought to need defensive works by the time, in the order of relative importance, the execution of them can be undertaken by the government. There are several small towns eastward of Mount Desert island that may, at that period, deserve equal attention. At present, however, the places named above will be the only ones estimated for, and $100,000 will be assumed as the cost of each.

The

Mount Desert island, situated a little east of Penobscot bay, and centrally as regards the Kennebec and St. Croix rivers, having a capacious and safe roadstead, affording anchorage for the highest class of vessels, and easily accessible from sea, offers a station for the navy of an enemy superior to any other on this portion of the coast. From this point his cruisers might act with great effect against the navigation of the eastern coast, especially that of Maine, and his enterprises of every kind could be conducted with great rapidity against any point he might select. These considerations, added to the advantages which would result in certain political events from our occupying so advanced a station, whence we might act offensively, together with the propriety of providing places of succor on a part of the coast where vessels are so frequently perplexed in their navigation by the prevailing fogs, lead to the conclusion that the fortification, in a strong manner, of this roadstead, is highly necessary. A survey of this island was begun many years ago, but the party being called off to other duties, it was never completed; the project of defensive works has not been formed. entire cost may be, as assumed by the engineer department, $500,000. Castine. It would seem to be impossible on this coast to deprive an enemy, enjoying naval superiority, of harbors, or to prevent his using them as stations during the war, insular situations, which his vessels would render unapproachable, being so numerous; but it seems proper that those positions of this nature, which are at the same time the sites of towns, should be secured against his visitations. During the last war the English held the position of Castine for some time, and left it at their own pleasure. It is probable that a work costing about $50,000 would deter an enemy from again making choice of this position. Penobscot bay-Upon this bay, and upon the river of the same name flowing into it, are several flourishing towns and villages. Of the many bays which intersect this coast, the Penobscot is the one which presents the greatest number of safe and capacious anchorages. As before observed, a large portion of these harbors must, for the present, be left without defences, but the valuable commerce of the bay and river must be covered, and to afford a secure retreat for such vessels as may be unable to place themselves under protection of the works to the east or west of the bay, the passage of the river must be defended. The lowest point at which this can be done, without great expense, is at the narrows opposite Bucksport. A project has been given in for a fort at that position, now estimated at $150,000.

West of the Penobscot comes St. George's bay, Broad bay, Damariscotta, and Sheepscot, all deep indentations, and leading to towns, villages, and various establishments of industry and enterprise of greater or less present value and future promise. These have not been surveyed, and, of course, no plans have been formed for their defence; $400,000 are assigned to the fortification of these waters. The Sheepscot is an excellent harbor of refuge for vessels of every class.

Kennebec river-This river, one of the largest in the eastern States, enters the sea nearly midway between Cape Cod and the mouth of the St. Croix. It rises near the source of the Chaudierre, a tributary of the St. Lawrence, and has once served as a line of operations against Quebec. The situation and extent of this river, the value of its products, and the active commerce of several

very flourishing towns upon its banks, together with the excellence of the harbor within its mouth, will not permit its defence to be neglected. Surveys incomplete-estimated cost of defences, as formed by the engineer department,

$300.000.

Portland harbor.-A little to the northwest of Cape Elizabeth is the harbor of Portland. The protection of the town, of the merchantmen, and of the shipsof-war that may be stationed there to guard the coast or that may enter for shelter, all of them important objects, may be secured, as an inspection of the map of the town and harbor will show, by occupying Fort Preble Point, House island, Hog Island ledge, and Fish Point. At the same time, if the two channels to the west and east of Hog Island ledge can be obstructed at small expense, which is hardly a matter of doubt, although some final surveys are necessary to decide this point, there will be no necessity for a battery on the ledge; and Fish Point need be occupied only by such works as may be thrown up in time of war. The expense, as now estimated, of the works planned for the defence— not including the defence of Hog Island channel, of which the mode has not been settled-will be $155,000 for Fort Preble, and $48,000 for House island. For Hog Island channel, say $135,000.

The mouths of the Saco, Kennebunk, and York.-Comparatively small works will, it is thought, adequately cover these places, and $75,000 is assumed as their aggregate cost.

Portsmouth harbor.-The only good roadstead, or good harbor, between Cape Elizabeth and Cape Ann, is Portsmouth harbor, within the mouth of Piscataqua river. Line-of-battle ships can ascend this river as high as Fox Point, seven miles above the town of Portsmouth. Between this point and Shooting Point is a branch of the river communicating with Great bay. This branch, which is one-third of a mile wide, presents, for two miles in length, an excellent cover for all sorts of vessels. This situation, sufficiently commodious for a secondary depot, designed to repair vessels-of-war seeking an asylum in this river, is too near the sea for a great naval depot; and, in other respects, does not possess the advantages of Boston, as was shown in the report of the board of engineers, 1520. Still, as Portsmouth is an excellent harbor and station, and as it is indispensable that some, at least, of these stations be provided with the necessary establishments for repairs, the depot in this river should be maintained. It is to be regretted that the bay to the south of Fox Point was not chosen as the site of the navy yard instead of Fernal's island. Being where it is, it will be necessary, in time of war, to make some particular dispositions for the protection of the vard from an attack from the north shore of the river.

The position of Fort Constitution must certainly, and that of Fort McCleary may possibly, be occupied by these defences; though the works themselves, especially the first named, must give place to such as will better fulfil the object. The other positions for forts are Gerrish's Point, island, and Clark's island; some, if not all, of which must be occupied. Some final surveys must be made before the necessary works can be accurately determined on, and before estimates can be made; but there is reason for believing that the entire expense of fortifying this harbor will not fall short of $500,000.

Newburyport harbor.-This is the next port south of Portsmouth. The Merrimack river, the mouth of which forms this harbor, is obstructed at its junction with the sea by a bar, on which there was formerly but six or seven feet of water at low tide. This entrance has since, however, been thought to be essentially important, and, at any rate, it leads to a beautiful, prosperous, and wealthy city. The points forming the mouth of the river are continually changing their form and position; near the middle of the present channel is said to be the spot once occupied by a fort. Under such circumstances, it seems advisable to rely, for the defence of this harbor, on forts to be thrown up on the approach of war, unless the works of harbor improvement now in progress shall be found to give

of an artificial harbor at the northeast point of Nantucket island. Besides these harbors on the direct route through the sound, there are the harbors of Nantucket, Edgartown, and Falmouth.

In addition to the many thousand vessels which pass this water annually, of which there are sometimes forty or fifty, a portion containing the most valuable cargoes, to be seen in the harbors awaiting a change of wind, there is supposed to be at least 40,000 tons of shipping owned in the towns of this sound, and employed in the whale fishery. If this portion of the coast is to be defended at all, it must be by fortifications, for there is no population scarcely, except that of the towns, and this is believed to be entirely without military organization. A privateer might run into either of these harbors and capture, destroy, or levy contributions at pleasure; $250,000 may perhaps suffice for the defence of all these places against the kind of enterprises to which they are exposed.

Buzzard's bay-Interposed between the island of Martha's Vineyard and the main are the Elizabeth islands, bounding Buzzard's bay on the south. This bay, although of importance as leading to the proposed canal to Barnstable bay, as covering the flourishing town of New Bedford, and as being one of the natural harbors to be used by an enemy in forcing the blockade of Narraganset roads, cannot be defended by fortifications, owing to its great breadth.

New Bedford and Fairhaven harbor.-No survey has been made of this harbor, which covers two of the most flourishing towns. It is certainly defensible, and probably for the amount assumed by the engineer department, namely, $300,000.

Narraganset bay. The properties of this great roadstead will be here adverted to very briefly; more minute information may be obtained by reference to reports of 1820 and 1821.

It is the only harbor on the coast accessible with a northwest wind, which is the most common and violent of the most inclement season; and as winds from N.NW. to S.SW. round by the east serve for entering both Boston and New York harbors, while this harbor can be entered with all winds from northwest to east round by the west, it follows that, while we possess this harbor, vessels may be certain of making shelter on this part of the coast with any wind that can blow, excepting only between N.NW. and NW. From this station the navigation of Long Island sound, and especially the communication between that sound and Buzzard's bay or Martha's Vineyard sound, may be well protected. The blockade of the excellent harbor and naval station of New London will be rendered difficult. From this station the navy will command southwardly, as from Hampton roads northwardly, the great inward curve of the coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras; the influence of which command over the blockading operations of an enemy will be apparent, when it is considered that the only harbors of refuge he can have will be the Delaware, Gardiner's, and Buzzard's bays, and that it is far from certain that improvements in the auxiliaries of fortifications may not deprive him of these also.

If Narraganset bay were without defence, an enemy would occupy it without difficulty, and, by the aid of naval superiority, form a lodgement in Rhode Island for the war. Occupying the island alone, or connecting therewith the position of Tiverton Heights, opposite the northern extremity of the island, a position which is of narrow front, easy to secure, and impossible to turn, he might defy all the forces of the eastern States, drive the United States to vast expense of blood and treasure, and while this position of his troops would keep in alarm and motion all the population of the cast, feigned expeditions against New York, through Long Island sound, or against more southern cities, would equally alarm the country in that direction; and thus, although he might do no more than menace, it is difficult to estimate the embarrassment and expense into which he would drive the government.

Of old forts, some of which were never finished, Fort Wolcott and Fort Green are the only ones retained in the projected system of defence.

The project of defence proposed by the board of engineers contemplates for the middle channel, on Brenton's Point, a strong fort, (now well advanced,) with outworks; another strong fort and outworks on the Dumplings; a smaller fort on Rose island, and the repair and modification of Fort Wolcott and Fort Green. The eastern passage is already shut by the permanent bridge at Howland's Ferry. As to the western passage, three modes present themselves: 1st, reducing the depth of water by an artificial ledge, so as, while the passage shall be as free as now for merchant vessels, to prevent the passage of ships-of-war; 2d, relying on fortifications alone to close the channel; or, 3d, resorting in part to one and in part to the other mode just mentioned. Being the least expensive and most certain, the estimate was founded on the first.

The total cost of the Narraganset defences are estimated at $2,500,000.

Gardiner's bay.―This most valuable harbor to an enemy investing this part of the coast is probably not defensible by fortifications alone. It has not been surveyed however, and at no distant day it will be an interesting question, whether by steam batteries, or some similar means, under the protection of and aided by fortifications, its defence may not be accomplished. The necessity for fortifying this bay will be more evident, should the railroad through Long Island, in contemplation, (perhaps in progress,) be constructed.

The engineer department has assumed the probable cost of the works at

$400,000.

Sag harbor, New York, and Stonington, Connecticut.-Neither of these have been surveyed with reference to defence. The first is possessed of a considerable tonnage; and the second, besides being largely engaged in commerce, is about to be the termination of a railroad from Boston. $100,000 may be assigned to the first, and $200,000 to the other.

New London harbor is very important to the commerce of Long Island sound; and as a port of easy access, having great depth of water, very rarely freezing, and being easily defended, it is an excellent station for the navy. It is also valuable as a shelter for vessels bound out or home, and desirous of avoiding a blockading squadron off Sandy Hook. In the plan of defence, the present Forts Trumbull and Griswold give place to more efficient works, whereof the expense is estimated at $314,515.

Mouth of Connecticut river.―This river has been shown to be subject to the expeditions of an enemy. It has not been surveyed in order to determine on the mode of defending it; and $100,000 is introduced here as the conjectural

cost.

New Haven harbor.—It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving and enlarging Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slight redoubt erected during the last war, called Fort Wooster. The expense of both may be stated at $90,000.

There are several towns between New Haven and New York, on both sides of the sound; none of them are very large as yet, though most, if not all, are prosperous and rapidly increasing. Although in their present condition, considering their local situation, it might not be deemed necessary to apply any money to permanent defences, yet, as part of the present object is to ascertain as near as may be, the ultimate cost of completely fortifying the coast, it seems proper to look forward to the time, perhaps not remote, when some of these towns may become objects of considerable predatory enterprise. Bearing in mind the increase of population in the mean time, and the manner in which the places generally are situated, it is thought that $200,000 will be enough to defend them all.

New York harbor.-The object of the projected works for the vicinity of H. Rep. Com. 86————7

New York are to cover the city against an attack by land or sea; to protect its numerous shipping; to prevent, as much as possible, the blockade of this great port, which will have progressively added to the immense wealth of its own rivers, greater and greater amounts of the productions of the boundless regions on the lakes; and to cover the interior communication uniting the Raritan with the Delaware. In the present condition of the defences of this harbor, an enemy would encounter no great opposition, whether his attack was made by land or water. Coming by the sound, he might land within ten miles of the city, upon the main, upon Long Island, or upon both; and, coming into the lower harbor, he might, while the works on Staten Island are in their present condition, risk forcing the passage of the Narrows, as well as the upper works, anchoring in the Hudson or in the East river; or he might land in Gravesend bay, eight miles from the city, and march directly to Brooklyn, where he would find the navy yard lying at his mercy, and whence he might levy a contribution or destroy half the city. The only mode of resistance would be the expensive, harassing and uncertain one of arraying a large body of militia upon Harlem and Brooklyn Heights, and this could be resorted to only in the event, by no means certain, of receiving timely intelligence of his design.

If we fortify Throg's Neck and Wilkins's Point, on the East river, and if we complete the works at the narrows, making them all too strong to be carried by a cup de main, we shall secure the means of transferring the neighboring militia upon the flanks and rear of an enemy should he march upon Brooklyn; while we shall secure the same advantage should he pursue the route by Harlem, besides increasing the length of his march to twenty miles through an intersected country.

This arrangement of defensive works, necessary as it is, still leaves the lower harbor open to an enemy's vessels, in which harbor, safe at all seasons, he could enforce the strictest blockade; cut off the lines of interior communication by the Raritan, and avail himself at any moment of a landing place in dangerous proximity to the city and navy yard. In view of these considerations, the board of engineers projected additional works: one for the East Bank, and another for the Middle Ground, which would perfect the defences of the harbor, compelling an enemy attacking on this side to land upon a dangerous coast, near thirty miles from his object, and to enforce his blockade by riding on the open sea, with a dangerous coast on either hand. Before determining on the works last mentioned, the board went into much research in order to ascertain whether the sand banks mentioned were unchangeable; and it was thought to have been very fully proved that there had been no material change in more than sixty years. This apparent stability of the shoals encouraged them to devise the projects referred to.

Recent surveys, it has been said, have discovered a new channel. If this be so, it may not be prudent to resort to the project, and it may become necessary to devise other means; but whatever they may be, they must, from the nature of the case, be very expensive; and there will be no great error, probably, in taking the estimated cost of the projected batteries as the cost of such mode of defence as may be finally resolved on. The cost of the complete defence of New York remaining to be incurred is, according to the estimates, $5,369,824.

Delaware bay and city of Philadelphia.-The coast, from the mouth of the Hudson to the Chesapeake, as well as that on the south side of Long Island, is low, sandy, covered by numerous sandy islands lying near and parallel to the coast, and having, besides the Delaware, many inlets and interior basins, but none, excepting the one named, affording water enough for sea-going vessels. The Delaware bay itself being wide and full of shoals, having an intricate channel, and being much obstructed by ice at certain seasons, affords no very good natural harbor within a reasonable distance of the sea. The artificial harbor now in course of construction near Cape Henlopen will, it is hoped, fully