quite apparent after a little reflection, only one or two very brief remarks will be made, viz.: The expense incurred by the nation defending itself on this plan will, from the first, greatly exceed that incurred by the attacking party; because, to resist a single fleet threatening the coast, there must be provided as many equal fleets as there are important objects inviting the attack of the enemy, and even with this costly preparation, all lesser objects are thrown upon his forbearance. These defences, moreover, being perishable in their nature, will need frequent removal and repair.

On the other hand, the proper fortification of the coast, preventing the possi bility of a blockade so strict as not to afford frequent opportunities for our navy to leave the harbors, our ships, no longer needed for passive defence, will move out upon their proper theatre of action, though inferior to the enemy, with confidence; knowing that, whether victorious, whether suffering from the violence of tempests, or whether endangered by the vicinity or the pursuit of a superior force, they can strike the extended coast of their country (avoiding the more important outlets, where alone a considerable blockading force may be supposed to lie) at numerous points where shelter and relief await them; hovering around the flanks and in the rear of blockading fleets, and recapturing their prizes; falling upon portions of these fleets, separated for minor objects, or by stress of weather; watching the movements of convoys, in order to pick up straggling vessels; breaking up or restraining the enemy's commerce in distant seas; meeting by concert at remote points and falling in mass upon his smaller squadrons, or upon his colonial possessions, and even levying contributions in his unprotected ports; blockading for a time the narrow seas, and harassing the coasting commerce of the enemy's own shores. These are objects which our own history shows may be accomplished, although contending by means of a navy as to numbers apparently insignificant, against a marine whose force and efficiency have never been paralleled. Our own history shows, besides, that the reason why our infant navy did not accomplish still more, was that the enemy possessing himself of unfortified harbors, was enabled to enforce a blockade so strict as to confine a portion of it within our waters. That this portion, however, indeed, that all was not captured, can be attributed only to respect-so misplaced that it could be the result of ignorance only-for the then existing fortifications; a result amply compensating the nation for the cost of those imperfect works. It would be difficult, nay, impossible, to estimate the full value of the results following the career of our navy, when it shall have attained its state of manhood, under the favorable conditions heretofore indicated. The blockade of many and distant parts of our coast will then be impossible, or, rather, can then be effected only at enormous cost, and under the risk of the several squadrons being successively captured or dispersed; the commerce of our adversary must be nearly withdrawn from the ocean, or it must be convoyed, not by a few vessels, but by powerful fleets. In fine, the war, instead of resulting in the pillage and conflagration of our cities and towns, in the destruction of our scattered and embayed navy, and of the expensive establishments pertaining to it, in the interruption of all commercial intercourse between the several portions of the maritime frontier, in the frequent harassing, and expensive assemblage of militia forces, thereby greatly lessening the products of industry, and infusing among this most valuable portion of our population the fatal diseases and the demoralizing habits of a camp life; instead of these and innumerable other evils attendant upon a conflict along and within our borders, we should find the war and all its more serious evils shut out from our territory by our fortresses, and transferred by our navy to the bosom of the ocean, or even to the country of the enemy, should he, relying on a different system, have neglected to defend the avenues by which he is assailable.

Our wars, thus becoming maritime, will be less costly in men and money, and at the same time more in unison with our institutions-forging no weapon for

defence capable of being turned, under other circumstances, against the life of the State; and keeping our domestic industry and relations, under our internal financial resources, beyond the reach of assault from without.

It is an incontestible principle in military science, and one fully illustrated by military history, that the worst mode of waging war, although strictly a defensive one in its origin and its object, is to permit its field of action to lie within our own borders; and that the best mode is that which longest sustains an offensive attitude. In our own case, war can be excluded from our territory only by fortifications; and we can assume the offensive, with the greatest portion of mankind, only through our navy. The construction of the former secures the means of creating, equipping, and repairing the latter, and leaves it unencumbered with duties which it imperfectly performs, to the full exercise of its great and appropriate functions. In accordance with these principles, what, in general terms, is the extent to which the government may be called on to prepare itself in fortifying the coast and in building up the navy?

It is not in human forecast to decide upon the station of the latter a generation hence. Political events may force the nation to place herself more nearly on a level with some of the greatest of maritime powers, or the prevalence of peaceful relations may restrict the growth of the navy to that demanded by the increase, rapid and extensive, of our commercial interests. But whatever may be the amount of enlargement of the naval force, whether greater or less; or whatever the mode, whether progressive and regular, or by sudden expansion, its increase will involve no corresponding extension in the number or strength of the fortifications, because these must be adequate to their object of themselves, and must consequently be, with some exceptions, as numerous and as strong while the navy is small, as when the navy shall have attained its maximum. A considerable enlargement of the naval force might build up new naval establishments, thereby, in raising the importance of certain positions calling for stronger defences.

The growth of the country in wealth and numbers will convert certain places, now presenting no inducements to the enterprise of an enemy, into rich and populous cities. But, with the exception of these cases, and such as these, it may be assumed that a good system of fortifications applied now to the maritime frontier will be equal to its object in all future times.

Conceiving it unnecessary to enlarge further on this part of the subject, a few remarks will be offered on the correlative influence of fortifications and in

terior communications.

The most important of these communications, in reference to a system of defence, are, first, such as serve to sustain, in all its activity, that portion of domestic commerce which, without their aid. would be interrupted by a state of war; and second, such as serve, besides their great original purposes, to conduct from the interior to the theatre of war necessary supplies and timely relief. The first, which are among the most important national concerns of this nature. lie parallel to, and not far from, the coast; the second, which, when they cross the great natural partition-wall between the east and the west, are equally im portant, lie more remote from the coast, and sometimes nearly or quite parallel to it, but generally fall, nearly at right angles to the line of the seaboard, into the great estuaries, where, in some cases, their products are arrested, or whence, in others, they flow and mingle with those of the first. To fulfil the object of the first-mentioned lines of communication, it is obviously necessary to prevent an enemy from reaching them through any of the numerous inlets from the sea which they traverse, including, of course, the great inlets wherein these unite with the communications coming from the interior. The security of the coastwise line, therefore, involves the security of the other, and is, in a great measure, indispensable to it. From such considerations as have been already presented, it is inferred that, for the security here required, we must, as in the case of

cities, harbors, naval establishments, &c., look to fortifications. But it fortunately happens, as will appear in the sequel, that wherever both objects exist, the works necessary for the one may often, if not always, be made to accomplish both. In reference to a system of defence for the protection of these lines of communication, it must be observed that, from the facility with which they may be broken up, and the serious evils consequent thereon, they offer to the enemy great inducements to enterprises of that nature. An aqueduct, an inclined plane, a tide-lock, a dam, an embankment blown up, is the work of an hour, and yet would interrupt the navigation perhaps for months.

The necessity of a regular army, even in time of peace, is a principle well established by our legislation. The importance of a well-organized militia is incident to the nature of our institutions, well understood by the people, duly appreciated by the government, and finely illustrated in our history. Nothing, therefore, need be said on these subjects, considered as general principles. It may, however, in a succeeding part of this communication, be deemed proper to hazard a conjecture or two touching the expediency of a peculiar organization of the latter.

Before going further, it is proper to be more explicit as to the sense in which the terms "nary" and "fortifications" have been employed.

By the term nary, only that portion of our military marine which is capable of moving in safety upon the ocean, and transferring itself speedily to distant points, is meant. Floating batteries, gunboats, steam batteries, &c., these, and indeed, all other modes of defence which are restricted in their sphere of action, tied down to local defence, and are produced chiefly in cases where the localities deny to fortifications their best action, are regarded as auxiliary to fortifications, and as falling within the same category. Under the term "fortifications," used as expressive of security afforded thereby to the seaboard, have been included. permanent and temporary fortifications, the auxiliaries just mentioned, and both fixed and floating obstructions to channels.

are

The circumstances which must govern in framing a system of fortifications

1st. The importance of the objects to be defended. Great naval establishments, great cities, &c., invite to greater preparation on the part of an enemy, and demand corresponding means of resistance.

2d. The natural advantages or disadvantages of the position to be fortified. It will often happen that the defence of a position of great consequence can be effected with smaller works, and at less expense, than a place of much less value. It will not follow, therefore, that the expense of fortifications will be proportionate to the importance of the object, though it is indispensable that the strength should be.

all

3d. The species of attack to which the place is liable. Some places will be exposed only to capture by assault; others by siege; others to reduction by cannonade, bombardment, or blockade; and some to a combination of any or these modes. If the enemy against which we fortify be unprovided with artil lery, the mode of fortifying becomes peculiar.

4th. Whatever may be the circumstances, it is of vital importance that all the works should be fully adequate to the object, and that they should, even with a small garrison, be perfectly safe from a coup de main.

Proceeding now to a concise description of the maritime frontier, considered as a whole, the several sections will be afterwards separately examined, applying as we go to the several positions the works already projected, and pointing out as far as practicable such as remain to be planned. The sea-coast of the

United States is comprised within the 24th and 46th degrees of north latitude, and spreads over 27 degrees of longitude. The general direction of that part which lies on the Atlantic, north of the peninsula of Florida, is N.NE. and S.SW. This peninsula stretches out from the continent in a direction a little

east of south; while that part which lies on the Gulf of Mexico corresponds nearly with the 30th parallel of north latitude.

Without estimating any of its indentations not properly belonging to its outline, and carrying our measure from point to point wherever the breaks are at all abrupt, the line of coast may be stated to be 3,300 miles in length.

Nearly parallel with the Atlantic coast extends a chain of mountains separating the sources of rivers flowing, on the one hand, directly into the ocean from those which run into the Gulf of St. Lawrence or the Gulf of Mexico. Even in the most lofty portion of this chain numerous gaps afford facilities for crossing by roads or railways.

Occasional expansions, at high elevations, present sufficient surface to afford the water required for crossing by canals; and, in other places, the rivers themselves have severed the chain, leaving no impediments to communications of either kind. On both sides of these mountains the country offers numerous natural means of intercommunication, and facilities and inducements for the creation of artificial ones in endless combination.

From this general description it may be deduced that, notwithstanding the great extent of our seaboard, the safety of each section of it is a matter not devoid of interest to every portion of the people, however remote geographically, at least so long as the nation shall continue her commercial relations with the rest of the world; and, indeed, until she shall find it her interest to interdict the circulation of domestic commerce through the avenues which nature or art may have created—a commerce of inestimable value at all times, and becoming more necessary, as well as more valuable, on every interruption of foreign traffic.

As lying closely connected with the coast, it will be convenient to describe briefly in this place that line of interior communication on which, in time of war, reliance must be placed as a substitute, in part, for the exterior coasting navigation of peace.

Beginning in the great bay to the north of Cape Cod, it passes overland either into Narraganset roads or Buzzard's bay; thence through Long Island sound to the harbor of New York; thence up the Raritan, overland to the Delaware, down this river some distance, overland to the Chesapeake, down the Chesapeake, up Hampton roads and Elizabeth river, through the Dismal swamp to Albemarle sound; thence through the low lands, swamps, or sounds of the Carolinas and Georgia to the head of the peninsula of Florida; thence overland to the Gulf of Mexico; thence through the interior sounds and bays to New Orleans, and thence through low lands, swamps, and bayous to the western boundary. Some of the few and brief natural interruptions of this extensive line have already been removed; some are rapidly disappearing before the energy of local or State enterprise, and to the residue the public attention is directed with an earnestness which leaves no reason to fear that they will not

in due time be overcome. In all cases where this line becomes much exposed to an enemy from the difficulty of fortifying broad waters, communications more inland are even now afforded, or are in progress by canals or railroads, which will be perfectly safe.

Proceeding now to a more minute examination of the coast, it will be convenient to divide it into four distinct parts, namely: the northeastern, extending from the English province of New Brunswick to Cape Cod; the middle, from Cape Cod to Cape Hatteras; the southern, from Cape Hatteras to Cape Sable; and the Gulf of Mexico frontier from Cape Sable to the Mexican borders. They will be taken up in the order in which they stand above.

THE NORTHEASTERN SECTION OF THE COAST.

The northeastern section is characterized by its serrated outline and its numerous harbors; and, though differing in these respects entirely from the other

sections, is not less distinguished in its climate than by the prevalence, at certain seasons, of dense and lasting fogs. The extent of this section, measuring from point to point wherever the breaks of the coast are abrupt, is about five hundred miles, while a straight line from Cape Cod to Quoddy Head is hardly half that distance. The eastern half of this coast is singularly indented by deep bays, the shores being universally rocky, and having numerous islands surrounded by deep water, which not only add to the number of harbors, but afford, besides, an interior navigation well understood by the hardy coasters of this section, and measurably secured by its intricacies and the other dangers of this foggy and boisterous region from interruption by an enemy. The western half, though it has two very prominent capes and a few deep bays, is much less broken in its outline than the eastern. It is covered by few islands, in comparison, but contains, nevertheless, several excellent harbors.

The eastern harbors of Maine are exposed in a peculiar manner. They are not only on the flank of our line, but they are also quite near to public establishments of the greatest maritime powers; they are, moreover, as yet, backed by a sparse population only, and are consequently both weak and exposed. The time cannot be very distant, however, when, becoming wealthy and populous, they will be the objects of a full portion of the public solicitude. Works designed for these harbors must therefore be calculated for the future-must be founded on the principle that they are to defend places much more important than any now existing there; that, being very near the possessions of a foreign power, they will be, in a particular manner, liable to sudden and to repeated attacks; and that, lying at the extremity of the coast, they can be only tardily succored. The works erected on this part of the coast should be so strong as to resist escalade, and to hold out long enough for the arrival of relief. Feebler works than these might be more injurious than beneficial; their weakness would, in the first place, invite attack, and it being a great advantage to occupy fortified places in an adversary's territory, the enemy would prepare himself to remedy the military deficiencies of these forts by adding temporary works, by the force of his garrisons and the aid of his vessels.

No surveys have been made of these harbors and no plans formed for their defence. It may be well to observe here, once for all, that much confidence is not asked for the mere conjectures presented below as to the number and cost of the works assigned for the protection of the harbors which have not yet been surveyed. In some cases there will be mistakes as to the number of forts needed, and in others the errors will be in the estimated cost, but the errors will probably as often lie on one side as on the other, so that the sum total may be a sufficient approximation to the truth.

This is the place to state, also, that the early estimates furnished for the projected works require considerable augmentation. The explanation of this is easy. In preparing those estimates the board of engineers obtained lists of prices from different sections of the country, and adopted them as accurate. Whether the lists thus furnished referred to materials and workmanship of inferior quality, or because they were drawn up at a period of unusually low prices, it has been found by experience that these prices were almost all too low. The board calculated with great care and labor, and with perfect honesty of purpose, applying the prices just mentioned to all the quantities susceptible of measurement and calculation; and they applied themselves with no less diligence and good faith to the estimate of expenses of a contingent nature, and, for the greater part, not to be foreseen with accuracy, either as to amount or kind. Having no experience in large constructions, these last were at least but conjectures; and, as the history of constructions on several parts of the coast has since shown, they were much too small. In consideration of these deficiencies, of the present great elevation of prices, and of the liability to great increase of cost from occasional interruptions of progress and breaking up of systems of opera