obvious reasons, arising out of general superintendence and other contingencies, but because accidents are liable to happen to unfinished works, and the business upon them is deranged by the winter, when they must be properly secured ; and the season for resuming labor always finds some preparations necessary, which would not have been required had no interruption happened.

But the political considerations which urge forward this great object are entitled to much more weight. When once completed we should feel secure. There is probably not a man in the country who did not look with some solicitude during the past season at our comparatively defenceless condition, when the issue of our discussions with France was uncertain, and who did not regret that our preparations, during the long interval of peace we had enjoyed, had not kept pace with our growth and importance. We have now this lesson to add to our other experience. Adequate security is not only due from the government to the country, and the conviction of it is not only satisfactory, but the knowledge of its existence cannot fail to produce an influence upon other nations, as well in the advent of war itself, as in the mode of conducting it. If we are prepared to attack and resist, the chances of being compelled to embark in hostilities will be diminished much in proportion to our preparation. An unprotected commerce, a defenceless coast, and a military marine wholly inadequate to the wants of our service, would indeed hold out strong inducements to other nations to convert trifling pretexts into serious causes of quarrel.

There are two suggestions connected with the prosecution of our works which I venture to make:

First. That the corps of engineers should be increased. The reasons for this measure have been heretofore submitted, and the proposition has been recommended by you to Congress. I will merely add, upon the present occasion, that the officers of this corps are not sufficiently numerous for the performance of the duties committed to them; and that if an augmentation does not take place, the public interest will suffer in a degree far beyond the value of any pecuniary consideration connected with this increase; and,

Secondly. I think that when the plan of a work has been approved by Congress, and its construction authorized, the whole appropriation should be made at once, to be drawn from the treasury in annual instalments, to be fixed by the law. This mode of appropriation would remedy much of the inconvenience which has been felt for years in this branch of the public service. The uncertainty respecting the appropriations annually deranges the business, and the delay which biennially takes place in the passage of the necessary law reduces the alternate season of operations to a comparatively short period. An exact inquiry into the effect which the present system of making the appropriations has had upon the expense of the works would probably exhibit an amount far greater than is generally anticipated.

The report from the ordnance department shows the quantity and nature of the munitions of war, estimated to be eventually necessary, and their probable cost, including new establishments necessary for their fabrication and preservation. The conjectural amount is $29,955,537.

Believing it is not expedient at present to make any preparations upon a scale of this magnitude, I have deemed it proper to accompany this report with a brief statement of my own views, where I depart from the suggestions that are presented in this document.

As our fortifications are constructed, their armaments should be provided; and the amount in depot should at all times exceed the anticipated demand, to meet the casualties of the service. We have now on hand 1,818 new cannon for sea-coast defence; and about 1,000 others, most of which are either useless or of doubtful character. The works actually finished, or so far completed as to admit of a part of their armament being placed in them, require about 2,000 guns. They are calculated ultimately to mount about 600 more. Others in

the process of construction will require about 1,400. So far we have certain data for our estimates; unless, indeed, which I am inclined to believe, it should not be found necessary ever to provide the full complement destined for the largest of these works. Beyond this, the subject is conjectural. And the quantity needed must depend upon the principles that may be adopted in the further progress of the system of fortifications. There are four private founderies at which the public cannon are cast. These, if their whole attention were devoted to the object, could manufacture from 1,200 to 1,500 annually. As to carriages and other supplies, the amount that could be procured within a reasonable period is almost indefinite. Iron carriages are now made for all the casemate batteries, and they have not only the advantage of indestructibility from the atmosphere, but, requiring no seasoned materials, they may be supplied by the founderies through the country to almost any extent.

We have two armories for the manufacture of small arms, and there are seven private establishments which fabricate arms for the government. All these supplies are of the best description, and are submitted to a rigid inspection, which prevents imposition. The armories can at present turn out about 27,000 arms annually, and probably 11,000 or 12,000 could be made at existing private establishments. Should any exigency require larger supplies, the quantity can be much increased. We have now on hand about 700,000 small arms, and there must have been issued to the States about 180,000 muskets, 25,000 rifles, 30,000 pistols, and 378 field cannon and carriages, under the act for arming the militia. If 100,000 of these muskets and rifles are preserved, there are in the country 800,000 of those species of arms belonging to the general or State governments.

What may be considered a proper supply is a question admitting much difference of opinion. It will be seen that the ordnance department fixes the amount at about 600,000, in addition to what are now on hand, and including the number necessary to arm the militia. We had, at the commencement of the last war, 240,000 muskets, and during its progress 60,000 more were made and purchased. At its termination there were but 20,000 at the various arsenals. The residue were in the hands of the troops, or had been lost in the service. This consumption was greater, I think, than was necessary, or than would probably again take place. A plan of accountability has been introduced, by which the men are charged with the arms they receive, and if these are improperly lost or injured, the value is deducted from their pay. The paymasters cannot settle with them till this matter is adjusted.

The stock of small arms in Great Britain, in depot, in 1817, was..
In the public service

Total...

818,282

200,974

1,019,256

The number in depot in France, in 1811, was 60,000, not including the great number in service.

My own impression, is that 1,000,000 small arms may be considered a competent supply for the United States; and if so, a large deduction may be made from the estimate of the ordnance department under this head of expenditure. Although the component materials of these arms are almost imperishable, still it is not expedient to keep a stock unnecessarily large on hand; because there is not only some risk and expense in their preservation, but because, like every other article manufactured by man, they are no doubt susceptible of great improvement. And it may be that those now made may be superseded by an improved model, which, once introduced, must be adopted, at whatever expense or inconvenience, by all nations. And the ingenious invention lately exhibited in this city, by which a series of balls, in separate charges, are brought by a

rotary motion to a common place of discharge, suggests the possibility of a revolution in the form of our fire-arms.

On the subject of depots for these arms, I accord with the general suggestions made by the colonel of ordnance. I think the number should be increased, and arms placed in every part of the country, ready to be used as circumstances may require.

It will be observed that, in the estimate I have made, I confine myself to the armament for the public service, connected with the actual defence of the country, whether to be used by the army or militia in time of war, but I do not extend my views to a supply for arming the militia, in order to discipline them in time of peace. The extent of this policy is a question not necessary in the consideration of the subject before me.

As the arms in depot approach whatever number may be assumed as the proper maximum, the necessity for additional armories becomes less. When our stock is once completed, the present armories, without any aid from the private establishments, will be able to supply the annual consumption. I think, therefore, that two additional armories, as suggested by the ordnance department, are not wanted. And, indeed, although there are considerations attending the transportation of the rude and the manufactured article, and other circumstances which would justify the establishment of a new armory upon the western waters at present, yet if the measure is not carried into effect soon its importance will annually diminish.

But a national foundery for cannon, both for the military and naval service, and perhaps two in different sections of the country, should be erected without delay. The best interests of the public require it. But I have nothing to add to the suggestions made upon this subject in my last annual report.

As to field artillery, the extent to which it shall be provided must depend upon the views of the legislature concerning the expediency of issuing it to the militia. If a more efficient organization does not take place I think the expenditure on this account may well be saved to the public treasury. I consider all attempts to improve the condition of the militia upon the present plan as so nearly useless that the whole system has become a burden upon the public without any corresponding advantage. The principal benefit which results from the existing state of things is the power to call into service such portions of the population as may be wanted. But this may be attained by a simple classification without the cumbrous machinery which at present creates expense and trouble, and which, while it promises little, performs still less.

Very respectfully, sir, I have the honor to be, &c.,

The PRESIDENT of the United States.

LEWIS CASS.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT,
Washington, March 30, 1836.

SIR: In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor to submit herewith the copy of a report prepared in fulfilment of the requirement of the first inquiry contained in the resolution of the Senate of the 18th of February last. The views presented by Colonel Totten on the subject are full and explicit, and are consonant with the principles heretofore advocated by this department. The report is therefore respectfully submitted without any further comments. Very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

Hon. LEWIS CASS, Secretary of War.

C. GRATIOT,

Chief Engineer.

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1836.

SIR: In compliance with your request, I have the honor to hand in some remarks on the fortification of the frontier of the United States.

And am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient,

Brig. Gen. CH. GRATIOT,

Chief Engineer, Washington.

JOS. G. TOTTEN, Lieut. Col. Eng. Brevet Colonel.

In presenting a summary statement of the general system of defence of the country by fortifications, as proposed and in part executed, it is proper to refer for much information as to localities, as to particular projects, and for statements and arguments somewhat elaborate, to communications made at different times by the board of engineers for fortifications.

These communications, of a nature forbidding too great publicity, are to be found in the records of the War Department in the shape of reports of the board of engineers of 1817, 1819, 1820, 1821, 1822, 1823, 1824, and 1825. Reference may also be made with advantage to the revised report of the board of engineers presented in 1826, and published as document No. 153 of the state papers of the first session of the nineteenth Congress. The report of 1826, just referred to, was drawn up by the undersigned, and was the work of much research and of mature deliberation; and in giving it now a careful perusal, he thinks that the information now called for by the Senate cannot be better afforded, at least by him, than by again presenting that report, occasionally condensing, curtailing, or omitting portions of the argument and certain descriptions, and adding such new facts as may have been developed by further research, or made more prominent and interesting by the progress of improvement in the country.

The elements going to make up the general system of maritime defence are a navy, fortifications, interior communications by land and water, and a regular army, and well organized militia.

The navy must be provided with suitable establishments for construction and repair, stations, harbors of rendezvous, and ports of refuge. All these must be covered by fortifications having garrisons of regular troops and militia, and being supplied with men and materials through the lines of interior communications. Not being required to remain in the harbors for their defence, the navy, pre-eminent as an offensive arm, will be prepared to transfer the war to distant oceans and to the shores of the enemy, and to act the great part which its early achievements have foretold, and to which its high destiny will lead. Fortifications should, 1st, close all important harbors against an enemy, and secure them to our military and commercial marine;

2d. Should deprive an enemy of all strong positions where, protected by naval superiority, he might maintain himself during the war, keeping the whole frontier in constant alarm;

3d. Must cover the great naval establishments from attack;

4th. Must protect the great cities;

5th. Must prevent, as far as possible, the great avenues of interior navigation from being blockaded at their entrances to the ocean;

6th. Must cover the coastwise and interior navigation, by closing the harbors and the several inlets which intersect the lines of interior communication, thereby further aiding the navy in protecting the navigation of the country; and

7th. Must shelter the smaller towns along the coast, and also all their com

mercial and manufacturing establishments which are of a nature to invite the enterprise or cupidity of an enemy.

Interior communications will conduct, with certainty, the necessary supplies of all sorts to the stations, harbors of rendezvous and refuge, and the establishments of construction and repair for the use both of the fortifications and of the navy; will greatly facilitate and expedite the concentration of military force, and the transfer of troops from one point to another; will insure to these troops supplies of every description, and will preserve, unimpaired, the interchange of domestic commerce, even during periods of the most active external warfare. The army and militia, together with the personnel of the marine, constitute the vital principle of the system.

It is important to notice the reciprocal relation of these elements of national defence; one element is scarcely more dependent on another, than the whole system is on each one. Withdraw the navy, and the defence becomes merely passive; we expose ourselves the more to suffer the evils of war, at the time that we deprive ourselves of all means of inflicting them. Withdraw interior communication, and the nary will often be greatly embarrassed for want of supplies, while the fortifications will be unable to offer full resistance for want of timely re-enforcements. Withdraw fortifications, and the interior communications are broken up, and the navy is left entirely without collateral aid.

That element in the system of defence, which is now to be attended to, is the fortification of the frontier. It may not be unprofitable here to go somewhat more into detail, as to the relation of this with the other members of the system; the rather, as the reasons for some conclusions hereafter to be announced will be the more apparent.

In considering the relation of fortifications, and of the navy, to the defence of the country, it will appear that the functions of the latter are not less appropri ately offensive than those of the former are necessarily defensive; the latter loses much of its efficiency as a member of the system the moment it becomes passive, and should in no case (referring now to the navy proper) be relied on as a substitute for fortifications.

The position, it is thought may be easily established.

If our navy be inferior to that of the enemy, it can offer, of course, without collateral aids, but a feeble resistance, single ships being assailed by fleets or squadrons. Having numerous points along our extended frontier to protect, all of which must be simultaneously guarded, because ignorant of the selected points of attack, the separate squadrons or vessels may be captured in detail, although the naval force be, in the aggregate, equal or superior to the enemy's. Should we in such a case venture to concentrate, under the idea that the particular object of the adversary was foreseen, he could not fail to push his forces upon the places thus left without protection. This mode of defence is liable to the further objection of being exposed to fatal disasters, independent of assaults of an enemy, and of leaving the issue of conflicts to be determined sometimes by accident, in spite of all the efforts of courage and skill. If it were attempted to improve upon this mode, by combining with it temporary batteries and fieldworks, it would be found that, besides being weak and inadequate from their nature, the most suitable positions for these works must often be neglected, under the unavoidable condition of security to the ships themselves. If the ships take no part in the contest, the defence is of course relinquished to the temporary batteries; if the ships unite in the defence, the batteries must be at hand to sustain them, or the ships must strike to the superior adversary. Placing these batteries in better position, and giving them greater strength, is at once resorting to defence by fortifications; and the resort will be the more effectual, as the positions are better chosen, and the works better adapted to the circum

stances.

On the great comparative expense of such a mode of defence, which will be