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TABLE C,

Exhibiting the cost of certain projected fortifications for the sea-coast defence, the forces necessary to protect them, with the existing works, the forces necessary for perfect security, with the aid of the proposed defences, and the expense of the troops in both cases.

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Number of troops necessary with the existing works

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140,000
70,000

Number of troops required with the projected works, under pay and within call.......

Expense of defending the above-mentioned points during a campaign of six months with the existing works..
Expense of defending the above-mentioned points during a campaign of six months with the projected works........

Difference.........

$19,250,000 6,447,000 12,803,000

N. B.-In one campaign of six months the difference of expense between the two systems will amount to within $961,073 08 of the whole cost of the projected works. The expense of the troops, above stated, results from a calculation which gives for the cost of a regular soldier $300 per annum, and for the cost of a militia soldier $500 per annum, the expense of officers being in both cases included. No estimate can be made of the enormous contingent expenses in assembling, organizing, and providing militia forces, of hospitals, waste of property, loss of time, &c. This estimate is undoubtedly below the truth. The forces under pay necessary for defence, with the proposed works, consist of peace garrisons, increased by a portion of militia, the residue of militia under pay being stationed upon the lines of approach of an enemy. * Supposing all militia serving six months and costing on an average $250 per man.

TABLE D,

Exhibiting the amount of militia force which may be concentrated at Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans, successively, from the 1st to the 11th day; each day's march being computed at fifteen miles; founded on the census of 1810.

Days.

Boston.

Newport, R. I.

New York.

Philadelphia. Norfolk, Va. Baltimore, Md. Charleston, S. C. Savannah, Ga

New Orleans.

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No. 3.

[Ho. REPS., Ex. Doc. No. 243, 24TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION ]

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ACCOMPANIED WITH REPORTS FROM THE SECRETARIES OF WAR AND NAVY, RELATIVE TO THE MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES OF THE COUNTRY.

To the Senate:

I transmit herewith reports from the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments, to whom were referred the resolutions adopted by the Senate on the 18th of February last, requesting information of the probable amount of appropriations that would be necessary to place the land and naval defences of the country upon a proper footing of strength and respectability.

In respect to that branch of the subject which falls more particularly under the notice of the Secretary of War, and in the consideration of which he has arrived at conclusions different from those contained in the report from the Engineer bureau, I think it proper to add my concurrence in the views expressed by the Secretary.

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1836.

ANDREW JACKSON.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, April 7, 1836.

SIR: In conformity with your instructions, I have the honor to transmit reports from the engineer and ordnance departments, furnishing so much of the information required by the resolution of the Senate of February 18, 1836, as relates to the fortifications of the country, and to a supply of the munitions of war. The former branch of this subject has required laborious investigations on the part of the officers charged with this duty, and their report has therefore been longer delayed than, under other circumstances, would have been proper; but the whole matter was too important to have the interests involved in it sacrificed to undue precipitancy.

The engineer report was received at the department on Friday last, and I have embraced such portions of the intervening time as other official calls and a slight indisposition would allow me to devote to its examination. I did not consider that any suggestions I could make would justify a further delay at this advanced stage of the session, while at the same time, I am aware that this letter will need all the allowance which these circumstances can claim for it.

It is obvious that, in the consideration of any general and permanent system of national defence, comprehensive views are not only necessary, but professional experience and a knowledge of practical details; such information, in fact, as must be obtained by long and careful attention to the various subjects which form the elements of this inquiry. Although, therefore, I do not concur in all the suggestions contained in these reports, and more particularly in those which relate to the nature and extent of some of our preparations, still I have thought it proper to lay them before you, rather than to substitute any peculiar views of my own for them. Both furnish facts highly interesting to the community, and if they anticipate dangers which it may be thought are not likely to happen, and suggest preparations which future exigencies will not probably require, they are still valuable documents, presenting the necessary materials for the action of the legislature. The report from the engineer department, in particular

evinces an accurate knowledge of the whole subject, while, at the same time, its general views are sound and comprehensive. I consider it a very able document.

Under these circumstances, I have thought it proper to submit some general remarks, explanatory of my own views, concerning a practical system of defence, and which will show how far the plans and details are in conformity with my opinion. I feel that this course is due to myself.

I shall confine my observations to the maritime frontier. Our inland border rests, in the southwest and northeast, upon the possessions of civilized nations, and requires defensive preparations to meet those contingencies only which, in the present state of society, we may reasonably anticipate. In the existing intercourse of nations, hostilities can scarcely overtake us so suddenly as not to leave time to move the necessary force to any point upon these frontiers threatened with attack. I am not aware of any peculiar position upon either of these lines of separation which commands the approaches to the country, or whose possession would give much superiority to an invading or defensive force. În fact, the division is, in both cases, an artificial line through much of its extent, and a portion of the natural boundary offers scarcely any impediment to military operations. Under such circumstances, it seems altogether inexpedient to construct expensive fortifications, which would do little more than protect the space under cover of their guns; which are not required as places of depot; which guard no avenue of communication, and which would leave the surrounding country penetrable in all directions. Without indulging in any improper speculations concerning the ultimate destiny of any portion of the country in juxtaposition with us, or looking for security to any political change, we may safely anticipate that our own advance in all the elements of power will be at least equal to that of the people who adjoin us; nor does the most prudent forecast dictate any precautions, founded upon the opinion that our relative strength will decrease and theirs increase. The lake frontier, indeed, presents some peculiar consideration; and I think the views submitted by the engineer department, respecting Lake Champlain, are entitled to much weight. This long, narrow sheet of navigable water opens a direct communication into the States of New York and Vermont, while its outlet is in a foreign country, and is commanded by a position of great natural strength. It is also within a few miles of the most powerful and populous portion of Canada, and open to all its resources and energies. With a view, perhaps, to possible rather than to probable events, it may be deemed expedient to construct a work at some proper site within our boundary which shall close the entrance of the lake to all vessels ascending its outlet. As such a work, however, would be an advanced post, and, from circumstances, peculiarly liable to attack, its extent and defences should be in proportion to its exposure.

There is already a considerable commercial marine upon the four great lakes, Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Michigan, which are open to the enterprise of our citizens. And this will increase with the augmenting population which is flowing in upon the regions washed by these internal seas. It is obvious that, from natural causes, the physical superiority will be found upon the southern shores of these lakes. The resolution of the Senate embraces the inquiry into the expediency of constructing permanent fortifications in this quarter. And this inquiry properly divides itself into two branches:

1st. The policy of fortifying the harbors on the lakes; and,

2d. The policy of commanding, by permanent works, the communications between them.

Both of these measures presuppose that the naval superiority upon these waters may be doubtful. But it is difficult to foresee the probable existence of any circumstances which would give this ascendency to the other party. It is

H. Rep. Com. 86- -5

unnecessary to investigate the considerations which bear upon this subject, as they are too obvious to require examination. They are to be seen and felt in all those wonderful evidences of increase and improvement which are now in such active operation. A victorious fleet upon these lakes could disembark an army at almost any point. If a harbor were closed by fortifications they would only have to seek the nearest beach, and land their men from boats, so that no defences we could construct would secure us against invasion; and temporary block-houses and batteries would probably be found sufficiently powerful to repel the attacks of any vessels seeking to enter the narrow harbors upon the lakes, if we could foresee the existence of any circumstances which would induce an enemy to endeavor to force an entrance into them.

As to the communication between the lakes, the inquiry, from geographical causes, is necessarily restricted to that from Lake Erie to Lake Huron, and to the straits of Michilimackinac. Of the former, almost sixty miles consist of two rivers, completely commanded from their opposite banks, while the entrance into one of these, the river St. Clair, is impeded by a bar, over which there are but about eight feet of water. No armed vessels could force their way up these rivers while the shores were in an enemy's possession, who might construct batteries at every projecting point, and who, in fact, might in many places sweep the decks with musketry. As to the straits of Michilimackinac, they are too broad to be commanded by stationary fortifications, even if any circumstances should lead to the construction and equipment of a hostile fleet upon the bleak and remote shores of Matchedask bay, in the northeastern extremity of Lake Huron.

I am therefore of opinion that our lake frontier requires no permanent defences, and that we may safely rely for its security upon those resources, both in the personnel and materiel, which the extent and other advantages our country insures to us, and which must give us the superiority in that quarter.

It may, perhaps, be deemed expedient to establish a depot for the reception of munitions of war in some part of the peninsula of Michigan, and to strengthen it by such defences as will enable it to resist any coup de main which may be attempted. From the geographical features of the country, our possessions here recede from their natural points of support, and are placed in immediate contact with a fertile and populous part of the neighboring colony. In the event of disturbances, the ordinary communications might be interrupted, and it would probably be advisable to have in deposit a supply of all the necessary means for offensive or defensive operations, and to place these beyond the reach of any enterprising officer who might be disposed, by a sudden movement, to gain possession of them. The expenditure for such an object would be comparatively unimportant, even should the contingency be judged sufficiently probable to justify precautionary measures.

I had the honor, in a communication to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate, dated February 19, 1836, a copy of which was sent to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Rep resentatives, to suggest the mode best adapted, in my opinion, to secure our frontier against the depredations of the Indians. The basis of the plan was the establishment of a road from some point upon the upper Mississippi to Red river, passing west of Missouri and Arkansas, and the construction of posts in proper situations along it. I think the ordinary mode of construction ought not to be departed from. Stockaded forts, with log block-houses, have been found fully sufficient for all the purposes of defence against Indians. They may be built speedily, with little expense, and, when necessary, by the labor of the troops. Our Indian boundary has heretofore been a receding, not a stationary one, and much of it is yet of this character. And even where we have planted the Indians who have been removed, and guaranteed their permanent occupation of the possessions assigned to them, we may find it necessary, in the redemption

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