ment of attack, require that every important point be duly prepared to repel his attempt or retard it until re-enforcements can arrive and adequate means of resistance be organized. By land we are acquainted with the motions of an enemy, with the movements and direction of its columns; we know the roads by which he must pass, but the ocean is a vast plain without obstacle; there his movements are made out of our sight, and we know nothing of his approach until he is already within the range of the eye. In a word, unless the vulnerable points of a sea-coast frontier are covered by permanent fortifications, their only chance of safety must depend on the issue of a battle, always uncertain, even when disciplined and well-appointed troops inured to danger have made all possible preparation for the combat. As for the garrisons which these forts will require in time of war, a small portion equal in number to the peace garrisons should be of regular troops; the surplus of militia, practiced in the manœuvres and drill of great guns; it being necessary that the greatest part of the troops required for the defence and service of the sea-coast fortifications should be artillery. This brings us to a suggestion or two in relation to the organization of the militia forces. Instead of the present small proportion of artillery the States might with advantage increase the amount of that force in the vicinity of each of the exposed parts of the coast, so as to be equivalent to the exigencies and armament of the works; substituting for the usual field exercises as infantry. actual drill and practice in the batteries. As soon as a movement on the part of the enemy would threaten the frontier of the State this force should throw itself into the forts and there remain as long as the precise point of attack should remain uncertain. In most parts of the seaboard it would also be advisable to have a considerable body of militia horse artillery, as being an useful arm in all cases, and as affording a defence, always applicable, against minor and predatory enterprises. This force might, in part, be drawn from the common proportion of cavalry. In the report we have taken no account of the interior and land frontiers of the Union; they have not yet been sufficiently reconnoitred to enable us to give an exact idea of the system of defensive works they may require. All that we can say by anticipation is, that from their general topographical features, these frontiers can be covered at a very moderate expense so effectually that no enemy will be able to invade them without exposing himself to disasters, nearly inevitable; and that the troops of the United States, supposing all her warlike preparations well arranged beforehand, will be able, at the opening of the first campaign, to carry the theatre of war beyond her own territory. If to our general system of permanent fortifications and naval establishments we connect a system of interior communications by land and water, adapted both to the defence and to the commercial relations of the country; if to these we add a well constituted regular army, and perfect the organization of our militia, the nation will not only completely secure its territory, but preserve its institutions from those violent shocks and revolutions which, in every age and in every country, have been so often incident to a state of war. Table A, following, contains the works constituting the proposed defensive system for the maritime frontier, divided into four classes. Table B contains a list of such existing works as it is contemplated to retain as accessaries to the system. Table C exhibits a comparison of the cost of defending certain important parts of the coast, in their present condition, and with the aid of the projected works. Table D shows a possible concentration of militia forces, in eleven days, at Boston, Massachusetts; Newport, Rhode Island; New York, New York; Phil. adelphia, Pennsylvania; Baltimore, Maryland; Norfolk, Virginia; Charleston, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; and New Orleans, Louisiana. All which is respectfully submitted. BERNARD, Brigadier General, JOSEPH G. TOTTEN, Major Engineers, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel, Brevet Major General ALEX. MACOMB, TABLE Showing the distribution, as now existing and as contemplated for the year 1826, of the corps of engineers, consisting of one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, two majors, six captains, six first and six second lieutenants, in all twenty-two officers, besides four brevet officers, which, included, makes the whole number in service twenty-six; also, showing what the distribution would be in each year during the progress of enlarging the corps by adding to it, annually, from the graduates of the Military Academy, until the whole number should amount to forty-five, the number to which the corps would be enlarged, should the addition recommended, of one brigadier general, one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, two majors, six captains, six first and six second lieutenants, be provided. REMARKS.-It will be perceived by this table that, although the number of officers would be progressively increased in each year until, in the year 1831, it would amount to the number to which it is recommended that the corps should be enlarged, there is no year within that period in which the strength of the corps would be adequate to afford the number of officers deemed requisite for the service even of the fortifications, and that, at the expiration of the period stated, a number of the fortifications now projected will not have been commenced. With the number of officers that would be at disposal in the several years during the progress of the gradual extension of the corps, agreeably to the project proposed for its increase, it would, however, be practicable to give proper attention to the fortifications, and also furnish the officers requisite for the direction of the several objects connected with internal improvements, which are stated in the table, by employing persons to superintend the details of the operations. Should the employment of such persons be found to be less advantageous to the public interest than to have the duties proposed to be confided to them performed by engineers, a further enlargement of the corps might be determined on after the completion of the project now proposed for its increase; but it would not be advisable to provide for a greater increase at this time, as the Military Academy upon it present establishment could not, without prejudice to other branches of the army, furnish the number of graduates requisite to fulfil such an object. The organization proposed for the topographical engineers would probably take effect immediately by the transfer of officers of artillery and infantry who have been on topographical duty, and have acquired the requisite qualifications. It is not deemed necessary to show the particular objects upon which the topographical engineers would be immediately or prospectively employed, as the whole corps, increased to the extent recommended, would be constantly and profitably employed in surveys, &c., relating to the general objects above stated. The field officers to be employed in the office of the chief engineer, on the board of engineers, in the superintendence of districts and fortifications of the largest class, and in inspections. The captains in the superintendence of construction, and the lieutenants as assistants. The topographical engineers to be employed in making general and particular surveys, and in preparing charts and maps of the coast and interior for fortifications and internal improvements. WASHINGTON, January 10, 1826. Designation of works. TABLE A. Classification of the proposed fortifications for the defence of the maritime frontier of the United States. FIRST CLASS. Fort Adams, Narraganset roads, Rhode Island* Fort Hamilton, New York harbor, New York* Fort Delaware, Delaware bay, and two batteries to be built by the garrisons* Fort Monroe, Hampton roads, Virginia* Fort Calhoun, Hampton roads, Virginia* 70 10 234 10 28 2,625 305 60 200 1,130 216 88888888 38 1,739 68 482 633 2,304 Yards. 381 904, 355 40 Fort at Mobile Point, Alabama* 85 750 100 10 675 538,766 65 Fort at Rigolets, near New Orleans, Louisiana' 80 400 58 6 308 360, 000 00 Fort at Chef Menteur, near New Orleans, Louisiana* 80 400 58 6 308 360, 000 00 Fort at Bayou Bienvenue, near New Orleans, Louisiana* Principal work or works for Savannah, Georgia, Charleston, South Carolina, Fort on Throgg's Point, near New York, New York. 100 1,540 193 6 29 490 471, 181 53 Fort on Sollers's Point, near Baltimore, Maryland. 60 835 159 305 673, 205 43 Fort on George's island, Boston harbor, Massachusetts. 100 900 309 50 30 2,168 458, 000 00 Fort on Wilkins's Point, near New York, New York. Fort St. Philip, near New Orleans, Louisiana Fort Tompkins and dependencies, New York harbor, New York. 100 970 100 10 4 726 485,988 58 Cost of construc- |