With a naval superiority we could blockade their ports and have the means of pursuing any vessels that might escape the blockade. To protect ourselves in this way our force must be decidedly superior; and our resources would enable us to do so if we can in the commencemeet of a war save even our mercantile marine and capture that of our enemy. Without fortified harbors I cannot see how we can gain such results and advantages with an enemy possessing safe harbors, offering effectual security to his vessels.

Nor could we at once calculate upon reducing Kingston. The fortifications at that place cannot be taken by assault or destroyed by bombardment. It is only by the operations of a systematic siege that they can be arrested from the hands of an enemy. Some time must elapse after the breaking out of the war before we could hope to take so important a place.

The command of the wider parts of the St. Lawrence is in the hands of the power possessing the naval superiority. We could not cross that river, where its banks are beyond gunshot from our shores without such naval ascendency, thereby prolonging the time necessary for reducing Kingston.

The commercial ports, in which self-interest now draws our numerous merchant steamers and ships, should therefore be provided with such heavy land batteries as will effectually secure the shipping in the commencement of hostilities and during any temporary check to our operations on land and water.

The same protection should be given to inlets, by which vessels could cut the lines of our railroads and canal communications.

Such batteries or fortifications are our only certain security. No increase of population or of mercantile marine can give us that protection (with the means our neighbors have at command) in the commencement of hostilities; nor can we gain the ascendency on the lakes without some fortified harbor, under cover of which to build and equip a fleet. The subjugation of the Canadas, if the result of a war, will not be accomplished before Quebec and Kingston are reduced.

These two places, if defended in proportion to their artificial strength, will call for harder fighting and more prolonged than any battle we have yet fought. They certainly can be taken, and we believe we know enough of their construction to fit out the necessary armaments, but it will require time, and large military resources, during which the lake coast should not be left unguarded and unprotected.

The reduction of these two fortresses cuts off in the one case all further relief from the northern country, and all means of further annoyances by water in the other; but the entire subjugation and annexation of the country to ours depends more upon the people. Unless they see fit to govern themselves, as a part of our confederacy, we cannot make them. We may hold it by military power, but with the people opposed, the struggle will not cease with the fall of Quebec and Kingston.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

RICHARD DELAFIELD,

Major of Engineers.

Letter from Charles Stewart, United States navy.

BORDENTOWN, NEW JERSEY,

November 11, 1851.

SIR: I received from the Hon. Secretary of the Navy a copy of your letter to him, dated June 22, together with a copy of the resolutions of the House of Representatives at their last session, in relation to the fortifications adopted in the year 1816 by the United States government, and after the war with

Great Britain, requesting answers to the questions propounded in the letter from some of the naval officers. Having no knowledge of the plan proposed at the period referred to, I am only enabled to predicate my opinion on the presumption that what was then adopted, and that under the experience of the war which had then terminated, was the best that could be devised to afford protection to those places and interests they were designed to secure.

The first question demands to know, "To what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications for the protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application of steam to vessels-of-war," &c., &c.

In answer to this question, I beg leave to say that no good reason presents itself to my mind for the abandoning of any of the works now in progress of construction, or for the reduction of the number contemplated to be erected, in consequence of the application of steam to the purposes of maritime warfare, or in consequence of the improvement in projectiles. But, on the contrary, I should presume, that as the application of steam is now assuming a determined and fixed means in the prosecution of national hostilities, that instead of an abandonment of any portion of the defences that have been adopted, a more extensive means of resistance and protection at all such points as present objects worthy of being attacked on our maritime frontier would be called for and induced, that the honor of the government may be sustained and the deep interest of the people secured. It may be true, yet I do not think it probable, that some of the places contemplated to be fortified in the plan of 1816 may have so deteriorated in interest as to admit of modifications or changes in the plan of fortifying; of this, however, I have no means of forming an opinion; but if we take into consideration the great advantage and facilities which steam power will accord to naval armaments for approach, attacking, or for passing insufficient fortifications, it cannot but appear to the government that this constitutes a new and highly dangerous power to be guarded against in all future time; more especially on a maritime frontier of very great extent, and deeply indented with water communication, affording to an enemy who possess steam power the greatest facilities of annoyance in all directions of our country.

Your second question asks, "What reliance could be placed on vessels of war or of commerce, floating batteries, gunboats, &c., &c., as substitutes for permanent fortifications?"

In answer to this question, I must say that I am of opinion that but little reliance ought to be placed for the security of high national interest on defences of such doubtful character. They are too subject to untoward casualties to constitute at all times a reliable means of resistance; and besides, they would require permanent fortifications to afford them continuance and protection. As auxiliaries to permanent works in resisting attacks, they might be made available sometimes with good effect, but no further ought they to be relied on.

To the third question which you ask, "Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications on the shores of the northern lakes?"

I again beg to express my entire ignorance of what that system proposes should be done. But considering that those lake shores constitute an important frontier boundary between our interior country and a powerful military and naval nation, I should think that it would be politic to secure by fortifications as far as reasonably practicable, all the important positions essential to commercial purposes and naval preparations for the lakes. In this direction there is but one power with whom we may be brought into collision, and that is Great Britain. She is, however, a power who, on a probability of hostilities with the United States, would readily throw on to our border and on the lakes a powerful re-enforcement of military and naval annoyance to our lake frontier. Very respectfully, I have the honor to remain your obedient servant, CHARLES STEWART.

Hon. C. M. CONRAD,

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

COLORADO DESERT.

[To accompany bill H. R. No. 417.]

APRIL 23, 1862.-Ordered to be printed.

Mr. CRISFIELD, from the Committee on Public Lands, made the following

REPORT.

The Committee on Public Lands, to whom was referred the joint resolution of the legislature of the State of California, passed April 12, 1859, asking the United States to donate and cede to the said State a tract of land known as the "Colorado Desert," in that State, for certain purposes therein set forth, having had the same under consideration, submit the following report :

That by the said joint resolution the United States are asked to grant to the State of California all the land within the following limits: "beginning at the initial point of the San Bernardino base line as established by the general survey; thence running east on the said line to the Colorado river; thence down said river to its junction with the southern State line; thence west, along said line, to the eastern base of the main range of mountains; thence northerly, along the base of the said range of mountains, to the place of beginning."

The motives of the State of California in asking for this grant are thus stated in the joint resolution: "It is respectfully represented that the State of California, in thus applying to the federal government to become the custodian of the above-described tract of land, is actuated by no other motive than that of the common good and general welfare, being fully impressed with the conviction that the disposition which it is in contemplation to make of these lands will inure to the benefit of both State and federal government. The entire section of country herein described is known to be a desert waste, devoid of water and vegetation, owing to which it presents a great barrier to travel and transportation on the most approved route of land communication between the Atlantic and Pacific." "It is proposed by the State that in the event of the approval and concurrent action of Congress, to cause to be constructed a proper system of hydraulics-a series of canals traversing through all the practicable portion of this sterile waste--and thus not only remove the existing impediments to travel and transportation, but cause the

desert to yield to the wants of man her latent, reserved, and hidden stores."

This description of the lands sought to be ceded by this government embraces an area of about six millions of acres, has a water front on the Colorado river of about one hundred miles, and stretches along the line dividing the State of California from the possessions of Mexico a distance almost as great. If we start from the point where the San Gorgonio Pass is intersected by the meridian line of San Bernardino, and trace the western base of the San Bernardino mountains in a southwest direction to the Colorado river, the line thus drawn will cut the territory now sought to be granted into two not very unequal parts, as will appear from the "map of public surveys in California to accompany the report of the surveyor general, 1860." The part lying north of this line is a mountain region, of which but little is known. It is certainly not possible to reduce the greater, if any, part of it to cultivation, or to irrigate it with water drawn from the Colorado river, for that river is on a much lower level. This portion of the territory is not in the line of travel between the Atlantic and Pacific, and its cession is not at all necessary to enable the State of California to carry into full effect the scheme of reclamation and improvement which she seems to contemplate. Besides, our knowledge of this region is not sufficient to enable us to determine its present or prospective value to the government and people of the United States. These mountains may be, and probably are, rich in minerals, and at some future day may prove sources of great wealth. The committee is of opinion that, for these and other reasons which might be assigned, it would be unwise to cede this portion of the described district; and to that extent it reports unfavor ably to the request of California.

With

The region of country lying south and west of the described line is of very different character. It is a vast, naked, desolate plain. the exception of a narrow strip of bottom land on the west bank of the Colorado river, and small patches of grass around the few water holes and springs in the vicinity of the San Gorgonio Pass, it is a waste, uninhabitable country, without vegetation, except occasional bunches of the creosote plant, and near the California mountains, of the artimesia, and incapable of vegetation. From April to October it is subject to intense heat, the atmosphere is dry and scorching like the hot air from a furnace, and from November to March to severe cold. At the latter season the winds from the Coast range of moun tains sweep across this vast plain to the Gulf of California with great violence, raising the fine sand of the desert in immense clouds, filling the atmosphere, concealing landmarks, almost obscuring the light of the sun, and forcing the traveller to stop immediately, and await, as best he can, until the gale ceases. The Indians dwelling at the outlet of the San Gorgonio Pass regard this desert with horror. They call it the journey of death," and believe that the souls of bad Indians are condemned to wander over this desert forever-in summer without water, in winter without clothing.

The desert character of this country proceeds not from the natural

barrenness of the soil, but simply from aridity. In many parts of it the soil is of the very best quality, being composed of alluvial earths, marl, and shells; and whenever it has been tested, under favorable circumstances, it has proved fertile and productive. It needs only water. After an adequate supply of moisture, the "careless" weed has been known to grow ten or twelve feet high in a few weeks. All the evidence before the committee goes to show that if this country can be sufficiently irrigated it will become productive; and when its surface is clothed with verdure its now drifting sands will become fixed, and we may venture the opinion that its excessive heats will be moderated, and its climate become pleasant and healthful to man. In its present condition this country is of no use either to this government or to the State of California. On the contrary, it is a positive injury to both. Over this plain lies the shortest and most direct route from the Pacific coast to Fort Yuma, the districts of the Gila and Arizona, and the Atlantic States, and is, indeed, the only route which can be formed through our own territory between these points. It is the best line for a railroad to the Pacific from the southern Atlantic States. Over this route should pass the trade and commerce between these important sections, the supplies and munitions of the government, and the current of migration to the Pacific coast; all which is frustrated by the want of water. The mail has to diverge into Mexican territory; the rich mineral productions of Arizona, instead of going out through some California port, are driven to the foreign and more distant port of Guaymas; travel is forced into circuitous routes, emigration suspended, and this immense region is left. unpeopled to the great detriment of the State of California in wealth. and power. And such must forever remain its condition unless an adequate supply of water can in some way be found; with that all would be changed.

It is well ascertained that water cannot be obtained on the plain itself. It seldom rains, and when it does, it is only in light showers; and it is impossible to gather and preserve in cisterns an adequate supply, even for the wants of travellers, and still more so to secure enough even for the most imperfect irrigation. All attempts to procure it by wells have signally failed. In some cases wells have been sunk to the depth of 120 feet, and no sign of water found. In one case, where a small quantity was found, it was lost entirely by deepening the shafts in the hope of a greater quantity. The citizens of San Bernardino county have spent above $4,000 in vain endeavors to procure water by sinking wells. This government has sent out frequent expeditions from Fort Yuma in search of water, but after hard labor and great suffering they have always returned without success. Even the streams that come down from the mountains are speedily evaporated in the hot atmosphere, or soon lost in the arid plain.

The State of California is of opinion that a supply of water may be obtained by turning the waters of the Colorado river, in sufficient. quantities, in upon this desert, and that in this way the whole region. may be reclaimed. The committee is of opinion that this is practicable, and promises success; at all events, it is so hopeful as to justify