At last the secretary was listened to, and the orders in council were repealed; but before the news reached the United States war had been declared. The messengers bearing respectively the declaration of war and the order removing the principal cause which led to the declaration, passed each other on the ocean. Thus was the war of 1812-'15, or, as it has been termed, "the second war of independence," a blunder which England lost no time in remedying, by seeking for and concluding a peace with the United States as soon as she could do so with honor to herself.

At the time peace was made England was never more powerful. Triumphant over all her enemies in Europe by sea and land, she was left by the general peace of 1814 in possession of vast means, ready organized and practiced in war, with which she might have given the United States some severe though not fatal blows. But however much her pride of power might have been gratified by carrying her triumphant arms to America, she preferred at once to resume peaceful and intimate relations with the United States, and to secure all the advantages flowing therefrom, then and forever. Her far-seeing statesmen know that the true policy to be followed in respect to the United States in 1815 was, with increased reasons for its adoption, that indicated by the statesmen of 1783; and they resolved that no future blunder should lead to a war between the United States and England so far as the latter could prevent it. In this favorable state of the political atmosphere, the clouds that lowered over the northeastern boundary, over Canada during the patriot demonstration, and over Oregon, were soon cleared away. It is true that the United States yielded in these instances something more than was due to England's just claims; but it was rather the graceful yielding of a daughter to a mother's solicitation than the acknowledgment of any power of coercion possessed by England. If the peaceful views of England were not then generally acknowledged, they are now made manifest. England is not only at this time to a great degree dependent on the United States in commercial matters, but signs are significant that she considers her future fate depends on maintaining the most friendly relations with the United States, so that they would, from interest in commercial matters, and perhaps from a better feeling for their noble mother, look with disfavor on any combination of the European powers to humble and crush her.

France also gave evidence how much importance she attached to the maintenance of the most intimate relations in trade with this country, and how reluctantly, if at all, she would resort to hostilities with the United States. The King of the French, supported by public opinion, was enabled to overcome the opposition of the chambers to the payment of the amount stipulated by treaty to be paid for spoliations on our commerce. This public opinion was especially expressed by numerous petitions, coming up from the great commercial and manufacturing districts of the kingdom, praying that the difficulties with America might be settled and peace preserved.

During the period extending from 1783 to 1812, considerable expenditures were made from time to time on the forts and batteries at the principal seaports, in anticipation of possible war growing out of the French revolution, and more recently in consequence of the continued aggression on our commerce by English cruisers; so that when war actually broke out in 1812 there was not a town of any magnitude that was not supplied with one or more batteries. Nevertheless, there were a great many small towns exposed without defence to the enemy, and were left unmolested by him, seeing that their destruction or injury could in nowise facilitate his operations, whilst such acts of vandalism would serve only to hold him up to the execration of the civilized world.

In the course of the war of 1812-'15 the defences of the country were considerably increased in value by the construction of field-works; and in no instance were such defences, supported by well-trained and patriotic volunteers, ever overcome. Attacks were made on Fort Boyer at Mobile, on Fort McHenry

at Baltimore, and on Fort St. Philip below New Orleans, and were successfully repelled. Our vessels-of-war were blockaded in New London, and chased into Marblehead and Boston, where they found security under the batteries. Castine was taken and held by the enemy, but being a point of no importance it was not retaken, for it served to detach a portion of the enemy's forces from operating at other points.

Washington was reached, and the Capitol brutally attacked and defaced. The success of the enemy, in this instance, was obtained less from the wellarranged plan of his operations than from the imbecility of the generals commanding the American forces rallied for the defence. The enemy was signally defeated many times, by sea and land, and the war was triumphantly terminated by the battle of New Orleans.

Thus was the country preserved intact, during a war of two years and eight months, against the operations of an enemy having the mastery at sea, and when the defences of the country were comparatively weak.

It should be here remarked that a large expenditure of money was incurred in consequence of the want of facile lines of rail, canal, or common way communications leading toward and along the northern, Atlantic, and Gulf frontiers, through which men, munitions, and machinery of war could be transported. Yet in face of these difficulties, movements were generally made when required, efficiently and with considerable promptness.

It was on account of the difficulty of wielding mobile forces for the defence of the seaboard and lake frontiers, rather than from any signal success obtained by the enemy against the ports and batteries, that it was determined at the close of the war to adopt a system of defence by permanent fortifications on a large scale. Under an excitement fed by the friends of the scheme, Congress voted large sums of money to be expended on works which were to be planned, principally, by a foreign engineer, with such help as might, perchance, be rendered by the native officers of engineers, some of whom had not altogether escaped distinction in the late war. A distinguished general officer of engineers in France, who stood high in the estimation of Napoleon, was engaged and received in service of the United States under the title of assistant engineer, with the rank and pay of a brigadier general. No protest against this arrangement was made by those officers of engineers whose rank and influence would have entitled them to be heard in opposition, if any was entertained by them. The acquiescence of these officers, if not amounting to approval, led Congress and the authorities to suppose that no serious disapproval of the measures adopted was entertained by them. Being thus negatively indorsed, it was considered that a good arrangement had been made by the government, by which a lack of skill in the native officers, unfitting them for the task of designing the grand scheme of defence, might be supplied by an importation from abroad.

Under the auspices of the foreign engineer, a scheme for the defence of the seaboard from Passamaquoddy to the Sabine was devised, involving a cost of many millions of dollars, and submitted to and approved by the government.

The progress of construction of the works under the new, or as it has been termed "the third system of defence," was not very rapid. The Gulf frontier being considered the weakest and most assailable was first attended to, and in about ten years the river and lake approaches to New Orleans, and the entrance to Mobile bay, were occupied by strong works. The commencement of new works of the system was, in the meantime, gradually extended to the north and south Atlantic coasts, and subsequently to all of the most important points along the Gulf and Atlantic frontiers. These defences, combining the repairs of old works with the construction of new ones, place the sea-coast of the United States in a better condition of defence than that of any other sea-coast in the world.

In planning the new works, it seems to have been taken for granted, in many instances, that each work must depend on itself, without chance of succor from

forces operating on the rear and flanks. Works were thus constructed, to sustain a siege from ten to fifty days, in the midst of a population from which relief to the invested work could be drawn in twenty-four hours. The expensive arrangement of these land defences have greatly increased the cost of the works, already from their nature very costly; and at this day excite the surprise of the professional examiner, acquainted with the vast means of collateral defence possessed by the United States, that anything more should have been required for most of the works, than security against assault by escalade.

The report to be made by the chief engineer of the United States, on the second resolution of the series before mentioned, will exhibit the exact condition of the works composing "the third system of defence," the number and strength of the works; the first estimates of cost; their extent, capacity, armament, and actual cost; and an estimate of the sums necessary to complete them.

This exhibition will prove what has been herein stated, that the United States, at this time, possess the best fortified sea-coast in the world.

Whilst the defence of the coast has been gradually accomplished in the course of thirty-five years by the construction of permanent, extensive, and expensive fortifications, new and important elements in the national defence and security have been rapidly, almost magically, developed. Our population has increased from 8,000,000 to 23,000,000. The progress of improvement in agriculture, manufactures and commerce, and in the facile lines of intercommunication necessary to meet the demands of the growing prosperity of the country, has advanced in a ratio even greater than that of the population.

The lines of communication, in combination with the electric telegraph, whilst they impart new life and vigor to the country, bring distant sections of it in easy correspondence with the centre, at once affording security against foreign aggression, and making the people more interested in preserving those glorious institutions under which, for seventy years, they have happily lived and prospered.

The interior and exterior commerce of the country have advanced with surprising strides. the latter has become so necessary to the leading commercial nations of the world, that its interruption would produce disastrous results to those nations. The stoppage of the supply of cotton following a war with the United States, would be attended in England by the most serious consequences to her trade and finances-consequences deemed by many as being fatal to the political institutions of that country.

In this brief review we have passed through three epochs: that of the revolutionary war; that of the war of 1812-'15; and that of the elapsed time from 1815 to 1851.

In the first epoch it has been shown that the power of England, although relatively greater than it is now in respect to this country, aided also as it was by a considerable portion of the inhabitants remaining loyal to England, was inadequate to subdue our people, or to retain any portion of our soil.

In the second epoch it has also been shown that though the national defence by permanent fortifications was weak in comparison with the present one, and the means for the operation of the mobile forces were limited and difficult in their use, the most formidable demonstrations of the enemy were easily defeated and the country preserved from any injurious attacks of the enemy, except in one or two instances.

And in the third epoch it is shown that, in the several international difficulties which have arisen with France and England, those powerful nations gave evidence throughout the pending negotiations, of their desire to maintain that pacific policy so essential to the prosecution of the commercial and manufacturing pursuits which have been extended so rapidly in their respective countries during the last thirty years.

This epoch, now of thirty-five years duration, is distinguished for the profound

peace which has been maintained throughout the civilized world without interruption, except in the instances of the Mexican war, and of some unimportant conflicts in Europe; and that whilst it has thus been distinguished, it is no less so on account of the wonderful progress made in the arts and sciences, by whose influence the character of nations and of their governments have been greatly changed for the better, affording new guarantees that the pacific policy, so long and profitably maintained by the leading commercial nations, will continue to be cherished toward all countries and toward ours in particular.

In view, then, of all these things, and especially of the new elements, moral, political, and physical, claimed to have been developed and to have greatly increased the power of the United States, and which must be considered in relation to the future arrangement of the national defence, the undersigned thinks that the general plan adopted thirty-five years ago should be essentially modified, by reducing the number and size of the works proposed to be constructed, and by abandoning some of the defences now in progress of construction, or which are about to be constructed under existing appropriations made by Congress.

The undersigned is also of the opinion that the best interests of the country require that the subject of modification should be submitted to a board composed of artillery and engineer officers, and some eminent civilians. That no new work should be commenced, even if it has been appropriated for by Congress; and that no appropriation should be made by Congress for the completion and repairs of existing works, until the whole subject of the national defence has been considered and reported by the said board.

The Secretary of War desires "that the chief engineer and the above-named officers (Colonel Thayer, Lieutenant Colonel De Russy, Major Delafield, and Major Chase) should direct their inquiries particularly to the following points: "1st. How far the invention and extension of railways have superseded or diminished the necessity of fortifications on the seaboard?

"2d. In what manner and to what extent the navigation of the ocean by steam, and particularly the application of steam to vessels-of-war, and recent improvements in artillery and other military inventions and discoveries, affect the question?

"3d. How far vessels-of-war, steam batteries, ordinary merchant ships and steamers, and other temporary expedients can be relied upon as substitutes for permanent fortifications for the defence of the large seaports?

"4th. How far the increase of the population on the northern frontier, and of the mercantile marine on the northern lakes, can obviate or diminish the necessity of continuing the system of fortifications on those lakes?"

The results of the inquiries made by the undersigned in the premises are expressed as follows:

1st. The invention and extension of railways and of the electric telegraph, in connexion with the great increase in the number and size of steam vessels navigating the rivers, bays, lakes, and ocean, have added greatly to the strength of the Union, by bringing the most distant sections within a few days' travel of the centre, and do thus contribute to preserve tranquillity at home and repel aggression from abroad.

The lines of railways, assuming the radiating point at New York, will shortly be extended to most of the important seaboard and inland towns in the United States. The telegraph lines following the rails, and also diverging from them, are beginning to interlace the country in every direction. By these means, and the rapid increase of our population indigenously and by immigration, agricul ture and manufactures, have been surprisingly extended throughout our broad domain, and an internal commerce has arisen, by the interchange of the products of art and of our various climates, which is considered to be of greater value than the exterior commerce of the country. With the exception of a few articles,

our artificial and natural productions embrace everything that can be produced in any part of the world.

These are immense elements of strength to a nation, and insure its power and prosperity. This is the moral effect.

The existence of these railways and telegraphs contribute directly and physically to the defence of the country, by enabling men and military supplies to be collected promptly and moved rapidly to points threatened with invasion. Railways extend already along the coast, in some instances, in double lines, from Portland to Savannah, connecting all the intermediate cities and other important points with the canals and rivers and the naval and military arsenals and depots. From this great base line, other lines convergent and divergent, have reached lakes Erie, Ontario, and Champlain, and they are rapidly approaching and crossing the great lakes and rivers of the west. And it is hoped that Congress will not long delay, in conjunction with the State of Texas, in making such a donation of lands as will enable private enterprise to commence and complete a railway leading from some point between the mouth of Red river and New Orleans, through Louisiana and Texas to El Paso, and thence through the valley of the Gila to San Diego, in California.

A single example of the pervading extent of the railway system will at once illustrate the subject, and exhibit in a favorable light these new means for the national defence. The completion of the railway now in course of completion, from Wilmington, in North Carolina, to Manchester, in South Carolina will enable troops to be transported continuously, by railway, from the valley of the Tennessee to Norfolk in two days, to Washington in two and a half days, and to Charleston and Savannah in one day. The extension of the railway now being made from Chattanooga, on the Tennessee river, to Nashville, will enable the volunteers from the superb military population of Tennessee to be carried to the most distant points of the north and south Atlantic, almost at a moment's warning, and in the course of three or four days; whilst the speedy completion of the road from Atlanta, in Georgia, to Montgomery, in Alabama, and the probable construction of a road from Montgomery to Mobile and Pensacola, will bring the Gulf of Mexico within a day's travel of the same great State of Ten

nessee.

At the north the system of railways is much more extended. The New York and Erie road, now complete, is proposed to be extended along the shore of Lake Erie to Cleveland, and thence to Detroit, from whence a road has been carried to Chicago, on Lake Michigan. The seaboard base of railways will thus be brought within easy communication of the most distant lake frontier.

The Massachusetts, Vermont, St. Lawrence, and Montreal railways will bring the whole Canada frontier, extending from Lake Ontario down to Montreal, within twenty-four hours' travel, on an average, of Boston, Portland, and New York.

The transportation of troops on railways may be effected with great promptness. The first regiment of Pennsylvania, raised in Philadelphia, the most distant point from the scene of action, were transported so rapidly to New Orleans, via Pittsburg and the Pennsylvania railways, that the regiment, one thousand strong, was placed in the van of the volunteer forces, raised for the campaign against Mexico, under General Scott.

Sufficient has been said to show that railways and the electric telegraph contribute largely to the national defence; that the works covering our large seaports and other important points, placed in connexion with the railways and telegraph, if they were now to be constructed, might be much reduced in size and cost, if not in number; that the facility with which these works could be relieved, in case of an attempted siege, would have rendered it only necessary for them to be made secure against a coup-de-main.

Under these views of the subject, it is at once perceived that, whilst the ex