in the nature of maritime attack and defence, these or kindred means must be resorted to; not, however, because they are means intrinsically good, or suitable under other circumstances, but because they are the only means applicable."

Admitting, then, that "any very broad water, where deep soundings may be carried at a distance from the shores greater than effective gun-range, and where no insular spots, natural or artificial, can be found or formed nearer the track of ships, will present such a situation; and we may take some of our great bays as examples," as a premise to the second query, then what auxiliaries shall be resorted to? Of all those which, in connexion with permanent works, might be selected to control effectually the channels of our principal watercourses and harbors, none are less reliable than floating batteries and gunboats.

In the well-constructed fort, the chief merit is a capacity of endurance almost impregnable to the assaults of shipping.

In the ship, a mobility which gives the facility of transferring the great power of her battery to any part of the channel that may need it. The disadvantage of one is its immobility, which restricts it to a fixed point, whence it can control nothing beyond gun range; of the other, a vulnerable material very susceptible of damage from protracted battering.

The floating battery unites the weak points of both fort and ship. It is neither spear nor shield, and is altogether objectionable, as inefficient, costly, and unsuited to the character and resources of a great nation. Its worthlessness as a defence is well manifested by the affair at Copenhagen in 1800, under circumstances when, of all others, it would have been most gratifying to every sense of justice that it should have protected the neutral rights of a brave but feeble nation. On that occasion there were six hundred and twenty-eight guns mounted on a line of floating defences, supported, as well as the urgency of the case admitted, by several forts and a reserve of heavy ships.

Nine English line-of-battle ships entered the channel skirted by the Danish line; commenced action at distances varying two hundred to four hundred yards, captured and destroyed the Danish floating batteries in three or four hours, and sustained no damage sufficient to interfere with their proceeding against the other parties to "armed neutrality "-Sweden and Russia.

The report of the board of engineers, previously referred to, embodies many interesting details of this event, to which the only material objection is the mode of stating the force.

1st. The Bellona, 74, and Russell, 74, grounded on the edge of the shoal, having their own line directly between them and the Danes, so that their fire could be of little avail, though themselves might be much damaged by the shot from the enemy which missed the English line.

2d. The frigates and sloops had been directed to take the stations of these ships opposite the tick rouer battery, so that of the twelve line-of-battle ships only nine were opposed to the floating batteries, being about fifty guns stronger than the Danish line, and not three hundred and eighty-two, as the report infers. One of the board of engineers' deductions from this engagement is so conclusive that it may be quoted without further comment. It is thus (page 20 :) "That it illustrates strikingly the advantages that a fleet possesses over a stationary line of floating defences. Lord Nelson was superior to the whole of his adversary's floating force; but not being disposed to run any unnecessary hazard, he directed all his force upon a part of the Danish line, which was of course defeated; and had there been no other than a floating force present, so of course would have been the remainder, had it been twice the strength it was. This example fully confirms what we have before urged on this topic."

Some idea of the expense of large floating batteries may be gathered from the paper of General Gaines on coast defence. Those proposed by him were to carry one hundred and twenty to two hundred cannon. The estimated cost by

the chief naval architect was $1,400,000, for each of the batteries with its tow boats; which sum would build three line-of-battle ships or two war steamers.

It is further to be urged, that any such passive system of defence is entirely at variance with the tone and temper of our people, and the reputation of a powerful nation. The national policy may be strictly defensive, but when compelled to resort to war, its system of operations should be rather offensive in its character, if it were only to enforce the sound maxim of preserving its own soil from the desolating presence of an enemy.

If the floating battery is the most useless of all the stationary defences, the gunboat may be considered as the most miserable of all the war craft that sail; nothing more effectual could possibly be devised to render skill and bravery unavailing. The experience which we have already had has sufficiently confirmed opinion in the navy as to the dependence that may be placed on the performance of these pigmy warriors, and renders it needless to occupy time in any labored exposition of their worthlessness. In reciting the events of past days, our own naval historian (Cooper) has very distinctly given his estimate of their demerits, which, by the way, he does not altogether confine to the question now at issue, of capacity for offence and defence, if we may judge from the following pithy paragraph:

"This was the development of the much condemned 'gunboat system,' which for a short time threatened destruction to the pride, discipline, tone, and even morals of the service."

It is singular, however, that two distinguished statesmen should, about the same time, have given their faith to the efficacy of the gunboat-one in England, and the other here. Mr. William Pitt, about the year 1803, in a motion censuring the ministry, found a strong reason in their neglect to provide more gunboats. Admiral Sir E. Pellow, then in Parliament, was unable to sustain his political friends in the measure, and in a short and characteristic speech used these words:

"As to the gunboats which have been so strongly recommended, this mosquito fleet, they are the most contemptible force that can be employed."

About thirteen years later it fell to his lot to verify this opinion. In his memorable attack on Algiers, it is stated that "soon after the battle began the enemy's flotilla of gunboats advanced, with a daring which deserved a better fate, to board the Queen Charlotte and Leander. The smoke covered them at first, but as soon as they were seen, a few guns, chiefly from the Leander, sent thirty-three out of thirty-seven to the bottom."

Dispensing, then, with such inefficient aids, there remains for consideration the navy proper, which, it may be asserted, is indeed not only a sure reliance, if it be properly constituted, but is indispensable to any degree of security along our line of coast, now washed for thousands of miles by the two great oceans; and also to maintain the communication by water and the isthmus between the Atlantic and Pacific States, where forts, floating batteries, and gunboats can no longer enter into the question, even were they a perfect defence for every other interest covered by our flag.

In the first place, it is believed to be susceptible of proof that a naval force, somewhat greater than the attacking force, may be relied on in connexion with the present or proposed works at Boston, New York, Delaware, Chesapeake, and some southeast port, to protect the coast from Florida to Maine, and (as corollary to this proposition,) will destroy or capture the enemy that may commit itself seriously against either of these ports.

To illustrate this, I will assume the attacking force to be the twenty steam frigates of the engineer's report of 1840. To New York harbor, to Delaware and Chesapeake bays, would be assigned a certain number of ships, varying with the peculiar circumstances of the time; for the present, let us assume the defending force to be stationed thus: New York ten ships, Delaware eight, and

Chesapeake seven; and to avoid the recounting of local details, I again recur to New York as the object selected by the enemy.

The stationary floating defence to be used will be the old sailing frigates and line-of-battle ships of the navy, having heavy batteries on the gun-decks, and pivot pieces of the largest calibre on the upper deck. Every spar taken out, even to the lower masts, and the ships well secured with several chains to their moorings; one at A, to bear on the ships in crossing the bar; three at B, C, and D, to close the swash channel; and one at E, inside of the southwest spit; which, with the fort on the Hook, is to assist in defending the main channel.

The enemy's twenty ships are signalled from the Neversink heights, and in half an hour the Delaware and Chesapeake squadrons are at sea steering north. It is obvious that any loss of time from irresolution or from want of information which is to be obtained by reconnoitring, must be to the disadvantage of the enemy.

Suppose him well supplied with pilots, which, in a war, the Cunard line can furnish abundantly, and aware that reinforcements are on the way, it is probable that the attack will be commenced without delay.

The first point of defence is at the bar; the deep water here is so narrow that the enemy will hardly risk his ships in any one channel, even in two columns, and his line is therefore exposed to the concentrated fire of our ten ships, and of the line-of-battle ship at A.

After crossing, the van will endeavor to form the line abreast, as far as the channel admits, in order to relieve the leading ships; but our own ships recede before them, and by this time the guns of the line-of-battle ships B and C are beginning to tell. Following our steamers, the enemy soon comes within the fire of the fort, and advancing onward, the line-of-battle-ship at E is brought into play. The headmost of his ships have now for more than half an hour been under the concentrated fire of four hundred pieces of the heaviest calibre; and it is hardly possible that they should not be incapacitated for moving with any rapidity. Even if their offensive powers be undisabled, they must therefore be soon dropped astern by their main body moving with full speed, and their force be lost in the rest of the day's operations. On the other hand, our own ships have felt the fire of the enemy's leading ships only, and if any one be damaged, can anchor near the fort or line-of-battle ships, and do good service on the passing ships.

It is probable that in rounding the southwest spit, the number of the hostile fleet will be reduced to fifteen or sixteen ships, capable of full motive power, if an average degree of success have attended the defending force. And these must be brought to action before reaching the city.

Without pretending to indicate the precise time and place most proper for this, suppose that it be decided to make a stand before entering the Narrows. When it is evident that the enemy will not attempt to force the swash, and has followed the main channel, the line-of-battle ships A, B, C may slip their moorings and be towed by river steamers on each side up the swash, their draught having been adapted to that purpose, and take in moorings previously provided at the debouche of the channel into the main course below the Narrows.

Our own steamers will here prepare to receive the attack, or to make it if declined by the enemy, who may adhere to the main purpose of reaching the city.

The action will, of course, terminate in the defeat of the weaker party, though not necessarily in the destruction or capture of his ships. But in what condition will the enemy find his ships? How many of his steamers will there remain to attempt the passage, and what will be their capacity to do it after the rough handling that has been experienced?

It may be that not one of his vessels has struck its flag or is disabled, but the power of moving with certainty and speed is crippled, and their exposure to the

fire of the forts therefore so much increased in time as to render the attempt hazardous. Pieces of heavy ordnance can also be mounted on stout merchant ships and steamers, forming a reserve to be placed along the passage where the guns of the forts do not command, so as to sustain a steady cannonade on whatever ships of the enemy may remain in a condition to proceed. Meanwhile a few hours will bring up a fresh squadron, and soon after this will be reinforced, so that fifteen steamers in perfect order will enter the bay. The result must be the capture and destruction of the invading force.

This is the view which I consider fairly presentable of the favorite case so frequently urged, wherein the advantage is enjoyed by the assailing party of selecting time and place without warning to the defending force.

It seems highly probable that the defence of any important point, with some

exception as it regards the southeast and Gulf coasts, can be made good with no greater additional force in the aggregate than above mentioned, admitting every advantage that can be claimed for this arrangement of the enemy.

That advantage is limited to a space in time that admits of no accident to force, speed, or any of the multifarious details of a fleet. Its operations must be as precise and perfect as those of the machine that moves each steamer.

From the moment that the hostile fleet comes in sight there is a sure concentration of a superior force, and in a few hourst here will no longer be the power to choose. An action is inevitable; and whatever be the result to our own squadron, that of the enemy will certainly be unable to prosecute any enterprise against harbors or coasts for the time.

It is, however, out of the question for any such fleet to hazard itself on a coast where the certain superiority, no matter how small, exists; and the entire line of shore northward would therefore be fully secured against an enemy's vessel. Southward of Hatteras the necessity of naval means for defence is even more stringent than to the northward.

The objects of attack differ as widely also from those just under consideration as the manner in which shipping must be applied to defence in order to be available.

The resources of private enterprise are no longer aggregated so densely, but are scattered along the country bordering on the coast in a manner that renders it difficult for the most eager marauder to do much in his line.

The commercial cities are pretty well defended from the extensive movements of large fleets by the bars which border the channel-ways to their harbors.

The interior lines of communication formed by the long downs of sand that skirt the Atlantic shore are, however, accessible to vessels of inferior force, and the command of these would give the control of all the trade that by its light draught finds convenience in the smoother waters of the inlet. The most important debouch, however, for the resources of the country is the outlet of the Mississippi, through which is poured, in a never-failing tide, the rich products of the great valley of the river. To check this, to impede it, to harass in the least degree, would be an evil of the greatest magnitude, and be felt in the remotest regions of the west.

The general character of the southern shore of itself prevents the operations of vessels of heavy draught; hence the defence must be nearly the reverse of that recommended for the shores north of Hatteras. There heavy ships will lie inshore, and light cruisers be thrown out seaward to watch the motions of the main force of the enemy, and coastwise to check small marauders or parties for wood and water. On the southeast and Gulf coast the light steamers and vessels of the third class would keep the inlets and their approaches and the various avenues contiguous to the Mississippi. While seaward the heaviest ships must abide the first brunt of the attack and defence at all risk, so as to cripple the forces of the assailant should he be strong enough to close with the inshore squadron.

The true and only key, however, to the defence of these shores, and to the immense interest there collected, is the Havana. The island to which it belongs enters its western extreme into the Gulf, leaving but two passages for vessels so narrow as to be commanded with the greatest facility; these are the great thoroughfares of trade and the mail steamers from New Orleans to California and New York. Hence if the use of the Havana be even at the disposal of an enemy while in the hands of a neutral power, each and all of these interests could be with difficulty defended, even by a superior naval force, and never guaranteed against severe losses. While from it as a United States port, a squadron of moderate size would cover the southeast and Gulf coasts, protect the foreign and inshore traders, and secure the lines from New Orleans or New York to the Pacific States by way of the Isthmus, its occupation would necessarily