defence or annoyance, unless, indeed, the proposed artificial connexions with the interior, before pointed out, should be found impracticable.

A very exact survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, which would suffice for forming a scheme of defence, if no other object were in view than the security of the town and harbor. Considered, however, as a naval station and a place of rendezvous and repairs, further surveys, extending a greater distance from the shores, delineating accurately the face of the country, and showing the several avenues by land and water, are found to be necessary.

The western extremity of Santa Rosa island is nevertheless so situated in respect to the mouth of the bay as to require in part the same works in either case, and the board can, therefore, whenever ordered, project a fort for this position which in either case should be the first occupied.

Perdido bay.*—This bay is intimately related to Pensacola and Mobile bays both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be surveyed carefully with a view to these objects.

Mobile bay.t-As the subject of the fortification of Mobile bay has been treated at some length in the report on the Gulf of Mexico defences made in 1817, and still more in detail in a special report of 1822, the board referring to these communications, especially the latter, will confine themselves here to a few general observations.

This bay receives at its head the two rivers Alabama and Tombeckbe, which water almost the whole State of Alabama-a State the fifth in the Union as to extent of territory, inferior to none in the quality of its soil, and hitherto doubling its population every four years since its admission into the confederacy.

The probable union at no distant day of the rivers discharging into Mobile bay with the Tennessee, whereby this bay will become a new outlet for a part at least of the productions of the western States, independently of the natural one, the great distance to which these rivers are even now navigable with steamboats, the fertility of soil, rapid growth of population and trade, the close lateral connexion which exists with New Orleans and the Mississippi on the one hand, and Pensacola bay on the other, serve to give great and increasing importance to this communication with the Gulf.

Referring for the mode of defence adopted by the board again to the same reports wherein the subject will be found treated at large, we now only add that the forts on Mobile Point and Dauphin island and the tower at the Pass au Heron, designed to defend the three passages into the bay and the important anchorage between Dauphin and Pelican islands, will cost $1,142,056 83.

New Orleans and the delta of the Mississippi-It is altogether unnecessary for the board to say anything in this report with a view to illustrate either the amount of benefits to result from applying a well-adapted system of defence to this part of the coast of the Gulf, or the direful consequences flowing from leaving it in an unprepared and defenceless condition. The value of the stake is now too great, is too rapidly augmenting, and is too justly appreciated, for the nation to suffer its safety ever again to hang on the doubtful issue of a battle.

We pass on, therefore, to the task of noticing briefly the avenues requiring defence and the works projected to attain that end, refering to the report of 1817, as embracing all the relations of the subject, both general and local.

The most northern water communication between the Mississippi and the Gulf is by the passage called the Rigolets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain; the next is by the pass of Chef Menteur, (divided from the former by Isle aux Pine,) also uniting the same lakes. Through these passages an enemy entering Lake Pontchartrain would, at the same time that he intercepted all water communication with Mobile and Pensacola, be able to reach New Orleans

See report of 1812. † See reports of 1817 and 1822.

See report of 1817.

from its southern shore, or he might continue onward through Lake Mauripas, Amite river, and Iberville river, thereby reaching the head of the delta, a position which he could easily maintain; or landing within the mouths of Chef Menteur he might move against the city along the ridge of the Gentilly road. The fort for the defence of the first named pass is completed and that for Chef Menteur is in a state of forwardness.

To the southwest of the latter pass and at the head of Lake Borgne is Bayou Bienvenu, a navigable channel (the one pursued by the English army in the late war) not running into the Mississippi, but having shores of such a nature as to enable troops to march from the point of debarkation to the city. A little to the south of this is Bayou Dupré, also affording easy access to the city. The few natural difficulties and the shortness of these lines of operation make it necessary to place a fort near the mouth of the first, and a tower at the outlet of the other. The defences of the Mississippi itself are placed at Plaquemine turn, the lowest position which can be occupied.

Fort Jackson, now building, is on the right shore, a little above old Fort St. Philip. This last work it was intended originally to improve, and an estimate was made with that view; from a recent inspection, however, it appears to be falling too rapidly to ruins to justify such an undertaking. It is nevertheless believed that that estimate will suffice for a new work, well adapted to the posi

tion.

The only permanent work required to the west of the Mississippi is a fort to occupy Grand Terre island, for the purpose of defending the entrance to Barrataria bay, an excellent harbor for a floating force guarding the coasting trade on that side, and whence there are several passages leading to the Mississippi near New Orleans.

The whole cost of the system of defence for New Orleans and the delta of the Mississippi is estimated at $1,566,515 42.

None of the old forts or batteries are embraced in the system.

Before leaving this part of our subject it is necessary to advert to the important uses which may be made of movable floating defences in aid of fortifications. The applications of this auxiliary force along the coast of the United States might be numerous, and, as has been before remarked, would in certain cases be requisite to attain full security for all the objects needing protection. In the instance before us, for example, fortifications will enable us to protect the city of New Orleans even from the most serious and determined efforts of an enemy; but owing to the great width of the passages we cannot by them alone deprive an enemy of good exterior anchorages, especially the very excellent one west of Chandeleur island, nor cover entirely the natural interior water communication between the Rigolets and Mobile.

We must therefore either quietly resign these powerful means of annoying and distressing us to the occupancy of an adversary, or seek their preservation in a timely preparation of a floating force adapted to this peculiar navigation, and capable, under favor of the shelter afforded by the forts, of being always on the alert, and of assuming alternately an offensive or defensive attitude according to the designs, the conduct, or situation of the enemy.

As these means of defence are, however, secondary to fortifications in every sense, as the extent to which they may be needed must depend on the relation of our naval force to that of other powers, a relation continually varying; and as the characteristics of this species of force may be expected to be modified or even radically changed in this age of rapid advancement in all the arts, it is considered premature to go now into any details in reference to its application here or elsewhere.

From the preceding sketch of the system projected for the defence of the

seaboard of the United States,* it will appear that all the fortifications proposed are not of the same pressing necessity, nor of like importance; that some are required immediately, while the commencement of others may be postponed. In proceeding to class them, we must observe that the works of the most urgent necessity are those destined to prevent an enemy from forming a permanent or even momentary establishment in the country-those which will defend our great naval arsenals, and those which will cover our chief commercial cities.

In the second class we will place such as defend those naval stations and cities of a secondary rank, which, either from natural or artificial defences, existing works, &c., are not entirely without protection, and can wait at least until the more important points are secured against a first attack.

Finally, in the third class we will arrange the works which will complete the defensive system in all its parts, but whose construction may, without great danger, be deferred until the frontier shall have received all the successive degrees of strength resulting from the gradual erection of the forts of the first and second classes.

A fourth class is added, containing such works as will be necessary, only conditionally.

Table A, joined to this report, has been drawn up on these principles, and shows:

First. That the works to be erected during the first period will cost $9,686,160 59, will require 2,610 men, at most, to garrison them in time of peace, and 20,517 in case of siege.

Second. That the works of the second class will cost $2,314,309 47, will require 666 men, at most, to garrison them in peace, and 6,841 in case of siege. Third. That the expense of the works belonging to the third class will amount to $4,536,984 62; their garrisons in time of peace to 635 men, and in case of siege to 6,071 men.

Fourth. That the total expense of completely fortifying the maritime frontier will amount to $16,537,454 68; the troops necessary to guard these fortifications in peace to 3,911 men, at most, and 33,482 men in time of war, supposing them all, which cannot happen, besieged at once.

The time required to construct the whole system must depend entirely upon the annual appropriations which the nation may grant to this branch of the publie service. All that can be said upon the subject is, that in an undertaking of such vital importance to the safety, prosperity, and greatness of the Union, there should be no relaxation of effort and perseverance. A work of such magnitude must, with every effort, be the work of years; and however long it may be before any sensible effects are produced, the final result is not the less certain. And should no danger threaten the republic in our own days, future generations may owe the preservation of their country to the precaution of their forefathers. France was at least fifty years completing her maritime and interior defences, but France, on more than one occasion since the reign of Louis XIV, has been saved by the fortifications erected by the power of that monarch and the genius of Vauban.

However slow the progress of the system may be, from the necessity of a sparing application of the public funds to this purpose, it is essential to disburse something in this way each year, so as to give to the frontier an annual increase of strength. We must, therefore, insist on the advantage of dividing the course of construction into several periods, according to the greater or lesser urgency; of beginning the works successively, agreeably to the order designated, and of rigidly adhering to it. By this mode satisfactory results will be obtained as

H. Rep. Com. 86———4

See report of 1821.

early as practicable, while, if we were to begin all at once, it would be long before we should be capable of defending ourselves anywhere.

We shall now enter upon the subject of the expense of erecting these works and garrisoning them for war, and compare it with the expense of defending the coast in its present state. To clear the subject as much as possible we shall only examine it with respect to Boston, Narraganset bay, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, and New Orleans. Charleston, South Carolina, and Savannah, Georgia, would also be included if we knew the cost of the defences and the amount of garrison necessary.

Supposing an enemy had concentrated twenty thousand men at Halifax or Bermuda, the government must, on hearing of this force, at once prepare to resist it at all the points mentioned above; as it will be impossible to foresee on which the first blow will be struck, it will be necessary to have troops encamped at each. And to meet the attack with a force not less, numerically, than that of the assailant, the troops kept constantly under arms in each of these camps must at least equal one-half of the hostile expedition, while as many more are kept in readiness within call. These points are so immediately accessible in some cases and so remote from succor in others, that, after the point of attack is announced by the appearance of the enemy before it, there will remain no time for re-enforcements to come from the interior.

By manoeuvring in front of any of these places he would induce us to concentrate our forces there, when, suddenly profiting of a favorable breeze, he would sail to another, which he would reach in a few hours, and would not fail to seize if a force were not stationed there likewise equal to his own. No re-enforcements can in this case arrive from the interior in time, for all the troops under march would have taken up a direction upon the point he had just quitted. Our whole coast from Maine to Louisiana would thus be kept in alarm by a single expedition, and such is the extent and exposure of the seaboard that an enemy would ruin us by a war of mere threatenings. If the cities are not garrisoned they will become his prey at once; and if they are, the treasury will be gradually emptied, the credit of the government exhausted, the wearied and starving militia will desert to their homes, and nothing can avert the direful consummation of tribute, pillage, and conflagration.

The table C joined to this report shows that to be in readiness on each of these vulnerable points it will be requisite to maintain 77,000 men, encamped and under arms at the seven places mentioned, and 63,000 ready to march and within call.

This number is in fact below that which would be required, for these points being exposed, according to our hypothesis, to an attack from 20,000 regular and disciplined troops, 20,000 militia would not be able to repel them unless aided by intrenchments, requiring a time to construct them which would not be allowed us, and involving expenses which we do not comprise in our estimate. Besides, to have 20,000 men, especially new levies, under arms, it will be necessary, considering the epidemics which always assail such troops, to carry the formation of these corps to at least 25,000 men.

The State of Louisiana being remote from succor requires a larger force under arms than the other points; we have fixed this force at 17,000, considering that the State might furnish 3,000 within call.

Considering all expenses, 1,000 regular troops, including officers, cost $300,000 per annum and $150 per man for a campaign of six months; 1,000 militia, including officers, cost $400,000 per annum, $200 per man for a six months' campaign.

But taking into consideration the diseases which invariably attack men unaccustomed to a military life, and the consequent expense of hospital establishments; the frequent movement of detachments from the camp to their homes and from the interior to the camp, and the cost of camping furniture, utensils, accou

trements, &c., which is the same for a short campaign as for a year; the cost of a militiaman cannot be reckoned at less than $250 per man for six months.

The seventy-seven thousand militiamen necessary to guard the above mentioned points, in the present situation of the maritime frontier, will therefore cost, in a campaign of six months, $19,250,000.

In strict justice there should be added to the expense, which is, we believe, much undervalued, amongst other things, the loss of time and diminution of valuable products resulting from draining off so considerable a portion of efficient labor from its most profitable occupation. This, besides being a heavy tax on individuals, is a real loss to the nation. It would be utterly vain to attempt an estimate of the loss to the nation, from the dreadful mortality which rages in the camps, of men suddenly exposed to the fatigues and privations of military life, or to compare the respective values in society of the citizen and the soldier.

The total expense of constructing the works at Boston, Narraganset bay, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, and New Orleans, will amount to $13,764,073 08, (see table B, and previous reports.) Their garrisons may consist of the same number of regular troops in time of war as in time of peace, the remainder being furnished by the militia, held in readiness to throw themselves into the forts on the first appearance of an enemy. By this arrangement 2,980 regulars and 24,000 militia, either in the works or in small corps on advantageous positions, making 26,980 men, would suffice after the erection of the works; 43,020 being kept in readiness to march when called upon.

We should, therefore, have only 26,980 to pay and support, instead of 77,000; and the expense would be $6,447,000, instead of $19,250,000. The difference, $12,803,000, being only $961,073 08 less than the whole cost of the fortifications, it follows that the expense of their erection will be nearly compensated by the saving they will cause in a single campaign of six months.

It is proper to add, that though the expense of these works will be great, that expense is never to be renewed; while with troops, on the contrary, the expense is annually repeated, if not increased, until the end of the war. Besides, the

disbursements for fortifications are made in time of peace, slowly, and to an extent exactly correspondent with the financial resources of the country. Armies are, however, most wanted, and must be paid in periods of great emergency, when the ordinary sources of revenue are dried up and when the treasury can only be supplied by a resort to means the most disagreeable and burdensome to the people.

The defence of our maritime frontier by permanent fortifications, and even the disbursements for their construction, will thus tend to a real and positive economy. The vulnerable points being reduced to a small number, instead of waiting an attack on every point, and holding ourselves everywhere in readiness to repel it, we shall force an enemy to direct his assaults against those few, which, being well understood by us, will of course have received a timely preparation. There can be no doubt that such a state of things will make an adversary more reluctant to risk his expeditions, and that we shall not only therefore be better able to resist but also be less frequently menaced with invasion.

Some prominent military writers have opposed the principle of fortifying an extensive land frontier, but none have ever disputed the necessity of fortifying a maritime frontier. The practice of every nation, ancient and modern, has been the same in this respect. On a land frontier a good, experienced, and numerous infantry may in some cases dispense with fortifications; but though disciplined troops may cover a frontier without their aid, undisciplined troops cannot. On a maritime frontier, however, no description of troops can supply the place of strong batteries disposed upon the vulnerable points. The uncertainty of the point on which an enemy may direct his attack, the suddenness with which he may reach it, and the powerful masses which he can concentrate at a distance out of our reach and knowledge, or suddenly, and at the very mo