some of the "various improvements" which the art of attack has received since 1708, and of which the art of defence has received so few! That instead of fighting ships from batteries of old-fashioned carronades, long twelves, eighteens, and twenty-fours; instead of the old-fashioned mortars, which Napoleon put his seal against, let us have in our forts the improved shell guns and heavy ordnance of the present day, which will plant shot and shell where they are aimed, and carry destruction to a distance which not a gun with which our forts (according to the list by the army board in 1840) are to be furnished can ever reach.

I am permitted by Commodore Warrington to quote from experiments which he has caused to be made in naval gunnery at the Washington navy yard.

These experiments are going on there daily; any one who pleases may witness them. I cite from them to illustrate the position I maintain as to the destructive powers of this new and heavy ordnance, the accuracy of its fire, &c.

The figures are copied from the note-book of Lieutenant Dahlgren, United States navy, the officer who conducts the experiments.

The target is built of one upright and two horizontal layers of stout oak logs, bolted and fastened together in the most substantial manner. It is two and a half feet thick. These experiments were not conducted to represent the effects of this heavy ordnance upon forts and their walls, but upon wooden walls and the sides of ships. Therefore shells were used in the eight and nine-inch pieces to contrast their range and probable effect with the range and probable effect of a solid 32-pound shot.

The charge of powder used with the 32-pound shot was twenty-eight per cent. of its weight. The charge used with the two shells was only about thirteen per cent. of their weight, or, in proportion, not half as much as that used with the solid shot. Figures 1, 2, and 3 exhibit a horizontal section of the target, made to show the penetration of the shot.

Fig. 1.

8-inch shell, seven pounds of powder.

The penetration of the S-inch shell was the least. It was unloaded. Had it been charged it would have been lodged in the best place; for, exploding in the middle of the target built to represent the side of a man-of-war, it would have torn it to pieces.

Figure 2 is the 32-pound shot. The hole that it leaves behind it is so filled up with splinters that a common knitting-needle cannot be thrust in after it. Such a shot as figure 2 would do no serious hurt to a ship's side.

Figure 3 is the 9-inch shell. Here the shot went through and dropped down on the other side of the target, as shown in the drawing. It tore off the logs and scattered the splinters in the most frightful manner. Much more would it have gone through had the shot been solid instead of hollow, and had it been fired with a full instead of a very reduced charge of powder.

These big hollow shot, and the bigger the better, are the things for our forts to use against ships; whereas it is the big solid shot that ships want to use against forts, for shells, after striking, are apt to explode without penetrating or breaking a stone wall.

Figure 4 illustrates a common example of target firing in the open air. This target is not one-fourth the size of that presented by the cross section of a frigate. One nine or ten-inch shell lodged in the ship's bows as she approaches, and exploding, would probably sink or destroy her. Neither of the two gentlemen named on figure 4 (whose balls were so well planted) ever saw a shotted gun fired before. They pointed and aimed it themselves; and it is a fair example of what an unpracticed eye may do with a gun when planted where it may be fired with aim.

The

Certainly we have nothing like invasion by sea to fear from any nation on this side of the water, and it is hardly probable that any of the crowned heads on the other side would have the hardihood to send into this country invading armies from beyond the sea. very air we breathe protects us from any such liability. It is free air. Our republican institutions are dangerous to kings; and, in the minds of the kings, the effect of these institutions upon the soldiers of royal armies is far more dreadful than would be the system of 1816, with all its panoply of big forts and great guns.

It is, therefore, that our forts should be constructed and armed almost exclusively for resisting and repelling the attack of ships.

According to the Paixhan experiments and the opinion of the French officer, one or two shot from an eight-inch gun lodged in the side of a seventy-four would disable her. What would be the effect, therefore, of one or two; twice as large, from a ten-inch gun, striking a frigate or a steamer?

In turn, and per contra, suppose the battery of this heavy ordnance intended to keep ships off from all our towns, except the principal cities, to be planted on the beach without any support. The target that one of these guns and its crew would expose to the ship is very small, and when we consider the English mode of firing, and their sea fights, it would not be one shot in a hundred that, being fired from a ship, would strike such a target; her own smoke would conceal it from her. It affords no surface for splinters, which do the mischief. So that

unless the shot would strike the gun or its carriage, and there is no necessity of having them as exposed as in this hypothetical case I have represented them to be, a shot from the ship might pass, even among the men, without its striking any of them, and consequently without doing any mischief.

Fig. 4.

Experimental battery. Practice with 9-inch shell guns, January 2, 1851.

Screen, 550 yards. Shell, 73 pounds. Charges, 9 pounds.

Present: Hon. Mr. Stanton (chairman) and Hon. Mr. White, (member,) of the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives. Some of the shot were fired by these gentlemen. The lower shells were fired with the quadrant, (54',) the upper by the sights alone.

On account of the above recited facts and circumstances, on account of the considerations and reasons which they suggest, I propose, in answer to your first question, modifications to our present system of fortifications, &c., in the following particulars, to wit:

1st. That inasmuch as the new and improved heavy ordnance for throwing shot, both hollow and solid, has a longer range, gives greater accuracy, and is far more destructive than most of the ordnance with which our forts are now furnished, or than that by which, according to the report of 1840, it is intended to furnish them; therefore, I recommend that most of this ordnance of inferior range, penetration, accuracy, and destructiveness, be disposed of; that the sup plies of more be discontinued; and that the new and improved ordnance be

substituted in its stead.

I would not recommend that any of the old ordnance should be sold or melted down until the supplies of the new are completed, or nearly so, for occasion may arise, before we can be completely furnished with the new, when the old would be of great service.

2d. That no further expenses be incurred for preparing our fortifications along the Atlantic seaboard, to withstand sieges by land.

3d. That none of the works (except those in Portsmouth harbor) proposed in the army report of 1840, table D, "as works to be first commenced," nor in table E, as "works to be commenced next after those in D;" nor in table F, as "works to be last commenced," be commenced at all.

4th. That for the protection of the towns, villages, and landings, therein to be provided for, one or more pieces, according to the condition of the place, of the most effective ordnance, be planted at suitable points behind simple embankments or earthen parapets.

See page 74-7, Doc. No. 206, House Rep., 1st session.

The carriages of the guns so mounted should be constructed with the view of easy transportation from one point to another along the shores of the harbor to be defended; so that on rails, paved or plank roads built for the purpose, these pieces might in fact constitute a locomotive battery along the beach, and not leave it, as all shore-batteries have done, entirely optional with the assailants to choose position. As far as the defences of the town against ships are concerned, this improved ordnance may thus be converted into a sort of "flying artillery." 5th. Instead of supporting garrisons at the public expense, in times of peace, for the care and management of these guns, it is proposed that they and their munitions, properly secured, be given in charge of the State, or of the authorities of the place to be defended; first taking such legislative steps in the matter as will induce the formation of one or more volunteer artillery companies at such place for the purpose of exercising the guns, learning the practice, keeping them in order, and ready for use, &c.

Officers of the army should be detailed to instruct the volunteers thus offering, in the great gun exercise; to examine and report upon the state of these companies and batteries, and keep the government informed, at all times, as to the efficiency and condition of each.

The whole seaboard defences of this kind should be classed in divisions, each in charge of an artillery, or engineer or ordnance officer of rank, with a proper staff.

The headquarters of each division should be the principal place in it, as at Old Point for one, New York for another, Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans, &c., for others. Each of these places should be provided with the means of great gun exercise, including a field of practice, targets, the kind of roads for manoeuvring this kind of ordnance, &c.

The commander of each division should have authority to invite, annually, or as often as necessary, these volunteer artillery companies, or the best disciplined of them, to visit his headquarters and exercise in the practicing field, at target firing, &c.; the government paying the expenses of the trip, by allowing so much mileage, and so much per day during the visit.

We see our volunteer companies now are continually in the habit of visiting distant towns and villages, as a body, in their military capacity, and at their own expense. The practicing and the exercise with such terrible pieces would draw together a large concourse of people. This would give éclat, and the presentation of a sword, or some other reward for the best shot, would invest this feature of the modified system of defence with much animation, and infuse into these volunteer artillery men a spirit, a nerve, and skill which, in the day of battle, would make their pieces as firm as "Bragg's battery," and far more terrible and destructive than they would be if casemated in stone walls and enveloped all the time with their own smoke.

So far my remarks, in reply to your first question, relate to the defences of the Atlantic seaboard only. I proceed now to consider how far, and to what extent, the system of 1816 may be modified with regard to the defences of our Gulf and Pacific coasts.

I will speak first of the defences for the Gulf of Mexico.

We have seen that the system of 1816, as extravagant as it is, was never intended, in the mind even of its strongest advocates, to provide fortifications for every port, harbor, and anchorage along the seaboard in which an enemy might find shelter, take refuge, or form rendezvous in time of war.

Fortress Monroe would not prevent an enemy from entering the Chesapeake bay, nor hinder him from anchoring safely with his fleet at Tangier island, nor at the mouth of the Rappahannock, the York, or the Potomac river, nor at any one of the numerous safe and commodious anchorages that are to be found above Old Point. As far as any permanent fortifications that it is possible to erect at

H. Rep. Com. 86―30.

Fortress Monroe and the Rip Raps are concerned, an enemy might select any one of the above-named places as a rendezvous for his fleet, and make that his centre of operations against the whole bay coast, the rivers and towns along it, and carry on his depredating and marauding expeditions with just as much impunity as though no such fortress had been built.

It protects Norfolk and the navy yard from a fleet, but it does not prevent that same fleet from running up to York river, or the Rappahannock, or the Potomac, or up the bay, nor does it prevent it from landing an army at any one of these places, and marching it off against Richmond, Fredericksburg, Washington, or Baltimore. The railroad and telegraph do that.

The circumstances that such a fortress as Monroe, with an important navy yard under its cover, is between his fleet and the sea, might somewhat cramp or embarrass such an enemy in his operations is admitted, but it would not, therefore, prevent them, for if his naval forces in the bay were superior to our own, he would command the bay in spite of the fort.

Even if the Chesapeake bay was lined with works from head to mouth, and on both sides, such a chain of military posts, however strong and costly, could not prevent an enemy from entering the bay with his fleet, and safely riding upon its broad bosom, out of the reach of their guns. He might still make it the centre of his operations; most of the time the anchorage is safe in any part of the bay; these forts would be immovable; they could not go after him; and at most, they would only prevent him from selecting the most convenient places for shelter, and the best points from which to operate. That is all.

The same is the case in the Gulf of Mexico. For eight or nine months in the year vessels may ride in safety at anchor off the shore, anywhere between Pensacola and Galveston. The land there forms a lee, and affords a shelter from the northers. From two to twenty miles from the land, and in depth varying from three or four to twenty-five or thirty fathoms, the anchorage is good.

Now, if we rely upon fortifications to protect that coast, it will be observed, the whole Gulf front might be lined with them, and still they would be harmless against a fleet with its powers of locomotion. It could string itself at anchor along the coast, in sight of the very works built for defending it; and if our reliance were upon them, it might capture or dam up in stagnant ruin, all the commerce of the Mississippi valley. In the Gulf, as well as in the Chesapeake, and in our own waters generally, we must have the naval supremacy. În any plan of providing for the national defences that is an essential feature, and it ought to be sine qua non with Congress.

The plan, therefore, of providing permanent fortifications for the Gulf, seems to be this: that we should select a few of the points which would be most important for us as places of refuge and rendezvous, and which, if occupied by an enemy in war, would enable him the most to annoy us, and fortify them.

These points are Key West and the Tortugas, and perhaps Ship and Cat islands. In a commercial and military sense, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea are but an expansion of the Mississippi and Amazon rivers. In this view of the subject, the mouth of the Mississippi is not at the Balize, nor that of the Amazon at Paia; they are both in the Florida pass, between Key West and Cuba.

For one-half the year there is a sort of monsoon in the Gulf of Mexico; during this period the winds are from the southeast; at this season, therefore, the winds and the currents in the Yucatan pass are such as to prevent the passage that way of vessels from the Gulf.

Moreover, the island of Jamaica, where the English have a naval station, overlooks the Yucatan pass. When the northeast winds prevail the Yucatan pass is open to sailing vessels; but a few steamers, with Jamaica as the centre of operations, would close it to our commerce.

When the southeast winds prevail, the route of a sailing vessel bound from