the guns of a fort, mounted in casemates, but also to the guns of double-decked ships.

A single broadside from the gun-deck of a man-of-war will so fill her between decks with smoke as to render the object at which she is firing invisible, and consequently, unless she will wait for her own smoke to clear off, which requires some time, the rest of her firing, as all sea fights prove, is without aim, very much by guess, and therefore to little purpose.

The same is the case with guns fired from casemates of forts on shore, for in no other way can we account for the random firing; the very shots, in proportion to the whole number cast, that tell in the engagements of double-decked ships and casemated forts.

Two frigates or two seventy-fours will engage each other within pistol shot, or a fleet will attack a fort, and when we come to count the shot that have been fired, and to compare those that have told with those that have been thrown away, and then recollect the size of the target, we are astonished.

In the action between the Constitution and the Guerriere, which lasted for about half an hour, the two ships being within pistol shot, the former sufferred "very little in her hull, and lost but seven men.'

In the fight between the United States and Macedonian, the two ships were at close quarters for one hour. The former had five men killed. "The United States," says the same authority, "suffered surprisingly little, considering the length of the cannonade."

In the case of the Constitution and the Java, the action lasted two hours. The Constitution lost nine men, and only "received a few round shot in her hull." Perhaps in this time the Java did not fire less than two thousand shot, and fifty of them, well placed in the hull of her antagonist, would have sunk her. The Hornet and the Peacock were single-decked ships; their smoke would clear, and the Hornet could see to take aim. In less than fifteen minutes she sunk her antagonist.

In the battle of the Nile, where seventy-fours were principally engaged, and they in smooth water at anchor, and close, too, lasted through a part of three days. (No firing here like the Hornet's, though her target was so small in comparison. The secret is, she fired with aim; they, blinded in smoke, without.) The action between the Wasp and the Frolic, also single-decked vessels, lasted forty-three minutes, in which time the killed and wounded aboard the Frolic amounted to between ninety and one hundred. These small vessels are more unsteady in a sea-way than large ones; they do not offer so large a target, and yet their fire is so destructive. How else is it to be accounted for?

In the battle of Trafalgar, which was of long duration, and mostly between ships-of-the line, the loss was only about six men to every ten guns engaged, not one-tenth part of what it was in the action of the Wasp.

The use that I intend to make of these facts may be objected to, on the ground that I deduce a principle from the sea and apply it to the land, viz: that, because at sea, guns fired in the open air are much more destructive than those about which the decks confine the smoke, it does not follow that guns, when served from behind sand bags or mud banks on shore, are more destructive than they would be if served in casemates, by a crew blinded with smoke. I will quote cases directly in point: our army in Mexico, with guns behind sand bags, battered down the walls of Vera Cruz, and lost only some half dozen men in the siege.

At the battle of Fuenterabia, in 1836, the town, with two guns of small calibre behind an old wall, and a third of large calibre, which was added on the evening

Cooper's Naval History.

of the attack, was successfully defended for a whole day from a combined attack of British and Spaniards, in six armed steamers and a number of gunboats.*

Then there was the famous case of the Martello tower, in the bay of Martello, in Corsica; one heavy gun, on the top of a tower, beat off in 1794 "one or two British ships-of-war, without sustaining any material injury from their fires." "This circumstance," says Colonel Pasley, in his rules for conducting the practical operations of a siege, "ought merely to have proved the superiority which guns on shore must always, in certain situations, possess over those of shipping, no matter whether the former are mounted on a tower or not.”

This is quoted with approbation by Colonel Totten, in his celebrated report of 1840, as an example of the superiority of forts over ships. But it appears to me only to prove and beautifully to illustrate the superiority of one gun, so mounted that it can fire with aim, over many guns that are enveloped in smoke, and fired without aim.

"one or

But if this Martello case affords grounds really for the "just decision" claimed by these two distinguished military authorities, then why have any forts at all? Why should our army engineers advocate so elaborately in 1836, and with so much ingenuity in 1840, the continuance of the system of 1816, if one gun on shore, "whether mounted on a tower or not," can and ought to beat off two British ships-of-war?" May I not, therefore, in proposing to reply, in part, upon open batteries on the shore for coast defence, urge the modification as a thing proved by actual experiment, and, by legitimate conclusion, quote in favor of such modification the opinion of our most distinguished engineers! We can never expect our works on the seashore to have anything stronger to resist than "British ships-of-war ;" and if one gun, in open battery on the shore, "whether mounted on a tower or not," be superior to "one or two" of those ships, surely our seaport towns of second and third rate importance may safely rely upon open batteries on the beach to protect them from "British" or any other "menof-war."

Colonel Jones, another authority of equal weight in military matters, quotes Nelson's attack upon Copenhagen, Sir John Duckworth's daring passage of the Dardannelles, the attack at Acre in 1840, and Lord Exmouth's cannonade of Algiers, as cases which lead to the supposition that land batteries cannot resist an attack by fleets. The Queen Charlotte, bearing Lord Exmouth's flag, being brought within fifty yards of the Mole, at Algiers, "poured such an irresistible fire on the works around," says Colonel Jones, as to silence every gun, and was ultimately compelled to withdraw, with the loss of only eight men killed and one hundred and thirty-one wounded."

66

The sides of a ship are of wood; it is combustible, the walls of a fort are not; and on board ships in a fight it is the splinters that do the mischief. One gun, even in open battery on the shore, has greatly the advantage of one gun on board ship. The former can take better aim, has nothing to fear from splinters, and presents a very small target; whereas it has the whole ship, with all its vulnerability for a target. But as to the superiority of ships over forts, it appears to me there is scarcely room for the question; each in its own sphere is superior to the other.

And that the Queen Charlotte should silence the mole battery, is to be accounted for upon the principle of firing with and without aim. She was within fifty yards of it; it therefore occupied nearly or quite one-half of her horizon, and she could not miss it, it was so large. In comparison to the fort she was a small target, and it required some attention to aim to hit her; but the smoke on both sides prevented this.

Therefore, supposing that in the attacks of ships against forts, the guns on each side be served with equal bravery, the question of superiority resolves

* Colonel Totten's Report on National Defence, 1840, Doc. No. 206, page 16.

itself almost entirely into a question of marksmanship. A shot that is fired without aim is generally a shot thrown away,

Nevertheless, the gallant colonel very properly cautions the "engineer charged with the defences of maintaining a fortress, so to arrange his batteries that the defence may be from several points distant from each other, armed with fifty-six pounders as the lowest calibre."

The system of 1816, according to the report of the board of army officers in 1840, does not contemplate a single gun heavier than a forty-two pounder, or an eight-inch howitzer. It contemplates mortars, but mortars against ships and random shots.

Previous to the attack of the junk ships in 1782, Gibraltar resisted a bombardment for two years.*

In 1789, Admiral Rodney threw into Havre de Grace 19,000 heavy shells, and 1,150 carcasses, in fifty-two hours, "to destroy a few boats."t

In 1792, the Duke of Saxe Tessehen threw into Lille, in one hundred and forty hours, "without effect, 30,000 hot shot and six hundred shells."‡

In 1795, Pichegree threw 3,000 shells into Manheim, and 5,000 into the Fort of the Rhine.§

In 1807, at Copenhagen, in three days of partial heavy firing, 6,412 shells, besides careasses were thrown.|| All these were thrown to no purpose.

At Fort Browne, on the Rio Grande, our men dodged the shells thrown by the Mexicans from Matamoras.

At Fort McHenry "the bomb bursting in air" furnished the poet with a stanzas; they produced no other effect.

Bonaparte's opinion of them may be learned from the instructions which he caused to be issued to the governors of besieged towns.

"Quant aux effets des bombes, et des autres projectiles incendiaires, nous examinerons plus tard, les moyens de les diminuer; mais nous observerons dés ce moment, qu'ils n'ont jamais contraint une place, bien défendue àse rendre. Les anciens sièges, en offrent la preuve; et les examples tout reèns de Lille, de Theonville, et de Mayence, la confoiment."

Therefore let us modify the system, so far as most of the mortars and all the 6,309 pieces of ordnance, from a twelve up to a long forty-two pounder, required by the plan of 1816, are concerned, and substitute for them the heavy calibres of the present day-the nine, ten, and eleven-inch solid shot and shell guns.

Taking the Martello tower for our guide, let us also, instead of building forts of the second and third class, contemplated in the system of 1816, send to every town along the seaboard, that an enemy could reach in his ships, one or more heavy pieces, and plant them there in open battery upon the beach, for the defence of the place, "no matter whether they be mounted in a tower or not."

By a proper organization, easy to be effected and kept up without any draft upon the treasury whatever, except for powder and ball to practice, volunteer crews for these guns may be procured from the towns themselves. Well-trained officers of the army should be sent to instruct them. In such hands each gun so planted and served out in the open air, having an embankment or a few sandbags for protection, will be more than a match for "two British ships-of-war."

Sir Sidney Smith, whose dashing gallantry and skilful bravery have been so much admired, attacked and felt the force of one of these open batteries in 1806. He was in the Pompée, an eighty-gun ship, and accompanied by two frigates; he anchored about seven hundred yards from a battery of two guns, situated on the extremity of Cape Licosa.

"The line-of-battle-ship and frigates fired successive broadsides till their ammunition was nearly expended; the battery continually replying with a slow

Sir J. T. Jones's Journal of Sieges in Spain, vol. II, page 374.

§ Ibid.

Ibid.

but destructive effect. The Pompée, at which ship alone it directed its fire, had forty shot in her hull; her mizzentopmast carried away; a lieutenant, midshipman, and five men killed, and thirty men wounded. At length, force proving ineffectual, negotiation was resorted to, and after some hours' parley, the officer, a Corsican, and a relation of Napoleon, capitulated. It then appeared that the carriage of one of the two guns had failed on the second shot, and the gun had consequently been fired lying on the sill of the embrasure; so that, in fact, the attack of an eighty-gun ship and two frigates had been resisted by a single piece of ordnance."

Whatever Napoleon's cousin could do with a gun, our officers, our soldiers, and the yeoman of this country can do as well.

This turning out of the citizens to defend their town, with a gun in open battery, against the attack of ships-of-war, is no experiment with us. The thing has been handsomely, gallantly, and successfully done.

66

"The affair of Stonington," says General Totten in his report of 1840, during the last war, affords another instance of successful defences by a battery. In this case there were only two guns (eighteen pounders) in a battery which was only three feet high, and with embrasures. The battery being manned exclusively by citizen volunteers from the town, repelled a persevering attack of a sloop-of-war, causing serious loss and danger, but suffering none."

In the war of 1828, between Peru and Columbia, I was serving on the Pacific station. Admiral Guise, a dashing officer and brave Scotchman, attacked the city of Guayaquil with the Peruvian squadron, which consisted of a frigate, a sloop-of-war, and several brigs and schooners. The approaches to the city were undefended. He took up his position without molestation within musket shot of it and commenced his fire.

Under cover of the dark the besieged threw up an embankment, and planting two or three field-pieces behind it opened a fire upon the ships at daylight, killed the admiral, and beat off his squadron.

The annals of war, the written arguments of the most distinguished officers of the engineer corps, and the facts which I shall state, afford, to my judgment and reason, ample grounds for the position which I maintain as to the dispensing with fortifications, in a large majority of cases, along the seaboard; and of substituting therefor a few pieces of this new, heavy, and destructive ordnance, without the protection of any mason work whatever. If these facts, annals, and arguments do not impress conviction upon your mind as strongly as they do upon mine, it is not because of their insufficiency-but because, in attempting to apply and illustrate them, I have obscured their bearing and weakened their force.

The fortifications of the coast," says the board of army officers, whose able report of 1840 quieted the public mind, and fastened for ten years longer upon the country the effete system of 1816; "The fortifications of the coast," say they, "must be competent to the double task of interdicting the passage of ships and resisting land attacks-two distinct and independent qualities. The first demands merely an array in suitable numbers and in proper proportions of heary guns, covered by parapets, proof against shot and shells."t

Now I propose to show that the railroads and the means of locomotion in this country sufficiently defend our fortifications from land attacks; and that consequently the principal requisite henceforward in a system of fortifications for the coast, is merely an array in suitable numbers and in proper proportions of heavy guns along the beach to cover the approaches of ships from sea to seaport towns.

*Journal of Sieges.-Colonel Jones.

Page 41, Doc. 206, House Rep., 1st session 26th Congress.

To support the propositions taken by General Totten in favor of the system of 1816, both in his report of 1840 and 1836, there was a table in the latter estimating the number of men that, according to the census of 1830, could be concentrated in Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans in eleven days.

This table was made the basis of important deductions in favor of the present system; and as the state of things now is so entirely different from what it was then, I quote the table in order to show that the changes which have taken place in our means of concentrating and moving forces in war leave abundant room for many modifications in the old system of 1816.

TABLE F.*

Exhibiting the amount of militia force that may be concentrated at Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans successively, from the first to the eleventh day; each day's march being computed at fifteen miles-founded on the census of 1830.

Days. Boston.

Newport, New York. Philadel- Norfolk. Baltimore. Charles- Savannah. New Or-
R. I.

ton.

leans.

phia.

This possible concentration of forces, which it required eleven days to make in 1836, may be now doubled and trebled, and made in as many hours; surely, therefore, this process of concentration-this immense artificial military aid which steam and electricity now afford, and which was not anticipated nor counted upon in 1816, when the foundations of the system were laid; surely they, by protecting our forts against sieges, call for modifications and suggest changes which it would be wise to consider and prudent to make.

In this country, more than in any other, the genius of free institutions compels the government to keep pace with the improvement of the age. The people do it, and they are the government. But in military establishments there is evidently a disposition to lag behind.

"In 1708 Marshal Boufflers, by authority from the King, given on the advice of the most experienced generals of that warlike age, ceded the strongest fortress in France to Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough, to avoid the risk of the breaches being carried by storm; and in those days the superiority of the assailants was never doubted. The art of attack has since that period received various improvements, and the art of defence remains the same."

The edition from which I quote was published in 1846-the work is one of acknowledged authority among military men-and according to it, it would be better to give our forts away than actually to subject them to a siege. Neither Vera Cruz nor any other fort in Mexico could withstand a siege from us. How important therefore is it that we should introduce in our system of coast defences

Page 71, Doc. 293, first session twenty-fourth Congress. †See Journal of Sieges in Spain, vol. 2, page 336.