than any progress within the Canadas. Yet the advance there has been highly respectable, and very extensive public works, intimately connected with a system of defence, have been completed.

But this very progress on our lake frontier, showing itself in large and populous towns with a rapidly increasing commerce, all exposed to sudden assaults, naturally lead one to pause well before advancing the opinion that the general government is absolved from giving adequate protection to all exposed and important points, whether on our lake or sea-coast.

Why should not Buffalo and Oswego be protected, as well as Savannah and Mobile? Not by extensive and costly works, capable of resisting invasion or siege, but sufficiently strong not to excite the cupidity or daring spirit of an enemy, who in a rapid incursion, might, as elsewhere, destroy an enormous amount of property before any resistance could be brought against him. To conduct a surprise may be difficult on the lakes; but we have had, within a few years, full proof that it is possible.

In case of a war with England her provinces will, in all probability be invaded, and this invasion, according to the declaration of a distinguished citizen, will be one almost en masse. He predicts that an army of a hundred thousand men will march upon the heart and capital of the country, and settle all at one blow; that neither forts nor ships will be wanted; and that the rivers and lakes, instead of obstacles, would become bridges to the invaders. One cannot fail to be stirred up by this captivating picture; but in the only trial heretofore made upon Quebec the river was not found to be a bridge, and the campaign failed for want of one. Suffice it, however, to say, if we carry on war on a large scale without being governed by the art of war, by science, and past experience, we may, and doubtless will, still be successful; but this result will be obtained by an increased expenditure of blood and treasure.

While an army, however large, was marching upon a vital point, millions of property might be destroyed along the lake shores, making a heavy discount on the fruits of the victory, which might be prevented by moderate expenditures. Our large frontier towns, where great injury could be suddenly inflicted, should be protected from liability to a coup de main by forts of moderate dimensions, to be garrisoned, in time of need, by those whose hearths they shelter. All lake harbors, whose position, depth of water, and accessibility would render them important as refuge harbors to our own ships or to those of the enemy, should also be defended by adequate works. All materials not perishable should be gradually collected for the construction of ships and steamers. preparations become invaluable where war threatens or comes; neither are they lost if it should not overtake us, for they may have had an important part in averting it.

These

In many particulars, and according to the opinion of men of the most experience, Ontario is the most important in the series of inland seas in a military point of view, and at this time the English steam tonnage upon it is greater than our own. This fact alone is one for consideration.

In connexion with the movements of large armies, nothing has been said of fortifying strategic points on the line of offensive operations, because this questions is a purely military one, and belongs so especially to another branch of the service that it would be mere presumption to touch upon it here.

Though not specially referred to in the questions under consideration, it may be expected that some notice will be taken of the facilities to be derived, in a system of national defence, from rapid railroad intercommunication and transportation. These certainly can confer a great and real benefit, amounting, perhaps, to positive exemption from the possibility of invasion. An army, with its baggage, can accomplish an ordinary march of twenty-five days in one day, and reach the terminus without fatigue, all ready for fight. The experiment of transporting troops in this way has already been tried in France, and, more

recently, the emperor of Russia has been amusing himself by sending his guards, with their artillery, to and fro between his capital and Moscow, with entire success. But it is a misapprehension of means and ideas to suppose that the necessity of coast defences will be done away with because we possess the power of transporting the militia from the interior to the seaboard in the briefest space conceivable. Are our farmers, mechanics, merchants, doctors, and lawyers to constitute the defence of our maritime frontier? Are they, in time of war, to sleep with their knapsacks on their backs and their muskets by their sides, and be ready at the sound of bell or steam-whistle to leave families and business to man floating batteries in or near our seaports, or sounds, or rivers? Besides, mere numbers, though they may prevent an enemy from landing on our shores, cannot prevent his ships approaching near enough to hurl destruction among themselves, destroy cities, and burn shipping.

But if we are to rely upon railroads as one of the modes of repelling sudden attacks, having for their object the destruction of property or the levying of contributions, it will be well to inquire as to the amount of dependence that can be placed upon them. The utility of a road may be destroyed in a few minutes by very little exertion; a single rail removed will cause delay if not a serious accident. During the last revolution in Paris troops were thus prevented from reaching the city from the departments. In time of war, for those roads at least which lie along the coasts, a system of frequent inspection may be necessary, and means of repairing injuries kept at hand.

In the first part of this report it has been stated that, however complete our system of fortifications may be made, a large sphere of action in a scheme of national defence will still devolve upon the navy. The general effect of fortifications is to exclude war from our borders, and contribute to the inestimable advantage of leaving society in an undisturbed state, pursuing its usual avocations. A navy becomes efficient just in proportion as it is relieved from harbor defence; and in a war, even defensive in its origin and object, the navy in almost every case must assume an offensive attitude. We lose the vantage-ground if we wait the assault of an enemy. One would suppose there could scarcely be a dissenting opinion in reference to this point; that the special function of the navy, in war, is to be aggressive. Our able engineers, and especially their present distinguished chief, in the admirable reports they have been making for years on this subject, invariably assign this high and all-important position to the navy.

General Cass tells us, "Our great battle upon the ocean is yet to be fought, and we shall gain nothing by shutting our eyes to the nature of the struggle." Similar views are held abroad as to the true sphere of a navy. The Duke of Wellington, while urging increased activity in the permanent defences of Great Britain, in the strengthening of forts, the construction of barracks, and place d'armes to be walled in, still considers the navy of England, through its powers of aggression, its most essential defence.

The extraordinary expansion of this country and its development in every department, shown especially in a commerce which, long since whitening every sea, has received a marvellous stimulant recently, by the accession of a thousand miles of coast on the Pacific, by new channels of trade, and by the modifications in the navigation laws of our great competitor, should lead all reflecting minds to consider how great would be the revulsion in our prosperity if, through any untoward event, we should loose the means of protecting this commerce. Standing now in the front rank with our great commercial rival, shall we neglect an old aphorism of Sir Walter Raleigh, most cogent still: "Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade, and whosoever commands the trade commands the riches of the world?”

Now, is our navy, in point of efficiency and numbers, what it should be? Our statesmen constantly allude to it as the right arm of the nation's power;

yet has this arm been kept in any degree of vigor commensurate with the work it may have to perform or in keeping with our position among the nations? Is it equal to the ordinary exigencies occurring almost daily? The law passed some years since limiting the number of seamen still exists. Since its passage our commerce has nearly doubled, and our squadrons are too small to give it adequate protection or to keep up a healthful spirit and experience in the naval profession. Recently the government had not at its disposal the means to prevent an unlawful aggression on the territory of a friendly power; nor was the force sufficiently respectable afterwards to infuse, by its presence alone, a little mercy into Spanish justice. But are we yet through with this question of Cuba? Are we not threatened with a foreign intervention? At any rate, does it not offer another striking instance to be added to the long list of dangers which, at different periods, have suddenly sprung upon us, and to which this day of special international amity has proved no exception? The French claims, the northeastern boundary, the affair of the Caroline, the Oregon controversy, have all shaken for the time being our relations with the two most formidable powers of Europe-formidable to us only because they have powerful navies-a collision with either of which would be rather a different affair from that with our neighboring republic, with whom similar disturbances ripened into actual hostilities. The naval power of England is greater than ever before in her history, and the disparity between us is yearly increasing, particularly in her steam navy. In the admiralty navy list for April, 1850, we find one hundred and fifty steamers-of-war; of course many of these are already obsolete in construction and machinery, but she is building new ones and launching numbers every year. In addition to these, especially constructed for war purposes, she has between sixty and seventy mercantile steamers, capable of being armed with thirty-two pounder cannon, for which the guns, carriages, and ammunition are actually prepared. She has, still further, two hundred and forty more, capable of mounting a lighter armament, and some six hundred besides, which might be of service to resist invasion from her neighbors. Exclusive of her squadrons abroad, which are large and efficient, with a due proportion of steamers to each, in January, 1851, she had in commission at home fourteen sail of the line, three of them screw steamers, ten frigates, four of them steamers, besides several steam sloops, all ready for sea. She has also ready for commissioning twenty other powerful steamers, viz: eight large frigates and twelve sloops.

The training of officers and men is in full keeping with this colossal force. Her squadron of evolutions offers the finest school for both, and the gunnery ships are making her able seamen expert artillerists, good swordsmen, and capital shots with pistol and carbine.

The navy of France is also powerful; it has risen entirely from its almost total extinction during the long and bloody contest from 1789 to 1815. In steamers-of-war, at the commencement of this year, she had one line-of-battleship of ninety guns, with screw propellers, fourteen steam frigates of first class, mounting from eight to sixteen guns of heavy ordnance; fifteen steam corvettes, and forty despatch steamers, most of them mounting from two to four shellguns. (See Etat Général de la Marine et des Colonies, for February, 1851.)

Both these navies have reached the highest state of efficiency, skill, and discipline, and their morale never was higher: that of England, roused to the maintenance of its boasted supremacy on the ocean; that of France, burning for an opportunity to show the world that is practical skill is now equal to that science and bravery which were ever conspicuous.

When completed, we shall have in our navy five steam frigates and one steam sloop. These vessels mount or will mount from six to ten guns, some of them of large calibre; they are strong, well-built, and efficient vessels, one or more of them quite equal, if not superior, to anything of the same class abroad. But this statement, compared with the two made above of the navies of England

and France, shows terrible odds against us. It is well to remember this; but it is not exhibited here with the intention of making it the basis of an argument to show that we should set to work and erect such fleets here. The temper of our people in relation to any such expenditures has already been spoken of, and there is no desire to advocate extravagant cost for contingent advantages.

But this disparity between us and other nations in our means of offence and defence, already so great, is yearly increasing. How is it to be got rid of or lessened? The reply is often made: Has it not ever been so? was it not quite as great when we went into the war of 1812? And it may well be asked how that disparity was overcome in that memorable contest. In the first place, it was lessened by the skill, courage, and coolness of our officers, united to the fine spirit, good gunnery, and high discipline of the crews. In the second. place, by a process equalling the greatest piece of strategy ever performed on land by the greatest military captains. We built frigates which in size, calibre of guns, and in the brave hearts who took charge of them, literally struck off from the British navy list everything below a line-of-battle ship, at least so far as these frigates were concerned.

The first encounter of our frigates with theirs astounded Britain. In accounting for her defeats, it was natural for her only to have seen the disparity in size and armament, but the official account of these frigates shows something more, and this is now acknowledged with becoming candor by some of her distinguished men. Sir Francis Head, in a recent work, says: "Gunnery was, in naval warfare, in the extraordinary state of ignorance we have just described, when our lean children, the American people, taught us, rod in hand, our first lesson in the art." Certain it is that the British admiralty board thought it necessary to put a stop to what they conceived to be a very unequal contest, and accordingly intimated confidentially to the captains of their ships that they did not conceive that any of his Majesty's frigates should engage single-handed the larger class of Ameican ships, which, though they may be called frigates, are of a size, complement, and weight of metal much beyond that class, and more resembling line-of-battle-ships.

Now, can we not once more render obsolete one-half or two-thirds of the English and French navies, and compel these powers to remodel their steam as well as sailing ships? It is the opinion of officers who have closely examined this subject, aided by actual experiments, that we have not yet reached the maximum point in the use afloat of heavy ordnance.

It is proposed to build ships that will carry guns of larger calibre and longer range than any heretofore used; to have auxiliary steam power, with the machinery out of reach of shot or shell, to be disencumbered of side-wheels, and, when not using this auxiliary power, to be fast and manageable under canvasvery much such a ship as the Princeton was, on a larger scale, and with the improvements which seven years have introduced. All candid minds will now admit that the conception and principle involved in the construction and armament of this ship was in advance of her day, for in casting round we have found nothing combining so many requisites for a steamer-of-war.

The advantage of guns with long ranges is feelingly dwelt upon by Sir Francis Head, already quoted. Speaking of the American navy in the last war, he says: "They not only converted their seamen into practical gunners and expert artillerymen, but, by substituting long guns instead of our short ones, they secured for themselves the immense advantage of being able, without loss or danger, luxuriously to pummel us to death, at ranges which they had precalculated they would be completely out of our reach."

It would seem unnecessary to mention that all improvements in the implements of war, the moment they are proved effective, will, of course, be seized upon by other powers, for concealment in these matters is no longer attempted. But the great point to be gained is to compel these powers, as it were, to

start, de novo, with us, and to render comparatively valueless their gigantic naval establishments. In the building of a steam navy we have scarcely commenced, and it is rather mortifying to think that even Spain has as many steamers-of-war as we have. Candor compels the admission, however, that circumstances have greatly favored us, and though this extreme economy or indifference might have cost us dear, certain it is that many millions of dollars have been saved by the delay. England and France have been going through the usual costly process in such matters before reaching a measure of excellenceone improvement almost immediately laid aside for another, and this one as rapidly giving way to something still better; while all this time we have been dealing most sparingly with this very expensive agent, steam power. But now that a great degree of perfection has been reached in its application, that the science and mechanical skill of the country are at so high a point, that our wealth and resources have so increased, shall we continue to refuse a reasonable measure of preparation for future exigencies?

Allusion has been made to the assistance England is prepared to receive from her mercantile steam vessels; and it may be said we have the same resources, so far as they go, of falling back upon our splendid mail steamers. These vessels would doubtless prove serviceable in many ways; they may carry a few guns of very respectable, though not of the largest calibre; built for speed, they would be admirable despatch vessels, serve to reconnoitre with safety the movements of an enemy, give warning of his approach, and the amount of his force-in short, be what Nelson termed his frigates, "the eyes of the fleet." But these steamers cannot form the basis of a steam navy; such an idea would be fatal to our naval efficiency. It is not intended by this to object to government's giving adequate protection to these mail steamers, in order to carry out the international postal arrangements. But they are not such steamers as the government would now build for war purposes; the side-wheel may be said to be almost obsolete, and their machinery is altogether too much exposed to shot and shell; ships so costly must, at least, be made less vulnerable. But if the mail steamers are to be depended upon, as our steam navy, and not as auxiliaries to it, as the English and French mercantile steamers are to their navies, then another question presents itself. At what stage of an impending emergency is the government, in conformity with the right granted in the contract, to take these steamers ?

If this be deferred until a late moment, there may be no time to fit them for war service, for very material alterations will have to be made. If further deferred, until hostilities break out, they certainly will not be ready for the first brush, and half of them may be picked up abroad by the smallest armed cruiser. Should they be taken by the government prematurely, their business and profit are broken up, and pass into the hands of their rivals, who may run their steamers to the last moment consistent with safety; for by the other powers, as stated above, they are only held as auxiliaries.

A few alarms, then, leading to no rupture, may saddle the government with a class of steamers not fit for the navy proper, to be disposed of at an enormous loss; for the alterations which will have been made to convert them into "menof-war" will have wholly unfitted them for their peaceful pursuits; just as much so as the exorbitant expenditure for the luxurious accommodation of passengers is wholly unnecessary for a steam frigate. In truth, in the transfer of these mail steamers this item may be so great that it should not be altogether overlooked It has been stated that the saloons, cabins, and decorations of one of these lines have cost from one hundred thousand to one hundred and twenty thousand dollars per ship, which, of course, must be paid for, though not one dollar of it would be required for naval use. Two iron hooks to swing his hammock, make the berth of the seaman, and a few pine boards compose the bunk of the officers.

In conclusion, whatever may be decided in relation to the national defence by