"It is to be observed that the great object of our fortifications is to exclude a naval force from our harbors; this end they ought fully to answer."

In truth, it cannot be questioned that our principal seaports, naval depots, and all important points on our seaboard, should receive commensurate protection; neither should there be, in our judgment, a question as to the mode in which this protection should be given. It would seem unnecessary to set forth the advantages for such purposes of fixed defences or fortifications. These advantages have been shown over and over again by our distinguished engineers, and never controverted. To run over some of these once more, it may be said of forts that they are the only permanent defences, and the most economical, for, with the present science in construction and choice of material, the outlay is there once for all, for the repairs are next to nothing. Forts offer means by which a small force is enabled to resist a large one; a small number of men a large army. In the event of an attack by a competent power upon a place liable to be put under contribution, the injury might be accomplished before sufficient means of resistance could be assembled. Forts can be made impregnable against any naval force that could be brought against them, and are needed for the protection of our own fleets while preparing for hostilities on the ocean. They are secure depots for munitions of war, and render defence certain and easy, and above all, a defence which rarely involves loss of life, leaving the ordinary state of society undisturbed. No alarms are created; no calling of men from their ordinary business. In short, by rendering success impossible, they derive immunity from attack.

It is impossible to view with favor the substitution of floating or steam batteries for permanent defences, the preparation of which will be ever deferred, on account of their perishable nature, until danger is pending; and if ready in time, their value ceases with the occasion which called them forth, for their decay is certain and speedy. Their unsuitableness and want of adaptation to the alterations constantly made in the means and implements of war are also elements of insecurity in these wood and iron defences for harbors. There can never be any certainty that some recent discovery has not lessened our effective force, without any remissness on our part; there can be no certainty that we may not be suddenly called on to renew our expenditures before our last appropriations have been spent. For example, a well-known, and scientific, and practical gentleman obtained the contract, under a law of Congress, to construct for harbor defence an iron floating battery, which was to be shot and shell proof-in fact, invulnerable in every respect. A target, constructed after the manner he proposed for the sides of his battery, was subjected to the test of one of Commodore Stockton's large guns. It presented little or no resistance; the ball passed through without difficulty, tearing out large fragments formed of seven thicknesses of boiler-iron, well bolted and rivetted together. There is no desire, however, to be understood as excluding altogether these costly and unwieldly machines; they may serve as important auxiliaries to forts, in broad sheets of water, or special localities not within the range of the fixed work; though, in all probability, in most cases the hulls of stout merchant ships, strengthened and prepared for mounting one or more pieces of heavy ordnance, would be sooner got ready and answer an equally good purpose. But to leave the whole defence of our harbors to such tempoary expedients, built of materials as vulnerable and perishable as ships, would be expending enormous sums in order to invite attack.

Throughout this report I was at first disposed to take for granted that no idea could prevail in this country, to any extent at least, that would desire to retain the nary proper-by which is meant efficient steam and sailing ships-ofwar-within the harbors, for harbor defence; but it seems to be included in the scope of one of the inquiries, and cannot be overlooked.

What, then, is the first object and main purpose of a navy but the defence

and protection of our commerce? It is the only form in which that protection can be given; but this is essentially taken away when it has assigned to it the defence of our seaports. It may be said that the navy will be increased to such a size as to be able to perform this double duty. There is nothing in our past history to authorize such a belief; and in time of peace the people of the United States will never support such a naval force. They object to spending much money on the personnel of military establishments. Nor does it belong to their temper, or their position among nations, to indulge in apprehensions of war; their time is too much occupied with the noble arts and pursuits of peace to feel such an interest in this subject as must be felt to bring them to such large expenditures upon perishable materials.

If our country had to rely upon naval defences, it may well be questioned whether any portion of the navy would be suffered to leave our coasts for the protection and preservation of our foreign commerce, while we were under the alarm of war. However great the naval force might be, it would not be thought sufficient. The dangers nearest home would command our interest and sympathy; the preservation of our great emporiums of commerce from sudden devastation would cause the single trading ships upon the ocean to be forgotten. And how would a naval force, for home defence, be partitioned out to the different cities and stations, without endless vexation, dissatisfaction, and dispute?

To employ our active navy, in whole or in part, to the entire or partial abandonment of our system of fortifications, would be to supplant impregnable bulwarks by pregnable ones-a fixed security by a changeable one-placing perishable materials in lieu of those that are durable; it would be exposing ourselves to the chance of being suddenly left, for a time, without defence, through new discoveries in the art of war; it would be opening the way to expenditures of money which no estimate could count the sums; it would be depriving our commerce of its legitimate protection, and would be resigning our sense of security, 7, peace of mind, and continuance in our pursuits without interruption, in the event of war. But there are objections to such a plan still more fatal: it involves the sacrifice of the lives of our fellow-citizens, and proposes to make their bodies, since they are brave and willing, the walls of defence for the enemy to fire at, instead of stone or mortar; it is compelling the conclusions of science to give way to mere speculations, and rejecting the experience of the world. Nor is this all that is involved in so destructive a proposition: it would divert_the navy from its highest duty; deprive it of its chief honor and merit, and best claim to the respect and support of the people, that is, the vindication of the national honor, and the maintenance of the national freedom and independence upon the high seas. Again, if naval defences are relied on, they will either be manned or not. If manned, what shall we say of the effects of such a life upon men and officers ?-would it not be destructive of all those characteristics of skill, daring, and endurance which give to the seamen his power and prestige upon the ocean? If not manned, then, compared to forts, they are what wooden docks are to stone docks. In either case, more men will be required to keep them in repair than forts.

On the question of economy, let us further consider the cost that would be entailed upon the nation, by the alarm of an invasion or the appearance of a hostile fleet on the coast.

The sudden equipment and preparation of an army, and its maintenance sufficiently long to remove all apprehension, would cost more, at every principal seaport, on one single occasion, than all the forts. Then what would be the first thing that an army would do, belched forth by the tens of thousands from every railroad station and terminus, but to set to work and throw up the best fortifications they could in the emergency? Would not every musket be grounded to take up picks and shovels? Again: shall we dwell upon the state of the public

mind, in one of our chief cities, if its approaches were left without forts equipped and manned?

Is there any exaggeration in the picture of an enemy's fleet of some thirty steamers watching an opportunity, and through the ever recurring viscissitudes on the ocean, familiar to professional men, eluding a naval force of our own, which it would not have been willing to encounter, running up New York harbor, anchoring from the North to the East river, in a semicircle round the battery, hurling destruction with its new and gigantic projectiles, setting fire to the forests of shipping, and burning the navy yard; and retreating the moment the temporary and hurried defences began to tell against them, destroying more property in a few hours than would cover the shores of Raritan bay, the Narrows, and the islands of the Sound, with fortifications? Now, this is the kind of wafare we must look to, and that we must carry on ourselves.

The greater the injury we can inflict, the more rapidly this injury is repeated, and the sooner we will obtain redress and bring an unnatural condition of affairs to a close. The position of Halifax, Bermuda, and the West Indies, must ever be borne in mind, where fleets may wait for a fitting opportunity for incursions; to suppose that there are to be no such thing as surprises, because railroads have been invented and hollow shot cast, seems to be taking for granted that human life has changed. Indeed, those who indulge in such theoretical securities are preparing for themselves surprises, perilous ones too.

Steam will be the great agent in giving to the new elements of destruction powers of ubiquity. Wherever there is a vulnerable spot, there we must dash, and there an active enemy will dash at us.

But it must be remembered that

so far as the improvement in projectiles, specially referred to in the inquiries under consideration, are concerned, these have, relatively to ships, strengthened forts. Hollow shot crumble into fragments and fall harmless when directed against stone walls. At the siege of Antwerp, under Marshal Girard, they were thrown from heavy mortars without effect, and experiments at home have further established the fact. It takes solid shot to batter walls and make breaches-plenty of them, and rapidly discharged, and concentrated upon or near one spot. On the other hand, we have only to imagine a few eight or ten-inch shells passing through the side of a line-of-battle-ship into the main or lower gun-deck, and there exploding amidst the dense crowd at the batteries, every fragment multiplying itself in countless splinters of wood and iron as destructive as itself, and if it should fail to burst, still doing all the injury a solid shot could do. Or, let one enter on the orlop deck among the passers of powder; or, lower still, striking at the water line, tearing out large irregular fragments, and leaving openings defying all shot-plugs. Change the scene to a steamer, with all the circumstances above mentioned of pervious sides and crowded decks, and conceive a few exploding in the engine-room; for truly has it been said that, compared to a sailing ship, a steamer has twenty mortal parts to one! No! when it comes to using hollow shot a ship will prefer engaging something similarly constructed. No ship or ships can lay under a fort at this day; no American fort, at least, with its furnaces for hot shot in addition to these murderous shells. In this connexion it may be well to make a passing allusion to the past successes of ships-of-war against forts.

They are certainly striking examples of naval prowess, and should always cause a thrill of professional pride in the breast of every seaman, let his flag be where it may; and they should be remembered and studied by officers to incite to deeds of daring, to self-reliance, and to faith in that "fortune which favors the brave." But there is no foundation for the theory attempted to be raised upon these successes. The attack on Algiers by Lord Exmouth, commanding the combined English and Dutch fleets, take it all in all, is probably the greatest naval achievement in this line.

About two hundred guns could be brought to bear against about one thousand in the fleet, and the fire of the admiral's ship, the Queen Charlotte, is considered generally by the profession to be equal to any on record; but she was permitted to come in close to the mole, take up her position, swing round her broadside, and make fast to an adjoining vessel, before a shot was fired upon her. This fact alone gives an idea how the defence was conducted; the batteries were defective and unskilfully served, yet the ships hauled off, and the batteries were not silenced, though redress was obtained. Indeed, it is admitted by Lord Exmouth that he could not have continued the contest.

Nearer the present day the capture of Acre is equally celebrated, and is interesting, as the new elements of war, steam power and hollow projectiles, were brought to bear.

The highest military authority in England expressed the opinion in Parliament that this was one of the greatest achievements of modern times; but the same authority added it was also connected with peculiar circumstances which they could not always hope to occur, and warned their lordships that they must not always expect that ships, however well commanded, or however gallant their seamen might be, were capable of commonly engaging successfully with stone walls.

The works in question were in a bad condition and were undergoing repairs. Their position permitted an approach through a channel where only a few guns could be brought to bear against the fleet, most of which took this passage. But few of the guns of the fort were heavy or effective, and only one battery of five guns were well served. About five hundred guns brought to bear on the fort; the walls were not breached, but a large magazine blew up, and, producing a panic, the fort surrendered, which, it must be remembered, was besieged by land also.

We have merely alluded to these two justly celebrated attacks of ships against forts to invite an examination into their details, and into the circumstances of other similar achievements nearly as striking, with the conviction that few persons could be found who would use these instances of success as an argument against the necessity of permanent defences. Surely we cannot measure what has been done in this way, when the preparations for defence and the resistance were conducted by those whose bravery, as in the cases cited, was left unaided by skill or science. Neither let it be supposed, where ships have attacked forts, the results have always been the same; far from it; and it is only neces sary to allude to the affairs at Fort Moultrie, and, later, to Mobile Point, Stonington, Fort McHenry, &c., from our own national experience.

Are we entirely to reject, in this question the experience and practice of the great European powers, England and France? The former, with her gigantie navy, according to the modern hypothesis, would seem to require no permanent defences; nor the latter with her increasing marine, already brought to a very formidable condition in numbers, material, and discipline.

Yet those two nations while building, without ceasing, war steamers are continually adding to the fixed defences of their seaboard, and this, too, with a view of making their navies more efficient in their share of the national defence. France, in consideration of the change likely to occur from the new elements in war now under consideration, has had recently her sea-coast re-examined by a high commission, representing all arms in her stupendous military organization; and the result was to order still further protection to numerous points on her seaboard, rendered accessible by light draught steamers mounting heavy ordnance, their forts to be garrisoned in time of need by the local militia, (garde nationale.) In England the call is for greater activity in material and permanent means of defence, particularly in the case of refuge harbors such as Portland

and Dover, while the fortifications of her great arsenals have all recently been strengthened.

After mature examination, I am of the opinion that in a system of national defence forts cannot be dispensed with without entailing enormous expenditures for uncertain results. The invention of cannon and their constant improvements have changed the form of fortifications, and added to the size, durability, and massiveness of their construction. Now the invention of cannon was a greater change in the art of war than any that has occurred in this century, and with regard to one of the principal improvements of the day in destructive agentsexplosive shot-the advantage has been given decidedly to forts.

On the other hand, if we cannot dispense with forts, can they not be modified? Is there no middle course? Fortifications in military science are regarded as a temporary means of resistance, by which an enemy is kept in check until relief is afforded.

In this view of their functions it seems probable that as, on the one hand, they might be more effectually assailed by steamers-of-war towing in heavy ships, both ships and steamers mounting the heavy ordnance which has been introduced, throwing solid as well as hollow shot, so, on the other hand, relief being more easily procured, their style of construction might be more economical. But this is a question belonging to the engineers.

It is one, however, which may be interesting just now with reference to fortifying our new coast on the Pacific-a work which surely ought not to be delayed. Here we are, as it were, building up another nation, and it must be built up with arms as well as arts; for without arms no nation was ever safe, much less great.

The position of Halifax, Bermudas, and the West Indies have been alluded to above in reference to our Atlantic and Gulf coasts. In the Pacific we have already outposts on our flanks, in the hands of first class powers. The French have a protectorate government in the Society Islands; they hold the Marquesas still nearer, with its superior harbors, and have been looking for years for some excuse for seizing the Sandwich group; for this is the only way to account for the manner in which they have ever countenanced the unjust and ungenerous demands of their agents in those islands. That they have not now possession of them is due, probably, to what has been stated of the determination of the government of the islands to hoist the American flag, and call upon the United States for protection or incorporation. It is impossible to estimate too highly the value and importance of the Sandwich Islands, whether in a commercial or military point of view. Should circumstances ever place them in our hands they would prove the most important acquisition we could make in the whole Pacific ocean-an acquisition intimately connected with our commercial and naval supremacy in those seas. Be this as it may, these islands should never be permitted to pass into the possession of any European power. Then we have British Oregon, with Vancouver's island, the Halifax of the Pacific coast; and last, though perhaps not the least, the Russian possessions of the Sitka, &c., in the north; and all these in an ocean above all others adapted to the use of steam.

The third inquiry submitted by the department is whether it be necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications on the shores of the northern lakes.

The first view of this branch of the subject would probably lead to the conclusion that, as we dispensed with forts during the war of 1812, we need them still less now; that the contiguity of the two frontiers will enable us to keep pace with any evidence of preparation on the other side; that our progress in population and resources, rendered so immediately available by the increase of water communication with all parts of the border States, especially with such important points as the city of Albany, which, in its turn, is connected with all sections of the country by its great river, railroads, and canals, was far greater