In conclusion, I have to refer to a tabulár statement of all the fortifications erected, under construction, or intended to be built on the Atlantic and Gulf frontier of the United States, said fortifications being arranged in classes, according to the order of importance, and within each class according to the geographical order of the States in which they are situated.

The statement exhibits the amounts expended, or to be expended for fortifications and for the armament, as also a specification of the armament.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JOSEPH G. TOTTEN,

Brevet Brig'r General and Col. of Engineers.

Hon. C. M. CONRAD, Secretary of War.

E.

Letter to the Secretary of the Nary.

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, June 17, 1851.

SIR: I herewith enclose a copy of certain resolutions adopted by the House of Representatives at the last session of Congress.

With a view to procure such information as will enable me to prepare the report called for by the House of Representatives, I have propounded to several officers of the engineer corps certain questions, to which they are desired to give their separate answers.

I desire also to obtain the opinions of several naval officers, combining professional science with experience and practical skill on several points connected with the proposed inquiry.

You will, therefore, oblige me by enclosing a copy of the within resolution to such officers as you may select, and requesting their separate opinions, in writing, on the following points, viz:

1. To what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications for the protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application of steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvement of projectiles, or other changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 1816?

2. What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war or of commerce, floating batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifications? 3. Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications on the shores of the northern lakes?

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. M. CONRAD, Secretary of War.

Hon. WILLIAM A. GRAHAM, Secretary of the Navy.

No. 1.

Report of Commodore Morris.

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1851.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a copy of your letter of June 17, 1851, to the Secretary of the Navy, with directions from him to report to you my opinions upon certain points connected with the present system of

fortifications for the defence of the coasts and shores of the United States, as it has been recommended by boards of engineers and others appointed in 1816 and at subsequent dates.

The particular points to which my attention is directed by your letters are: "1st. To what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications for the protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application of steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvements of projectiles, or other changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 1816?

"2d. What reliance could be placed on vessels-of war or of commerce, floating batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifications? "3d. Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications on the shores of the lakes?"

1. I have endeavored to ascertain, by an examination of some of the reports from the boards of engineers and other officers upon this subject, what system of defence they recommended, the bases of that system, the objects they proposed to accomplish by it, the particular measures which they suggested to secure those objects, and the data on which they determined the character and force of the respective fortifications which are embraced in their general plan of defence.

2. The bases of their system are: a navy composed of armed vessels capable of navigating the ocean with safety and of reaching distant points speedily. Fortifications, permanent and temporary, with the auxiliaries of floating batteries, gunboats, and steam batteries, and both fixed and floating obstructions to channels.

Interior communications by land and water, and a regular army and well, organized militia, all to be so combined as to form a complete system.

3. The objects of the system were to leave the navy free to protect our own commerce or to act against an enemy on the ocean or upon his unprotected coasts; to close all important harbors against an enemy, and secure them to our military and commercial marine; to deprive an enemy of all strong positions, where, protected by naval superiority, he might maintain himself and keep our frontier in continual alarm; to prevent, as far as practicable, the great avenues of interior navigation from being blockaded at their entrances into the ocean; to cover the coastwise and interior navigation, by closing the harbors and the several inlets from the sea which intersect the lines of communication, and thereby further aid the navy in protecting the navigation of the country; and to protect our great naval establishments.

4. To secure these important objects with all practicable sound economy, and in a manner which in time of war should require the least necessary interruption to the ordinary pursuits of our citizens, appears to have been the controlling motive in determining the position, character, and extent or force of the respective works which the boards have proposed.

5. Of these works permanent fortifications are mainly relied upon, and have preference over any of their auxiliaries wherever due security can be given without the aid of the latter.

6. The dimensions, form, and strength of each fortification appears to have been determined by the local topography, the importance of the interests which it was intended to secure, the character and amount of force by which it might probably be assailed, and the time which would be required to concentrate upon it a sufficient number of militia to secure it from capture by such assailing force. 7. Your first question requires an opinion of the expediency of any modification of the present system of fortifications in consequence of two specified causes, and of "any other changes that have taken place since it was adopted." It becomes necessary, therefore, to ascertain what "other changes" have thus occurred, and which would probably have led the boards of engineers to different recommendations, if the present states of things had existed when the plans were proposed. 8. Among these causes and changes the most important appear to be the dis

covery of a channel leading from the ocean into the bay of New York, which could not be commanded by any of the fortifications proposed by the board; the application of steam power to armed and other vessels for ocean navigation; the great increase in the number and the size of the mercantile and packet steamers which are employed on our interior lakes, bays, and rivers, and the substitution of shells for solid shot to be fired from cannon; the introduction of the electric telegraph for communicating intelligence, and of railroads for the transportation of persons and materials; and a greatly increased and more dense population in the vicinity of many of the points which were intended to be protected against

an enemy.

9. The operations of vessels which depend on the wind alone must always be uncertain, and the best-devised plans will be greatly exposed to failure in execution by them. When used as an assailing force against batteries or other fixed objects, the winds which are necessary to carry them to their desired positions might frequently prevent the possibility of their retreat, if it should be desired. The present defences were calculated to resist a force of this character, or which depended on such vessels for its transportation.

Ships-of-the-line and armed vessels of smaller sizes are now moved by steam, either as the only motive power or as auxiliary to sails.

These vessels, under ordinary circumstances and for special purposes, may have their movements regulated and combined, at the will of their commander, with almost the same precision and certainty as can be accomplished by troops on land.

The capacity and armament of many of these vessels, connected with their light draught of water enable them to operate with comparative ease and safety through channels and upon positions which would be almost secure against attacks by common sailing vessels.

10. When the present system was proposed, the use of explosive shells was only contemplated from mortars, either for attack or defence.

Arrangements are now made for the general use of such shells from large cannon, thus combining the superior accuracy of shot firing with the destructive effects of explosive shells-a change which greatly increases the dangers of a floating force when opposed to permanent fortifications of earth and masonry.

11. In determining upon the character and extent of many of the fortifications which were proposed by the boards, an important element of their calcu lations was the facility or difficulty of concentrating troops upon the work in case assistance should be required to repel an attack by an enemy. This element of calculation has been greatly changed since by the increased density and amount of available population, and at many points by the greatly increased facilities for communicating intelligence by telegraphs and railroads, and for receiving re-enforcements of men and supplies by railroads and steamers. The purchase of Florida since the fortifications and defences for the Gulf of Mexico were proposed has given to us new and important positions for strengthening our defences on that frontier, and for giving greater security to the immense interests connected with the valley of the Mississippi. Our more recent acquisitions, which have given us an extensive ocean frontier on the Pacifie ocean, have brought with them new interests, which require fortifications or other adequate means for their protection and security.

12. The increased power which has been given to vessels when moved by steam to regulate and secure their joint or separate action as may be desired, and to reach with comparative ease and safety places which might be considered as nearly secure against ordinary sailing vessels; the additional power which is given to fortifications when acting against ships or other floating force by the substitution of explosive shells for solid shot; the discovery of new channels to and from some of our harbors; the facilities for more rapid concentration of troops and supplies than was formerly practicable, and the acquisition

of large extents of new territory, are changes or causes which, in my opinion, may render some "modifications" of the details of the present system more advantageous. At least these changes appear to be of sufficient importance to justify, if not to require, preparatory to definitive action, a re-examination of the present system, as recommended by former boards, with the same thorough and careful deliberation which was bestowed when it was originally proposed.

13. In reply to your second question, "What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war or of commerce, floating batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifications?" I respectfully state that, in my opinion, no safe reliance could be placed on any of the kinds of force enumerated in your question, as "substitutes" for permanent fortifications, unless they should be multiplied to an extent that would require an expenditure which would be unreasonably great, and much greater than would give equal security by a judicious combination of permanent fortifications and a floating force as auxiliary to them. On any sudden emergency, private steamers and other merchant vessels might be usefully employed in aid of other means which had been previously prepared, either by having them armed to contend with an enemy, or to bring forward re-enforcements of men, materials, or other supplies. Little advantage could be expected, however, from the vessels, for direct assistance, unless all that was necessary for their armament and equipment had been previously prepared, and kept ready for immediate use.

14. The voluntary use of vessels-of-war, which are able to navigate the ocean as substitutes for fixed fortifications, or even as direct auxiliaries to them, except in extreme cases, would, in my opinion, be highly injudicious. The proper employment of such vessels-of-war or of our navy is to afford all possible protection to our merchant shipping, to destroy or harass an enemy's commerce, and either by itself or in conjunction with troops to assail an enemy's possessions at points where they would otherwise be inaccessible to us. 15. The protection which the coasts of our country may justly expect from the navy is that which it may afford by intercepting forces which may threaten attacks upon it; or when unequal to that task, diminishing the means of an enemy for such attempts, by rendering it necessary for him to protect his own commerce or his own shores against our ships-of-war.

16. With a navy sufficiently powerful to compete fairly with that of an enemy, great additional security would be given to our coasts by it, and still greater if our naval force was decidedly superior. But even under these favorable circumstances the chances for avoiding the most vigilant watchfulness on the ocean are so great, that so long as we expect wars with nations having a respectable navy, sound policy and true economy, in my opinion, requires permanent fortifications at all points necessary to defend our important national establishments, our populous and wealthy cities, against sudden attacks, and to keep open, as far as practicable, our coastwise navigation and other communications, which might otherwise be interrupted by any enemy who could elude the vigilance of our navy. The navy, if employed as here suggested, would not render it as substitute for fortifications, but would give an increased security to our seaboard, and in proportion to its strength diminish the necessity of interrupting the ordinary pursuits of our population.

17. To the third question, "Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortification on the shores of the lakes?" I state as my opinion that no future attacks from the Canada shores of the lakes, of a character sufficiently powerful to affect the final result of war, are to be apprehended; still, the advantages which are offered by the St. Lawrence and Rideau canals for the increase of a naval force on Lake Ontario might give to Great Britain a temporary superiority of naval force on that lake. This superiority, and the presence of a considerable body of regular troops which are always kept in Canada, might induce and possibly enable an enemy in Canada, by a sudden incursion,

to injure our great lines of communication by railroads and canals, on the lake frontier, or to levy contributions on cities near it, all of which would be greatly exposed if there were no fortifications to furnish military supplies for the surrounding militia, and so aid them in repelling such attacks.

18. Under existing circumstances it would, in my opinion, be expedient to continue the present system so far as to retain all the fortifications on the lake frontier which have been completed, and to complete such as have been commenced. The expense would be comparatively inconsiderable, and would no doubt be amply repaid by the increased security and other advantages which would be gained at the commencement of any war in which Canada would have the character of an enemy to us.

It has been difficult for me to confine my remarks very strictly to the precise questions which were submitted, but it was believed that the reference to other changes" in the first question would be a sufficient excuse for the latitude which has been taken.

66

With much respect, your obedient servant,

Hon. C. M. CONRAD,

Secretary of War.

No. 2.

C. MORRIS, Captain U. S. Navy.

Report of Commodore C. M. Perry.

NORTH TARRYTOWN, July 25, 1852.

SIR: In obedience to your order of the 23d ultimo, covering a copy of a communication with the Secretary of War, together with a copy of a resolution of Congress, calling for information upon the expediency of modifying the system of national fortifications established in 1816, I have the honor to report

In reply to the first inquiry, as follows:

"To what extent, if to any, ought the present system of fortifications for the protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application of steam to vessels-of-war, the inventions or improvement of projectiles, or other changes that have taken place since it was adopted in 1816?"

I may remark that, in my opinion, it is desirable that the system referred to should be substantially modified by an entire abandonment of the plan of exterior coast fortifications, and a confinement to the completion of the works already commenced for the protection of our principal ports of trade and naval depots; and that no greater number of works should be recognized as permanent means of defence of the more important points upon the seaboard than those that may be suitably garrisoned and kept in constant preparation, whether in peace or war, for repelling an enemy.

In the attempt to sustain the position which I propose to assume, being at my residence in the country, without proper documents or other data to enable me to enter fully into detail, I shall, with two exceptions, refrain from alluding to the published statements and reports of others upon the subject; and while cheerfully according to those who may differ from me all credit for sincerity and patriotism, I may content myself with a general expression of opinion upon the question under investigation, calling particular attention to the report of Mr. Cass, when Secretary of War.-(See Doc. 293, 24th Congress, April 8, 1836.) Concurring, as I most fully did at the period of its date, (1836,) and as I do now, in the opinion set forth in that masterly state paper, I might be satisfied in assuming the whole range of argument of that distinguished man, as exhibiting