Lake Champlain, with the power of throwing troops, mechanics, and sailors in a few days upon the shore of the upper lakes, and with the strongest inducements to keep up then an active warfare. The possession of a naval depot at Penetanqueshin, on Lake Huron, which it is understood can readily be made a strong place, and where there is now one war steamer, and the easy communication with it from Toronto would allow enterprises to be prepared and sent at favorable moments against the establishments and commerce of the upper lakes. But an anchorage under the defence of Fort Mackinac as a place of rendezvous and watch for our own steam squadron, and a place of refuge in case of disaster, would be very important in counteraction of any such project. Fort Gratiot, when strengthened, would prevent any such hostile expedition from passing through the strait in Lake St. Clair and endangering Detroit, while it would cover any of our vessels retreating to that end of the lake. Fort Wayne, near Detroit, will prevent the passing of any vessel between Lakes Huron and Erie, while it would become the rallying point of the militia of that region assembled to meet threatened attacks of a serious nature, or to organize expeditions into the opposite territory, and its garrison would protect the neighborhood from all predatory inroads.

Even on Lake Erie, where we might have the means of arming and manning any number of steamers, we should derive important if not indispensable aid from batteries, duly prepared at Buffalo. The English now own several good steamers on this lake, and by the aid of the Welland canal they could bring in others, and they could also soon build a number within harbors secure and near; so that we may reasonably look for vigorous efforts of that nature if we leave our great places uncovered. The proposed battery and tower, in addition to the one already constructed at Buffalo, will place that city out of danger of conflagration, bombardment, or contribution, a security otherwise to be attained only by keeping it constantly covered by a number of war steamers greater than the enemy can bring. There can be no comparison as to the expense of the two modes, while the naval defence will be subject to all the chances of absence, at the moment of need, on other duty; of being enticed away by other real or fictitious attacks; of being dispersed for a time by tempests, &c. Other important places on the lake shore will be distant comparatively, not under constant supervision from the Canada side, less valuable, and for these and other reasons may, with less damage, be left to such defences as temporary and hastilyprepared works may supply. The two batteries at Buffalo would cover the whole face of the shore, so that no vessel could lie within reach of the city without coming under their fire, and the towers would guard these guns from being spiked in any attempts at surprise.

On Lake Ontario, with the exception of some slight repairs, all has been done that has been proposed for the present. But we have seen that we shall here be under the naval command of the English, and must, therefore, make timely preparation to avert the more serious consequences.

On the St. Lawrence we should, as soon as possible after a war becomes probable, erect a work to command its navigation; and we ought, also, then to do something for the protection of Ogdensburg.

The obvious advantages afforded by our occupation of the outlet of Lake Champlain would seem to require nothing to be added to the preceding remarks. I may say, however, that the fort now under construction, and more than half finished, will give to us the control of the lake beyond all doubt, and retain it in spite of the energetic efforts that its great importance might induce an enemy to make for its capture or reduction. It will keep all the shores of the lake, as well as its surface, free from any hostile irruption, because no expedition could penetrate, on either side, without exposing itself to be cut off by troops landed in its rear, and it will secure the inappreciable advantage of taking the armies destined to the conquest of Canada, together with all their supplies, up to the H. Rep. Com. 86————27

very frontier with all the velocity of steam; it will bring all re-enforcements with the same rapidity and certainty; and, moreover, in case of reverses it will establish a limit to retreat-a place of shelter, refreshment, and a base for renewed operations.

It is necessary to consider that this point is so near to the point of concentration of the English, in the case we have supposed, that no temporary work could be prepared in time, or, if prepared, would be competent to resist, unless very strong, extensive, and defended by a large body of troops.

If these defences be not carried to completion we may look with certainty to see the English widen and deepen the Chambly canal, a trivial operation, and at the very beginning of a war throw a squadron of war steamers into the lake, from which they could not be driven but by infinite cost and much sacrifice of life and loss of time.

I forbear to enlarge further on this and other important matters connected with this frontier system of defence, again taking the liberty, if the subject be deemed worthy of further pursuit, to refer to the special reports before mentioned, and also to that in document 206. In these reports will be seen views in relation to the embodying militia forces in support of the lake frontier, and also in support of the frontier eastward of Lake Champlain, as well as other ideas supposed to have an important bearing on the topic.

No speculations are ventured as to a possible change in the political condition of Canada. Until Great Britain shall willingly relinquish her dominion we may be certain that all her energies will, if necessary, be exerted in its maintenance; and whether this be for ten years or for a century, the defensive system herein advocated, as dictated by forecast and prudence, should be steadily adhered to; for, up to the moment of relinquishment, if such moment ever arrive, the defences may be growing more and more necessary.

The considerations detailed in the preceding remarks, and others with which it does not seem necessary further to burden this long report, permit me to make no other reply to the fourth inquiry of the Hon. Secretary of War than that no change has occurred, or is likely to occur, that will justify the relinquishment of the system of defence for the northern frontier, of which system the portion designed to be first prepared and to be permanent is now nearly completed.

NORTHERN FRONTIER.

* Expected to be completed within about one year after the amounts required to complete shall have been appropriated.

The inquiries embodied in the resolutions of the House of Representatives, and those specified in the letter of the Hon. Secretary of War calling for this report, have seemed to me to require that the several topics should be gone into with some minuteness. Certain of these, moreover, having been often of late placed before the public mind in erroneous lights, according to my judgment, it appeared to be a duty of my office to press such considerations as might be calculated to satisfy the inquiries of the unprejudiced and uncommitted of the necessity of a permanent system of defence, and of the adaptation to our wants and circumstances of a system of fortification.

Were it not for the length and diffusion of the preceding remarks, of which I m fully conscious, but which I have not time to condense, I should have introduced other considerations of like tendency and of much weight.

As it is, in the full knowledge of our remaining weakness at many important points, and under a deep conviction of the grave consequence likely to flow from tardiness in the prosecution of the system, or interruption to its progress, I feel constrained to invoke for it, with all admissible earnestness, the prompt and liberal support of the Executive and Congress.

At the same time, I only fulfil a further duty in warning the same authorities against relying on means that, though inordinately expensive, will be but temporarily of use, and insufficient while they last, instead of those adopted by all enlightened, experienced nations as relatively cheap as permanent, and in all respects adequate.

COAST OF THE PACIFIC.

Several works of defence will be required for this coast. The special board of engineers organized for its examination, whose province it is to project the necessary works, have but just commenced their sessions, and have had the time to examine and determine on the location of a single fort only. This is on the southern side of the entrance to San Francisco bay, where a work will undoubtedly be required.

For the other points of the coast no positive information as to the locality. size, and cost of works can now be offered. The joint commission of naval and engineer officers who recently made a reconnoissance of the coast, without the means of minute examination, suggest several points that will probably require defence in the course of time. These positions they designate as requiring fortifications to be commenced immediately, namely, San Francisco bay, San Diego harbor, and the mouth of Columbia river; and the department is disposed to rely confidently upon the opinion of the intelligent officers composing the commission. Several other points they also suggest as ultimately requiring defence, submitting estimates of cost. The number of these works, as well as the cost, must be taken as conjectural until a thorough examination can be made.

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The localities specified, with approximate cost of works, are as follows: The commission of navy and engineer officers constituted by the President for the purpose of making an examination of the coast of the United States lying on the Pacific ocean, with reference to points of defence and occupation, for the security and accommodation of trade and commerce, and for military and naval purposes,'

state:

"The several works required for the defence of harbors, roadsteads, rivers, sounds, &c., upon the coast of the United States on the Pacific will be shown in the following tables, arranged in the order of their relative importance, in three classes, with approximate estimates of their cost; each class being shown in a separate table, and the heading being applicable to all the tables."