ducing the depth of water by an artificial ledge, so as, while the passage shall be as free as it is now for the coasting trade, it shall be shut as to the vesselsof-war, including steam vessels; second, by relying on fortifications alone to close the channel; or, third, by resorting in part to one, and in part to the other mode just mentioned. Either is practicable; but, being the least expensive and most certain, the estimates are founded on the first. The total cost of the Narraganset defences is estimated at $1,699,000.—(Classes A, B, D, F.)

Gardiner's bay-It is uncertain whether this harbor, which would be a very valuable one to an enemy investing this part of the coast, is defensible by fortifications alone. After it shall have been surveyed, it may appear that, from one or more positions, the whole anchorage may be controlled by heavy sea-mortars. In such a case, the defensive works would not be costly. If it be found expedient to fortify some particular portion of the bay as an anchorage for steam batteries, (which, however, is not anticipated,) the expense would probably be as great as was anticipated some years since by the engineer department, viz: 8400,000.-(Class F.)

Sag Harbor, New York, and Stonington, Connecticut.-Neither of these harbors has been surveyed with reference to defence. The first is possessed of considerable tonnage; and the second, beside being engaged in commerce, is the terminus of a railroad from Boston. $100,000 may be assigned to the first, and $200,000 to the other.-(Classes E and F.)

New London harbor is very important to the commerce of Long Island sound ; and, as a port of easy access, having a great depth of water, rarely freezing, and being easily defended, it is an excellent station for the navy. It is also valuable as a shelter for vessels bound out or home, and desirous of avoiding a blockading squadron off Sandy Hook. The plan of defence includes the rebuilding of Forts Trumbull and Griswold-the former having been already done, very nearly-remaining expense estimated at $198,000.-(Classes A and F.) Mouth of Connecticut river. This river has been shown to be subject to the expeditions of an enemy. No survey has been made with a view to its defences. $100,000 is introduced here as the conjectural cost.-(Class F.)

New Haven harbor.-It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving and enlarging Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slight redoubt erected during the last war, called Fort Wooster. The expense of both may be set down at $90,000, exclusive of $5,000 for immediate repairs of old Fort Hale.— (Classes A and F.)

There are several towns between New Haven and New York on both sides of the sound; none of them are very large as yet; still most, if not all, are prosperous and increasing. Although in their present condition it might not be deemed necessary to apply any money to permanent defences, yet, as part of the present object is to ascertain, as near as may be, the ultimate cost of completely fortifying the coast, it seems proper to look forward to the time when some of these towns may become objects of predatory enterprises of some magnitude. Bearing in mind the probable increase of population in the meantime, and the situation of the places generally, it is thought that $200,000 will be enough to provide defences for all.-(Class F.)

New York harbor.-The objects of the projected works for the security of New York are to cover the city from an attack by land or sea; to protect its numerous shipping; to prevent, as far as possible, the blockade of this great port, and to cover the interior communication uniting this harbor with the Dela

ware.

There are two avenues to the city, namely, one by the main channel, direct from sea, and one by the sound.

The projected system of defence closes this last avenue at the greatest distance possible from the city, namely, at Throg's Point. The occupation of this point

will force the enemy to land more than twenty miles from the city on one side, and still further from the navy yard on the other.

A work now in progress and nearly finished at Throg's Point will prevent any attempt to force this passage. It will, as we have seen, oblige an enemy to land at a considerable distance from the object; and, as he will then be unable to turn the strong position afforded by Harlem river, the cover on the New York side will be sufficient.

But should he land on the Long Island side, he might, by leaving parties on suitable positions, with a view to prevent our crossing the river and falling on his rear, make a dash at the navy yard, having no obstacle in his front. To prevent this effectually, and also to accomplish other objects, a work should be erected on Wilkins's Point, opposite Throg's Point. This work, besides completing the defence of that channel, would involve a march against the navy yard from this quarter in great danger, since all the forces that could be collected on the New York shore might, under cover of this work, be crossed over to Long Island, and fall on the rear of the enemy, cutting off his communication with the fleet. The two works on Throg's and Wilkins's Points may therefore be regarded as perfectly protecting on that side the city and navy yard. Against an attack by the main channel there are:

1st. The works in the vicinity of the city, which would act upon an enemy's squadron only after its arrival before the place. They consist of Fort Columbus, Castle Williams, and South Battery, on Governor's island, Fort Wood, on Bedlow's island, and Fort Gibson, on Ellis's island.

It is necessary that these works be maintained, because, in the event of the lower barriers being forced, these would still afford a resource. It is a disadvantage of their positions, however, that the destruction of the city might be going on simultaneously with the contest between the forts and the fleets. They cannot, however, be dispensed with until the outer barriers are entirely completed, if even then.

2d. At the Narrows, about seven miles below the city, the passage becomes so contracted as to permit good disposition to be made for defence. On the Long Island side of the Narrows is Fort Lafayette, which is a strong water battery, standing on a reef at some distance from the shore, and immediately behind it, on the top of the bank, is a small but strong work, called Fort Ham ilton. Some repairs being applied to these works, this position may be regarded as well occupied.

On the west or Staten Island side of the Narrows are the following works, all of which were erected by the State of New York, viz: Fort Richmond, which is a water battery; Battery Hudson, which is at some height above the water; Battery Morton, which is a small battery on the top of the hill, and Fort Tompkins, which is also on the hill, and is the principal work. All these works, as well as the site common to them all, are now the property of the United States by purchase from the State of New York.

Batteries Hudson and Morton have been put in perfect order, and afford a formidable array of guns. Fort Richmond, which occupied the best position within the whole harbor for channel defence, had fallen entirely to ruin; it is now being reconstructed, and with the appropriation asked for in the estimates of last year might have been now ready for one tier of guns.

The nature and extent of repairs required by Fort Tompkins have not yet been settled, this not being deemed so pressing as a state of readiness in the batteries just mentioned. Besides these works, there has been projected for Staten Island an advanced redoubt, which, however, falls within the class of works (F) last to be erected.

With the Narrows thus defended, and the works near the city in perfect order, New York might be regarded as pretty well protected against an`attack by water through this passage.

But there lies below the Narrows a capacious bay, affording good anchorage for any number of vessels-of-war and transports. An enemy's squadron being in that bay, into which entrance is very easy, would set a seal upon this outlet of the harbor. Not a vessel could enter or depart at any season of the year. And it would also intercept the water communication, by way of the Raritan, between New York and Philadelphia.

The same squadron could land a force on the beach of Gravesend bay, (the place of the landing of the British, which brought on the battle of Long Island in the revolutionary war,) within seven miles of the city of Brooklyn, of its commanding height, and of the navy yard, with no intervening obstacle of any

sort.

This danger is imminent, and it would not fail, in the event of war, to be as fully realized as it was during the last war, when, on the rumor of an expedition being in preparation in England, twenty-seven thousand militia were assembled to cover the city from an attack of this sort. It is apparent that the defences near the city and those at the Narrows, indispensable as they are for other purposes, cannot be made to prevent this enterprise, which can be thoroughly guarded against only by

3d. An outer barrier at the very mouth of the harbor. This would accomplish two objects of great consequence, namely, rendering a close blockade of the harbor impossible, and obliging an enemy who should design to move troops against the navy yard to land at a distance of more than twenty miles from his object, upon a dangerous beach, leaving, during the absence of the troops, the transports at anchor in the ocean, and entirely without shelter.

The hazard of such a land expedition would moreover be greatly enhanced by the fact that our own troops, by passing over Long Island under cover of the fort at Wilkins's Point, could cut off the return of the enemy to his fleet, which must lie at or somewhere near Rockaway. Time, distance, and the direction of the respective marches would make, very naturally, such a manœuvre a part of the plan of defence. Against an enemy landing in Gravesend bay no such manœuvre could be effectual, on account of the shortness of his line of march, as well as of its direction.

In view of these considerations, the board of engineers projected additional works, one for the east bank, and another for the middle ground, these positions being on shoals on either hand of the bar outside of Sandy Hook. Before determining on the works last mentioned the board went into much research, in order to ascertain whether these shoals were unchangeable, and it was thought to have been fully proved that there had been no material alteration in more than sixty years. This apparent stability of the shoals encourage the board to devise the project referred to.

More recent surveys have, however, discovered new, or rather other channels. If they, indeed, be new channels, they show a want of stability in the shoals that forbids any such structures as the batteries formerly contemplated. And whether new or not they would deprive these batteries of a material portion of their efficacy. Removing, then, these defences from this outer bar, they must occupy the position of Sandy Hook; at which they will afford a very good defence of the main channel, and prevent the entrance to or occupation of the lower bay for any hostile purpose whatsoever, and cover a secure anchorage there for our own merchantmen and privateers, and for our steam and sailing cruisers.

To recapitulate as to New York harbor. The security of the city of New York, Brooklyn, &c., and the navy yard requires, first, defences on the passage from the sound; namely, the completion of Fort Schuyler on Throg's Point, (Class B,) and the erection of a fort on Wilkins's Point (Class F)-cost of both $711,000; second, completion of repairs on works of Governor's island, Bedlow's island, and Ellis's island-estimated cost $42,689, (Class A;) third, repairs

of the works at the Narrows, including those formerly belonging to the State of New York-cost $326,834, (Class A and B ;) and fourth, the erection of outer defences on Sandy Hook-estimated by the board of engineers to cost $1,200,000, (Class D;) the total cost will therefore be $2,332,523.-(Classes A, B, D, F.)

Delaware bay, Fort Delaware, Fort Mifflin, Delaware Breakwater.—The coast from the mouth of the Hudson to the Chesapeake, as well as that on the south side of Long Island, is low and sandy, and is penetrated by several inlets; but not one, besides the Delaware, is navigable by sea-going vessels. The Delaware bay itself being wide and full of shoals, having an intricate channel, and being much obstructed by ice in the winter, affords no very good natural harbor within a reasonable distance of the sea.

The artificial harbor constructed just within the mouth of Delaware bay supplies this need, and must be securely fortified. No plans have, however, as yet been made with that object; and as to the probable cost, nothing better can now be done than to assume the conjectural estimate made some years since in the engineer department, namely, $600,000.—(Class F.)

The lowest point at which the bay is defensible is at Pea Patch island, about forty-five miles below the city of Philadelphia. A fort on that island, to replace the one destroyed by fire; a fort opposite the Pea Patch, on the Delaware shore, to assist in commanding the Delaware channel, and at the same time to protect the mouth of the Delaware and Chesapeake canal; a temporary work on the Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the commencement of a war, to assist in closing the channel on that side; together with floating obstructions, to be put down in moments of peril, will effectually cover all above this position-including Philadelphia and its navy yard, Wilmington, New Castle, the canal before mentioned. and the Philadelphia and Baltimore railroad.

The rebuilding of Fort Delaware was long delayed by difficulties attending the settlement of claims to the island (Pea Patch) on which it is to stand; these having been adjusted, the fort is in progress-the tedious and difficult process of forming a foundation with piles and grillage being concluded. In the meantime, Fort Mifflin, an old work, standing about seven miles below the city of Philadelphia had been put in good order.

The expense of Fort Delaware is, according to revised estimates, $580,000. and of the fort opposite, $521,000.-(Classes C and F.)

Chesapeake bay, Hampton roads, James river, Norfolk, and the navy yard.The works projected for these are: first, a fort at Old Point Comfort—this is called Fort Monroe; second, a casemated battery called Fort Calhoun, in the Rip Rap shoals, opposite Old Point Comfort; and, third, a line of floating obstructions, extending across the channel from one of these works to the other. Fort Monroe is of itself complete, but an advanced redoubt on the land side is unfinished, and considerable work is yet necessary to secure proper ventilation and the necessary dryness to the great powder magazines within the fort, designed as a principal depot of that material. Attempts to secure good water by an artesian well are still persevered in. Required to complete, $75,000.— (Člass B.)

Fort Calhoun cannot yet be carried forward for want of stability in the foundation. The artificial mass on which it is to stand having been raised out of the water, the walls of the battery were begun some years since; but it was soon found that their weight caused considerable subsidence. On an inspection by engineer officers it was then decided to keep the foundation loaded with more than the whole weight of the finished work until all subsidence had ceased. The load had hardly been put on, however, before it was injudiciously deter mined to take it off, and begin to build, although the settling was still going on. Happily, a better policy prevailed before the construction was resumed, but not before the very considerable expense of removing the load had been incurred, and the further expense of replacing it rendered necessary. The subsidence

has now so nearly ceased that it is contemplated to resume the construction at an early day. (Class C.) Required to complete, $729,332.

It may be expedient in time of war, by way of providing interior barriers, to erect batteries on Craney island, at the mouth of Elizabeth river, and to put in condition and arm Old Fort Norfolk, which is just below the city.

Harbor of St. Mary's.-The central situation (as regards the Chesapeake) of this fine basin, its relation to the Potomac, its depth of water, and the facility with which it may be defended, indicate its fitness as a harbor of refuge for the commerce of the Chesapeake bay, and as an occasional, if not constant, station during war of a portion of the naval force. A survey has been made, but no project has been formed. The engineer department some years ago conjectured that the cost of defences in this harbor might amount to $300,000.—(Class F.) Annapolis harbor.-Fort Severn has been put in an efficient condition, and repairs have been advanced on Fort Madison; these will be continued until that work also shall afford an efficient battery.-(Class A.) Estimated at $30,000.

Harbor of Baltimore. The proximity of the city to Chesapeake bay greatly endangers the city of Baltimore. In the present state of things an enemy, in a few hours' march, after an easy landing, and without having his communication with his fleet endangered, can make himself master of that great emporium of commerce. There are required for its security two forts on the Patapsco, one at Hawkins's Point, and the other opposite that point; these being the lowest positions at which the passage of the Patapsco can be defended. Besides the advantages that will result of obliging the enemy to land at a greater distance, thereby gaining time by delaying his march, for the arrival of succor, and preventing his turning the defensive positions which our troops might occupy, it will be impossible for him to endanger the city by a direct attack by water.

The operations on Fort Carroll-the work occupying the extremity of Sollers's flats, (opposite Hawkins's Point,)—are proceeding with all the rapidity allowed by the appropriations. Estimate, $865,000.-(Class C.)

The work on Hawkins's Point belongs to class F, and is estimated to cost $376,000.

The present Fort McHenry, Redoubt Wood, and Covington Battery should be retained as a second barrier. The first mentioned is now in good condition, and the repairs required for the others may be applied at the beginning of a war. Mouth of Elk river.-The completion of the line of water communication from the Delaware to the waters of the Chesapeake makes it proper to place a fort somewhere near the mouth of Elk river, in order to prevent an enemy from destroying, by a sudden enterprise, the works forming this outlet of the canal. There have been no surveys made with a view to establish such protection, which is estimated at $50,000.-(Class F.)

Cities of Washington, Georgetown, and Alexandria.-Fort Washington covers these cities from any attack by water, and will oblige an enemy to land at some eight or ten miles below Alexandria, should that city be his object, and about twice as far below Washington. It will also serve the very important purpose of covering troops crossing from Virginia, with a view to fall on the flanks of an enemy moving against the Capitol from the Patuxent or the Chesapeake. The repairs on this work have been completed.-(Class A.)

Cedar Point, Potomac river. But all these objects would have been better fulfilled had the work been placed at Lower Cedar Point. As it is, however, the contemplated works being constructed in the Patuxent, and the militia of the surrounding country in a due state of preparation, an enterprise against Washington would be a hazardous one. As giving complete security to the towns in the district, covering more than sixty miles in length of the Potomac; the river terminus of the great railroad from the south, and a large tract of country lying between the Potomac and the Patuxent; the work on Cedar Point should not H. Rep. Com. 86—26