such expanse that batteries cannot be made to control the passage. These have been before spoken of. If the occupation of or passage through these must be defended, it must be by other means than batteries upon the shore. The reliance must, from the nature of the case, be a floating defence of magnitude at least equal to the force the enemy may bring. The complete defence of each of these bays would, therefore, involve very great expense-certainly, in most cases, greater than the advantages gained. The Chesapeake bay cannot, for instance, be shut against a fleet by fortifications; and if the entrance of the enemy is to be interdicted, it must be by the presence of a not inferior fleet to his own. Instead of such a system, it will be better to give up the bay to the enemy, confining our defence to the more important harbors and rivers that discharge into the bay.

By this system not only will these harbors be secured, but the defences will react upon the bay itself, and at any rate secure it from predatory incursions, because, as before shown, while Hampton roads and the navy yard at Norfolk are well protected, no enemy would proceed up the bay with any less force than that which could be sent out from the navy yard. In certain cases of broad waters, wherein an enemy's cruisers might desire to rendezvous in order to prosecute a blockade or as a shelter in tempestuous weather, there may be positions from which sea-mortars can reach the whole anchorage, although nothing could be done with guns. A battery of sea-mortars, well secured from escalade, would in such a case afford a good defence, because no fleet will lie at anchor within the range of shells.

In thus distributing the various exposed points of the sea-coast into general classes, according to the most appropriate modes of defence, we do not find that anything can be substituted for fortifications, where fortifications are applicable, and we find them applicable in all the classes but the last, and in the last we shall find them indispensable as auxiliaries. In this last class there are, no doubt, some cases where naval means must constitute the active and operative force; and it is probable that steam batteries may, of all floating defences, be most suitable, as before stated.

Before proceeding to a specification of the positions on our coast requiring fortifications, something more should be said on the general subject, though on another branch, namely: the proper magnitude and strength to be given to these fortifications.

The present system is founded on this principle, to wit: That the fortifications should be strong in proportion to the value of the objects to be secured. The principle will not, I suppose, be controverted, although the mode of apply ing it may be.

There will hardly be a difference of opinion as to the mode of guarding the less important points. There being no great attraction to an enemy, works simple in their features, requiring small garrisons only, containing a molerate armament, but at the same time inaccessible to the dashing enterprises that ships can so easily land, and which can be persevered in for a few hours with much vigor, will suffice. Circumstances must, however, materially modify the properties of these works, even when the points to be guarded are of equal value. În one, the disadvantage of position must be compensated by greater power; in another, natural strength may need little aid from art; in another, greater width in the guarded channel may demand a larger armament; and in a fourth. peculiar exposure to a land attack may exact more than usual inaccessibility; but all these varieties lie within limits that will probably be conceded.

As to the larger objects, it has been contended that there has been exaggeration in devising works to cover these, the works having been calculated for more formidable attacks than they will be exposed to.

It is easy to utter vague criticisms of this nature, and it is not easy to rebut them without going into an examination as minute as if the criticisms were ever so precise and pertinent.

But let us look a little at the material facts. What is the object of an enemy? What are his means? What should be the nature of our defences?

The object may be to lay a great city under contribution, or to destroy one of our naval depots, or to take possession of one of our great harbors, &c.

It was estimated that in the great fire in the city of New York in the year 1835, the property destroyed within a few hours was worth upward of $17,000,000, although the fire was confined to a very small part of the city, and did not touch the shipping. Is it easy, then, to estimate the loss that would accrue from the fires that a victorious enemy could kindle upon the circuit of that great city, when no friendly hand could be raised to extinguish them? or is it easy to overrate the tribute such a city would pay for exemption from that calamity? Can we value too highly the pecuniary losses that the destruction of one of the great navy yards would invoke? and the loss beyond all pecuniary value of stores and accommodations indispensable in a state of war, and that a state of war could hardly replace?

But what are the enemy's means? They consist of his whole sea-going force, which he concentrates for the sake of inflicting the blow.

“From the nature of maritime operations, such a fleet could bring its whole strength to bear upon any particular position, and by threatening or assailing various portions of the coast, either anticipate the tardy movements of troops upon land and effect the object befo e their concentration, or render it necessary to keep in service a force far superior to that of the enemy, but so divided as to be inferior to it on any one point.”*

We have, then, objects of sufficient magnitude, and the means of the enemy consist in the concentration of his whole force upon one of these objects.

With the highest notion of the efficiency of fortifications against shipping, these are not cases where any stint in the defensive means are admissible. Having, therefore, under a full sense of the imminent danger to which the great objects upon the coast are exposed, applied to the approaches by water an array of obstacles worthy of confidence, we must carefully explore all the avenues by land, in order to guard against approaches that might be made on that side in order to evade or to capture the works guarding the channels.

But before deciding on the defences necessary to resist these land attacks, it will be proper to estimate more particularly the means that an enemy may be expected to bring forward, with a view to such land operations.

History furnishes many examples, and the expedition to Flushing, commonly called the Walcheren expedition, may be cited as peculiarly instructive.

From an early day Napoleon had applied himself to the creation of a maritime force in the Scheldt; and in 1809 he had provided extensive dockyards and naval arsenals at Flushing and at Antwerp. On his invasion of Austria that year he had drawn off the masses of his troops that had before kept zealous watch over these naval preparations, relying now on forts and batteries, and on the fortifications of Flushing and Antwerp for the protection of the naval establishments and of a fleet containing several line-of-battle ships and frigates and a numerous flotilla of smaller vessels.

The great naval establishment at Flushing, near the mouth of the Scheldt, and of Antwerp, some sixty or seventy miles up the river, with the vessels afloat on the river or in progress in the yards, presented an object to England worthy of one of her great efforts.

The troops embarked in this expedition consisted of upwards of thirty-three thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry, more than three thousand artillery, and some hundred of sappers and miners, constituting an army of about forty thousand men.

Mr. Secretary Cass.

The naval portion consisted of thirty-five sail of the line, twenty-three frigates, thirty-three sloops-of-war, twenty-eight gun, mortar, and bomb vessels, thirtysix smaller vessels, and eighty-two gunboats, making a total of one hundred and fifty-five ships and other armed vessels, and eighty-two gunboats. The guns, mortars, &c., provided for such bombardments and sieges as the troops might have to conduct, amounted to one hundred and fifty-eight pieces, with suitable supplies of ammunition and stores of every kind.

The idea of sailing right up to their object, in spite of the forts and batteries, seems not to have found favor, notwithstanding the power of the fleet. The plan of operations, therefore, contemplated the landing a portion of the army on the island of Walcheren, to carry on the siege of Flushing, while another portion proceeded up the Scheldt, as high as Fort Bartz, which was to be taken; after which the army would push on by land about twenty miles further and lay siege to Antwerp, all of which it was thought might be accomplished in eighteen or twenty days from the first landing.

The execution did not accord with the design. Flushing, it is true, was reduced within fifteen days; and in less than a week from the debarkation (which was on the 31st of July) Fort Bartz was in possession of the English, having been abandoned by the garrison. But it was twenty-five days before the main body, with all necessary supplies for a siege, were assembled at this point and ready to take up the line of march against Antwerp. Since the first descent of the British matters had, however, greatly changed.

The French were now in force; they had put their remaining defences in good condition; they had spread inundations over the face of the country; and not only would there be little chance of further success, but the safety of the expedition, formidable as it was, might have been compromised by a further advance; it was therefore decided in council to abandon the movement against Antwerp; the troops accordingly returned to the island of Walcheren, which they did not finally leave till the end of December.

The failure in the ultimate object of the expedition is to be ascribed to the omission to scize, in the first instance, the south shore of the river and capture the batteries there, as was originally designed, and which was prevented by the difficulty of landing enough troops at any one debarkation in the bad weather then prevailing. The capture of these batteries would have enabled the expedition to have reached Fort Bartz during the first week; and, in the then unprepared state of the French, the issue of a dash upon Antwerp can hardly be doubted.

The dreadful mortality that assailed the British army is wholly unconnected with the plan, conduct, or issue of the enterprise as a military movement; unless, indeed, it may have frustrated a scheme for occupying the island of Walcheren as a position during the war.

Possession was held of the island for five months; and it was finally abandoned, from no pressure upon it by the French; although, after the first six weeks, the British force consisted, in the aggregate, of less than seventeen thousand men, of which, for the greater part of the time, more than half were sick-effectives being often reduced below five thousand men.

We see, therefore, that an effective force of less than ten thousand men maintained possession of the island in the face of, and in close proximity to, the most formidable military power in Europe, for more than three months. And no reason can be perceived why it might not have remained an indefinite period while possessed of naval superiority.

The proximity of England undoubtedly lessened the expense of the expedition; but it influenced the result in no other way material to the argument.

I will allude to no other instances of large expeditions sent by the English to distant countries than the two expeditions, each of about ten thousand men, sent, in the year 1814, against this country-one by the way of Canada, the

other to the Gulf of Mexico. United, in a single force of twenty thousand men against our sea-coast, the expense would have been less and the result more certain.

The French, notwithstanding their constant naval inferiority, have found opportunities to embark in great undertakings of the same nature. In 1802 Leclerc proceeded to St. Domingo with thirty-four line-of-battle-ships and large frigates, more than twenty small frigates and sloops, and upwards of twenty thousand men. We learn from these points in history, what constitutes an object worthy of vast preparations, and it is impossible to resist the fact that our own coast and rivers and bays possess many establishments not less inviting to an enemy than Flushing and Antwerp.

We are taught, moreover, what constitutes a great expedition; in other words, what is the amount of force we must prepare to meet. And, more than all, we are taught that such an expedition, seizing a favorable moment when the military arrangements of a country are incomplete, when the armies are absent or imperfect in their organization or discipline, does not hesitate to land in the face of the most populous districts; and availing of the local peculiarities, and covered and supplied by a fleet, to undertake operations which penetrate into the country and consume considerable time.

It seems, therefore, that whenever the object we are to cover possesses a value likely to provoke the cupidity of an enemy, or to stimulate his desire to inflict a serious blow, it is not enough that the approaches by water are guarded against his ships; it will be indispensable to place safeguards against attacks by land also. A force considerable enough for very vigorous attacks against the land sides of the fortifications may be thrown upon the shore; and, if these yield, a way is opened for the ships, and the enemy carries his object.

In certain positions the local circumstances would favor the land operations of an enemy, permitting him, while operating against the fortifications, to be aided by the fleet and covered from the reaction of the general force of the country. In other positions the extreme thinness of the population in the neighborhood would require the forts to rely for a considerable time solely on their own strength. In all such cases a much greater power of resistance would be requisite than in circumstances of an opposite nature. In all such circumstances the works should be of a strength adequate to resist an attack, although persevered in vigorously for several days. But when these land operations lead away from the shipping, or when the surrounding population is considerable, or when considerable numbers of volunteers or regulars can be speedily drawn in by steamers or railroads, or the enemy is unable to shelter his movements by local peculiarities, then it will suffice if the work can withstand vigorous attacks for a few hours only.

The magnitude and strength of the work will depend, therefore, on the joint influence of the value of the objects covered, the natural strength of the position, and the succor to be drawn from the country. We may introduce, as instances, New York and Pensacola. The former is as attackable as the latter; that is to say, it equally requires artificial defences; and, owing to its capacious harbor and easy entrance, it is not easy to place it in a satisfactory condition as to the approaches by water. But, while an enemy in approaching any of the principal works by land could not well cover himself from the attacks of the concentrated population of the vicinity, the rapid means of communication from the interior would daily bring great accession to the defence. A land attack against the city must consequently be restricted to a day or two, and the works will fulfil their object if impregnable to a coup de main.

Pensacola, an object in many respects of the highest importance, and growing in consequence every day, is capable of being defended as perfectly as the city just mentioned. The principal defences lie on a long sandy island which closes in the harbor from the sea. An enemy landed on this island (Santa Rosa) would

H. Rep. Com. 86—25

be in uninterrupted communication with his fleet, could, owing to the sparseness of its population, have nothing to apprehend for some time from any re-enforcements arriving at the place, and would be well protected by position from the effects of this succor when it should arrive.

While in possession of naval superiority, he might, therefore, not unreasonably calculate on being able to press a siege of many days of the work which occupies the extremity of the island and guards the entrance to the harbor. And even before coming into possession of this work, his gun and mortar batteries on the same island could destroy everything not bomb-proof and incombustible at the navy yard.

An attack not less persevering, and with equal chances of success, might be made from the other side of the harbor also.

If, therefore, the power to resist a coup de main be all that is conferred on the works at Pensacola, their object will be attained only through the forbearance of the enemy, it being obviously indispensable that the principal of these works be competent to resist a short siege. If this liability resulted from the thinness of the neighboring population, it would still be many years before this state of things would be materially altered.

But it does not depend on this alone: the peculiar topographical features will continue this liability in spite of increasing numbers and ever so easy and rapid communication with the interior, it having been proved that a fleet may lie broad off this shore and hold daily communication therewith during the most tempestuous season. The English fleet of men-of-war and transports lay, during the last war, from February 7 to March 15, 1814, anchored abreast of Dauphin island and Mobile Point, where the exposure is the same as that off Pensacola. Between the cases cited, which may be regarded as the class of extreme cases, (a class comprising, however, many important positions,) almost every conceivable modification of the defence will be called for to suit the various conditions of the several points.

The fortifications of the coast must therefore be competent to the double task of interdicting the passage of ships and resisting land attacks-two distinct and independent qualities. The first demands merely an array, in suitable numbers and in proper proportions, of heavy guns covered by parapets proof against shot and shells; the second demands inaccessibility. As there is nothing in the first quality necessarily involving the last, it has often happened, either from the little value of the position or from the supposed improbability of a land attack, or from the want of time to construct proper works, that this property of inaccessibility has been neglected.

Whenever we have an object of sufficient value to be covered by a battery, we should bear in mind that the enemy will know the value of the object as well as ourselves; that it is a very easy thing for him to land a party of men for an expedition of an hour or two; and unless we take the necessary preventive measures his party will be sure to take the battery first, after which nothing will prevent his vessels consummating the design it was the puruose of the battery to prevent. In general, the same fortifications that guard the water approaches will protect the avenues by land also; but in certain cases a force may be so landed as to evade the channel defences, reaching the object by a route entirely inland. Of course this danger must be guarded against by suitable works whenever the people cannot come promptly to the rescue.

After the preceding exposition of views on the general subject of the defences of the coast, it may not be out of place here to indicate the mode by which the system of fortifications can be manned and served without an augmentation, for that particular purpose, of the regular army.

The force that should be employed for this service in time of war is the militia, (using the term in a comprehensive sense,) the probability being that, in most of the defended points on the seaboard, the uniformed and volunteer companies