where. Forts capable of resisting a coup de main would no doubt, therefore, fulfil their purpose and be respected; and accordingly no siege is to be anticipated, and any auxiliary force that great caution might demand could be easily and speedily forwarded by the numerous and fast steamers on the bay.

Hampton roads and Chesapeake bay. The board of naval officers and engineers intrusted with the selection of sites for a great northern and a great southern naval depot, recommended, in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820, Burwell's bay, on James river, for the one, and Charlestown, in Boston harbor, for the other. They also recommended Boston harbor and Narraganset bay at the north, and Hampton roads at the south, as chief naval rendezvous. In these reports the commissioners entered at large into the consideration of all the matters relating to these important objects, and reference is now made to those reports for many interesting details.

Such an expansion has, however, since then been given to the present navy yard at Gosport, (opposite Norfolk,) that there is little probability of any other position on these waters being occupied for such purposes.

The great importance of retaining Hampton roads during a war, and of covering the navy yard, is conceded on all hands. But the bearing of this harbor upon the general defence of Chesapeake bay is not generally understood.

Being the great naval depot station and rendezvous of the southern coast, it may be safely assumed that this harbor, during war, will never be without a number of ships-of-war, some ready for sea, others just returned from sea, and others held in condition to be suddenly despatched. This being so, should an enemy with a small or moderate force venture up Chesapeake bay, with designs upon any of the rivers, harbors, or towns, his capture would be inevitable by the squadrons of sailing and steaming vessels issuing from his rear from Hampton roads. This certain result would keep back any enemy from any such predatory venture. If, then, we provide adequate defences for the more important places upon the bay and its tributaries, there will remain no temptation to large expeditions, and the peace of this wide-spread navigable water and the safety of the great amount of business and commerce traversing it in all directions will be secured. Thus, by covering the anchorage of our squadron, the defences of Hampton roads become to a most important extent the defences of all the upper waters.

The following very important relation existing between the defences of Hampton roads and the security of both Norfolk and the navy yard, independent of closing the channel to those places, is also not generally understood, and has been overlooked by cities.

If we suppose no defences at the mouth of the roadstead, or only such as can be disregarded or easily silenced, an enemy might debark his troops in Lynnhaven bay and despatch them against Norfolk, while his fleet would pass up the harbor to the vicinity of the town, not only covering the flank of his troops, but landing parties to turn any position that might be taken by an army attempting to defend the place; or, instead of landing in the bay, he might, at his option, land the main body quite near to Norfolk, and having possession of James river, he would prevent the arrival of any succor in steamboats or otherwise by that channel.

There are two or three defiles on the route from Lynnhaven bay to Norfolk, caused by the interlocking of streams, that with the aid of field-works would possess great strength; and being occupied in succession, would undoubtedly delay, if not repulse, an enemy assailing them in front. Since the naval depot seems fixed at Gosport, these must indeed be chiefly relied on for its security from land attacks, and timely attention must be given on the breaking out of a war, to the occupying of these defiles with appropriate defences. These positions, however, possess no value whatever if they can be turned; and without adequate fortifications at the outlet of Hampton roads, there would seem to be

no security for Norfolk or the navy yard, except in the presence of a large military force.

On the completion of the defences at the mouth of Hampton roads the circumstances will be very different. Then those defiles must be attacked in front, because no part of the enemy's force can be landed above the mouth of the roads. But this is not all. The moment an enemy advances towards Norfolk from this point of debarkation, his communication with his fleet will be jeoparded; because as the defiles do not require a large body to defend them against an attack in front, the greater part of the re-enforcements arriving from above by way of the river may be landed upon his flanks or in his rear. An offensive land movement by the enemy, under such circumstances, could be justified only in the case of his finding an entire want of preparation caused by the unexpected commencement of hostilities. In connexion with this disposition for defence, it may be expedient, on the breaking out of a war, to throw up a field-work on the shore opposite the position of Fort Calhoun, which would, besides, contribute to the exclusion from the roadstead of vessels of small draught. The above remarks show that the fortifications in progress are not less necessary to the security of the navy yard and the city of Norfolk from a land attack than from an attack by water; and that both these important functions are superseded to the task of defending the only good roadstead of the southern coast, and of contributing in a very important degree towards the defence of the Chesapeake bay.

As in the case of Narraganset roads, it has been objected to this system of defence, that, although it may shut up this anchorage, it leaves others in this region open. May we suppose, then, that if there were no other than this harbor, its defence would be justifiable? If so, it would seem that the objection rests on the principle that, in proportion as nature has been bountiful to us, we must be niggardly to ourselves; that having little, we may cherish it; but having much, we must throw all away.

The same criticism complains of the unreasonable magnitude of one of these works, (Fort Monroe,) and it is conceded that there is justice in the criticism. But it has long been too late to remedy the evil. It may not, however, be improper to avail of this opportunity to remove from the country the professional reproach attached to this error. When the system of coast defence was about to be taken up, it was thought best by the government and Congress to call from abroad a portion of that skill and science which a long course of active warfare was supposed to have supplied. Fort Monroe is one of the results of that determination. It was not easy, probably, to come down from the exaggerated scale of warfare to which Europe was then accustomed; nor for those who had been brought up where wars were often produced and always magnified by juxtaposition or proximity, to realize to what degree remoteness from belligerent nations might diminish military means and qualify military objects. Certain it is, that this experiment, costly as it was in the case of Fort Monroe, would have been much more so but for the opposition of some whose more moderate opinions had been moulded by the circumstances and wants of our own country.

The mistake is one relating to magnitude, however, not to strength. Magnitude in fortification is often a measure of strength, but not always, nor in this instance. Fort Monroe might have been as strong as it is now against a water attack, or an assult, or a siege, with one-third its present capacity, and perhaps at not more than half its cost. I do not think this work too strong for its position, nor too heavily armed; and as the force of the garrison will depend mainly on the extent of the armament, the error which has caused an excess in the first outlay will not involve much useless expense after completion.

The railroad coming down from the interior of the country to Norfolk navy yard might unquestionably render service in bringing forward troops in the H. Rep. Com. 86-23

event of a powerful and persevering land attack on the defences of Norfolk and the navy yard, and in like manner useful re-enforcements might arrive rapidly in the steamers of James river. But we have seen that without the defences at the mouth of the roads there would be no time nor opportunity for any such force to arrive, or to act when arrived. The enemy would proceed from sea directly up to his object, and need not necessarily lose a tide nor land a man. If a sudden attack with a large squadron of armed steamers-for this great naval depot presents an object worthy of a great expedition-is to be repelled, it will not be by crowds of volunteers rushing in from the country with muskets and rifles on their soulders, but by fortifications of some sort, or by naval means; and if by the latter, by a force not materially less than the enemy's.

Cumberland sound, at the mouth of St. Mary's river.-It is an important principle, bearing peculiarly on the defence of the whole southern coast, that on a shore possessing few harbors it is at the same time more necessary to preserve them all for our own use and more easy to deprive an enemy of that shelter without which a close blockade cannot be maintained. This principle is enforced in the instance of our southern coast by the two following weighty considerations, viz: first, its remoteness from the naval rendezvous, the Chesapeake, which is, on a mean, six hundred miles distant, and to leeward both as to wind and current; and second, its being close upon the larboard hand as they enter the Atlantic of the great concourse of vessels passing at all seasons through the Florida channel. While, therefore, this part of the coast, from the concentration of vessels here, is in great need of protection of some sort, naval aid can be extended to it only with difficulty, and at the risk of being cut off from all retreat by a superior enemy.

All the harbors accessible to vessels-of-war on this part of the coast will sooner or later need defences, because otherwise they will be seized by an enemy, in order, for one thing, to paralyze the valuable commerce that circulates within the rivers, sounds, and internal lateral communications. The products of a considerable portion of Georgia find outlet only by these channels. Perhaps it may require a war to demonstrate the necessity and advantage of such protection; but there are reasons already alluded to, and of much weight, for securing the mouth of Cumberland sound at any rate, independent of those just mentioned. One of these is particularly important, namely, the situation of this point with respect to the commerce flowing through the Gulf of Mexico. Every vessel bound northward from the Gulf must pass close up by Cape Cañaveral before she can bear away clear of the Matinilla reef, and hence two or three cruisers may take such positions at this outlet that all passing vessels will be seen. While we occupy Cumberland sound our own steaming or sailing cruisers can hold these posts permanently and fearlessly, assured of a place of refuge from a superior enemy.

When the best and deepest of these Georgia entrances shall be fortified, the operation of investing the coast and watching the great outlet of commerce through the Florida passage will be a difficult and hazardous one to an enemy, to whom no perseverance or skill can avail to maintain a continuous blockade, while on the part of our small vessels-of-war, steam frigates, and privateers, the same sort of supervision will be at all times easy and safe. In the meantime the fortifications of Cumberland sound alone will enable us, with the help of a floating force, to protect the whole of this part of the coast from all small expeditions, and to harass and disturb the operations of larger ones, without endangering the safety of our own cruisers.

This sound was occupied by the British during the war of 1812, and Cumberland island made headquaters, a great collateral purpose being, as it would again be, to excite the slaves to insurrection, if possible, at least to desertion.

No railroads now exist to influence in any way the security of this harbor, but both railroads and canals have been talked of, which would greatly enhance

the value of defences on the Georgia coast, and especially those of Cumberland sound.

Key West and the Tortugas.-These are the first important positions that present themselves on doubling round Cape Florida into the Gulf of Mexico. Strong opinions have been several times expressed in favor of these fine harbors, and I beg leave particularly to refer to a letter from Commodore Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy, July 3, 1829, (Senate documents, 1st session 21st Congress, vol I, No. 1, page 236,) and letter from the Secretary of the Navy, March 25, 1830, (Senate documents, 1st session 21st Congress, vol. II, No. 111, page 1.)

A naval force designed to control the navigation of the Gulf could desire no better position than Key West or the Tortugas. Upon the very wayside of the only path through the Gulf, it is at the same time well situated as to all the great points therein. It overlooks Havana, Pensacola, Mobile, the mouths of the Mississippi, and both the inlet and the outlet of the Gulf.

The Tortugas harbor and that of Key West affords perfect shelter for vessels of every class, with the greatest facility of ingress and egress. And there can be no doubt that an adversary in possession of large naval means would with great advantage make them his habitual resort and his point of general rendezvous and concentration for all operations on this sea. With an enemy thus posted, the navigation of the Gulf by us would be eminently hazardous, if not impossible, and nothing but absolute naval superiority would avail anything against him. Mere military means could approach no nearer than the nearest shore of the continent. There are no harbors in the Gulf at all comparable with these that an enemy could resort to with his large vessels. To deprive him of these would, therefore, be interfering materially with any organized system of naval operations in this sea. The defence of these harbors would, however, do much more than this. It would secure to our own squadron, even should it be inferior, the use of these most valuable positions, and would afford a point of refuge to our navy and our commerce at the very spot where it would be inost necessary and useful.

I forbear to enlarge on this point, merely adding that certain and complete defence will be easily secured, and that we shall thereby possess ports of refuge in the middle of the Gulf whenever we have to fly, and points of rendezvous and refreshment in the very midst of all passing vessels whenever we hold the mastery. Every vessel that crosses the Gulf of Mexico passes within sight of the two forts commenced under the sanction of Congress and now in progress, one at Tortugas, and one at Key West.

It is needless to say that with the possession of these advanced posts, and with the control of the commerce of the Gulf thereby insured, no railroads upon the main can have any relation. The forts must rely solely on their own efficiency and power of resistance. Happily the local circumstances allow these conditions to be easily secured.

I could adduce many other illustrations of the truth of the assertions made in the commencement of these remarks, that though occasional benefit will result to the system of fortification on the seaboard from the construction of railroads, they in general will have little or no bearing on the immediate means of defence. These, whether they be forts or ships, must be put in a state of preparation and kept so by the use of means that railroads do not supply, or at least that can be well supplied without them.

Numerous and facile communications, whether by railroad or steamers, or common roads, are important undoubtedly to the general activity and vigor of war, whether offensive or defensive; but it is as communications that they are useful, not as being of themselves instruments of warfare, or as supplying any that can be substituted for ships or forts.

I ought here to advert to the idea often announced, though always vaguely and in general terms, namely, that by the help of these railroads large bodies of men may be thrown from the interior of the country upon the exposed points of the coast, and there erect, and arm, and serve temporary batteries adequate to repel any maritime attack.

If we have waited for the opening of a war to do this, our enemy, who knows the fact as well as we, will surely not allow time for the completion even of such works as these. And in adopting this policy, we undertake to afford a protection to the country in the first days and weeks of the war, that nations experienced in warlike affairs have considered as hardly accomplished after years and years of labor during peace.

In many important cases, the contemplated batteries could not be erected hastily, because they would have to be supported by piling and grillage; and in others, even the very sites would have to be raised out of the water. The inferiority in efficacy and equipment of such batteries, when erected, would have to be compensated by an increased number of guns; but in many instances, a good defence could only be made in positions where there is not room for the requisite number of guns, except by placing them tier above tier, an arrangement wholly inconsistent with sudden preparation.

But even if the sudden arrival of a number of men brought by railroad could supply the want of duly-prepared batteries, there are important defensive points to which railroads do not approach, and are not likely to approach. And it also happens that wherever such railroads reach the coast, it is already peopled beyond all probable wants for laborers upon sea-coast batteries. If such batteries were required to be erected as speedily as possible at Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah, &c., they could be much sooner and better executed by calling in the laborers and mechanics of these cities, than by relying on the heterogeneous aid of regiments of volunteers and drafted militia. The second question of the honorable Secretary is in these words: “In what manner and to what extent the navigation of the ocean by steam, and particularly the application of steam to vessels-of-war and recent improvements in artillery and other military inventions and discoveries, affect the question?" And the third question, which it will be convenient to consider in connexion with the second, is in these words, namely: How far vessels-of-war, steam batteries, and ordinary merchant ships and steamers, and other temporary expedients, can be relied upon as a substitute for permanent fortifications for the defence of our large seaports?"

The application of steam to vessels-of-war acts upon the question of sea-coast defence, both beneficially and injuriously. It acts injuriously in several ways; but chiefly, first, by the suddenness and surprise with which vessels may fall upon their object, and pass from one object to another in spite of distance, climate, and season; and secondly, by their ability to navigate shallow waters.

The first property, by which squadrons may run into our harbors, outstripping all warnings of their approach, affords no chance for impromptu preparations; accordingly, whatever our preparations are to be, they should precede the war. It seems past all belief that a nation having in commission-as France and England always have-a large number of war steamers ready for distant service in twenty-four hours, receiving their orders by telegraph, capable of uniting in squadrons, and in two or three days at most speeding on their several paths to fall upon undefended ports-it is not to be expected, I say, that they should delay such enterprises until temporary resorts could be got ready to receive them. And yet there are those who insist that we should leave defensive measures to a state of war-that we should let the day supply the need.

Inadequate as all such measures must prove, there would not be time to arrange even these. By the second property, due to their light draught of water, these vessels will oblige the defence to be extended in some form to passages,