a large military and naval force, with a view to immediate damage or more or less protracted occupation; or,

3. By suddenly appearing with a large squadron of vessels before our principal commercial cities, laying them under contribution, and burning or carrying off the shipping, and by making powerful attacks upon our navy yards in order to destroy those establishments; or,

4. By attacks upon smaller towns and establishments of the coast with small squadrons or single vessels, or with privateers, capturing the shipping therein, and levying contributions, and by like means intercepting the interior commerce within the bays, sounds, and estuaries of the coast; these lesser enterprises being often conducted under the countenance and support of considerable fleets.

The danger may take any of these forms, or all of them. And against any or all of these a naval force of equal or greater strength, if it could with any certainty be found at hand, might be an adequate resort, though it would not be the most economical. But, in the first place, we are yet and shall be for years inferior in our naval preparation to nations with which we are likely to be in conflict; and next, if we were even far superior, it would be impossible to have, at each of the points to be guarded, a naval force sufficient to secure it, because a hostile squadron of twenty or thirty sail of the line and war steamers would fall with equal ease on either of the important points, and could with no more certainty be expected at one than at another; so that, to resist successfully, we must be ready at each and all, with a force not less than that of the enemy; if less, an unavailing resistance would but augment the calamitous consequences. An enemy's squadron, assembled at Halifax or Bermuda, must be equally looked for at every important point from the Penobscot to New Orleans, inclusive, for it could with equal ease fall upon either. The same would be true, moreover, of such a force assembled in any Atlantic port of Europe.

Having seen the modes in which we may be assailed, and that no navy we are likely to possess can supply the requisite guarantees, the first question of the Secretary of War leads us to inquire, to what extent we may be aided by our numerous and multiplying railroads. This question is in the following words:

How far the invention and extension of railroads have superseded or diminished the necessity of fortifications on the seaboard?

If there are cases in which fortifications will be aided by these roads-cases in which works of less strength and efficiency may be relied on, because such aid can be afforded in moments of need-there are many others in which any such aid as they could supply would be useless, and many also to which railroads can have no application.

In very rare cases, a fort lying near existing or probable railroads may also occupy a position exposing it to a besieging army. In such a case, undoubtedly, a railroad would have a direct influence; and the strength and cost of the fort would of course be materially lessened, in consequence of the rapidity with which the railroad would bring succor.

In most cases, however, forts are not liable to a siege, nor to any attack that will keep an enemy more than a few hours before them; they are required, by sudden action, to defend the passage of a river or a channel leading to important objects, or to prevent an enemy's squadron from seizing, or cannonading, or bombarding ships, navy yards, cities, &c.-duties to be accomplished only by heavy artillery in its various forms. The question whether the various forms of heavy artillery will be better placed for this purpose within forts or vessels will be examined hereafter; but that this artillery, however arranged, is the only effectual instrument of defence, admits no doubt. This artillery being in adequate numbers, properly placed, sufficiently manned, out of the reach of seizure by the enemy, and too powerful to be silenced by him-all conditions indispensable, whether in communication with railroads or not-is prepared with

all useful accessories and ready for its great functions, independent of any aid to be supplied from without.

It happens, moreover, that few of the points necessarily occupied for this defence are so situated as to be benefited by railroads, unless the latter be constructed with the exclusive purpose of communicating with them; and some are wholly unapproachable by such means, were they ever so necessary.

As it is undoubtedly true that these communications, even as they now exist, may bring with much rapidity militia and volunteers from the interior, and from lateral sources, to many points of the coast, it may be worth while to examine a little more in detail, whether such use could be made of these superadded numbers as to justify dependence on them for defence against a powerful enemy.

Suppose a hostile fleet to be in front of the city of New York, which nothing would prevent if the channels of approach were not fortified, in what way could the 100,000 or 200,000 new men poured into the city and environs by railroads, although armed with muskets and field-pieces, aid the half million of people already there? It seems to me very clear that these additional forces would, like the population proper of the city, be utterly powerless in the way of resistance, with any means at their command; and if resistance were attempted by the city would but serve to swell the list of casualties unless they should at once retreat beyond the range of fire. If the enemy's expedition were intended, according to the second supposed mode of attack, for invasion or occupation for some time of a portion of the country, then in many places this resource of railroads would be of value; because then the duty of defence would fall upon the army and militia of the country, and these communications would swell their numbers.

But of all the circumstances of danger to the coast this chance of an attempt by an enemy to land and march any distance into a populous district is least to be regarded, whether there be or be not such speedy mode of receiving reinforcements, and our system of fortifications has little to do with any such danger. In preparing against maritime assaults the security of the points to be covered is considered to be greatly augmented whenever the defence can be so arranged as to oblige an enemy to land at some distance: for the reason that opportunity is thereby allowed, in the only possible way, for the spirit and enterprise of the people to come into play.

Instead of being designed to prevent a landing upon any part of the coast, as many seem to suppose, and some to allege in proof of extravagant views on the part of the system of defence, the system often leaves this landing as an open alternative to the enemy, and aims so to cover the really important and dangerous points as to necessitate a distant landing and a march towards the object through the people. It is because the expedition would otherwise easily accomplish its object, without landing and without allowing the population to partake in the defence, that the fortifications are resorted to. For instance, without Fort Delaware, or some other fort low down in Delaware bay, an enemy could place his fleet of steamers in front of Philadelphia by the time his appearance on the coast had been well announced throughout the city. And in spite of all New Jersey, Delaware, and lower Pennsylvania he could levy his contributions and burn the navy yard shipping, and be away in a few hours. But being obliged, by the fort above mentioned, to land full forty miles below the city, the resistance to his march may be safely left to the courage and patriotism that will find ample time to array themselves in opposition.

A distant landing is deemed to be a great advantage to the defence in all cases; and in populous districts, if the forts be sufficient for this particular duty, it makes the security complete.

It is no part of the task assumed by the system of fortifications to guard against the invasion and protracted occupation of a well-peopled district, or of a point around which the forces of the country could be soon rallied. In such

attempts railroads would accelerate the issues; but even the common modes of conveyance would soon bring forces enough to overwhelm them.

But there are places important in themselves, or necessary to the general welfare, that have not the advantage of a large population at hand or within call, and which may nevertheless be very tempting objects to an enterprising enemy. The navy yard at Pensacola will, for instance, in time of war, be of infinite value in reference to the commerce of the Gulf of Mexico. Its destruction would therefore be a great object with a maritime enemy, and it has accordingly been so fortified as to be safe from a coup de main, or, at any rate, will be so when the little remaining to do is complete. A hostile expedition adequate to the reduction of these defences would, however, be able to exclude all relief approaching laterally from the Mississippi, and there is no help to be supplied from the neighborhood, and none but very tardy succor to come from the interior; so that an enemy would find time to reduce the forts established on the islands at the mouth of the bay.

This case illustrates one aspect of the influence of railroads on the coast defence of the United States. While there is no such road by which succor can come from the interior, the security of the harbor and navy yard of Pensacola must depend wholly on the strength and state of readiness of the defences, naval and military, at the mouth of the harbor, there being no neighboring population; and these defences will be liable to a somewhat prolonged as well as powerful attack, giving time for sieges of several days duration.

With a railroad extending into the interior of Alabama, an attacking force, though large, would have to confine itself to comparatively brief and hurried. operations, even though a short siege may be considered out of the question. But although such a railroad were made, a sudden onslaught would suffice for the destruction of the naval establishments (if there were no fortification) whenever the attacking naval force were larger than that which might be present for defence; that is to say, whenever we had not a large squadron present. As before said, the railroad can supply none of the means of resisting such attacks. Without fortifications no existing or projected railroad would do anything towards the protection of New Orleans against a squadron of armed steamers; and not more could such communications do for Mobile or for the hundreds of large vessels that lie in the mouth of Mobile bay awaiting cargoes. There are, moreover, very great points in our system of sea-coast defence that derive their importance much more from their general relation to and bearing on general commerce and the security of large portions of the coast than from local interests. Narraganset road, Delaware Breakwater harbor, Hampton roads, Cumberland sound, (Georgia,) Key West, and the Tortugas, are points of this character; and neither of these would derive material aid from any existing or probable railroad communications. It is proper here to say something of these

relations.

Narraganset bay-As a harbor this is acknowledged by all to be the best on the whole coast of the United States, and it is the only close man-of-war harbor that is accessible with a northwest wind, the prevailing and most violent wind of the inclement season. Numerous boards and commissions-sometimes composed of naval officers, sometimes of army officers, sometimes of officers of both services-have at different times had the subject of this roadstead under consideration, and all have concurred in recommending in strong terms that it be made a place of naval rendezvous and repair, if not a great naval depotone or more of these commissions preferring it for the latter purpose to all other positions. These recommendations have not been acted on, but it is next to certain that a war would force their adoption upon the government. With the opening of this anchorage properly defended, hardly a vessel-of-war of ours could come, either singly or in small squadrons, upon the coast in the boisterous season without arming at this port, on account of the comparative certainty of

an immediate entrance; and this would be particularly the case with vessels injured by heavy weather, or in conflict with the enemy-with vessels bringing in prizes, or pursued by a superior force.

The use of the port would almost necessarily bring with it the demand for the means of repairing and refitting; and the concentration of these upon some suitable spot would be the beginning of a permanent dock yard.

For the same reason that ships-of-war would collect here, it would be a favorite point of rendezvous for privateers and their prizes, and a common place of refuge for merchantmen.

From this, as a naval station, the navigation of Long Island sound and the communication between this and Martha's Vineyard sound or Buzzard's bay might be well protected; New London harbor would be covered; this navy yard would command southwardly, as that from Hampton roads northwardly, the great inward curve of the coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras, the influence of which command over the blockading operations of an enemy will be apparent when it is considered that the only harbors of refuge left to him will be the Delaware, Gardiner's and Buzzard's bays, and Martha's Vineyard sound.

The bays just mentioned belong to the class which, being too wide for complete defence by batteries, must call in such auxiliary defence as the navy may supply; and, in reference to their defence by these means, nothing can be more important than the fortifications of Narraganset roads, because all but Delaware bay, including an anchorage for ships-of-war under Block island, would be commanded by a single squadron of those floating defences lying in these roads. To a squadron of steam batteries, for instance, lying under the fortifications, it would be a matter of little consequence into which of the above anchorages an enemy should go, all being within reach of three or four hours, and some within sight. We will here observe, by the way, that this use of floating defences is in accordance with the principle before insisted on They are not expected to close the entrance into these several bays—that would require a squadron for each at least equal to the enemy's; but as the enemy goes in merely for rest or shelter, and there is no object that he can injure, he may be permitted to enter, and our squadrons will assail him only when the circumstances of wind, weather, &c., give all the advantages to the attack. The fortification of Narraganset roads is, therefore, in effect, a most important contribution towards the defence of all the neighboring anchorages. But the same properties that make Narraganset roads so precious to us would recommend them to the enemy also, and their natural advantages will be enhanced in his eyes by the value of all the objects these advantages may have accumulated therein.

If this roadstead were without defence, an enemy could occupy it without opposition, and by the aid of naval superiority form a lodgement on the island of Rhode Island for the war. Occupying this island with his troops, and with his fleets the channels on either side, he might defy all the forces of the eastern States; and while from this position his troops would keep in alarm and motion the population of the east, feigned expeditions against New York or against more southern cities would equally alarm the country in that direction; and thus, though he might do no more than menace, it is difficult to estimate the embarrassment and expense into which he would drive the government.

It has been alleged that similar consequences would flow from the occupation of other positions, (such for instance as are afforded in the bays just mentioned,) and that therefore the defence, in a strong manner, of Narraganset roads is useless. Even allowing that there are other inaccessible positions whereon an enemy might place himself, is it a reason, because the foe can, in spite of us, possess himself of comparatively unsafe and open harbors, that we should not apply to our own uses, but yield up to him the very best harbor on the coast;

that we should submit to capture and destruction the valuable objects that accumulate in consequence of the properties of the harbor?

But it is believed that none of the outer and wider harbors will answer for such an establishment as we have supposed, nor for any other purpose than an occasional anchorage for ships-of-war, and for these reasons, among others: that although ships-of-war might possibly ride in these broad waters at all seasons, it would seem to be a measure of great temerity for transports to attempt it, except in the mildest seasons; and there can be but little doubt that a hostile expedition would resort to no harbor as a place of rendezvous, unless it afforded sure protection to its transports, these being the only means by which ulterior purposes could be executed, or final retreat from the country effected.

If, moreover, Narraganset roads became a naval station, or at least the station of a floating force designed to act against these outer waters, such an establishment by an enemy on other positions would at once be put upon the defensive and require the constant presence of a superior fleet, thus measurably losing the object of the establishment. Independent of deficient qualities as harbors, however, none of these bays would answer our purposes: First, because they cannot be securely defended; and second, because they are difficult of access from the main, the communication with them being liable to interruption by bad weather, and liable to be cut off by the enemy.

It seems quite evident that the circumstances involved in the occupation and defence of Narraganset roads will not be materially changed by the facilities of railroad communications; so far as numbers can aid in defensive arrangements, they could be supplied in due time and to the extent needed by the surrounding district and common modes of conveyance.

Delaware Breakwater harbor.—In the long stretch of coast between New York bay and the Chesapeake, a distance of about three hundred miles, there is no other entrance from the ocean (except for small vessels) than that at the mouth of the Delaware bay. This circumstance led the commercial men of the country to call, with great unanimity and earnestness, for the creation at this place, which was without a safe anchorage and was full of dangerous shoals, of an artificial harbor. This call had reference mainly, it is true, to protection in stress of weather; but for the same reason, namely, the great distance on either hand to any place of shelter, it must become a place of refuge from an enemy. Vessels near that coast, whether bound north or south, will be liable to be cut off from other refuge and forced into this only entrance; and vessels bound up the Delaware must seek it, of course; so that as this artificial harbor provided by the government must be resorted to in time of war for security of both kinds, thereby becoming a place of rendezvous, it will be an attractive point for an enemy. It would, moreover, since it now yields a safe anchorage, most certainly become the habitual resort of an enemy's vessel cruising on this coast, in order to command the great channel of commerce that sweeps in near these capes. These considerations show the necessity of defending this harbor, and its secure defence would afford the further great advantage of providing a port whence our cruisers, whether steam or sail vessels, might keep watch over this same channel of commerce whenever they were not confined within the defences by the actual presence of a superior enemy.

This case also is one in which the objects in view do not depend on the use of railroads; they can all be achieved without such aid. And it is also a case in which railroads of themselves would do nothing, and in which nothing could be dispensed with because of their existence. If the enemy landing an army were to lay siege to a fort on the shore side of the harbor, then a railroad would certainly be useful in expediting the arrival of succor. But though an enemy would certainly use this harbor for the purposes above stated, if it were not defended, it is not to be supposed that for the conquest of these advantages he would bring a great land expedition that would find much richer booty else