Again, in 1813, the French garrisons of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Hamburg, Wettenberg, and Magdebourg, would have had a fatal influence upon the Prussians, had not the political perfidy of Austria, and the treason of his own generals, prevented Napoleon from profiting by the advantages of his own position. If, after the disasters of this campaign, the fortresses of France failed to save the nation, the cause must be sought for in the peculiar features of the invasion itself, rather than in any lack of military influence in the French defences. A million of disciplined men, under consummate leaders, were here assailing a single State, impoverished by the fatal war in Russia, torn in pieces by political factions, deserted by its sworn allies, its fortresses basely betrayed into the enemy's hands, and its military power paralyzed by the treason of generals, with their entire armies. Its only hope was in the fortresses which had remained faithful; and Napoleon said at St. Helena, that if he had collected together the garrisons of these fortresses, and retired to the Rhine, he could have crushed the allies, even after their entrance into Paris. But political considerations prevented the operation.

Again, in 1815, Napoleon, even after his defeat at Waterloo, possessed lines of defence sufficiently strong to resist all attempts at invasion. But, again, the want of co-operation on the part of the government at Paris, and treason of his own generals, forced his second abdication. If he had retained the command of the army, and the nation had seconded his efforts, the allies could never have reached Paris. But the new government presented the disgraceful spectacle of opening the way for the enemies of their country. "France," said Napoleon, at St. Helena, "will eternally reproach the ministry with having forced her whole people to pass under the caudine-forks, by ordering the disbanding of an army that had for twenty-five years been its country's glory, and by giving up to our astonished enemys our still invincible fortresses."

History fully supports Napoleon's opinion of the great danger of penetrating far into a hostile country to attack the capital, even though that capital may be unfortified. The fatal effects of such an advance, without properly securing the means of retreat, is exemplified by his own campaign in Russia in 1812. If, after the fall of Smolensky, he had fortified that place and Vitepsh, which by their position closed the narrow passage comprised between the Dnieper and the Dwina, he might, in all probability, on the following spring, have been able to seize upon Moscow and St. Petersburg. But leaving the hostile army of Tschkakoff cantoned in his rear, he pushed on to Moscow; and when the conflagration of that city cut off his hopes of winter quarters there, and the premature rigor of the season destroyed the horses of his artillery and provision trains, retreat became impossible, and the awful fate of his immense army was closed by scenes of horror to which scarcely a parallel can be found in history. We might further illustrate this point by the Russian campaign of Charles XII, in 1708-'9, the advance of the French army on Lisbon in the Peninsular war, and others of the same nature.

Even single works sometimes effect the object of lines of fortifications, and frustrate the operations of an entire army. Thus Lille suspended for a whole year the operations of Prince Eugene and Marlborough, Metz arrested the entire power of Charles V, and Strasbourg was often the bulwark of the French. Napoleon said to O'Meara, that, if Vienna had been fortified in 1805, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the event of the war. General Kutusoff's army could there have awaited the return of the other Russian corps and of the army of Prince Charles, then approaching from Italy. Again, in 1809, Prince Charles, defeated at Eckmulh, and forced to retreat by the left bank of the Danube, would have had time to reach Vienna, and form a junction with the forces of General Heller and Archduke John. If Berlin had been fortified in 1806, the army routed at Jena would have rallied there, and been joined by the Russians. If Madrid had been strongly fortified in 1805, the French army, after the victories of Espinosa

Tudella, Burgos, and Sammosiera, would not have marched towards that capital, leaving in the rear of Salamanca and Valladolid both the English army of General Moore and the Spanish army of Romana. These two would, under the fortifications of Madrid, have united with the armies of Arragon and Valencia. If Moscow had been fortified in 1812, its conflagration would have been avoided; for, with strong works, and the army of Kutusoff encamped on its ramparts, its investment would have been impossible. Had not Constantinople been well fortified, the empire of Constantine must have terminated in 700, whereas the standard of the Prophet was not planted there until 1440. This capital was therefore indebted to its walls for 800 years of existence. During this period it was besieged 53 times, but only one of these sieges was successful. The French and Venetians took it, but not without a very severe contest. Paris often owed its safety to its walls. In 885, the Normans besieged it two years without effect. In 1358, the Dauphin besieged it in vain. In 1359, Edward, King of England, encamped at Montrouge, devastated the country to its walls, but recoiled from before its works, and retired to Chatres. In 1429, it repulsed the attack of Charles VII. In 1464, the Count of Charolois surrounded the city, but was unsuccessful in his attacks. In 1472, it repulsed the army of the Duke of Bourgone, who had already ravaged its precincts. In 1536, when attacked by Charles V, it again owed its safety to its walls. In 1589, it repulsed the armies of Henry III and Henry IV. In 1636, the inhabitants of Paris for several years owed their safety to its walls. If this capital had been strongly fortified in 1814 or 1815, the allied armies would not have dared to attempt its investment.

We had intended to enter into an analysis of the Peninsular war, and point out the influence of fortifications upon military operations in Spain and Portugal; but further illustrations would seem unnecessary; for the usefulness of fortifications in the defence of inland frontiers is too evident in itself, and, as we have already shown, is too well supported by historical facts, and the recorded opinions of the best military men of modern ages, to be overthrown by a mere assertion of their worthlessness, no matter by whom such assertion is made.

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While there exists this great unanimity among military men upon the vast importance of fortifications as land defences, there is an equal diversity of opinion respecting the best manner of arranging them. We shall mention three eral systems of arranging forts for the defence of an open country, each of which has been advocated at different times, and afterwards received various modifications and additions. These three systems are the most important, and, in fact, comprise the main features of all others worthy of much consideration. They are:

1st. Montalembert's system of continuous lines.

2d. A system of three lines of detached works, strongly recommended by ́ D'Arcon.

3d. A system proposed by Vauban, and advocated by Rogniat, consisting of lines of very strong works placed at considerable distances from each other, and covering large intrenched camps.

The first was proposed in 1790, and for a time attracted considerable notice in France, but has long since been exploded, as utterly incompatible with the principles of military art. A writer, however, of some pretension in this country, recommends its adoption for the defence of Baltimore and the Chesapeake. The same author would dispense entirely with our present system of fortifications on the sea-coast, and substitute in their place wooden martello towers!

In the second system the works of the first line are to be about one day's march apart, those of the second line opposite the intervals of the first and at the same distance, and those of the third line having the same relation to the second. Works of different sizes are recommended by some writers for each of these three lines.

In the system first recommended by Vauban, and more recently by Rogniat, the works of the advanced line are to be thirty leagues apart, and the other lines at the same distance from each other, with their works opposite the intervals in front. Under the guns of each is established a large intrenched camp.

These systems were designed for an open country, and either of them would be greatly modified in its application; for, in practice, the frontier to be defended will always be of a broken character. The proper application of forts in the defence of such frontiers is a question of no easy solution. The principle laid down by Jomini, "that fortifications should always be constructed on important strategic points," is undoubtedly the correct one; but how to determine these points involves questions which often perplex the patience and try the skill of the engineer; yet determine them he must, or his fortifications will be worse than useless. A fort improperly placed, like a cannon with its fire reversed upon its own artillerists, will be sure to effect the destruction of the very forces it was designed to protect.

The system of fortifications adopted by the board of 1840 for the defence of our northern frontier-a system whose extravagance is so much spoken of in the Apalachicola report-consists of a single line of forts placed at different points along the extreme frontier, and one large military station and depot opposite about the middle of this line, and some two hundred miles back in the interior of the country. This great central station it is proposed to locate at Albany or in that vicinity; and the line of forts to be as follows: First, a fort at the falls of St. Mary; second, at Michilimackinac; third, at the foot of Lake Huron; fourth, at Detroit; fifth, at Buffalo; sixth, at the mouth of Niagara river; seventh, at Oswego; eighth, at Sackett's harbor; ninth, at the Narrows of the St. Lawrence, below Ogdensburg; tenth, at Rouses's Point; elventh, arrangements for depots at Plattsburg, and at the head waters of the Kennebeck and Penobscot; and, twelfth, a fort at Calais, on the St. Croix river.

This system has been considerably commented on by military men, and various opinions have been advanced recpecting its merits. Some are of opinion that more and larger works should have been planned for the western extremity of the line, while others regard the eastern portion as far the most important. This difference results from a diversity of opinion respecting the most feasible line of operations against Canada. According to the views of the one party we should concentrate our forces at the single point of Augusta, and advance from thence against Quebec, a distance of some two hundred and fifty miles along the isolated carriage road through the valley of the Chaudiere; while the other party would draw their military munitions from Pittsburg, and their troops from the States bordering on the Ohio river, and then ascend the Detroit and St. Clair rivers, and Lake Huron; get in the rear of the enemy by way of the Georgian bay and Lake Simcoe, or still further north, by Lake Nipissing and the Ottowa river-thus leaving him between us and our true base. This subject is worthy of examination.

The selection of positions for fortifications on this frontier must have reference to three distinct classes of objects, viz: The security, first, of the larger frontier towns, where much public or private property is exposed to sudden dashing expeditions of the foe, made either on land or by water; second, of lake harbors, important as places of refuge and security to our own ships, or as shelters to the enemy's fleet while engaged in landing troops or furnishing supplies to an invading army; third, of all the strategic points on the probable lines of offensive or defensive operations. These objects are distinct in their nature, and would seem to require separate and distinct means for their accomplishment; nevertheless, it will generally be found that positions selected with reference to one of these objects equally fulfil the others, so intimately are they all connected. To determine the strategic points of a probable line of military operations is therefore the main thing to be attended to in locating the fortifications. That such points of max

imum importance are actually marked out by the peaceful or hostile intercourse of nations cannot be doubted.

The relative importance of cities and towns is less varied by the fluctuations of commerce on a land frontier than on the sea-coast. The ever changing system of "internal improvements," by furnishing new highways and thoroughfares for the transportation of products of manufactures and agriculture, either continually varies the relative standing as the seaports already opened, or else opens new ones for the exportation of their products and importation of foreign articles received in exchange. But these "internal improvements" are seldom carried so far as to connect together two separate and distinct countries; and consequently the prnicipal places on the dividing line usually retain their relative. importance, no matter how often they may have declined during times of hostility, or again flourished with the increased commercial intercourse which results from peace. The principal European places of traffic near the frontiers have remained the same for ages, and in all probability ages hence the great frontier marts will be nearly the same as at present. This stability of rank among the border towns is not confined to commercial influence; the same holds true with respect to that established by iutercourse of a hostile character. Military history teaches us that lines of hostile operations, and the fields upon which the principal battles between any two countries have been fought, are nearly the same, no matter how remote the periods of comparison. These points and lines, so important in commerce as well as in war, result from the natural features of the ground, and we ought therefore to expect that they would be as little liable to sudden changes as the character of the earth itself. From these remarks it will readily be perceived that there are three distinct methods of determining the strategic points between this country and Canada: first, by an examination of the topography of the two countries; second, by tracing out the main channels of commercial intercourse; third, by reviewing the lines of their military operarations. The last method is the least liable to error, and perhaps is the most easily understood, inasmuch as it is sometimes difficult to point the precise degree of connexion between prospective military lines and the channels of commerce, or to show why these two have a fixed relation to the physical features of the country. In the present instance, moreover, this method furnishes us ample data for the formation of our decision, inasmuch as the campaigns between this country and Canada have been neither few in number, nor unimportant in their character and results.

By tracing out the history of the earlier of these campaigns, it will be seen that the English were vastly superior in strength and numbers, yet the result of the several campaigns was decidedly in favor of the French, who not only retained their possessions in the north, but extended their jurisdiction to the mouth of the Mississippi, and laid claim to the whole country west of the Allegany mountains. This success must be attributed not to any superiority of the Canadians in bravery, but to the higher military character of their governors, and more especially to their fortifications, which were constructed in situations most judiciously selected to influence the Indians and facilitate incursions into the English colonies. The disparity of numbers was always very great. At the middle of the eighteenth century the white population of the colonies amounted to upwards of one million of souls, while that of both Canada and Louisiana did not exceed fifty-two thousand. But the French possessions, though situated at the extremities of a continent and separated by an almost boundless wilderness, were nevertheless connected by a line of military posts strong enough to resist the small arms that could there be brought against them. This fortbuilding propensity of the French became a matter of serious alarm to the colonies, and, in 1710, the legislature of New York especially protested against it in an address to the crown. While the military art was stationary in England, France had produced her four great engineers-Errard, Pagan, Vauban,

and Cormontaingne; and nowhere has the influence of their system of military defence been more strikingly exhibited than in the security it afforded to the Canadian colony when assailed by such vastly superior forces. Still further accessions were now made to these forces by large re-enforcements from the mother country, while the Canadians received little or no assistance from France; nevertheless they prolonged the war till 1760, forcing the English to adopt the slow and expensive process of reducing all their fortifications.

The history of the northern wars of the revolution and of 1812 still further proves the importance of fortifications in defence. From this history it will also be seen that positions for defence selected by the board are really important ones; and, moreover, that while the proposed eastern and western routes have been used as auxiliary to the main attack, the line of Lake Champlain has been the field of strife and blood for fifteen campaigns. Nature has marked this out as one line of intercourse with Canada; for, besides being the shortest and easiest line of communication, it possesses many other advantages. Military stores, &c., can easily be transported by water, while the roads on each side of this line offer good routes to the troops. These roads generally converge to the northern extremity of the lake, thus enabling us to concentrate forces at that point while the enemy's invading forces would be obliged to pursue diverging routes. The line of the Kennebec, on the contrary, is only a single road, but little travelled, and penetrating a wide and almost uninhabited wilderness. General Jomini says, emphatically, that a line of operations should always offer two or three roads for the movement of an army in the sphere of its enterprises -an insuperable objection to the Kennebec, except as a diversion to the main attack. But there are still stronger objections to this route than its want of feasibility for the transportation of the main army; for, even if that army should succeed in reaching Quebec in safety, the expedition would be entirely without military results, unless that fortress could be immediately reduced. It would be precipitating our entire force upon the strongest position of the enemy, and making both the success and safety of our army entirely dependent upon the reduction of that fortress-a contingency which would be extremely doubtful, under the most favorable circumstances; and, should we be ever so fortunate in our operations, its siege would occupy a considerable length of time. What principle of military science would justify such a disposition of our force? We are fully aware of the great advantages which we should derive from the reduction of Quebec; but we are also aware of the great difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to accomplish that object. We believe it can and will be made to surrender to our arms; but at the same time we conceive it to be utter folly to base our military operations on the contingency of a short and successful siege. By advancing upon Montreal by the Champlain route, we would cut off the Canadian forces in the west from all re-enforcements; and then, as circumstances might direct, could besiege Quebec or attack the enemy in the field; or, perhaps, manoeuvring as the French did at the siege of Mantua, accomplish both objects at the same time.

If the Champlain line is, as we believe, the most important line in the north, its security by fortifications is a matter of great interest. The works recommended by the board for this purpose deserve the earliest attention of Congress. But are these works alone sufficient to accomplish the object? They consist of a single fort, costing $600,000, on Lake Champlain, near the extreme frontier, and depots at Plattsburg and Albany. But what is to retard the advance of a hostile army if it should pass this extreme frontier barrier?—or what defensive works are to protect the debouche of the northern canal, or even to save the great central depot? We know of no foreign engineer who has recommended less than three lines of fortifications for the security of a land frontier; and Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, and General Jomini agree in recommending at least this number of lines. There may be circumstances that render it un