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ceed the offensive; and that these defences, being perishable in their nature, will require frequent renewal and repairs.

The proper fortification of the coast preventing the possibility of a blockade so strict as not to offer frequent opportunities for our vessels to leave the harbors, the navy, no longer needed for passive defence, will move out upon its proper theatre of action, though inferior to the enemy, with confidence; knowing that, whether victorious, whether suffering under the violence of tempests, or whether endangered by the vicinity or the pursuit of a superior force, they can strike the extended coast of their country, (avoiding the harbors and important outlets of the country where alone a blockading force may be supposed to lie,) at numerous points where succor and protection await them. Hovering around the flanks and rear of blockading fleets, and recapturing their prizes, falling upon portions of these fleets, separated for minor objects, or by stress of weather; watching the movements of convoys, to capture straggling vessels; breaking up or restraining the enemy's commerce in distant seas; meeting, by concert, at distant points, and falling in mass upon his smaller squadrons or upon his colonial possessions, and even levying contributions in the unprotected ports; blockading for a time the narrow seas, and harassing the coasting commerce of the enemy's home;-these are objects which our own history shows may be accomplished-although contending against a nation whose marine has never been paralleled as to force and efficiency, with a navy apparently, as to numbers, insignificant. Our own history shows, besides, that the reason why our infant navy did not accomplish still more, was that the enemy being able to occupy unfortified harbors, was enabled to enforce a blockade so strict as to confine a portion within our waters. That this portion, indeed that all, was not captured, is to be attributed solely to a respect, so misplaced that it could only have been the fruit of ignorance, for the then existing fortifications; a result, notwithstanding, amply compensating the nation for the cost of these works.

It would be difficult, nay impossible, to estimate the full value of the results following the career of our navy, when it shall have attained its state of manhood, under the favorable conditions heretofore indicated. The blockade of many and distant parts of our coast will then be impossible, or rather can then only be effected at enormous cost, and the risk of the several squadrons being successively captured or dispersed; the commerce of our adversary must be nearly withdrawn from the ocean, or it must be convoyed, not by a few vessels, but by powerful fleets. In fine, the war, instead of resulting in the conflagration or pillage of our cities and towns, in the destruction of our scattered and embayed navy, and the expensive establishments pertaining to it, in the interruption of all commercial intercourse between the several sections of the frontier; in the frequent harassing and expensive assemblage of the militia forces, thereby greatly lessening the products of industry, and infusing amongst this most valuable portion of our population the fatal diseases and the demoralizing habits of a camp life; in the copious flow of blood which a war raging at the doors of freemen must cause; and in a natural despondency, unavoidably consequent, and leading, perhaps, as a lesser evil, to the relinquishment of national rights-instead of these, and the innumerable other evils attendant upon a conflict within our borders, we shall find the war and all its terrors shut out from our territory by our fortresses, and transferred by our navy to the bosom of the ocean, or even to the country of the enemy, should he, relying on a different system, have neglected to fortify the avenues by which he is assailable. Our wars thus becoming maritime, will be less costly in men and money, and more in unison with our institutions, leaving untouched our domestic relations, our industry, and our internal financial resources.

It is truly an axiom in military science and one fully illustrated by military history, that the worst mode of waging war, although strictly defensive, is to allow its field of action to be within the borders, and that the best is that which

most frequently assumes an offensive attitude. In our case war can only be excluded from our territory by fortifications; and we can only assume the offensive through our navy. The construction of the former secures the means of creating, equipping, and repairing the latter, and leaves it unencumbered with duties which it imperfectly performs, to the full exercise of its important and appropriate functions.

Since the great improvement in the implements and the tactics of armies, war has cost less in men and more in money than it did in earlier times. But though it is less profuse of blood nowadays, losses of this sort are more severely felt. because of the great multiplication of the branches of productive industry, which, affording employment for a greater proportion of the population, leaves a lesser disposable for war; and on the other hand, if it is more expensive in money, the existing system of finance, founded on the resources afforded by the creation of new wants and the development of new species of industry, produce more ample means than were possessed by the people of the earlier ages. That nation, therefore, which consumes the smallest portion of its disposable population, and which is the least liable to have the regular operations of its laboring classes disturbed by its quarrels, will enjoy a decided superiority over every other; and as the art of war is now carried among all civilized nations to the same degree of perfection, that nation must triumph which can longest keep the field possessed of these means of warfare. And as the destruction of men will thereby be always less, and the resources derived from industry always greater, the advantage must always rest, everything else being equal, with the country which, from its geographical situation and its natural and artificial strength, is most secure from invasion.

Should France ever regain for boundaries the Alps, the Pyrenees, the sea, the marshes of Holland and the Rhine, for which she has so continually labored— accessions of great value to her in her relations with Italy, with Spain, and with the powers of Germany, (countries then entirely open to offensive operations on her part)-still her situation would be greatly inferior, under this point of view, to the insular situation of Great Britain.

Since the union, which put an end to all invasion except by sea, England has effectually guarded herself by perseverance in the augmentation of her navy and in the maintenance and increase of her coast defences; and it is to this system, more perhaps than to her institutions, that England owes her present elevated rank. Securely relying for protection on the defence the government had wisely provided, her population, although surrounded by enemies, calmly directed its genius, its enterprise, and its industry to the accumulation of individual wealth; giving in return for this protection ample means for its continuance, and enabling the government, by disbursements beyond all parallel in actual expenses and in subsidies, to ward off from their territory, and to terminate favorably in the capital of their enemy, a war which had threatened the existence of the nation.

Another advantage, resulting from such a geographical position as warrants confiding the defence to coast fortification and to a navy, is, that the destruction of men in naval contests being much less than in those between armies, a greater number is left to carry on the ordinary and profitable pursuits of civil life. Actions on the ocean are short and decisive, and a few months are often sufficient to decide the superiority for the rest of the war. Besides that, it is rather the injury sustained by the vessels than the loss of life which closes the conflict; privations among sailors are not often severe, and diseases are rare. In armies, on the contrary, the loss of men is immense; skirmishes happen daily, battles are frequent; soldiers are exposed to wants of every kind; to the inclemencies of weather, the variety of climate, and to the ravages of epidemicsmore fatal than the swords of the enemy.

The terminations of the many struggles which for a century and a half have

taken place between France and England, furnish so many striking proofs of the truth of the principle just advanced. In their long and bloody contests, the ratio of expense of men by France and England was as four to one; and when, in consequence of these losses, the French armies were driven back into their own territory, the discouraged people, seeing their sources of finance exhausted and their own employments suspended, paralyzed, by their loud demands for peace at this critical juncture, the last efforts of the government, which more than once was obliged to subscribe to the hardest conditions.

It is this property of inaccessibility by land at which the United States should aim, and which it may attain by well-contrived permanent works, and by the gradual increase of the navy.

Conceiving that we have enlarged sufficiently on this part of our subject, we shall now advert briefly to the correlative influence of fortifications and interior communications.

The most important of these communications in reference to a system of defences are, first, such as serve to sustain, in all its activity, that portion of our domestic commerce which, without their aid, would be interrupted by a state of war; and, second, such as serve, besides their great original purposes, to conduct from the interior to the scene of war necessary supplies and timely relief. The first, which are amongst the most important national concerns of this nature, lie parallel to, and not distant from, the sea-coast; the second, which, whenever they cross the great natural partition wall between the east and the west, are equally important, lie more remote from the coast, and sometimes nearly or quite parallel to it, but generally fall nearly at right angles to the line of the seaboard into the great estuaries, where in some cases their products are arrested, or whence in others they flow on unmingled with those of the first. To fulfil the object of the first-mentioned lines of communication it is obviously necessary to prevent an enemy from reaching them through any of the numerous inlets from the sea which they traverse, including, of course, the great inlets wherein these unite with the more interior communications. The security of these lines, therefore, involves the security of the other, and is in a great measure necessary to it. From what has been before stated we infer that for the security here required we must, as in the case of cities, harbors, naval establishments, &c., look to tortifications. But it fortunately happens, as will appear in the sequel, that wherever both objects exist the works necessary for the one may easily be made to accomplish both. We will only add, in reference to the necessity of a system of defence for the protection of these lines of communication, that from the facility with which they may be broken up, and the serious evils consequent thereon, they offer great inducements to enterprises with that object on the part of the enemy. An aqueduct, an embankment, a tide-lock, or a dam blown up is the work of an hour, and yet would interrupt navigation for months.

The reciprocal value of interior communication to fortifications has been already distinctly stated, and is too apparent to need elucidation.

The necessity of a regular army, even in time of peace, is a principle well established by our legislation. The importance of a well-organized militia is incident to the nature of our institutions, well understood by the people, and duly appreciated by the government. The board have, therefore, nothing to remark on these subjects, considered as general principles. They may, however, find it their duty, in a succeeding part of this report, to venture a suggestion or two touching the expediency of a peculiar local organization of the latter.

Before quitting the subject which has hitherto occupied their attention, the board find it convenient to be more explicit as to the sense in which they have used the terms "navy" and "fortifications." By the first they allude to that portion only of our military marine which is capable of moving in safety upon the ocean, and transferring itself speedily to distant points. Floating batteries, gunboats, and steam batteries they consider as pertaining to fortifications, being always useful,

and sometimes indispensable, as well as powerful auxiliaries. Under the term "fortifications," used as expressive of security afforded thereby to the seaboard, have been included permanent and temporary fortifications-the auxiliaries just mentioned, and both fixed and floating obstructions to channels.

The board now proceed to a concise description of the maritime frontier, considered as a whole, after which they will examine the several sections separately, applying as they go to the defensible positions the works projected for general and local security. In this part of their report it will be necessary to refer frequently to preceding reports for details.

*The sea-coast of the United States is comprised within the 24th and 46th degrees of north latitude, and spreads over 27 degrees of longitude. The general direction of that part which lies on the Atlantic north of the peninsula of Florida is N.NE. and S.SW.; this peninsula stretches out from the continent in a direction a little east of south; while that part of the coast which lies on the Gulf of Mexico, corresponds nearly with the 30th parallel of north latitude. out estimating any of the indentations not properly belonging to it, and carrying our measures from point to point, wherever these breaks are at all abrupt, the line of coast may be stated to be 3,300 miles in length.

Nearly parallel with the Atlantic coast extends a chain of mountains separating the sources of rivers flowing on the one hand directly into the ocean from those which run into the Gulf of St. Lawrence or Gulf of Mexico. In the most lofty portions of this chain numerous gaps afford facilities for crossing it by roads or railed ways. Occasional expansions at high elevations or depressions of the summit present sufficient surface to collect the water necessary for crossing by canals, and in other places the rivers themselves have severed the chain, leaving no impediments to communications of either kind. On both sides of these mountains the country presents numerous natural means of intercommunications, and facilities and inducements for the creation of artificial ones in endless combinations.

From this description it appears that notwithstanding the great extent of our seaboard, the safety of each section of it is a matter not devoid of interest to every portion of the people however remote geographically, at least so long as the nation shall continue her commercial relations with the rest of the world; and indeed until she shall find it her interest to interdict the circulation of domestic commerce through the avenues which nature or art may have created— a commerce of inestimable value at all times, and becoming more necessary as well as more valuable on every interruption of foreign traffic.

As being in close connexion with the coast it will be convenient to describe. briefly, in this place the line of interior communication on which, in time of war, reliance must be placed as the substitute for the exterior coasting navigation.

Beginning in the great bay to the north of Cape Cod it passes over land either into Narraganset Roads or Buzzard's bay; thence through Long Island sound to the harbor of New York; thence up the Raritan overland to the Delaware; down this river some distance; overland to the Chesapeake; down the Chesapeake, up Hampton Roads and Elizabeth river; through the Dismal Swamp to Albemarle sound; thence through the low lands, swamps, or sounds of the Carolinas and Georgia to the head of the peninsula of Florida; overland to the Gulf of Mexico; and thence through interior sounds and bays to New Orleans. Some of the few and brief natural impediments to this extensive line have already been removed; some are rapidly disappearing before the energy of local or State enterprises; and to the residue the public attention is directed with an earnestness which leaves no reason to fear that they will not ere long be overcome.

See report of 1819.

* Proceeding now to a minute examination of the coast, we find it naturally divided into four distinct parts, namely: The Northeastern, extending from Nova Scotia to Cape Cod; the Middle, from Cape Cod to Cape Hatteras; the Southern, from Cape Hatteras to Cape Sable; and the Gulf of Mexico frontier, from Cape Sable to the mouth of the Sabine river.

We will now take them in the order in which they stand above.

TBE NORTHEASTERN SECTION OF THE COAST.

The northeastern section is characterized by its serrated coast and its numerous harbors; and though differing in these respects entirely from the other sections, is no less distinguished in its climate by the prevalence, at certain seasons, of dense and lasting fogs. The extent of this section, measuring, where the breaks in the coast are abrupt, from point to point, is about 500 miles; while a straight line from Cape Cod to Quoddy Head is hardly half that distance. The eastern half of this coast is singularly indented by deep bays, the shores being universally rocky, and having numerous islands, surrounded by deep water, which not only add to the number of harbors but afford an interior navigation perfectly understood by the hardy sailors of the country, and measurably secured by its intricacies and the other dangers of this foggy and boisterous region from interruption by an enemy. The western half, though it has two very prominent capes and a few deep bays, is much less broken in its outline than the eastern. It is covered by few islands in comparison, but contains, nevertheless, several excellent harbors.

Considering the sparseness of the population in the eastern part of the State of Maine, the little comparative value of any existing establishment there, the proximity of a province of another power, within which is situated an important post of naval rendezvous, the board think it would be inexpedient to undertake, under present circumstances at least, the defence by permanent works of any position to the east of Mount Desert island; especially as the capture of any work there, whereof the strength would be proportionate to the importance of the place covered, might, owing to its destitution of succor, be easily achieved by an enemy, who would not fail to profit of its situation to harass both our commercial and naval operations.

+ Mount Desert island, situated between Frenchman's and Penobscot bays, and centrally as respects the Kennebeck and St. Croix rivers, having a capacious and safe roadstead, affording anchorage for first rate vessels, easily accessible from the sea, and being easily defended by batteries, offers a station superior to all others on this portion of the coast for a navy of an enemy. From this point his cruisers can act with great effect against the navigation of the eastern coast, especially that of Maine; and his enterprises of every kind can be conducted, with little loss of time, against any point he may select. These considerations, added to the advantages which would result from possessing ourselves of a naval station which would enable us to assume the offensive, should our political relations again make it necessary, in the immediate vicinity of a formidable provincial establishment of another power; together with the necessity of providing places of succor on a part of the coast where vessels are so frequently perplexed in their navigation by the prevailing fogs; lead the board to the conclusion that the fortification of this roadstead in a strong manner is indispensable. From the incomplete state of the surveys, however, they are not at present able to state the particular modes nor the expense of the defences. Penobscot bay. The next important part of this coast, proceeding westward,

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See report of 1821, and the memoir on the defences of the narrows of the Penobscot, 1825,

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