Imatges de pàgina
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to set the ordinary calmness of probability at defiance, and trust to daring and to fortune for success; but for government to fit out expeditions on such a principle would be the height of reprehensible folly-criminal as an avowed game of hazard played with dice of human bones.' It would be doubly criminal in the government of this country, [England,] so amply provided with the power of placing the fair means of success at the disposal of efficient armaments. But naval armaments alone cannot contend successfully against well-constructed and well-defended land batteries; nor is there anything in naval history to justify the dangerous and erroneous opinion now entertained on the subject."

Mr. Poinsett says: "After a careful and anxious investigation of a subject. involving in so high a degree the safety and honor of the country, I fully concur in the opinions expressed by the board [of officers on national defence] of the superiority of permanent works of defence over all other expedients that have yet been devised, and of their absolute necessity, if we would avoid the danger of defeat and disgrace; a necessity rather increased than diminished by the introduction of steam batteries and the use of hollow shot. It would, in my opinion, prove a most fatal error to dispense with them, and to rely upon our navy alone, aided by the number, strength, and valor of the people, to protect the country against the attacks of an enemy possessing great naval means. To defend a line of coast of three thousand miles in extent, and effectually to guard all the avenues to our great commercial cities and important naval depots, the navy of the United States must be very superior to the means of attack of the most powerful naval power in the world, which will occasion an annual expense this country is not now able to bear; and this large naval armament, instead of performing its proper function as the sword of the State, in time of war, and sweeping the enemy's commerce from the seas, must be chained to the coast or kept within the harbors.

"It has been clearly demonstrated that the expense of employing a sufficient body of troops, either regulars or militia, for a period of even six months, for the purpose of defending the coast against attacks and feints that might be made by an enemy's fleet, would exceed the cost of erecting all the permanent works deemed necessary for the coast. One hundred thousand men, divided into four columns, would not be more than sufficient to guard the vulnerable points of our maritime frontier, if not covered by fortifications. This amount of force, which would be necessary against an expedition of twenty thousand men, if composed of regulars, would cost the nation $30,000,000 per annum; and if militia, about $40,000,000; and supposing only one-half the force to be required to defend the coast, with the aid of forts properly situated and judiciously constructed, the difference of expense for six months would enable the government to erect all the necessary works. This calculation is independent of the loss the nation would suffer by so large an amount of labor being abstracted from the productive industry of the country, and the fearful waste of life likely to result from such a costly, hazardous, and harassing system of defence.

"It must be recollected, too, that we are not called to try a new system, but to persevere in the execution of one that has been adopted after mature deliberation, and that is still practiced in Europe on a much more extensive scale than is deemed necessary here; so much so, that there exist three single fortresses, each of which comprises more extensive and stronger works than is here proposed for the whole line of our maritime frontier. We must bear in mind, also, that the destruction of some of the important points on our frontier would alone cost more to the nation than the expense of fortifying the whole line would amount to; while the temporary occupation of the others would drive us into expenses to recover them, far surpassing those of the projected works of defence. The organization of the permanent defences proposed for our frontiers is not based upon military and naval considerations alone, but is calculated to protect

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the internal navigation of the country. The fortifications proposed, at the same time that they protect our coast from the danger of invasion, and defend the principal avenues and naval establishments, cover the whole line of internal navigation, which, in time of war, will contribute, in an essential manner, to the defence of the country by furnishing prompt and economical means of transportation; so that, while the main arteries which conduct our produce to the ocean are defended at their outlets, the interior navigation parallel to the coast will be protected, and a free communication kept up between every part of the Union." Although it would appear on a superficial view to be a gigantic and almost impracticable project to fortify such an immense extent of coast as the United States, and difficult, if not impossible, to provide a sufficient force to garrison and defend the works necessary for the purpose, yet the statements contained in the reports of the board remove these objections entirely. The coast of the United States, throughout its vast extent, has but few points which require to be defended against a regular and powerful attack. A considerable portion of it is inaccessible to large vessels, and only exposed to the depredations of parties in boats and small vessels-of-war; against which inferior works, and the combination of the same means, and a well-organized local militia, will afford sufficient protection. The only portions which require to be defended by permanent works of some strength are the avenues to the great commercial cities and naval and military establishments, the destruction of which would prove a serious loss to the country, and be regarded by an enemy as an equivalent for the expense of a great armament. It is shown, also, that the number of men required on the largest scale, for the defence of these forts, when compared with the movable force that would be necessary without them, is inconsiderable. The local militia, aided by a few regulars, and directed by engineers and artillery officers, may, with previous training, be safely intrusted with their defence in time of war.

"It cannot be too earnestly urged, that a much smaller number of troops will be required to defend a fortified frontier than to cover one that is entirely unprotected; and that such a system will enable us, according to the spirit of our institutions, to employ the militia effectually for the defence of the country. It is no reproach to this description of force, and no imputation on their courage, to state, what the experience of two wars has demonstrated, that they cannot stand the steady charge of regular forces, and are disordered by their manœuvres in the open field; whereas their fire is more deadly from behind ramparts.” Mr. Bell says: "Since the recent and successful experiments in the navigation of the Atlantic by steam, and the consequent changes anticipated in maritime warfare, it is not an uncommon impression that fortifications, and all other land defences, may be dispensed with altogether; and that the navy, improved and strengthened by war steamers and floating batteries, may be safely and exclusively relied upon for the defence of our extensive sea-coast. Another error, not less to be regretted, has obtained some hold upon the public mind since the extension of steam navigation already adverted to, and the improvements suggested in the means of defending the seaboard. It is, that the defence of our numerous inlets, harbors, and naval depots, will, by their improvements, be rendered not only more certain, but less expensive than heretofore, and therefore of diminished importance in every point of view. The very reverse of these conclusions, it may be justly apprehended, will be realized in the experience of the future. The increased facilities which the late extension of steam navigation will give to any great maritime power, holding possession of one or more naval depots on this side of the Atlantic, in concentrating a large naval or military force upon any one of the numerous assailable points upon our extensive sea-coast; the celerity of movement, and the greater certainty and precision which will thereby be secured in the execution of all the details of an attack-enabling an enemy to make it, in every instance, a surprise-will probably create a necessity for increasing our defences in some form, at an expense far exceeding anything here

tofore deemed inportant or necessary to reasonable security. But the prospect of successful defence by the navy alone vanishes altogether when we reflect that it is only in infancy, and that for a long time it must be inferior to the naval armaments of several of the powers of Europe. Whether the United States will be able, at any time, to contend with them upon the ocean, it is obvious, will depend upon the successful development of our naval resources after the commencement of a war; but how could this development take place in the face of a much more powerful enemy, if our depots and navy yards are suffered to remain without protection by fortifications, and there are no harbors in which our shipsof-war may take refuge and remain in safety when pursued by superior squadrons? It would be fatal to the national honor to neglect to fortify sufficiently and amply those passes, by land and water, by which an enemy could approach the depositories of our naval supplies, and also the principal harbors of easy

access to our own vessels."

"The necessary quality of buoyancy in war steamers and floating batteries requires that they should be constituted mainly of wood; and whether of wood or iron, their destructibility, by the usual missiles employed in war, will be neither greater nor less than that of the war steamers and floating batteries with which an enemy may attack them. It is clear, then, that nothing will be gained by their exclusive employment in this point of view. It is equally clear that an enemy is able to concentrate a much superior force upon any one of our great harbors and naval depots than is provided for its defence; he must, without some extraordinary casuality, be successful. To guard, therefore, against the capture or destruction of all our opulent cities and great naval depots upon the seaboard, the government must provide a greater number of war steamers and floating batteries, for the defence of each of them, than any foreign nation will probably be able to assemble upon our own coast, and thus have it in his power, by uniting his whole force in an attack upon one point at a time, to lay under contribution or destroy the whole.

"But suppose each of our great harbors or depots should be thus defended, and that all the channels or passes by water could be so guarded and blocked up by floating batteries, or with the advantages of position, to set at defiance any naval force which could be brought to the attack, without fortifications to guard the passes or avenues over which an enemy could reach his object by land, what would prevent him from disembarking a sufficient land force at some other, but not distant point upon the coast, and effecting all his purposes of spoliation and destruction? It is manifest that something more will be wanting than war steamers and floating batteries to give even a tolerable security to our cities and naval depots. If fortifications are to be dispensed with, it is clear, that to afford them adequate protection and security against the sudden assaults of an enemy approaching by sea, will require not only such a preparation of war steamers and floating batteries as already described, but a stationary land force sufficient in numbers and discipline to resist any number of veteran troops the enemy might have it in his power to employ as an auxiliary force in his enterprises upon our shores.

"Supposing the defences of a harbor, by fortifications, to be complete, and the attacking ships or war steamers of an enemy shall have succeeded in passing the outer channels leading to it, without material damage from the forts designed to guard them; or if they shall have taken advantage of the darkness of the night, and passed them unobserved, they will have gained but little by that success. They will be exposed at every point within to the fire of one or more land batteries. They will be able to find no anchorage or resting place where they will not be liable to be disabled, burnt, or blown up by the shells and hot shot discharged under protection of walls impenetrable to the shot of an enemy, except at the gun ports. Not so, however, when floating defences are exclusively relied upon. They will have no advantage in the fight over the

attacking force they will be equally exposed and combustible; and when overcome, all resistance ceases, and the success of the enemy will be complete." Mr. Spencer says: "While fortifications are more effectual for defence, in certain positions, than floating forces, they are less expensive in construction, more durable, and requiring an outlay in repairs utterly insignificant when compared with the expense of maintaining ships and renewing them. They are indispensable for the purposes of covering the military and naval depots, and all other public or private establishments which would incite the enterprise or the cupidity of a foe, and excluding him from strong positions, where his naval superiority might enable him to maintain himself, and from which he might make incursions into the interior, or assail an extensive line of coast."

We have already alluded to the remarks of the Apalachicola report on the relative cost of ships and forts, and the economy of their support. We do not regard this question of relative cost a matter of any great importance, for it can seldom be decisive in the choice of these two means of defence. No matter what their relative cost may be, the one cannot often be substituted for the other. There are some few cases, however, where this might be taken into consideration, and would be decisive. Let us endeavor to illustrate our meaning. For the defence of New York city, the Narrows and East river must be secured by forts; ships cannot, in this case, be substituted. But let us suppose that the outer harbor of New York furnishes no favorable place for the debarkation of .oops, or that the place of debarkation is so far distant that the troops cannot reach the city before the defensive forces can be prepared to repel them. This harbor would be of great importance to the enemy as a shelter from storms, and as a place of debarkation or of rendezvous preparatory to a forcible passage of the Narrows; while to us its possession would not be absolutely essential, though very important. A strong fortification on Sandy Hook might probably be so constructed as to furnish a pretty sure barrier to the entrance of this outer harbor; on the other hand, a naval force stationed within the inner harbor, and acting under the protection of forts at the Narrows, might also furnish a good though perhaps less certain protection for this outer roadstead. Here, then, we might well consider the question of relative cost and economy of support of the proposed fortification on Sandy Hook, and of a home squadron large enough to effect the same object and to be kept continually at home for that special purpose. If we were to allow it to go to sea for the protection of our commerce its character and efficiency as a harbor defence would be lost. We can therefore regard it only as a local force-fixed within the limits of the defence of this particular place and our estimates must be made accordingly.

The average durability of ships-of-war in the British navy has been variously stated at 7 and 8 years in time of war, and from 10 to 12 and 14 years in time of peace. Mr. Perring, in his "Brief Inquiry," published in 1812, estimates this average durability at about 8 years. His calculations seem based upon authentic information. A distinguished English writer has more recently arrived at the same result from estimates based upon the returns of the Board of Admiralty during the period of the wars of the French revolution. The data in our own possession are less complete, the appropriations for building and repairing having heen so expended as to render it impossible to draw an accurate line of distinction. But in the returns now before us there are generally separate and distinct accounts of the timbers used for these two purposes; and consequently, so far as this (the main item of expense) is concerned, we may form pretty accurate comparisons.

According to Edge, (pp. 20, 21,) the average cost of timber for hulls, masts, and yards in building an English 74-gun ship is £61,382. Let us now compare this cost of timber for building with that of the same item in repairs for the following 15 ships, between 1800 and 1820. The list would have been still

further enlarged, but the returns for other ships during some portion of the above period are imperfect:

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This table, although incomplete, gives for the above 15 ships, during a period of less than 20 years, the cost of timber alone, used in their repair, an average of about $400,000 each. More timber than this was used, in all probability, upon the same vessels, and paid for out of the funds appropriated "for such ships as may be ordered in the course of the year to be repaired." But the amount specifically appropriated for timber for these 15 ships would, in every 12 or 15 years, equal the entire first cost of the same items. If we were to add to this amount the cost of labor required in the application of the timber to the operations of repair, and take into consideration the expense of other materials and labor, and the decayed condition of many of the ships at the end of this period, we should not be surprised to find the whole sum expended under these heads to equal the first cost, even within the minimum estimate of seven years. The whole cost of timber used for hulls, masts, and yards, in building, between 1800 and 1820, was £18,727,551; in repairs and "ordinary wear and tear," £17,449,780; making an annual average of $45,601,589 for building timber, and $42,733,714 for that used in repairs. A large portion of the vessels built were intended to replace others which had been lost, or were so decayed as to be broken up. But it may be well to add here the actual supplies voted for the sea service, and for the wear and tear, and the extraordinary expenses in building and repairing of ships from 1800 to 1815:

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