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armed, constructed, and garrisoned. General Moultrie says, only thirty rounds from the battery were fired, and was of opinion that the want of powder alone prevented the Americans from destroying the men-of-war."

"Mobile fort fell without resistance, yielding up near five hundred regular troops, officers and men, and a full supply of the necessaries for a vigorous defence."-In 1814, a British fleet of four vessels, carrying 92 guns, attacked Fort Boyer, a small redoubt, located on a point of land commanding the passage from the Gulf into the bay of Mobile. This redoubt was garrisoned by only one hundred and twenty combatants, officers included, and its armament was but twenty small pieces of cannon, some of which were almost entirely useless, and most of them poorly mounted, "in batteries hastily thrown up, and leaving the gunners uncovered from the knee upwards;" while the enemy's land force, acting in concert with the ships, consisted of twenty artillerists, with a battery of one twelvepounder and a howitzer, one hundred and thirty marines, and six hundred Indians and negroes. His ships carried five hundred and ninety men in all. This immense disparity of numbers and strength did not allow to the British military and naval commanders the slightest apprehension that four British ships, carrying 92 guns, and a land force somewhat exceeding seven hundred combatants, could hardly fail in reducing a small work, mounting only twenty short carronades, and defended by a little more than one hundred men, unprovided alike with furnaces for heating shot or casemates to cover themselves from rockets and shells." Nevertheless, the enemy was completely repulsed; one of his largest ships was entirely destroyed; his entire loss in killed and wounded could have fallen but a little short of one hundred, while ours was only eight or nine. Here was a fair trial of strength, with a result most flattering to the American pride; but the Apalachicola report passes it by in silence, and quotes, as proof of the superiority of British ships over American batteries, the land attack of General Lambert, in February, 1815, in which not a single ship was in the remotest degree concerned.

We have now disposed of the several examples adduced in the Apalachicola report to prove the superiority of British naval armaments, gun for gun, over both American and European batteries. There are a few other trials of strength between ships and forts, which are not mentioned in that report-trials too well known to admit of any doubt or difference of opinion respecting their results. Why does the report pass over in silence the attacks upon Stonington, Cagliari, Martello, Santa Cruz, Marcou, &c., and offer such examples as "Constantinople by a Venetian fleet," 'Mocha, in Arabia," "Senegal," "Canton?" &c. We will in part supply this omission, limiting ourselves, however, to the period of the French revolution.

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On the 21st of January, 1792, a considerable French squadron attacked Cagliari, in Sardinia, but after a bombardment of three days, (during which they attempted to land,) they were most signally defeated and obliged to retire.

In 1794, in the bay of Martello, Corsica, a small tower armed with one gun in barbette, was attacked by two English ships, "the Fortitude of seventy-four and the Juno frigate of thirty-two guns. After having engaged it for two hours and a half, they were obliged to haul off with considerable damage. The Fortitude lost seven men, and was three or four times set on fire by heated shot; once in the cock pit and state room. There were about thirty men in the tower, though three were sufficient to work the gun." The garrison does not appear to have sustained any loss. Colonel Pasley, an English officer of high standing, says that this attack "proved the superiority which guns on shore must always, in certain positions, possess over shipping, no matter whether the former are mounted on a tower or not."

In July, 1797. Nelson, with a squadron of eight ships of his own choosing, carrying near four hundred guns, entered the bay of Santa Croix, Teneriffe, and attacked the town. The ships fired upon the small land batteries without

producing any effect, and a force of one thousand men was several times landed in boats, but as often driven back with great loss; a single ball striking the side of the Fox cutter instantly sunk her, with near one hundred seamen and marines. After many desperate attempts by the dauntless Nelson to carry the works, the British were compelled to retire with a loss of two hundred and fifty killed and wounded, while the garrison received little or no damage.

In the early wars of the French revolution the English took possession of the islands of Marcou and fortified them, in order to command the coast trade between Cherbourg and Havre. In 1798 the French attempted to retake these little islands, and attacked the English redoubt with fifty-two brigs and gunboats, carrying 80 long 36's and 18-pounders and six or seven thousand men. The redoubt was armed with two 32-pounders, two 6-pounders, four 4-pounders, and two carronades; its garrison consisted of only 250 seamen and marines. Notwithstanding this great disparity of numbers, the little redoubt sunk seven of the enemy's brigs and boats, captured another, and forced the remainder to retreat with great loss. The loss of the garrison was only one man killed and three wounded.

In July, 1801, Porto Ferrairo was garrisoned by 300 British, 800 Tuscans, and 400 Corsicans. The French army which besieged this motley garrison first consisted of 1,500 men, but was afterwards increased to 6,000 land forces and three frigates. The siege was continued for five months, during which time the place was several times bombarded and assaulted without success, and was at last surrendered by the treaty of Amiens.

In July, 1801, Admiral Saumarez attacked the defences of Algesiras with a fleet of one 80-gun ship, five 74's, one frigate, and a lugger, carrying in all 502 guns. The land defences consisted of Green island battery of seven 18 and 24-pounders, and St. Jaques battery of five 18-pounders. The floating defences consisted of two 80-gun ships, one of 74, one of 44, and some gun-boats; in all 306 guns. The English here chose their time and mode of attack, had the wind in their favor, and a naval superiority of 196 guns; and yet they were most signally defeated, and compelled to retire with the entire loss of one ship and with the others much injured. Can this be attributed to the superior skill and bravery of the French and Spanish ships and crews? Such a supposition would be in contradiction to the whole history of the war, and we must therefore attribute it to the fire of the land batteries. An examination of the details of this battle will prove clearly that these 12 guns ashore more than compensated for the 196 extra guns of the English. The Hannibal, 74 guns, ran aground near the land battery, and thus became exposed to its fire. Her position was such, however, that she continued to return the fire even after the other ships had retired. An attempt was made by the Audacious, 74 guns, and the Cæsar, 80 guns, to cut out the Hannibal, but the fire of the little battery was so severe that the admiral says in his despatches, he was obliged to make sail and leave her to her fate. The whole loss of the English in killed and wounded was 375. All the ships were much injured. The Cæsar and Pompée were so much shattered as to preclude the hope of their being ready in any seasonable time to proceed to sea, but by working night and day, the former was got ready for the first battle of Trafalgar, but the latter was reduced almost

to a wreck.

Shortly after this battle, the French and Spaniards, encouraged by their success at Algesiras, proceeded to attack the English at sea. The combined fleet now carried 1,012 guns, and the English only 422; the former, nevertheless, were most completely beaten-showing, as did every naval contest during the war, that on the water the English were far superior to their opponents.

In 1803 the English, under Commander Hood, constructed a small battery

of some 15* guns upon Diamond rock, about six miles from Port Royal bay. It was garrisoned with about 100 men. This little work was found so much to annoy the French shipping going to and from Martinique that in 1805 they determined to destroy it. The force sent to accomplish this consisted of two 74-gun ships, one frigate, and a brig, with a detachment of 200 troops. Several ineffectual attempts were made to silence its fire or carry it by storm, and on the fourth day of the siege the little garrison, though still unharmed in their works, capitulated, for want of both ammunition and provisions. There was not a single man killed or wounded in the redoubt, while the French lost 50 men. In 1808 a French army of 5,000 men laid siege to Fort Trinidad, then garrisoned by less than 100 Spaniards and British marines. An English seventyfour and a bomb vessel attempted to annoy the besiegers, but were soon driven off by a French land battery of three guns. During the progress of the siege an additional force of 50 seamen and 30 marines were thrown into the fort, making in all about 180 men; and this little force not only successfully sus tained the siege but most bravely repulsed a storming party of 1,000 picked men, capturing the storming equipage and killing the commanding officer and all who attempted to mount the breach.

In 1806 the British ship Pompée, 80 guns, the Hydra, 38 guns, and another frigate, force not given, "anchored about 800 yards from a battery of two guns situated on the extremity of Cape Licosa, and protected from assault by a tower, in which were five and twenty French soldiers commanded

by a lieutenant. The line-of-battle-ship and the frigates fired successive broadsides till their ammunition was nearly expended, the battery continually replying with a slow but destructive effect. The Pompée, at which ship alone it directed its fire, had 40 shot in her hull, her mizzen topmast carried away, a lieutenant, midshipman, and 5 men killed, and 30 men wounded. At length, force proving ineffectual, negotiation was resorted to, and, after some hours' parley, the officer capitulated. It then appeared that the carriage of one of the two guns had failed on the second shot, and the gun had subsequently been fired lying on the sill of the embrasure; so that in fact the attack of an 80-gun ship and two frigates had been resisted by a single piece of ordnance." In the latter wars of the French revolution the British partially fortified the island of Anhault as a depot and point of communication between England and the continent. This place was attacked by the Danes in 1811 with twelve gunboats carrying 72 guns and howitzers and 800 men and several transports, with a land force whose number has been variously stated from 1,000 to 3,000. The whole Danish attacking force is estimated by several English writers at 4,000. The only fortification of importance on the island was a small redoubt, called Lighthouse fort, and the garrison consisted of only 381 men. The Danes, under cover of darkness and a thick fog, succeeded in effecting a landing; but on their approach to the batteries a well directed and destructive fire of grape and musketry was opened upon them. They were most signally defeated, with a loss of forty killed and five or six hundred wounded and prisoners. The remainder re-embarked in their boats, but were pursued by two small English vessels that had opportunely arrived and the greater part of them taken or destroyed.

Leghorn, during the absence of the army in 1813, was attacked by an English squadron of six ships, carrying over 300 guns and 1,000 troops. "This attack failed owing to the strength of the fortifications," and the troops and seamen were re-embarked during a temporary suspension of hostilities.

When Lord Lynedock advanced against Antwerp in 1814, says Colonel Mitchell," Fort Frederick, a small work of only two guns, one at right angles and the other looking diagonally up the stream, was established in a bend of the

The armament is said to be "that of a sloop-of-war." Sloops-of-war then carried from 10 to 15 guns.

Polder Dyke at some distance below Lillo; the armament was a long 18-pounder and a 53-inch howitzer. From this post the French determined to dislodge us, [the English,] and, on a very fine and calm morning, an 80-gun ship dropped down with the tide and anchored near the Flanders shore about 600 yards from the British battery; by her position she was secured from the fire of the 18pounder and exposed to that of the howitzer only. As soon as everything was made tight her broadside was opened; and if noise and smoke were alone sufficient to insure success in war, as so many of the moderns seem to think, the result of this strange contest would not have been long doubtful, for the thunder of the French artillery actually made the earth to shake again; but though the earth shook, the single British howitzer was neither dismounted nor silenced; and though the artillerymen could not, perfectly exposed as they were, stand to their gun whilst the iron hail was striking thick and fast around, yet no sooner did the enemy's fire slacken for a moment than they sprang to their post ready to return at least one shot for eighty. This extraordinary combat lasted from seven o'clock in the morning till near twelve at noon, when the French ship, having had forty-one men killed and wounded, her commander being in the list of the latter, and having besides sustained serious damage in her hull and rigging, returned to Antwerp without effecting anything whatever. The howitzer was not dismounted, the fort was not injured-there being, in fact, nothing to injure—and the British had only one man killed and two wounded." But we will not specify examples; the whole history of the wars of the French revolution is one continued proof of the superiority of fortifications as a maritime frontier defence. The sea-coast of France is almost within a stone's throw* of the principal British naval depots. Here were large towns and harbors, filled with the rich commerce of the world, offering the most dazzling attractions to the brave and enterprising enemy. The French navy was at this time utterly incompetent to their defence, while England supported a maritime force at an annual expense of near ninety millions of dollars. Her largest fleets were continually cruising within sight of these seaports, and not unfrequently attempting to cut out their shipping. At this period, says one of her naval historians, "the naval force of Britain, so multiplied and so expert from long practice, had acquired an intimate knowledge of their [the French] harbors, their bays, and creeks; her officers knew the depth of water and the resistance likely to be met with in every situation." On the other hand, these harbors and towns were frequently stripped of their garrisons by the necessities of distant wars, being left with no other defence than their fortifications and militia. And yet, notwithstanding all this, they escaped unharmed during the entire contest. They were frequently attacked, and, in some instances, the most desperate efforts were made to effect a permanent lodgement; but in no case was the success at all commensurate with the expense of life and treasure sacrificed, and no permanent hold was made on either the maritime frontiers of France or her allies. This certainly was owing to no inferiority of skill and bravery on the part of the British navy, as the battles of Aboukir and Trafalgar, and the almost annihilation of the French marine, have but too plainly proven. Why, then, did these places escape? We know of no other reason than that they were fortified, and that the French knew how to defend their fortifications. The British maritime expeditions to Quebec, the Scheldt, Constantinople, Buenos Ayres, &c., sufficiently prove the ill success and the waste of life and treasure with which they must always be attended. But when her naval power was applied to the destruction of the enemy's marine, and in transporting her land forces to solid bases of operations on the soil of her allies in Portugal and Belgium, the fall of Napoleon crowned the glory of their achievements.

Only 184 miles across the British channel at the narrowest place
H. Rep. Com. 86————20

We shall close our remarks upon this part of the subject of maritime defence by quotations from the reports of Mr. Poinsett, Mr. Bell, and Mr. Spencer, and from the military work of Colonel Mitchell, of the British army. The latter, in his remarks on military organization, &c., says: "The numerous and splendid victories achieved by British fleets over forts and batteries have not only tended to make naval attacks popular, but have also led to the very general belief that ships can contend successfully against batteries on shore, wherever the latter are fairly accessible, and as often as there is anything like a fair proportion as to the numerical force of guns between the contending parties. None of the many theories that have resulted from the modern chance games of war can possibly be more erroneous or more dangerous, because the public voice may, at some moment of general excitement, induce the government to fit out naval armaments for the attainment of objects totally beyond the reach of naval power. Under the mischievous belief that wooden walls can stand battering as long as stone walls, the lives of British seamen, the fame of the navy, and the honor of the country may be risked in enterprises in which skill and courage can effect nothing, and in which success can be anticipated only from the folly or cowardice of the enemy-always precarious foundations on which to trust for victory.

"To strike even a pretty large object with a ball fired from a piece of artillery, at a moderate range, is no very easy matter; and the difficulty is, of course, much increased when the gun is placed, as on board a ship, on a moving or at least a very unsteady platform, and where those whose business it is to take aim are, after the first fire, completely enveloped in smoke. And though towns and fortresses are not exactly small, or even moderately small objects, they nevertheless, when situated on a level, present but a very narrow horizontal line to the shipping; and of this line a still narrower part is vulnerable. To unroof the houses of a few harmless citizens, or to throw shells into a second-rate town, is a mode of warfare as unworthy as inefficient, and will never induce a commander of ordinary firmness to relinquish his post or give up the contest. To breach a rampart where there are no troops for debarkation, and when, as in such maritime expeditions generally, there is no intention to storm the works, is of course useless; so that the only remaining alternative is to dismount or to silence the artillery. This can be effected only by striking the guns themselves, or by so completely demolishing the parapet as to prevent the men from working them. The first is difficult, for a gun presents but a very small mark; and the second is not easy, because it requires time, and a great many well-directed shots."

"To batter down even an ordinary rampart with the floating artillery of a fleet seems to us next to an impossibility, when we recollect the long and welldirected fire, constantly striking from a short range on the same spot, that was required to breach even the rickety walls of some of the Spanish fortresses. A ship-of-war brings, as we have said, a much greater body of fire to bear upon a single point than a land battery can return from an equal front; yet is the loss which a ship is liable to experience from the fire of the small number of battery guns far greater than any that can be inflicted by its own superior artillery. Every shot that strikes a ship occasions some mischief, whereas one hundred guns may strike a battery without producing any effect whatever." "A ship of any force is a large object, easily struck by the fixed artillery of forts. The vulnerable part of a battery is, on the contrary, a small object, which it is difficult to strike with the floating artillery of ships."

"How, then, it may be asked, are the many victories gained by our fleets over land defences to be accounted for? By circumstances, and by the conduct of our seamen, whose bravery naturally commanded success whenever it was within their reach, and not unfrequently wrung it, by mere excess of daring, from the fears of their astonished and intimidated adversaries. Naval and military operations present but too many occasions where both sailors and soldiers are forced

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