It appears from the above-mentioned report that the number of guns actually brought into action by the floating force amounted to 94, besides four heavy sea mortars; that the whole number so employed in the fort was only 19; that these were generally so small and inefficient that their balls would not enter the sides of the ordinary attacking frigates; that the principal injury sustained by the castle was produced by the explosion of powder magazines, which were injudiciously placed and improperly secured; that the castle, though built of poor materials, was but slightly injured by the French fire; that the Mexicans proved themselves ignorant of the ordinary means of defence, and abandoned their works when only a few of their guns had been dismounted; that, notwithstanding all the circumstances in favor of the French, their killed and wounded, in proportion to the guns acting against them, was upwards of four times as great as the loss of the English at the battle of Trafalgar!

“St. Jean d'Acre reduced in a few hours by a British fleet, and taken possession of by the seamen and marines."-Fortunately, the principal facts connected with this attack are now fully authenticated. For the armament of the fleet we quote from the British official papers, and for that of the fort from the pamphlet of Lieutenant Colonel Matuszewiez.

The fortifications were built of poor materials, antiquated in their plans, and much decayed. Their entire armament amounted to only 200 guns, some of which were merely field-pieces. The water fronts were armed with 100 cannon and 16 mortars, those of the smaller calibre included. When approached by the British fleet the works were undergoing repairs, and, says Commodore Napier, "were fast getting into a state of preparation against attack."

The British fleet consisted of eight ships-of-the-line, carrying 646 guns; six frigates, carrying 236 guns; four steamers, carrying eighteen guns; and two or three other vessels whose force is not given. "Only a few guns," says Napier, "defended the approach from the northward," and most of the ships came in from that direction. The western front was armed with about forty cannon; but opposed to this were six ships and two steamers, carrying about 500 guns. Their fire was tremendous during the engagement, but no breach was made in the walls. The south front was armed in part by heavy artillery, and in part by field pieces. This front was attacked by six ships and two steamers, carrying over 200 guns. The eastern front was armed only with light artillery; against this was concentrated the remainder of the fleet, carrying 240 guns. The guns of the works were so poorly mounted that but few could be used at all; and these, on account of the construction of the fort, could not reach the ships, though anchored close by the walls. "Only five of their guns," says Napier, "placed in a flanking battery, were well served and never missed; but they were pointed too high, and damaged our spars and rigging only." The stone was of so poor a quality, says the narrative of Colonel Matuszewiez, that the walls fired upon presented on the exterior a shattered appearance, but they were nowhere seriously injured. In the words of Napier, "they were not breached, and a determined enemy might have remained secure under the breastworks, or in the numerous casemates without suffering much loss." The explosion of a magazine within the fort, containing 6,000 casks of powder, laid in ruins a space of 60,000 square yards, opened a large breach in the walls of the fortification, partially destroyed the prisons, and killed and wounded 1,000 men of the garrison. This frightful disaster, says the French account, hastened the triumph of the fleet. The prisoners and malefactors, thus released from confinement, rushed upon the garrison at the same time with the mountaineers, who had besieged the place on the land side. The uselessness of the artillery, the breaches in the fort, the attacks of the English-all combined to force the retreat of the garrison, "in the midst of scenes of blood and atrocious murders." We will close this account with the following extract from a speech of the Duke of Wellington, in the House of Lords, February 4, 1841: "He had had," he said, "a little experience in services

of this nature, and he thought it his duty to warn their lordships on this occasion that they must not always expect that ships, however well commanded, or however gallant their seamen might be, were capable of commonly engaging successfully with stone walls. He had no recollection in all his experience, except the recent instance on the coast of Syria, of any fort being taken by ships, excepting two or three years ago, when the Fort of San Juan d'Ulloa was captured by the French fleet. This was, he thought, the single instance that he recollected, though he believed that something of the sort had occurred at the siege of Havana in 1763. The present achievement he considered one of the greatest of modern times. This was his opinion, and he gave the highest credit to those who had performed such a service. It was, altogether, a most skilful proceeding. He was greatly surprised at the small number of men that was lost on board the fleet; and, on inquiring how it happened, he discovered that it was because the vessels were moored within one-third of the ordinary distance. The guns of the fortress were intended to strike objects at a greater distance; and the consequence was, that the shot went over the ships that were anchored at one-third the usual distance. By that means they sustained not more than onetenth of the loss which they would otherwise have experienced. Not less than 500 pieces of ordnance were directed against the walls, and the precision with which the fire was kept up, the position of the vessels, and, lastly, the blowing up of the large magazine-all aided in achieving this great victory in so short a time. He had thought it right to say thus much, because he wished to warn the public against supposing that such deeds as this could be effected every day. He would repeat that this was a singular instance, in the achievement of which great skill was undoubtedly manifested, but which was also connected with peculiar circumstances, which they could not hope always to occur. It must not, therefore, be expected as a matter of course that all such attempts must necessarily succeed.”

We have now discussed the several instances, in other countries, of British naval prowess, so highly lauded by the Apalachicola report, except the taking of "Constantinople by the Venetian fleet," and the English conquest of "Canton, but just now." With respect to the former conquest, it will be sufficient to remark, that it was made before the invention of gunpowder. The utter inefficiency of the Chinese to carry on war with modern Europeans, with anything like equality of forces, is too well known to require comment. Their land batteries were constructed in violation of all rules of the art; and they attempted to frighten away the English by the sound of their gongs, and the turning of somersets by their troops! Ten Englishmen were anywhere more than equal to one hundred natives!

We now turn to the examples of British naval superiority, said by the report to have been exhibited in their several attacks upon the fortifications of our own country. The only refutation we shall offer is the following brief account of the facts. They are collected from the best English and American authorities.

"Louisburg was attacked and taken by a naval force."-So says the Apalachicola report; but we confidently affirm that, although several times attacked, it never was taken by a naval force alone, no matter how superior that force might be. This place was first reduced in 1745. For this attack the colonies raised about 4,000 men and 100 small vessels and transports, carrying between 160 and 200 guns. They were afterwards joined by ten other ships, carrying near 500 guns. This attacking force now, according to some of the English writers, consisted of 6,000 provincials, 800 seamen, and a naval force of near 700 guns. The troops landed and laid siege to the town. The garrisons of of these works consisted of 600 regulars and 1,000 Breton militia, or, according to some writers, of only 1,200 men in all. The armament of Louisburg was 101 cannon, 76 swivels, and six mortars. Auxiliary to the main works, was an island battery of thirty 22-pounders, and a battery on the main land armed with

thirty large cannon. Frequent attempts were made to storm the place, but the most persevering efforts were of no avail-many of the New Englanders being killed and wounded, and their boats destroyed, while the garrison remained unharmed. At length, after a siege of 49 days, want of provisions, and the general dissatisfaction of the inhabitants, caused the garrison to surrender. When the New Englanders saw the strength of the works, and the little impression which their efforts had produced, they were not only greatly elated but astonished at their success. It should be noticed that, in the above attack, the number of guns in the fleet was almost three times as great as that of all the forts combined; and yet the naval part of the attack was unsuccessful. The besieging army was four times as great as all the garrisons combined; and yet the place held out forty-nine days, and at last was surrendered through the want of provisions and the disaffection of the citizens.

A formidable effort was now made by the French to recover this place. For this purpose, a large fleet was sent from France, consisting of near forty shipsof-war, two artillery ships, and fifty-six transports, carrying about 3,500 men and 40,000 stand of small arms for the use of the Canadians; but this formidable armament was scattered by storms, and the project abandoned. The place was afterwards surrendered by treaty.

In 1757 a British fleet of fifteen ships-of-the-line, eighteen frigates, and many smaller vessels, and a land force of 12,000 effective men, were sent to attempt the reduction of this fortress; but, being now defended by seventeen ships-ofthe-line and a garrison of 6,000 regulars, its reduction was declared by the British to be impossible. The forces sent against this place in 1758, consisted of twenty ships-of-the-line and eighteen frigates, with an army of 14,000 men. The harbor was defended by only five ships-of-the-line, one fifty gun ship, and five frigates, three of which were sunk across the mouth of the basin. The fortifications of the town had been much neglected, and in general had fallen into ruins. The garrison consisted of only 2,500 regulars and 600 militia. Notwithstanding the number of guns of the British fleet exceeded both the armaments of the French ships and all the forts, it did not risk an attack, but merely acted as transports and as a blockading squadron. Even the French ships and the outer works commanding the harbor were reduced by the land batteries erected by Wolfe; and the main work, although besieged by an inequality of forces of nearly five to one, held out for two months, and even then surrendered through the petitions and fears of the non-combatant inhabitants, and not because it had received any material injury from the besiegers. The defence, however, had been continued long enough to prevent, for that campaign, any further operations against Canada.

"Quebec was taken from the French by Admiral Saunders, who, with twentyone sail of the line, entered the St. Lawrence in 1759."-This is certainly a remarkable discovery, for we are sure that no one ever before heard of Quebec being taken by Admiral Saunders. This discovery opens a new era in military history; for, hereafter, the fleet which transports an army, though it may not have a gun of its own on board, is entitled to the credit of all the conquests which that army may achieve. The battle of the Pyramids was not fought by Napoleon, but by Admiral Brueix, who conveyed the army to Egypt! The defence of Portugal was not made by Wellington, but by the ships which landed him on the peninsula!

The several naval attacks on Quebec are matters of interest, and we shall notice them briefly, not, however, for the purpose of refuting the inferences of the above-mentioned report. In 1690, Massachusetts fitted out a fleet of thirtyfour ships, the largest carrying forty-four guns and about 200 men. The whole command consisted of about 2,000 men. This force, under the command of Sir William Phipps, ascended the St. Lawrence and laid siege to Quebec, whose defences were then of the slightest character, and armed with only twenty-three

guns. The attack was kept up for some time; but, at length, the fleet, receiving more injuries from the batteries than it inflicted on them, withdrew from the contest, and hastened home with precipitation. In 1693, a considerable fleet was sent out from England, to attempt the reduction of Quebec; but a portion of the crews being destroyed by the yellow fever, the project was abandoned. In 1709, a combined attack by sea and land was planned against Quebec and Montreal; the army advanced as far as Wood creek, but the fleet never ascended as far as Quebec, and the expedition was abandoned. In 1711, an English fleet of fifteen ships-of-war, carrying over 800 guns, forty transports, and six storeships, with over 5,000 seamen and a large land force, attempted the conquest of this place; they failed, however, to reach their destination, and, after losing in the St. Lawrence a part of the ships and more than 1,000 men, abandoned the project. In the latter part of 1745, the English colonial fleet of some 600 guns, at Louisburg, was directed to attack Quebec; but, not receiving the promised reinforcements from the Duke of Newcastle, they did not venture to ascend the St. Lawrence. The fleets of Admiral Saunders and Holmes consisted of "twenty-two ships-of-the-line, and an equal number of frigates and small armed vessels." The ships-of-the-line alone carried 1,500 guns. Wolfe's army amounted to about 8,000 men. The works of Quebec were armed with ninety-four guns and five mortars, and only a part of these could be brought to bear upon the shipping. The fleet ascended the St. Lawrence without difficulty, and arrived at the Isle of Orleans in the latter part of June, but did not approach the city until after Wolfe had "secured the posts, without the command of which, the fleet could not have lain in safety in the harbor." Admiral Holmes's division first ascended the St. Lawrence above Quebec, but was soon withdrawn, to cover the landing of the troops at the falls of Montmorenci, where an unsuccessful attack was made upon the intrenchments of Montcalm. Several attempts with the combined sea and land forces were made to carry the works, but they proved equally unsuccessful. Although the ships carried fifteen or twenty times as many guns as the forts, their inability to reduce these works was acknowledged. The siege had continued for two months, and still the fortifications were uninjured. General Wolfe himself distinctly stated, that in any further attempt to carry the place, the "guns of the shipping could not be of much use;" and the chief engineer of the expedition gave it as his opinion, that "the ships would receive great damage from the shot and bombs of the upper batteries, without making the least impression upon them." Under these circumstances, it was finally determined to endeavor to decoy Montcalm from his works, and make him risk a battle in the open field. In an evil hour, the French consented to forego the advantages of their fortifications, and the contest was finally decided upon the plains of Abraham, with forces nearly equal in number, but greatly dissimilar in character-the English being disciplined and chosen troops, while nearly one-half of their opponents were militia and Indians, who gave but a weak support to the regulars. Both Wolfe and Montcalm fell in this battle, but the former on the field of victory; and five days afterwards the inhabitants, weakened and dispirited by their losses, surrendered the town, although its fortifications were still unharmed.

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The frigate Roebuck silenced the efficient batteries at Red Hook," &r.-The little batteries of Red Hook and Governor's Island, however much ridiculed by the Apalachicola report, were really of great importance to the security of Washington's army, which was then intrenched in the lines of Brooklyn, with its right resting upon the small field works of a few guns at Red Hook. This little work, and the corresponding one on Governor's Island, prevented the British shipping from passing into the East river, where they could have assailed the Americans in rear, and cut off their retreat. The former of these batteris was never very seriously engaged; and we cannot find, either in American or English histories, any notice of its being silenced by the Roebuck. We

know that it was not abandoned till Washingion had effected his retreat across the East river. Beatson says, the Roebuck exchanged only a few random shots with it.

The entire English attacking force consisted of 103 ships, carrying over 2,600 guns, and a veteran army of 30,000 men. The fleet lay some days at the Narrows before landing the troops, and seven days more clapsed previous to Washington's retreat.

Baltimore and Washington. The attacks upon these two places by the British, in the war 1812, are referred to in the Apalachicola report; the first as proof of the inefficiency of a "fortress, well situated, having a good garrison nay, where all the requisite conditions are fulfilled," to withstand the fire of shipping; for it "was evacuated by the fire of the two hostile frigates ;" and the second as being defended without the use of fortifications, inasmuch as the attacking fleet could not approach the works erected for the defence of the city, and therefore neither received nor inflicted much injury.”

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We deny the correctness of these assertions. The fort on the Potomac was not a fortress, was not well situated, was not well garrisioned, nor were the requisite conditions of defence fulfilled. It was a small inefficient work, incorrectly planned by an incompetent French engineer, and has not yet been completed. The portion constructed was never, until very recently, properly prepared for receiving its armament, and at the time of attack could not possibly have held out a very long time. But no defence whatever was made. Captain Gordon, with a squadron of eight sail, carrying 173 guns, under orders to "ascend the river as high as Fort Washington, and try upon it the experiment of a bombardment," approached that fort, and, upon firing a single shell, which did no injury to either the fort or the garrison, the latter deserted the works, and rapidly retreated. The commanding officer was immediately dismissed for his cowardice. The fleet ascended the river to Alexandria; but learning, soon afterwards, that batteries were preparing at the White House and Indian Head, to cut off his retreat, it retired in much haste, but not without injury.

The whole fleet sent to the attack of Baltimore consisted of forty sail, the largest of which were ships-of-the-line, carrying an army of over six thousand combatants. The troops were landed at North Point, while sixteen of the bomb vessels and frigates approached within reach of Fort McHenry, and commenced a bombardment which lasted twenty-five hours. During this attack, the enemy "threw 1,500 shells, four hundred of which exploded within the walls of the fort, but without making any unfavorable impression on either the strength of the work or the spirit of the garrison." The forts labored under the disadvantage of being armed with guns of too small a calibre to reach the shipping; but a fleet of barges sent to storm one of the batteries was repulsed with loss, and both fleet and army soon withdrew from the contest. We thought it was a fact too well known to need re-assertion at the present day, that the gallant resistance of Colonel Armistead in Fort McHenry, and of General Smith upon the enemy's line of approach per North Point, saved that beautiful city from being destroyed by the ruthless foe.

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Charleston was taken, notwithstanding the attack on Fort Moultrie failed."-When this second attack was made on Charleston, Marshall says that Fort Moultrie was out of repair, and Fort Johnson in ruins. There was, however, some time before this attack, a full trial of strength, before Charleston, between the American batteries and British ships. The fort mounted only 26 guns, while the fleet carried 270 guns. In this contest the British were entirely defeated, and lost, in killed and wounded, more than seventy men to every ten guns brought against them, while their whole 270 guns killed and wounded only thirty-two men in the fort. Of this trial of strength, which was certainly a fair one, Cooper, in his Naval History, says: " It goes fully to prove the important military position, that ships cannot withstand forts, when the latter are properly