teries supporting this line did not carry over 80 or 90 guns at most; and that both these land and floating batteries were mostly manned and the guns served by volunteers.

3d. That the fixed batteries in the system of defence were either so completely masked or so far distant, as to be useless during the contest between the fleet and floating force.

4th. That the few guns of these batteries which were rendered available by the position of the floating defences repelled with little or no loss to themselves, and some injury to the enemy, a vastly superior force of frigates which had attacked them.

5th. That the line of floating defences was conquered and mostly destroyed, while the fixed batteries were uninjured.

6th. That the fortifications of the city and of Amack island were not attacked, and had no part in the contest.

7th. That as soon as the batteries were unmasked, and began to act, Nelson prepared to retreat; but, on account of the difficulty of doing so, he opened a parley, threatening, with a cruelty unworthy the most barbarous ages, that unless the batteries ceased their fire upon his ships, he would burn all the Danish prisoners in his possession; and that this armistice was concluded just in time to save his own ships from destruction.

Sth. That, consequently, the battle of Copenhagen cannot properly be regarded as a contest between ships and forts, or a triumph of ships over forts; that so far as the guns on shore were engaged they showed a vast superiority over those afloat-a superiority known and confessed by the English.

And yet, in the face of all these facts, and in opposition to the accumulated testimony of English, French, and Danish historians, the Apalachicola reporter persists in regarding this as a contest between ships and batteries, in which the latter gained the victory; nay, he goes so far as to rank all the old rotten hulks and rafts of the Danish line as fortifications, for he says; "The British fleet fought only 468 guns afloat against those 986 guns on Amack and crown batteries; yet in four hours they were silenced, and the object gained." A strange inaccuracy of vision, while looking at well-known and undisputed historical

events!

Constantinople." Sir John Duckforth forced the passage of the Dardanelles with six ships-of-the-line, and was rebuked because he had not continued on to Constantinople, and with his small force assaulted the city."-The channel of the Dardanelles is about 12 leagues long, 3 miles wide at its entrance, and about three-quarters of a mile at its narrowest point. Its principal defences are the outer and inner castles of Europe and Asia, and the castles of Sestos and Abydos. Constantinople stands about 100 miles from its entrance into the sea of Marmora, and at nearly the opposite extremity of this sea. The defences of the channel had been allowed to go to decay; but few guns were mounted, and the forts were but partially garrisoned. In Constantinople, not a gun was mounted, and no preparations for defence were made; indeed, previous to the approach of the fleet, the Turks had not determined whether to side with the English or French, and even then the French ambassador had the greatest difficulty in persuading them to resist the demands of Duckforth.

The British fleet consisted of six sail of the line, two frigates, two sloops, and several bomb vessels, carrying 818 guns, beside those in the bomb ships. Admiral Duckforth sailed through the Dardanelles on the 19th February, 1807, with little or no opposition. This being a Turkish festival day, the soldiers of the scanty garrison were enjoying the festivities of the occasion, and none were left to serve the few guns of the forts which had been prepared for defence. But while the admiral was waiting in the sea of Marmora for the result of negotiations, or for a favorable wind to make the attack upon Constantinople, the fortifications of this city were put in order, and the Turks actively employed, under French engineers and artillery officers, in repairing the defences of the

straits. Campbell, in his Naval History, says: "Admiral Duckforth now fully perceived the critical situation in which he was placed. He might, indeed, succeed, should the weather become favorable, in bombarding Constantinople; but, unless the bombardment should prove completely successful in forcing the Turks to pacific terms, the injury he might do to the city would not compensate for the damage which his fleet must necessarily sustain. With this damaged and crippled fleet, he must repass the Dardanelles, now rendered infinitely stronger than they were when he came through them."

Under these circumstances, the admiral determined to retreat; and on the 3d of April escaped through the Dardanelles, steering midway of the channel, with a favorable and strong current. "This escape, however," says Baines, was only from destruction, but by no means from serious loss and injury. In what instance, in the whole course of our naval warfare, have ships received equal damage in so short a time as in this extraordinary enterprise?" In detailing the extent of this damage, we will take the ships in the order they descended.

The first had her wheel carrried away, and her hull much damaged, but escaped with the loss of only three men. A stone shot penetrated the second between the poop and quarter deck, badly injured the mizzen mast, carried away the wheel, and did other serious damage; killing and wounding 20. Two shot struck the third, carrying away her shrouds and injuring her masts; loss in killed and wounded, 30. The fourth had her mainmast destroyed, with a loss of 16. The fifth had a large shot, six feet eight inches in circumferance enter her lower deck; loss 55. The sixth not injured. The seventh a good deal damaged, with a loss of 17. The eighth had no loss. The ninth was so much injured that "had there been a necessity for hauling the wind on the opposite tack she must have gone down;" her loss was 8. The tenth lost 12. The eleventh was much injured, with a loss of 8-making a total loss in repassing the Dardanelles of 167, and in the whole expedition 281, exclusive of 250 men who perished in the burning of the Ajax.

Such was the effect produced on the British fleet, sailing with a favorable wind and strong current past the half-manned and half-armed forts of the Dardanelles. Duckforth himself says that, had he remained before Constantinople much longer, till the forts had been completely put in order, no return would have been open to him, and "the unavoidable sacrifice of the squadron must have been the consequence." Scarcely had the fleet cleared the straits before it (the fleet) was re-enforced with eight sail of the line; but, even with this vast increase of strength, they did not venture to renew the contest. They had effected a most fortunate escape. General Jomini says, that if the defence had been conducted by a more enterprising and experienced people the expedition would have cost the English their whole squadron.

Great as was the damage done to the fleet, the forts themselves were uninjured. The English say their own fire did no execution, the shot in all probability not even striking their objects-"the rapid change of position, occasioned by a fair wind and current, preventing the certainty of aim." The state of the batteries when the fleet first passed in is thus described in James's Naval History: "Some of them were dilapidated, and others but partially mounted and poorly manned." And Alison says: "They had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The castles of Europe and Asia, indeed, stood in frowning majesty, to assert the dominion of the Crescent at the narrowest part of the passage, but their ramparts were antiquated, their guns in part dismounted, and such as remained, though of enormous calibre, little calculated to answer the rapidity and precision of an English broadside."

With respect to the "rebuke" mentioned in the Apalachicola report, we have been unable to ascertain by whom it was given. We can find no account of it in the several histories of the British navy. The House of Commons rejected

a motion to call for the papers; the board of admiralty made no charges or complaints; and, in the public estimation, says James, "Sir John rather gained than lost credit for the discomfiture he had experienced." Much has been said because the fortifications of the Dardanelles did not hermetically seal that channel, (an object they were never expected to accomplish, even had they been well armed and well served;) but it is forgotten, or entirely overlooked, that twelve Turkish line-of-battle-ships, two of them three-deckers, with nine frigates, were, with their sails bent and in apparent readiness, filled with troops," and lying within the line of fortifications; and yet this naval force effected little or nothing against the invaders. It is scarcely ever mentioned, being regarded of little consequence as a means of defence; and yet the number of their guns, and the expense of their construction and support, could hardly have fallen short of the incomplete and half-garrisoned forts, some of which were as ancient as the reign of Amurath.

Algiers. The attack upon Algiers, in 1816, has been frequently alluded to as a great instance of naval success, and is discussed at considerable length by the board of officers appointed by Mr. Poinsett, on the subject of national defence. But this board confessed themselves uninformed on several important facts; and their report, on this account, is less satisfactory than it otherwise would have been. The Apalachicola reporter has paraded this attack as entirely decisive of the superiority of guns afloat; but we cannot find that his account is sustained by any authority whatever.

The following narrative is drawn from the reports of the English and Dutch admirals, and other official and authentic English papers:

The attack was made by the combined fleets, consisting of five sail of the line, eighteen or twenty frigates and smaller vessels, besides five bomb vessels and smaller rocket boats, mounting in all about 1,000 guns. The armament of some of the smaller vessels is not given, but the guns of those whose armaments are known amount to over 900. The harbor and defences of Algiers had been previously surveyed by Captain Warde, royal navy, under Lord Exmouth's direction; and the number of the combined fleet was arranged according to the information given in this survey-just so many ships, and no more, being taken, as could be employed to advantage against the city, without being needlessly exposed. Moreover, the men and officers had been selected and exercised with reference to this particular attack.

From the survey of Captain Warde, and the accompanying map, it appears that the armament of all the fortifications of Algiers and the vicinity, counting the water fronts and parts that could flank the shore, was only 284 guns of various sizes and descriptions, including mortars. But not near all of these could act upon the fleet as it lay. Other English accounts state the number of guns actually opposed to the fleet at from 220 to 230. Some of these were in small and distant batteries, whereas nearly all the fleet was concentrated on the inole-head works. Supposing only one broadside of the ships to have been engaged, the ratio of forces, as expressed by the number of guns, must have been about five to two. This is a favorable supposition for the ships; for we know that several of them, from their position and a change of anchorage, brought both broadsides to bear. The Algerine shipping in the harbor was considerable, including several vessels-of-war, but no use of them was made in the defence, and nearly all were burnt. The attacking ships commanded some of the batteries, and almost immediately dismounted their guns. The walls of the casemated works were so thin as to be very soon battered down. Most of the Algerine guns were badly mounted, and many of them were useless after the first fire. They had no furnaces for heating shot, and, as "they loaded their guns with loose powder, put in with a ladle," they could not possibly have used hot shot, even had they constructed furnaces. The ships approached the forts, and many of them anchored in their intended positions, without a shot

being fired from the batteries. The action commenced at a quarter before three, and did not entirely cease till half-past eleven. The ships now took advantage of the land breeze, and, by warping and towing off, were able to get under sail and come to anchor beyond reach of the land batteries. Negotiations were again opened, and the Dey surrendered the Christian slaves, and yielded to the terms of the treaty.

During the contest, the fleet "fired nearly 118 tons of powder and 50,000 shot, (weighing more than 500 tons of iron,) besides 960 thirteen and ten inch shells, (thrown by the bomb vessels,) and the shells and rockets from the flotilla." The vessels were considerably crippled, and their loss in killed and wounded amounted to $83. The land batteries were much injured, and a large part of their guns dismounted. Their loss is not known; the English confess they could obtain no account of it, but suppose it to have been very great. This seems more than probable; for, besides those actually employed in the defence, large numbers of people crowded into the forts to witness the contest. So great was this curiosity, that, when the action commenced, the parapets were covered with the multitude, gazing at the manoeuvres of the ships. To avoid so unnecessary and indiscrimite a slaughter, Lord Exmouth (showing humanity that does him great credit) motioned with his hand to the ignorant wretches to retire to some place of safety. This loss of life in the batteries, the burning of the buildings within the town and about the mole, the entire destruction of their fleet and merchant vessels anchored within the mole and in the harbor, had a depressing effect upon the inhabltants, and probably did more than the injuries received by the batteries in securing an honorable conclusion to the treaty. We know very well that these batteries, though much injured, were not silenced when Lord Exmouth took advantage of the land breeze, and sailed beyond their reach. The ships retired: first, because they had become much injured, and their ammunition nearly exhausted; second, in order to escape from a position so hazardous, in case of a storm; and third, to get beyond the reach of the Algerine batteries. Lord Exmouth himself gives these as his reasons for the retreat, and says: "The land wind saved me many a gallant fellow." And Vice-Admiral Von de Capellan, in his report of the battle, gives the same opinion: “In this retreat," says he, "which, from want of wind and the damage suffered in the rigging, was very slow, the ships had still to suffer much from the new opened and redoubled fire of the enemy's batteries; at last, the land breeze springing up," &c.

An English officer, who took part in this affair, says: "It was well for us that the land wind came off, or we should never have got out; and God knows what would have been our fate, had we remained all night."

The motives of the retreat cannot, therefore, be doubted. Had the Arabs set themselves zealously at work during the night to prepare for a new contest, by remounting their guns, and placing others behind the ruins of those batteries which had fallen-in other words, had the works now been placed in hands as skilful and experienced as the English, the contest would have been far from ended. But, in the words of the board of defence, "Lord Exmouth relied on the effects produced on the people by his dreadful cannonade, and the result proves that he was right. His anxiety to clear the vessels from the contest shows that there was a power still unconquered, which he thought it better to leave to be restrained by the suffering population of the city than to keep in a state of exasperation and activity by his presence. What was this power but an unsubdued energy in the batteries?

"The true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount of injury done on the one side or the other, particularly as there was on the one side a city to suffer as well as the batteries, as the relative efficiency of the parties when the battle closed. All political agitation and popular clamor aside, what would have been the result had the fight been continued, or even had Lord Ex

mouth renewed it next morning? These are questions that can be answered only on conjecture; but the manner the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts whether, had the subsequent demands of Lord Exmouth been rejected, he had it in his power to enforce them by his ships; whether, indeed, if he had renewed the fight, he would not have been signally defeated.

"On the whole, we do not think that this battle, although it stands preeminent as an example of naval success over batteries, presents an argument to shake the confidence which fortifications, well situated, well planned, and well fought, deserve, as the defences of a seabord."

We cannot help regarding these conclusions just when we reflect upon all the circumstances of the case. The high character, skill, and bravery of the attacking force; their immense superiority in number of guns, with no surplus human life to be exposed; the antiquated and ill-managed works of defence; the entire want of skill of the Algerine artillerists and the neglect of the ordinary means of preparation; the severe execution which these ill-served guns did upon the enemy's ships, an execution far more dreadful than that effected by the French or Dutch fleets in their best contested naval battles with the ships of the same foe-from these facts we must think that those who are so ready to draw from this case conclusions unfavorable to the use of land batteries as a means of defence against shipping know but little of the nature of the contest.

An English historian of some note, in speaking of this attack, says: "It is but little to the purpose, unless to prove what may be accomplished by fleets against towns exactly so circumstanced, placed, and governed. Algiers is situ ated on an amphitheatre of hills sloping down towards the sea, and presenting, therefore, the fairest mark to the fire of hostile ships. But where is the capital exactly so situated that we are ever likely to attack? And as to the destruction of a few second-rate towns, even when practicable, it is a mean, unworthy species of warfare, by which nothing was ever gained. The severe loss sustained before Algiers must also be taken into account, because it was inflicted by mere Algerine artillery, and was much inferior to what may be expected from a contest maintained against batteries manned with soldiers instructed by officers of skill and science, not only in working the guns, but in the endless duties of detail necessary for keeping the whole of an artillery material in a proper state of formidable efficiency.'

San Juan d'Ulloa, "falling before a small French squadron after a few hours' cannonading."-The following facts relative to this attack are drawn principally from the report of the French engineer officer, who was one of the expedition. The French fleet consisted of four ships carrying 188 guns, two armed steamboats, and two bomb ketches, with four large mortars. The whole number of guns found in the fort was 187; a considerable portion of these, however, were for land defence. When the French vessels were towed into the position selected for the attack "it was lucky for us," says their reporter, “that the Mexicans did not disturb this operation, which lasted nearly two hours, and that they permitted us to commence the fire." "We were exposed to the fire of one 24-pounder, five 16-pounders, seven 12-pounders, one 8-pounder, and five 18-pounder carronades—in all nineteen pieces only." If these be converted into equivalent 24-pounders, in proportion to the weight of balls, the whole 19 guns will be less than 12 24-pounders! This estimate is much too great, for it allows three 8-pounders to be equal to one 24-pounder, and each of the 18-pounder carronades to be three-quarters the power of a long 24-pounder; whereas, at the distance at which the parties were engaged, these small pieces were nearly harmless. Two of the powder magazines, not being bomb-proof, were blown up during the engagement, by which three of the 19 guns on the water front of the castle were dismounted, thus reducing the land force to an equivalent of ten 24-pounders. The other 17 guns were still effective when abandoned by the Mexicans.