its recovery, sending out for this purpose a fleet of 92 sail, carrying over 4,000 guns and 25,000 men. A battle was fought with the British off Malaga, but without any decided result, the victory being claimed by both sides. In the latter part of this year and the beginning of 1705, the French and Spaniards besieged Gibraltar both by sea and land. 8,000 bombs and 70,000 cannon balls were fired at the work without materially injuring it, and the besiegers were at last forced to retire with a loss of near 10,000 men, while the loss of the garrison amounted to only 400.

This place was again besieged by the Spaniards in 1720 with a considerable fleet; the garrison at that time "consisted of only three weak battalions;" nevertheless, the naval attack proved abortive. Another attack in 1726 was mostly by land forces; the loss of the besiegers 3,000, of the garrison 300.

Although the Spaniards had been thrice defeated in their attempts to recover Gibraltar, the siege was renewed at the commencement of the war in 1779. The garrison now numbered 5,382 men. The blockade was begun about the middle of the summer with a considerable fleet, but it was soon afterwards suspended till the winter of 1780. This blockade was raised in 1781 by the arrival of a large British naval force, but the shipping on both sides was much annoyed by the land batteries which the two parties had erected. So vigorously was the land attack continued, that, on the 4th of May, 1782, not a single day had elapsed without firing from these batteries "for a space of nearly 13 months!"

The following is Dr. Campbell's account of the general attack in September of the same year: According to his authority the combined forces consisted of "40,000 land troops, 47 sail of the line besides floating batteries, frigates, and other vessels-of-war." A simultaneous attack by land and sea was first planned, in which a loss of 20 ships-of-war and a proportional number of troops was expected by the besiegers; and "there can be little doubt that the Spanish monarch, in his extreme eagerness to obtain possession of Gibraltar, would not have hesitated to make this enormous sacrifice, provided there was a reasonable chance of success; but, to all who knew the strength of the fortress, the scheme was regarded as wild and impracticable. Another was therefore proposed." This was, to besiege the works at the same time by land and sea— the sea attack to be made by ships and a large number of floating batteries, constructed in such a manner as to be bomb proof, and to contain within themselves the means of extinguishing the fires caused by red hot shot. This was supposed to be effected by means of water pipes and tamping with wet sand. The hanging roofs were contrived in such a manner that they could be raised and let down with the greatest facility, at the pleasure of those on board the vessels.

These battering ships were armed with 154 pieces of heavy ordnance on the attacking side, with 58 in reserve, to be used in case of accident. "The whole number of men on board could not be less than 6,000 or 7,000." As the effect of these vessels would "depend in a great measure on the rapidity and constancy with which they were fired, a kind of match was contrived by which they were all to go off together, as it had been by a single shot." The roofs and sides of the ships were so thick that, for a long time, says Drinkwater, the balls could not be made to penetrate them. Another English writer says, "their powers of resistance to projectiles of artillery were certainly greater than that afforded by the [British] squadron at Algiers."

The attack was commenced on the 8th of September by the troops and the ships then present. For the land siege they employed 1,200 pieces of heavy ordnance, and more than 83,000 barrels of powder! For several days the besiegers "fired at the rate of 6,500 cannon shot and 1,080 shells in every 24 hours." On the 9th the combined fleets of France and Spain in the bay amounted to 48 sail of the line, 10 battering ships, a large number of frigates,

gun and mortar boats, bomb ketches, &c. The new battering ships joined in the attack about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 13th, anchoring about 900 yards from the works. They seemed for a long time, says Campbell, "completely invulnerable to all attempts made by the garrison to destroy them; while they continued through the greatest part of the day to maintain a heavy and destructive cannonade, they resisted the combined powers of fire and artillery to such a degree that the incessant showers of shells and the red hot shot with which they were assailed made no visible impression upon them. About 2 o'clock, however, there were evident symptoms of their approaching destruction;" and during the night a large portion of them were either burnt or torn in pieces. "It is impossible to ascertain the loss of the Spaniards on this memorable day; that it was enormous is certain, both from the nature and effect of the fire from the garrison, and from the very circumstance that they published only a vague and contradictory account respecting it. Such admirable measures had been taken for the security of the garrison, that their loss was comparatively light. In the course of about nine weeks the whole number of slain amounted only to 65, and the wounded to 388. How little chance the Spaniards had of succeeding in their attack, even if their battering ships had not taken fire, may be judged from this circumstance—that the works of the fortress were scarcely damaged." "As the enemy now had most melancholy proof that Gibraltar could not be taken by any means that human power could bring against it, the only chance that remained to them was by famine." A blockade and the land siege were therefore kept up for some time, but were unsuccessful.

Drinkwater gives nearly the same account as above. The number of men in the garrison, when attacked, was 7,000. Neither the whole number of guns in the fort nor in the ships could be brought into action; but, according to Drinkwater, the number of guns afloat, which were actually brought to bear on the fortifications, was 300, while this fire was returned by only 80 cannon, 7 mortars, and 7 howitzers. The loss of the garrison during this engagement was 16 killed and 67 wounded, while the enemy's loss during the same time was estimated at 2,000.

We add a third account from the British Naval Chronicle, coinciding with those already given: "47 sail of the line, 10 invincible battering ships, carrying 212 guns, numerous frigates, xebecs, bomb ketches, cutters, and gun and mortar boats, with small craft, for the purpose of disembarkation, were assembled in the bay. On the land side were stupendous batteries and works, mounting 200 pieces of ordnance, and protected by an army of 40,000 men, commanded by a victorious and active general, and animated by the presence of two princes of the blood, a number of officers of the first distinction, and the general expectation of the world. To this prodigious force was opposed a garrison of 7,000 effective men, including the marine brigade, with only 80 cannon, 7 mortars, and 9 howitzers." The loss of the enemy in killed and prisoners was calculated at 2,000, while the garrison, in so furious an attack, had only 1 officer, 2 subalterns, and 13 privates killed, and 5 officers and 63 privates wounded. The damage sustained by the fortress itself was so small that the whole sea line was put in order before night."

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Copenhagen.-The passage of the Cattegat by the British fleet in 1801, and their attack on Copenhagen, have often been alluded to in discussions on the power of ships and batteries; and although the facts and circumstances are all well authenticated, they have sometimes been most singularly perverted, and the most unwarrantable inferences drawn from them. The following are the main features and facts of the case, as drawn from the official returns and authentic records: The British fleet of fifty-two sail, eighteen of them line-ofbattle-ships, four frigates, &c., sailed from Yarmouth roads on the 12th of March, passed the sound on the 30th, and attacked and defeated the Danish line on the 2d of April.

The sound between Cronenberg and the Swedish coast is about two and onehalf miles wide. The batteries of Cronenberg and Elsinore were lined with 100 pieces of cannon and mortars; but the Swedish battery had been much neglected, and then mounted only six guns. Nevertheless, the British admiral, to avoid the damage his squadron would have to sustain in the passage of this wide channel, defended by a force scarcely superior to a single one of his ships, preferred to attempt the difficult passage of the Belt; but after a few of his light vessels, acting as scouts, had run on the rocks, he returned to the sound.

He then tried to negotiate a peaceful passage, threatening a declaration of war if his vessels should be fired upon. It must be remembered that England was at peace with both Denmark and Sweden, and that no just cause of war existed. Hence, the admiral inferred that the commanders of these batteries would be loth to involve their countries in a war with so formidable a power as England, by commencing hostilities, when only a free passage was asked. The Danish commander replied, that he should not permit a fleet to pass his post, whose object and destination were unknown to him. He fired upon them, as bound to do by long-existing commercial regulations, and not as an act of hostility against the English. The Swedes, on the contrary, remained neutral, and allowed the British vessels to lie near by for several days without firing upon them. Seeing this friendly disposition of the Swedes, the fleet neared their coast, and passed out of the reach of the Danish batteries, which opened a fire of balls and shells; but all of them fell more than two hundred yards short of the fleet, which escaped without the loss of a single man.

The Swedes excused their treachery by the plea that it would have been impossible to construct batteries at that season, and, even had it been possible, Denmark would not have consented to their doing so, for fear that Sweden would renew her old claim to one-half of the rich duties levied by Denmark on all ships passing the strait. There may have been some grounds for the last excuse; but the true reason for their conduct was the fear of getting involved in a war with England. Napoleon says that, even at that season, a few days only would have been sufficient for placing one hundred guns in battery; and that Sweden had much more time than was requisite. And with one hundred guns on each side of the channel, served with skill and energy, the fleet must necessarily have sustained so much damage as to render it unfit to attack Copenhagen.

On this passage, we remark: 1st. The whole number of guns and mortars in the forts of the sound amounted to only 106, while the fleet carried over 1,700 guns; and yet, with this immense superiority of more than sixteen to one, the British admiral preferred the dangerous passage of the Belt to encountering the fire of these land batteries. 2d. By negotiations and threatening the vengeance of England, he persuaded the small Swedish battery to remain silent, and allow the fleet to pass near that shore, out of reach of the guns of Cronenberg and Elsinore. 3d. It is the opinion of Napoleon and the best English writers, that if the Swedish battery had been put in order, and acted in concert with the Danish works, they might have so damaged the fleet as to render it incapable of any serious attempt on Copenhagen.

This passage of the Cattegat is quoted by the Apalachicola report as a case settling the naked question of relative strength of guns afloat and guns ashore, and as decisive of the perfect inability of our fortifications to stop the transit of a fleet!

We now proceed to consider the circumstances attending the attack and defence of Copenhagen itself. The only side of the town exposed to the attack of heavy shipping is the northern, where there lies a shoal extending out a considerable distance, leaving only a very narrow approach to the heart of the city. On the most advanced part of this shoal are the crown batteries, carrying in all H. Rep. Com. 86—19

eighty-eight guns.* The entrance into the Baltic, between Copenhagen and Salthorn, is divided into two channels by a bank, called the Middle Ground, which is situated directly opposite Copenhagen. To defend the entrance on the left of the crown batteries, they placed near the mouth of the channel four shipsof-the-line, one frigate, and two sloops, carrying, in all, 358 guns. To secure the port and city from bombardment from the King's channel, (that between the Middle Ground and town,) a line of floating defences were moored near the edge of the shoal, and manned principally by volunteers. This line consisted of old hulls of vessels, block ships, praams, sloops, rafts, &c., carrying, in all, 628 guns-a force strong enough to prevent the approach of bomb vessels and gunboats, (the purpose for which it was intended,) but utterly incapable of contending with first-rate ships-of-war; but these the Danes thought would be deterred from approaching by the difficulties of navigation. These difficulties were certainly very great; and Nelson said, beforehand, that "the wind which might carry him in would most probably not bring out a crippled ship." Had the Danes supposed it possible for Nelson to approach with his large vessels, the line of floating defences would have been formed nearer Copenhagen, the right supported by batteries raised on the isle of Amack. "In that case," says Napoleon, "it is probable that Nelson would have failed in his attack; for it would have been impossible for him to pass between the line and shore thus lined with cannon." As it was, the line was too extended for strength, and its right too far advanced to receive assistance from the battery of Amack. A part of the fleet remained as a reserve, under Admiral Parker, while the others, under Nelson, advanced to the King's channel. This attacking force consisted of eight ships-of-the-line and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying, in all, 1,100 guns, without including those in the six gun-brigs, whose armament is not given. One of the seventy-fours could not be brought into action, and two others grounded; but Lord Nelson says, "although not in the situation assigned them, yet they were so placed as to be of great service." This force was concentrated upon a part of the Danish line of floating defences, the whole of which was not only inferior to it by 382 guns, but so situated as to be beyond the reach of succor, and without a chance of escape. The result was what might have been expected. Every vessel of the right and centre of this outer Danish line was taken or destroyed, except one or two small ones, which cut and run under protection of the fortifications. The left of the line, being supported by the crown battery, remained unbroken. A division of frigates, in hopes of proving an adequate substitute for the ships intended to attack the batteries, ventured to engage them, but "it suffered considerable loss, and, in spite of all its efforts, was obliged to relinquish this enterprise and sheer off."

The Danish vessels lying in the entrance of the channel to the city were not attacked, and took no material part in the contest. They are to be reckoned in the defence on the same grounds that the British ships of the reserve should be included in the attacking force. Nor was any use made of the guns on shore, for the enemy did not advance far enough to be within their range.

The crown battery was behind the Danish line, and mainly masked by it. A part only of its guns could be used in support of the left of this line, and in repelling the direct attack of the frigates, which it did most effectually. But we now come to a new feature in this battle. As the Danish line of floating defences fell into the hands of the English, the range of the crown battery enlarged and its power was felt. Nelson saw the danger to which his fleet was exposed, and, being at last convinced of the prudence of the admiral's signal for retreat, "made his mind to weigh anchor and retire from the engagement."

up

* Some writers say only sixty-eight or seventy; but the English writers generally say eighty-eight. A few, apparently to increase the brilliancy of the victory, make this number till greater.

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To retreat, however, from his present position was exceedingly difficult and dangerous. He therefore determined to endeavor to effect an armistice, and despatched the following letter to the Prince Regent :

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Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark, when no longer resisting; but if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, Lord Nelson must be obliged to set on fire all the floating batteries he has taken, without the power to save the brave Danes who have defended them.”

This produced an armistice, and hostilities had hardly ceased when three of the English ships, including that in which Nelson himself was, struck upon the bank. They were in the jaws of destruction, and could never have escaped if the batteries had continued their fire. They therefore owed their safety to this armistice." A convention was soon signed, by which everything was left in statu quo, and the fleet of Admiral Parker allowed to proceed into the Baltic. The Rev. Edward Baines, the able English historian of the wars of the French revolution, in speaking of Nelson's request for an armistice, says: This letter, which exhibited a happy union of policy and courage, was written at a moment when Lord Nelson perceived that in consequence of the unfavorable state of the wind, the admiral was not likely to get up to aid the enterprise; that the principal batteries of the enemy, and the ships at the mouth of the harbor, were yet untouched; that two of his own division had grounded, and others were likely to share the same fate." Campbell says these batteries and ships still unconquered. Two of his own (Nelson's) vessels were grounded and exposed to a heavy fire; others, if the battle continued, might be exposed to a similar fate, while he found it would be scarcely practicable to bring off the prizes under the fire of the batteries."

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With respect to the fortifications of the town, a chronicler of the times says they were of no service while the action lasted. "They began to fire when the enemy took possession of the abandoned ships, but it was at the same time the parley appeared." The Danish commander, speaking of the general contest between the two lines says: "The crown battery did not come at all into action." An English writer says distinctly: "The works (fortifications) of Copenhagen were absolutely untouched at the close of the action." Colonel Mitchell, the English historian, says: "Lord Nelson never fired a shot at the town or fortifications of Copenhagen. He destroyed a line of block ships, praams, and floating batteries that defended the sea approach to the town; and the Crown Prince, seeing his capital exposed, was willing to finish by armistice a war the object of which was neither very popular nor well understood. What the result of the action between the defences of Copenhagen and the British fleet might ultimately have been is therefore uncertain. The BOMBARDMENT OF COPENHAGEN BY NELSON, as it is generally styled, is, therefore, like most other oracular phrases of the day, a mere combination of words without the slightest meaning."

The British lost in killed and wounded 943 men, and the loss of the Danes, according to their own account, which is confirmed by the French, was but very little higher. The English, however, say it amounted to 1,600 or 1,800; but let the loss be what it may, it was almost exclusively confined to the floating defences, and can in no way determine the relative accuracy of aim of the guns ashore and guns afloat.

The facts and testimony we have adduced prove incontestably:

1st. That of the fleet of 52 sail and 1,700 guns sent by the English to the attack upon Copenhagen, two ships of 148 guns were grounded or wrecked ; seven ships-of-the-line and 36 smaller vessels, carrying over 1,000 gans, were actually brought into the action; while the remainder were held as a reserve, to act upon the first favorable opportunity.

2d. That the Danish line of floating defences, consisting mostly of old hulls, sloops, rafts, &c., carried only 628 guns of all descriptions; that the fixed bat