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by a naval force as has sometimes been alleged. Colonel Mitchel says, that the fleet kept up so tremendous a fire upon the batteries that the French officers, who had been present at Austerlitz and Jena, declared, que la cannonade in these battles had been a mere jeu d'enfans in comparison. Yet, what was the effect produced on the defences of the place by this fire, so formidable, to judge by the sound alone? The writer can answer the question with some accuracy, for he went along the entire sea line the very day after the capitulation and found no part of the parapet injured so as to be of the slightest consequence, and only one solitary gun dismounted, evidently by the bursting of a shell, and which could not, of course, have been thrown from the line-of-battle-ships, but must have been thrown from the land batteries."

We have now shown that a naval force cannot be relied on as the sole means of securing a coast from naval attacks; that maritime descents must in general be limited to striking some sudden blow upon an unprotected point; and that fortifications and land forces are the best means of warding off these descents. Before examining the questionof relative cost of forts and ships, we will pass to the consideration of the question of their relative power, gun for gun, when actually brought into contact.

It must be remembered that this question does not at all involve the expediency of supporting navies and batteries. Both must be supported; for neither can perform the duties of the other, no matter how strong it may be.

Let us suppose a fair trial of this relative strength. The fort is to be properly constructed and in good repair; its guns in a position to be used with effect; its garrison skilful and efficient; its commander capable and brave. The ship is of the very best character, and in perfect order; the crew disciplined and courageous; its commander skilful and adroit; the wind, tide, and sea, all as could be desired.* The numbers of the garrison and crew are to be no more than requisite, with no unnecessary exposure of human life to swell the list of the slain. The issue of this contest, unlesss attended with extraordinary and easily distinguishable circumstances, would be a fair test of their relative strength.

What result should we anticipate, from the nature of the contending forces? The ship, under the circumstances we have supposed, can choose her point of attack, selecting the one she may deem the most vulnerable; but she herself is everywhere vulnerable; her men and guns are much concentrated, and consequently much exposed.

But in the fort, "it is only the gun, a small part of the carriage, and now or then a head or an arm raised above the parapet, that can be hurt; the ratio of the exposed surfaces being not less than fifteen or twenty to one. Next, there is always more or less motion in the water, so that the ship's gun, although it may have been pointed accurately at one moment, at the next will be thrown entirely away from its object, even when the motion of the ship is too small to be otherwise noticed; whereas in the battery the gun will be fired just as it is pointed, and the motion of the ship will merely vary to the extent of a few inches, or at most two or three feet, from the spot in which the shot is to be received. In the ship, there are, besides, many points exposed that may be called vital points. By losing her rudder, or portions of her rigging, or of her spars, she may become unmanageable and unable to use her strength; she may receive shots under water and be liable to sink; she may receive hot shot and be set on fire. These damages are in addition to those of having her guns dismounted and her people killed by the shots that pierce her sides, and scatter splinters from her timbers-while the risks of the battery are confined to those mentioned above, namely, the risk that the gun, the carriage, or the men may be struck." The opinions of military writers and the facts of history fully accord with

• These conditions for the battery are easily satisfied; but for the ship, are partly dependent on the elements, and seldom to be wholly obtained.

these deductions of theory. Some few individuals, mistaking or misstating the facts of a few recent trials, assert that modern improvements in the naval service have so far outstripped the progress in the art of land defence that a floating force is now abundantly able to cope, upon equal terms, with a land battery. Ignorant and superficial persons, hearing merely that certain forts had recently yielded to a naval force, and taking no trouble to learn the real facts of the case, have paraded them before the public as proofs positive of a new era in military science. This conclusion, however groundless and absurd, has received credit with us merely from its novelty. The Americans are often attracted by what is new and plausible; old theories and established principles are frequently regarded so much the less for their antiquity, notwithstanding the proofs and arguments which time has thrown around them.

In the Apalachicola document are embodied many crudities long since repudiated in the theories and banished from the practice of the old world.

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The report consists of three or four pages of a survey of the bays of Apalachicola, St. Joseph's, St. Andrew's, Ship island, and Tampa, and 30 pages of an attempt to prove the worthlessness of fortifications and the superior efficiency of naval defences. We shall comment only upon the propositions contained in this portion of the document, viz: "That whatever policy we adopt must and ought to be nearly exclusive in its application;" "that our defensive policy should be by naval means; "that the system of fortifications recommended by Mr. Poinsett in 1839, and by Mr. Bell and Mr. Spencer in 1841, is intended to lay the foundation of a great military power, to cover the country with castles, dangerous to freedom,' but utterly worthless in defence;" "that fortifications are useless, nay, dangerous without an army educated to defend them, and of competent numbers; "that for the true interests of the country, it had been better that we had never known this system, and that the further prosecution of it should be abandoned;" "that we had better blow into air and leave in ruins, citadels which command our cities with their guns and control our harbors, that might and probably would be seized upon by an excited populace for lawless purposes; that fortifications do not and cannot successfully resist the attacks of ships;" and that "they must henceforth be constructed beyond the reach of fleets to be even secure."

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This report further says there is scarcely a port in the old or new world which has not been forcibly entered by hostile fleets and fallen before their broadsides! In support of these broad assertions the following successful naval attacks are adduced, viz:

Jamaica in Cromwell's time, Rio Janeiro, Carthagena in 1565, [1585?] 1697, 1706, and 1741; Porto Bello in 1740, Guadaloupe in 1759 and 1794, Martinique, Havana, the Cape of Good Hope, Malta, Curaçoa, Chagres in 1841, Senegal and Mocha, Java, Sumatra, and "the rich city or Manilla," Madras, Calcutta, Pondicherry and Ceylon, Gibraltar, Copenhagen, Constantinople, Algiers, San Juan d'Ulloa, St. Jean d'Acre, Louisburg, Quebec, Red Hook, Washington and Baltimore, Charleston and Mobile.

Let us now examine these cases, and see if they authorize the inferences drawn from them by the report.

"Jamaica, by a British fleet, in Cromwell's time."-In the reduction of Jamaica in 1655, no trial of strength was made between the ships and forts; it was effected almost wholly by the army of General Venobles, which amounted to about 5,000 men. The defensive army was forced to capitulate and the principal place surrendered by treaty. So little assistance was rendered to the army by the fleet that one of the commissioners openly declared, "he suspected they were betrayed." And this same naval force of 30 ships, under Admirel Penn, also made an attack on Hispaniola, but after a contest of some two weeks, was repulsed with great loss.

"Rio Janeiro, taken by Duguy Truin, with a small fleet," &c.—Truin did

really sail into the harbor of Rio Janeiro in 1711, in spite of the little defences at the entrance, but that passage cost him the loss of 300 men out of his small fleet. He did not stop to test the question of strength, but sailed past with all possible speed. His troops were landed and batteries erected on shore, but neither soldiers nor inhabitants remained to fight, they had fled to the

mountains.

Carthagena. The taking of this place in 1585 was effected entirely by land troops. The fleet merely acted as transports and took no part in the contest. The conquest of this place by the French in 1697 was also effected by land forces, the ships again acting merely as transports. The heavy train of land artilery made a breach in the walls of the town, through which the assault was made. The Carthagena taken in 1706 was the place of that name in old Spain, but this was an operation purely political, no defence whatever being made. In the words of Dr. Campbell, "information being received that the inhabitants of Carthagena wished only for the presence of the [English] fleet and an opportunity of declaring for King Charles III, it was determined to steer thither." The fleet arrived on the 1st of June, and the conditions of surrender were finally settled on the following day."

The attack in 1741 was a total failure, though made with 30 ships-of-theline and numerous smaller vessels-124 sail in all, carrying 2,682 guns, 16,000 seamen and 12,000 troops. The defences of Carthagena consisted of 10 forts and batteries, 9 of which (the armament of the 10th not known) carried 222 guns of all calibres; but a part of this number of guns were too small to reach the ships at any considerable distance. Of these 9 forts, one (of 85 guns) was unfinished, two (together 71 guns) were blown up before attacked, and only a part of the guns were mounted in one of fascine batteries (of 15 guns.) Carthagena itself was armed with 160 guns, but the only attack made upon it was an experimental one by a floating battery. The several garrisons of these forts amounted to only 4,000 men. The siege continued forty days, when the British re-embarked their troops and retired with a severe loss. In the single attempt to take fort St. Lazar the loss amounted to over 600 men.

Carthagena had been bombarded in 1740, for three days, by a fleet of nine sail-of-the-line, carrying between five and six hundred guns, and near 4,000 men, but the forts were unharmed, and the bombardment "had no other effect than that of terrifying the inhabitants and injuring some churches and convents." The ships, however, were so much injured as to render it necessary for them to return to Porto Bello for repairs.

"Porto Bello taken by Admiral Vernon in 1740."-Vernon's fleet here consisted of six sail of the line, carrying 380 guns and 2,495 men, and a small land force. The attack was first made upon Fort Iron, which carried 78 guns and a lower battery of 22 guns; the garrison amounted to less than 300 men in all. It was begun by the Hampton Court, of 70 guns and 495 men, firing 400 balls in the first 25 minutes. The other ships soon followed, but their united efforts being unable to effect a breach in the walls of the fort, a body of sailors and soldiers were directed to attack it on the land side. These soldiers climbed into the embrasures on each other's shoulders, and reduced the garrison by a fire of musketry; those who capitulated being only 40 in number, including both officers and privates; the remainder had fled. Gloria Castle and the other battery in the further part of the harbor were neither of them attacked; together they carried 120 guns in all and a garrison of 400 men. Dr. Campbell, in his British Naval History, says: "It must be confessed that the easy conquest of Admiral Vernon and his command is to be in part attributed to the cowardice of the Spaniards in surrendering the first fort before a breach was made, and the other two before they were attacked. Gloria Castle might have sustained a long siege, and the batteries in that and St. Jeronimo, if properly served, would have rendered the entrance into the harbor exceedingly dangerous, if not im

practicable." Another English writer of equal authority says: "The Spaniards deserted their forts, and such was their pusillanimity that they suffered them to be taken without bloodshed. Vernon found more difficulty in demolishing the fortifications of the place than in taking them."

An attempt had previously been made by Admiral Hosier, with a large English squadron, to reduce this place; but, says Dr. Campbell, “after a siege of six months or more, he weighed anchor, and sailed for Jamaica, after such a loss of men, and in so wretched a condition, that I cannot prevail on myself to enter into the particulars of a disaster which I heartily wish could be blotted out of the annals and of the remembrance of this nation." So much for the naval attacks on Porto Bello.

"Among the rest, the island of Guadaloupe is remarkably in point," &c.The attacks quoted in the report are those of 1759 and 1794. The first was made by Commodore Moore, with 10 ships-of-the-line, some frigates and gun vessels, carrying about 1,000 guns, and 60 transports, with 800 marines, and a land force of six regiments of the line, a detachment of engineers and artillerists, and a large number of volunteers from the English islands—in all, about 6,000 men. The defences consisted of a citadel and several open water batteries, carrying in all, about 100 guns. The several garrisons were composed of "five companies of regular troops, scarce making 100 men in the whole island." The ships and batteries were here actually brought into contact, and the following is the order of the engagement, so far as given by the English writers themselves:

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How the other ships and batteries were engaged, or whether engaged at all, is not stated. Some of the English writers state the armament of the citadel at 43 guns, and that of the Berwick ship at 66—an unimportant difference; all agree upon the other points.

Here was a naval force of 7 to 1, (we count both broadsides of the engaged ships, and also all the guns of the engaged forts, both those for the land and water defences,) and what was the result? Some of the batteries were injured; but the citadel, though attacked by a force of more than 5 to 1, had, according to Beatson, neither its walls injured nor its guns dismounted. The garrison was driven out by the bravery of the British forces on land; the town was taken, and the whole island finally subdued, after a contest of a little over three months. All this is well known; and it is also well known, to those who have taken the trouble to examine the facts of the case, that there is nothing in it to justify a single inference in favor of the superiority of guns afloat over those on shore.

The reduction of Guadaloupe, in 1794, was almost wholly effected upon land. The force sent out upon this expedition consisted of 18 vessels-of-war, carrying between 700 and 800 guns, and nearly 7,000 troops. A part of these troops were landed near some small batteries, under the fire of the Winchelsea; but the principal defences of the place being almost entirely without garrisons, were carried by the enemy's land forces. The English left a large squadron for the defence of the island; but, notwithstanding this, the French found the means of

evading them, and reorganizing their forts, which, being now properly defended, repelled the combined attacks of Admiral Jervis and General Grey.

Martinique.-The same combined sea and land forces, under Commodore Moore, which attacked Guadaloupe in 1759, also made an attack upon Martinique in the same year. Notwithstanding the great superiority of the attacking force over the land forces of Port Royal, the several attempts of the British to silence the batteries, and effect a lodgement by land, were altogether ineffectual, and the enemy was at last compelled to re-embark his troops, and retire from the contest, with several of his vessels seriously injured, and many of his men killed and wounded. The fleet afterwards sailed to St. Pierre, for the purpose of attempting that part of the island; but, after a reconnoissance of the place, the commodore decided against it, because, said he, "the ships may be so much injured in the attack as to prevent them from availing themselves of their success, and from undertaking any other expedition during the season."

While the French population of Martinique, in 1793, were distracted by the same political differences which were then deluging the mother country in blood, England attempted to capture the island, through the assistance of the royalist party. The British attacking force consisted of five ships-of-the-line and three smaller vessels, 496 guns in all, and a land force of 3,000 men, of which 1,100 were regulars; (some writers estimate this land force at only 2,000 men.) General Rochambeau, it is said, had "only a few hundred troops" for the defence of the batteries; nevertheless, he most signally repulsed the enemy, and compelled him to abandon the island.

But the English returned again in 1794, with a superior force; their fleet now consisted of eighteen vessels-of-war, carrying between 700 and 800 guns, and a number of transports with near 7,000 troops. General Rochambeau's army amounted to only 600 men, of whom 400 were militia. The British naval force, notwithstanding its immense superiority, did not attempt to force its way into the harbor, and attack the forts. On the contrary, the troops were first landed upon other parts of the island, and took possession of Point Solomon, Pigeon island, Casnavire, and several other batteries; thus "opening," says an English writer, "a way for the British fleet to advance." The other forts were regularly besieged on the land side; siege batteries were erected within 200 yards of Fort Louis, and others within 500 yards of Fort Bourbon. When Fort Louis had been fired upon for 48 hours by these siege batteries, and bombarded by the gun boats, the Asia, of 64 guns, and the Zebra, of 16 guns, advanced to take a part in the attack. The former was twice driven back by the fire of the fort; the latter ran aground near by; her crew landed and assisted in the capture of the fort, Captain de Rouvignée coming up at the same time on the opposite side with a body of infantry and some field pieces. The other forts were taken in the regular operations of a land siege, being reduced mainly by the "heavy British batteries in the second parallel." This siege lasted seven weeks, and the entire loss of the British in killed and wounded was 318-equal to one-half of the defensive army.

The Apalachicola report, apparently forgetting the previous unsuccessful naval attacks upon Martinique, adduces this attack of 1794 as an example of the superiority of guns afloat. "The joint attack upon St. Louis," he says, "was anticipated by Captain Faulkner, of the Zebra, who laid his ship alongside the fort, and carried it at the head of his crew."

This is an error. Captain Faulkner was assisted by a land force, and was himself anticipated, even in the attack, by the crews of the boats. It was at first supposed that he preceded these, and it was so stated in Sir John Jervis's despatches; but the error was afterwards corrected. James, in his Naval History, gives the corrected version of the affair, and says: "The boats commanded by Captains Nugent and Riou, containing as many as 1,200 men, pushed across the Carénage before the Zebra could get in, and stormed and took possession of

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