tection. If the attacks of the enervated enemies of France were weak, so also feeble were her own efforts to resist these attacks. The republican armies repelled the ill-planned and ill-conducted invasion by the Duke of Brunswick— but it was by the substitution of human life for preparation, system, and skill; enthusiasm supplied the place of discipline; robbery produced military stores; and the dead bodies of her citizens formed epaulements against the enemy. Yet this was but the strength of weakness, the aimless struggle of a broken and disjointed government; and the new revolutionary power was fast sinking away before the combined opposition of Europe, when the great genius of Napoleon, with a strong arm and iron rule, seizing upon the scattered fragments, and binding them together in one consolidated mass, made France victorious, and seated himself on the throne of empire.

No people in the world ever exhibited a more general and enthusiastic patriotism than the Americans during the war of our own revolution; and yet our army received, even at that time, little or no support from the militia. The letters and reports of Washington, and his highest officers, are filled with proofs of this. The following_brief extracts are from Washington's letters to the President of Congress, December, 1776:

"The saving in the article of stores, provisions, and in a thousand other things, by having nothing to do with the militia, unless in cases of extraordinary exigency, and such as could not be expected in the common course of events, would amply support a large army, which, well officered, would be daily improving, instead of continuing a destructive, expensive, and disorderly mob." "In my opinion, if any dependence is placed on the militia another year, Congress will be deceived. When danger is a little removed from them, they will not turn out at all. When it comes home to them, the well-affected, instead of flying to arms to defend themselves, are busily employed in removing their families and effects; whilst the disaffected are concerting measures to make their submission, and spread terror and dismay all around, to induce others to follow their example. Daily experience and abundant proofs warrant this information." "Short enlistments, and a mistaken dependence upon the militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our debt." "The militia come in, you cannot tell how; go, you cannot tell when; and act, you cannot tell where; consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last at a critical moment."

These remarks of Washington will not be found too severe, if we remember the conduct of our militia in many an open field of the revolutionary war and of that of 1812.

But there is another side to this picture. We can point to the defence of Charleston, Mobile, New Orleans, Fort McHenry, Stonington, Niagara, and Plattsburg, in proof of what may be accomplished by militia, in connexion with fortifications. These examples most fully demonstrate the great value of a militia, when properly employed, as a defence against invasion. With fortifications, they constitute a grand military reserve, upon which we must always fall back in cases of pressing emergency. But we must not forget that, to call this force into the open field-to take the mechanic from his shop, the merchant from his counter, and the farmer from his plough, will necessarily be attended with an immense sacrifice of human life. The lives lost on the battle-field are not the only ones; militia, being unaccustomed to exposure, and unable to supply their own wants with certainty and regularity, contract diseases, which occasion, in every campaign, a most frightful mortality.

There is a vast difference in the cost of supporting regulars and a militia, as ours is now organized. The late Secretary of War, in a report to Congress, says that the expenses of the latter "invariably exceed those of the regular forces at least three hundred per cent.;" and that 55,000 militia were called into service during the Black Hawk and Florida wars, and that "30,000,000 of

dollars have been expended in these conflicts!" Facts like these should awaken us to the necessity of reorganizing and disciplining this arm of defence. Privateers bear to the regular navy somewhat the same relation that the militia do to the regular army. In the war of 1812 they were of considerable advantage in capturing enemy vessels and destroying their commerce.

III. In reference to the influence of field fortifications, railroads, canals, &c., on the operations of a campaign, we will only remark that the vast changes which have been made since our last war, in the facilities of locomotion, render doubly imperative the duty of military preparation. Surrounded as our country is by disciplined forces, capable of striking at any moment a deadly blow at the prosperity of our large cities, our government cannot, but with the deepest guilt, neglect the means of averting such a calamity.

We may regard as permanent means of defence

1st. The army.

2d. The navy.

3d. Fortifications.

The first two of these could hardly be called permanent, if we were to regard merely their personnel or materiel; but, looking upon them as institutions or organizations, they present all the characteristics of durability. They are sometimes subjected to very great and radical changes. By the hot-house nursing of designing ambition or rash legislation, they may become overgrown and dangerous; or the storms of popular delusion may overthrow and apparently sweep them away; but they will immediately spring up again in some form or other, so deeply are they rooted in the organization of political institutions.

I. The importance of maintaining a permanent military force has already been alluded to in speaking of the equilibrium of national power. An army should always be kept within the limits of the nation's wants; but pity for a country which reduces it in numbers or support, so as to degrade its character or endanger its organization. "A government," says one of the best historians of the age, which neglects its army, under whatsoever pretext, is a government culpable in the eyes of posterity; for it is preparing humiliations for its flag and its country, instead of laying the foundation for its glory."

On this point, Mr. B. F. Butler, formerly Acting Secretary of War, remarks: "Our experience, as an independent state, has clearly shown that a permanent force, large enough to keep in check our savage neighbors, to fulfil towards them our treaty stipulations, and to garrison our more important fortifications, and capable of furnishing a considerable body of instructed officers qualified to organize, in case of need, an efficient army, is indispensable to the preservation of peace on our borders and with other nations. The history of our relations with the Indian tribes, from its beginning to the present hour, is one continued proof of this remark; and for a long series of years the treatment we received from European powers was a most humiliating illustration of its truth. Twice we were compelled to maintain, by open war, our quarrel with the principal aggressors; and the last of these conflicts, from the causes which provoked it, as well as from its severity and length, well deserves the appellation sometimes given to it of a second war of independence. After many years of forbearance and negotiation, our claims in other cases were at length amicably settled; but, in one of the most noted of these cases, it was not without much delay and imminent hazard of war that the execution of the treaty was finally enforced. No one acquainted with these portions of our history can hesitate to ascribe much of the wantonness and duration of the wrongs we endured to a knowledge on the part of our assailants of the scantiness and inefficiency of our military and naval force."

In a report on this subject, Mr. Calhoun says: "The organization of the army ought to be such as to enable the government, at the commencement of hostilities, to obtain a regular force, adequate to the emergencies of the country,

properly organized and prepared for actual service. It is thus only that we can be in the condition to meet the first shocks of hostilities with unyielding firmness, and to press on an enemy while our resources are yet unexhausted. But if, on the other hand, disregarding the sound dictates of reason and experience, we should in peace neglect our military establishment, we must, with a powerful and skilful enemy, be exposed to the most distressing calamities."

In another able report to Congress, in 1818, Mr. Calhoun demonstrated that great danger would result from reducing the then existing military establishment, which was in all near 13,000 men. Nevertheless, this reduction took place in 1821, and we were soon made to suffer the consequences. It is stated, on high authority, "that if there had been two regiments in position at Jefferson Barracks, near St. Louis, in 1832, the war with Black Hawk, which cost the country $3,000,000, would have been easily avoided; and it cannot be doubted that the scenes of devastation and savage warfare, which overspread the Floridas for nearly seven years, would have been avoided, and millions saved, if two regiments had been available."

Congress, though late, became convinced of the impolicy of departing from the organization recommended by Mr. Calhoun, and in the successive acts of 1833, 1836, and 1838, restored the number to about 12,000. But the Congress of 1842-43 have again reduced the aggregate number to between 7,000 and 8,000.

A singular feature of this reduction was, that while it discharged, without the power of re-enlisting them, the veteran non-commissioned officers and privates of the last war, the raw recruits had to be retained-thus depriving the army of its very best material.

II. Our remarks on the duty of government to support an army are equally applicable to the support of the navy. It, too, has important duties both in peace and in war, and its healthful organization should be attended to with zealous care. But it also has had its vicissitudes within the last few years.

The personnel of the navy, however, has escaped much more fortunately than that of the army. Its organization has been somewhat improved, and its numbers and support left untouched.

The pay proper of the navy (including marines) for the fiscal year of 1843 is $2,917,280 15; that of the army, for the same period, is $1,313,370. The appropriations made for the support of the navy (including marines) for the fiscal year of 1843, including pay, provisions, arms, fuel, clothing, commutation, hospital stores, transportation, increase, repairs, &c., of ships, repairs and improvement of docks, navy yards, and arsenals, instruments, clerks, printing, and other contingencies, amount in all to $5,586,757. The whole appropriation for the army, for the same period, including pay, provisions, arms, clothing, fuel, quarters, commutation, transportation of troops and supplies, forage, horses, building and repairs of quarters, parade grounds, camps, armories, arsenals, the manufacture of cannon for the army and fortifications, and arms for the militia, the collection of materials for powder, &c., clerks, instruments, printing, postage, and other contingencies, amount in all to $3,965,768 60.

III. Permanent fortifications differ in many of their features from either of the two preceding elements of defence. They are passive in their nature, yet possess all the conservative properties of an army or navy, and, through these two, contribute largely to the active operations of a campaign. When once constructed they require but little expenditure for their support. In time of peace they withdraw no valuable citizens from the useful occupations of life. Of themselves they can never exert an influence dangerous to public liberty; but as the means of preserving peace, and as obstacles to an invader, their influence and power are immense. While contributing to the economical support of a peace establishment by furnishing drill grounds, parades, quarters, &c., and to its efficiency still more by affording facilities both to the regulars and militia for that species of artillery practice so necessary in the defence of water frontiers,

they also serve as safe depots of arms, and the immense quantity of material and military munitions so indispensable in modern warfare. These munitions usually require much time, skill, and expense in their construction, and it is of vast importance that they be preserved with the utmost care.

Maritime arsenals and depots of naval and military stores on the sea-coast are more particularly exposed to capture and destruction. Here an enemy can approach by stealth, striking some sudden and fatal blow before any effectual resistance can be organized. But, in addition to the security afforded by harbor fortifications to public property of the highest military value, they also serve to protect the merchant shipping and the vast amount of private wealth which a commercial people always collect at these points. They furnish safe retreats and means of repair for public vessels injured in battle or by storms, and to merchantmen a refuge from the dangers of the sea or the threats of hostile fleets. Moreover, they greatly facilitate our naval attacks upon the enemy's shipping; and if he attempt a descent, their well-directed fire will repel his squadrons from our harbors, and force his troops to land at some distant and unfavorable position.

The three means of permanent defence which we have mentioned are of course intended to accomplish the same general object; but each has its distinct and proper sphere of action, and neither can be regarded as antagonistical to the others. Any undue increase of one, at the expense of the other two, must necessarily be followed by a corresponding diminution of national strength. It does not follow, however, that all must be maintained upon the same footing. The position of the country and the character of the people must determine this. England, from her insular position, and the extent of her commerce, must maintain a large navy; a large army is also necessary for the defence of her own sea-coasts and the protection of her colonial possessions. Her men-ofwar secure a safe passage for her merchant vessels, and they transport her troops in safety through all seas, and thus contribute much to the acquisition and security of colonial territory. France has less commerce, and but few colonial possessions. She has a great extent of sea-coast, but her fortifications secure it from maritime descents; her only accessible points are on the land frontiers. Her army and fortifications, therefore, constitute her principal means of defence. The United States possess no colonies; but they have a sea-coast of 3,000 miles, with numerous bays, estuaries, and navigable rivers, which expose our most populous cities to maritime attacks. The northern land frontier is 2,000 miles in extent; and in the west our territory borders on foreign possessions for some two or three thousand miles more.

The principal attacks we have had to sustain, either as colonies or States, from civilized foes, have come from Canada. As colonies, we were continually encountering difficulties and dangers from the French possessions. In the war of the revolution, it being one of national emancipation, the military operations were more general throughout the several States; but, in the war of 1812, the attacks were confined to the northern frontier, and a few exposed points along the coast. In these two contests with Great Britain, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Orleans, being within reach of British naval power, and offering the dazzling attraction of rich booty, have each been subjected to powerful assaults.

Similar attacks will undoubtedly be made in any future war with England. An attempt at permanent lodgement would be based either on Canada or a servile insurrection in the southern States. The former project, in a military point of view, offers the greatest advantages, and probably the latter would be resorted to merely for effecting a diversion. But, for inflicting upon us a sudden and severe injury by the destruction of large amounts of public and private property, our seaport towns offer inducements not likely to be disregarded. This mode of warfare, barbarous though it is, will certainly attend a conflict

with any maritime power. How can we best prepare, in time of peace, to repel these attacks?

To furnish an answer to this question, a joint commission, of our most distinguished military and naval officers, was formed soon after the war of 1812. To the labors of this board, whose investigations were continued for several years, we owe our present system of sea-coast defence. The details of this system received some additions and alterations by a board of officers appointed by President Van Buren in 1839. Their report constitutes one of the documents which form the basis of these remarks.

This system has received the approbation of the several Presidents, and, (with one apparent exception,*) of all the Secretaries of War, and the highest military authorities of the land. The fluctuating state of the public finances, however, has much delayed the completion of the project. When the treasury was full to overflowing, Mr. Benton strongly advocated the appropriation of a sum sufficient for the gradual construction of these works of permanent defence. But Congress preferred turning this stream into the already swollen channels of trade and speculation. We know the consequences. For a part of two years the public works were mostly suspended. Mechanics and laborers on our fortifications were discharged. The works themselves, suspended in the middle of their construction, were much injured by exposure, and the total cost of their construction nearly doubled.

Some persons, from a partial or superficial view of the subject, from self-interest, or from entire ignorance of the principles of the military art, have proclaimed opinions, in public speeches and through the newspapers of the day, decrying all works of defence as inexpedient and useless. Their objections to the use of permanent works of national defence may be summed up as follows: 1. That fortifications are useless as a defence of the sea-coast, inasmuch as our maritime cities and arsenals can be better and more economically secured by a home squadron; land batteries being unable to cope, gun for gun, with a naval force.

2. That, on a land frontier, they are not only useless, but actually injurious, inasmuch as their garrisons must weaken the active army, and fetter its movements. That the fundamental principle of modern military science, as developed by Napoleon, celerity of movement, is wholly incompatible with the use of fortifications.

Let us examine each of these objections separately.

1. To prove the absurdity of relying exclusively upon naval means for seacoast defence, it might be sufficient to refer to the written opinions of our highest naval officers themselves; but, as their reports are not within reach of easy reference, we shall proceed to discuss the general principles upon which these opinions were founded.

We have already alluded to the impossibility of substituting one means of defence for another. The efficiency of the bayonet can in no way enable us to dispense with artillery, nor the value of engineer troops in the passage of rivers and the attack and defence of forts render cavalry the less necessary in other operations of a campaign. To the navy alone must we look for the defence of our shipping upon the high seas; but it cannot replace fortifications in the protection of our harbors, bays, rivers, arsenals, and commercial towns.

Let us take a case in point. For the defence of New York city it is deemed highly important that the East river should be closed to the approach of a hostile fleet at least fifteen or twenty miles from the city, so that an army landed there would have to cross the Westchester creek, the Bronx, Harlem river, and

*The apparent exception to which we allude is the report of 1836, in which the system is approved, but objections made to the extent of its application.