battery to be from 200 to 300 feet long, and from 90 to 150 feet wide-the bottom to be as nearly flat as the best tested principles of naval architecture will allow, consistently with the great weight of timber and metal to be provided for, with the requisite facility of the movement that will be required over shoal water. Each floating battery to be secured in the bottom and sides with copper sheeting, and copper or iron bolts; and on the upper parts, exposed to the enemy's shot and shells, with the thickest sheet iron, and iron bolts; and otherwise made capable of sustaining a heavier broadside than the largest of our ships-of-war is capable of sustaining; to carry from one hundred and twenty to two hundred heavy cannon-say long 24 and 32-pounders, with some 80pounders for carrying hollow shot, together with some mortars for throwing shells; with a furnace for heating red-hot shot for illuminating the enemy's fleets and transports. Each floating battery to have state-rooms for the comfortable accommodation of from 600 to 1,000 men, with storerooms for all the munitions of war, requisite for that force for six to eight months' service. Each floating battery to be attended and propelled by such number of tow-boats as the exigencies of the service shall from time to time demand-to be permanently stationed in each harbor in time of peace, and in war as many tow-boats to be chartered as the commanding officer may deem necessary to render the floating batteries in the highest degree efficient. As in war tow-boats will seldom be needed for the merchant service, an ample supply of them, particularly in our large seaports, may be chartered on moderate terms: for example, in the harbor of New Orleans it is believed that twelve tow-boats, with several steamboats having the best of engines to be converted into tow-boats, would be thrown out of employment during a state of war. These could be usefully employed in the United States service, in aid of the public tow-boats and floating batteries. But should this reliance be deemed unsafe, we can readily adopt the obvious alternative of having each floating battery supplied with two tow-boats of great power, as in war they would be needed near the batteries, ready to wield them in the event of an attack, and at other times to act as tenders in supplying them with men and munitions of war. In a state of peace the floating batteries, it is believed, would require but one tow-boat each, excepting when employed in deepening the ship channels-a work which may be accomplished with the most perfect ease and to any desirable extent, wherever the bottom of the channel consists of mud and sand, as in all the outlets of the Mississippi. This important work will be done by attaching to the bottom of each floating battery a framework of ploughs and scrapers of iron, made to let down and raise up at pleasure, according to the hardness or softness of the clay and sand, or mud, of which the bar or bottom of the channel may be composed. If very hard or tough, the ploughs and scrapers might not break up and take off more than two to four inches in depth at one movement; but where the bar is composed entirely of soft mud, as that at Balize and the Northeast and Southwest passes have often been, from four to six inches in depth, it is believed, may be carried off at once wherever the bar is very narrow, and in the immediate vicinity of very deep water, which would be the reservoir or place of deposit to which the mud and sand would be removed. But in a state of peace, when the batteries should not be employed in deepening the ship channels, their extra tow-boats might be advantageously employed in the merchant service.

2. Float ng batteries such as are here proposed, constitute, as your memorialist verily believes, the only sure means of defence of the passes into our seaports against ships-of-war propelled by steam power-means of defence without which it is in the power of any nation, or community of men, or pirates, capable of fitting out ten or even five such steamships-of-war as those employed in the destruction of the castle of San Juan de Ulloa, to destroy the city of New York or New Orlans by fire, with the newly invented 80-pound cannon shot and shells, in a single day, at any season of the year; approaching them in the

night, and taking them by surprise: as with such a fleet, well manned and supplied, either city could be fired in five hundred places in one hour; and in a few hours more thousands of the most splendid edifices, by which these magnificent cities are embellished, would be reduced to ruin and desolation.

3. This opinion has not been formed without a full knowledge of the fact that both New York and New Orleans number among their citizens many men and volunteer corps of military science, patriotism, and unsurpassed chivalry. But these fine volunteer corps, attacked by means and by weapons hitherto unknown to them, or unprovided for, and thus taken by surprise, may share the fate of the heroic Danes at Copenhagen, when attacked by Nelson; with this striking difference in their favor, and against us, the Danes were not taken by surprise. A protracted negotiation with England preceded the attack; and after the British fleet had made its appearance on the coast of Denmark, and in sight of their harbor, they had some three or four days for preparation; they had a fleet nearly equal to that brought into action against them by Nelson, together with an army of some thousands of men, seamen, soldiers, and volunteers, with several fortitications on land, aided by some floating batteries-presenting altogether an armament of upwards of 1,000 cannon, with an immense supply of small arms and every requisite munition of war. In this state of preparation the harbor of Copenhagen was entered in open day by twelve ships of the line-three of which were rendered nearly useless by having got aground; with nine ships of the line, therefore, Nelson sustained a close action for four hours, during which time his loss was less than one thousand, while the loss of the Danes was near six thousand men, together with their fleet-to say nothing of the losses sustained by the inhabitants of the city. This was the result of an attack with nine ships of the line, propelled by wind and sails, upon the seaport of Copenhagen, when strongly fortified and defended by large naval and land forces. What then must be the fate of such a city as New York or New Orleans, without any effective means of defence, attacked by ten, or even five ships-of-war, armed with the newly invented 80-pounders, and propelled by steam power? We know that a fleet consisting of this description of ships-of-war may cross the Atlantic from a European port to New York in the short space of fourteen day's time, and that it may enter our harbors in the night, and be seen at our wharves, with matches lighted ready for action, at daylight in the morning-ready to take or destroy money or property amounting to ten times as much as all the floating batteries and railroads embraced in the proposed system of national defence would cost. In the outrageous attack on Copenhagen, England was fighting for the dominion of the sea. Denmark and Sweden, with Russia and France, were then nobly opposing that lawless pretension, as we, the United States, have long opposed it. Nelson, on embarking in the expedition, is reported to have said to his commander, Admiral Parker, "I hope we shall give our northern enemies that hailstorm of bullets, which gives our dear country the dominion of the sea; we have it, and all the devils in the north cannot take it from us if our wooden walls have fair play." This is the language of a truehearted British seaman and soldier. Such was the noble bearing of our own Decatur, when he exclaimed, “Our country in her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be right; but in war may she always triumph-right or wrong!"

In the memorable attack on Copenhagen, it is worthy of remark here that the experienced Admiral Nelson, who had won more great naval victories than any other commander had, previous to the action stated to the commander-inchief the following opinion: "If the wind is fair, and you determine to attack the ships and Crown islands, you must expect the natural issue of such a battle— ships crippled, and perhaps one or two lost; for the wind which carries you in will most probably not bring out a crippled ship." Nelson, however, had the good fortune, after taking and destroying a fleet nearly equal to his own, and killing six times as many men as he lost in action, to sail out of the harbor, which

he had filled with wrecks, without the loss of a single British vessel, though he had several greatly damaged.

4. With floating batteries, such as are here proposed, it is more than probable that the brave Danes would have destroyed the whole of Nelson's fleet without sustaining the loss of a vessel, a battery, or one hundred men. The floating batteries of the Danes, like those of the French and Spaniards at the siege of Gibraltar in the year 1783, were inefficient, simply because they were unwieldy. No effective means for wielding floating batteries, when large enough to be formidable, had ever been discovered previous to the discovery by Robert Fulton of that development of steam power applicable to ships and all other floating structures. With regard to the ten great floating batteries, especially constructed for the memorable siege against Gibraltar, it is obvious to every man of military mind that, however formidable such batteries might have been, even without tow-boats, or steam power in any other form, employed in the defence of a high rock fort like that of Gibraltar, such floating batteries could never be relied on as effective means of attack upon a high rock fort of that description, as the immense strength of the position and of the work, with the great elevation of the cannon of the work attacked, would insure the destruction of floating batteries, or render an attack by them unavailing. It is a well ascertained fact, however, not generally known, as but few historians have noticed it, that the floating batteries employed in the siege of Gibraltar were manned principally with convicts. This fact may be considered as the most conclusive among the principal causes of their failure, as well as of the opinion entertained and expressed by the French and Spanish commanders, that most of these batteries were set on fire by the men on board, whose duty it was to defend them. Be this as it may, a minute examination of the military history of the terrible siege of Gibraltar is respectfully referred to by your memorialist as evidence in favor of his proposition for the immediate construction of floating batteries for the defence of our ports and harbors; inasmuch as it is obvious that, if the commander of Gibraltar had been supplied with ten floating batteries, such as are here proposed, with our present means of tow-boats, with steam power to wield them, he would have destroyed the whole of the combined fleets employed against him, or at least have kept them out of the bay or harbor of Gibraltar. To the siege of Gibraltar and the attack on Copenhagen, two of the most terrible and extraordinary events known to modern history, in reference to the attack and defence of seaports, an event known to your memorialist and many other officers now in service will be added, to show the utter impracticability of locking up a navigable river or inlet, or of arresting the movement of a fleet thereon, by fortifications with cannon placed on the banks of such river or inlet. On the night of the 6th of November, 1813, the flotilla, under the command of Major General Wilkinson, consisting of nearly 300 boats, sloops and schooners, passed the fort of Prescott, upon the Canada side of the river St. Lawrence, under a constant fire of the cannon of the fort, manned by the best of British artillerists, without the loss of a boat or other vessel, and with the loss of but one man killed and two wounded; notwithstanding the flotilla was nearly one hour in the act of passing the fort, during the whole of which time the fire of the enemy's cannon was incessant, and the line formed by the flotilla in its movement was deemed to be within pointblank shot of the fort-say from 600 to 800 yards' distance! This fact was proven by the whistling of the enemy's shot, many, probably hundreds, of which passed apparently from 20 to 50 feet above our heads, while on board the boats in their slow passage, for they were propelled by oars, upon a gentle current, which enabled us to move at the rate of not more than three miles an hour. This movement was effected in the night, tolerably clear, but without moonlight. With the history of these three events before us, it would seem to be the height of imprudence in us to perse

vere in the construction of costly forts, with the vain hope of protecting our seaports against fleets propelled by steam power, without the employment of floating batteries, such as are here recommended, with railroads to sustain them by timely reinforcements.

5. But it has been contended by men of high pretensions in theory, if not in the practical science of war, that, in place of the floating batteries here proposed as means of harbor defence, we should direct our attention mainly to the construction of steamships of war. In reply to this theoretical suggestion, it is only necessary to say that we must, indeed, ultimately have steamships of war, or we must give up the whole of our foreign commerce; but, if we desire to preserve our seaports and commercial emporiums, we must have for their protection floating batteries, which constitute, in the present state of the arts, the natural link in the great chain of national defence between the land and naval means of service; and, as these floating batteries are not designed for going to sea, (excepting near our ports and harbors in calm weather,) they properly belong to the land service. The fact that our seaports are rendered more than ever liable to sudden and unlooked for attacks by fleets propelled by steam power, renders it all-important to their security that our means of harbor defence should never, even for a single day, be left exposed to an assault, when that assault may, in all human probability, result in the destruction of one of our most vital points of military and commercial operations. If, however, steamships of war should be preferred to the proposed floating batteries, a solemn act of Congress should be passed, forbidding any officer from removing them beyond the immediate vicinity of the harbor to which they may be assigned; as it must be obvious that our seaports cannot be protected without every requisite means of protection is held ready for action within our harbors, respectively. The floating batteries, it is believed, will cost but little more than the timber, iron, copper, and other materials for their construction, if they are built, as they should be, by the troops intended to defend them, aided by some ship-carpenters to give them tight bottoms.

6. With three to five of the proposed floating batteries placed in the form of a crescent across the Mississippi river, with the concave side of the crescent down the river, and this curved line of floating batteries flanked by a small temporary fort on each bank of the river, so as to bring the cannon of each fort or battery to bear on any fleet or vessel ascending the river from the sea, we should be certain thus to give each of the enemy's leading vessels a double cross-fire-raking them in front and on each side at one and the same time, with several of our heavy guns from each one of our floating batteries and adjacent forts, with red-hot shot-a description of defence which would to a certainty, in 99 cases out of 100, be fatal to any fleet that could possibly be brought against our line of batteries. But, "to make assurance doubly sure," we could have our floating batteries occasionally connected together by chain cables and chevaux-de-frise, which might sometimes bring us in close contact with a daring foe, as Nelson or our own Decatur and Perry were in the mode of attack which characterized those chivalric naval commanders. But the contact thus produced would insure to us the moral and physical effect of our efforts being in selfdefence, with the superior strength of our batteries, bulwarks, and weight of metal-advantages which we should enjoy from the moment the invading foe comes within the range of our long and heavy cannon, until he finds himself entangled in, and arrested by, our chevaux-de-frise, where the contact would be so close as to enable us to throw into his ships hand grenades and incendiary shells, with an occasional supply of heated steam; while our own batteries would be preserved from a similar annoyance by their superior width, strength, and peculiar structure of their upper works, which are proposed to be secured by sheet-iron of immense thickness; a description of work which it is believed could not be so effectually applied to vessels of anything like the ordinary model of ships-of-war designed for sea service.

But again: "to make assurance doubly sure," we should not risk such places as New York and New Orleans-by far the most vital, and in a civil and (the latter more especially) in a military point of view, the most important seaports in America-without at least two curved lines of defence-one at or near the entrance of the harbor, and the other at the next narrow, strong, interior point, fortified as above suggested, with the curved line of floating batteries flanked by a fort on each side of the river or channel; for example, for the harbor of New York, the Narrows; and for the Mississippi, Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

7. Floating batteries, such as are here proposed, constitute the only effective means of defence against fleets propelled by steam power, in a nation situated as the United States are, covering a large extent of country, bordered by a seaboard of near 4,000 miles in extent, indented by many fine seaports, with great cities filled with the wealth of a lucrative commerce with every quarter of the globe, together with our own agricultural products, fully capable of sustaining our expansive commerce, until it surpasses that of any other part of the globe: provided we take care to maintain an attitude of honest defiance towards the licensed as well as the unlicensed pirates of every quarter of the world, by which they will clearly understand that we desire to be at peace, to do equal and impartial justice to all nations, and to engage in entangling alliances with none; and above all, if we are attacked, we should be prepared speedily to concentrate at the point of attack sufficient force and supplies to overwhelm the invader with irretrievable defeat before he will have it in his power to destroy any of our means of defence, or our seaport towns. Our lawless neighbors will thus be taught that if they attack us they do it at their peril, and at the risk of leaving their armies to enrich our plantations,

8. So much for their uses in a state of war; then, on the return of peace, when the most expensive fixed fortifications are absolutely useless, and, moreover, a heavy burden to the country to keep them in repair, floating batteries will be usefully employed as barracks and hospitals, and in deepening the channels, liable to be filled up by clay, and loam, and sand, as those at the mouth of the Mississippi river are often filled up. As floating barracks and hospitals, the proposed batteries would be of essential benefit to the service everywhere, inasmuch as the outlets of our rivers and seaports are generally healthy positions; and they will form the most appropriate asylums for our convalescent or slightly disabled soldiers or seamen, most of whom will render essential service in preparing fixed ammunition, and in the instruction of the young and inexperienced, and in holding them ready for action. Above all, in a state of peace the proposed floating batteries will be of immense utility to the service for all purposes of military schools, to which the aspiring youth of our country of the community will gladly repair, for the attainment of military knowledge, where it can be acquired both in theory and in practice, and where its study and practice will be rendered most delightful and praiseworthy by the simple process of the students rendering immediate and important public service in return for the publie instruction received by them. The military education of our youth should commence at the age of sixteen, and be completed at the age of twenty-one or twenty-two. If our youth are educated upon floating batteries at the entrance of our harbors, near the Balize, Sandy Hook, or the Narrows; otherwise, if the youth of each Atlantic or southern State are educated at the entrance of the principal seaport of such State, the graduate, after finishing his education, would have the proud satisfaction of exhibiting to his parents or guardian, on his return home, the gratifying evidence of his having performed five years' honorable service, while acquiring attainments qualifying him for a high, perhaps the highest, command in the army; attainments, too, tending to qualify him in no small degree for the highest stations recognized by the free institutions of our country, and exonerating him forever after from any other than mere voluntary service.

H. Rep. Com. 86—16