in consequence every day, is capable of being defended as perfectly as the city just mentioned. The principal defences lie on a long sandy island, which closes in the harbor from the sea. An enemy landed on this island (Santa Rosa) would be in uninterrupted communication with his fleet; could, owing to the sparseness of the population, have nothing to apprehend, for some time, from any re-enforcements arriving at the place; and would be well protected, by position, from the effects of this succor, when it should arrive. While in possession of naval superiority, he might, therefore, not unreasonably calculate on being able to press a siege of many days of the work which occupies the extremity of the island, and guards the entrance to the harbor. And even before coming into possession of this work his gun and mortar batteries, on the same island, would destroy every thing not bomb-proof and incombustible at the navy yard. An attack not less persevering, and with equal chances of success, might be made from the other side of the harbor also.

If, therefore, the power to resist a coup de main be all that is conferred on the works at Pensacola, their object will be obtained only through the forbearance of the enemy; it being obviously indispensable that the principal of these works be competent to resist a short siege. If this liability resulted from the thinness of the neighboring population, it would still be many years before this state of things would be materially altered. But it does not depend on this alone; the peculiar topographical features will continue this liability in spite of increasing numbers, and ever so easy and rapid communication with the interior; it having been proved that a fleet may lie broad off this shore and hold daily communication therewith during the most tempestuous season. The English fleet of men-of-war and transports lay, during the last war, from the 7th of February to the 15th of March, 1814, anchored abreast of Dauphin island and Mobile Point, where the exposure is the same as that off Pensacola.

Between the cases cited, which may be regarded as of the class of extreme cases, (a class comprising, however, many important positions,) almost every conceivable modification of the defence will be called for, to suit the various conditions of the several points.

The fortifications of the coast must therefore be competent to the double task of interdicting the passage of ships and resisting land attacks-two distinct and independent qualities. The first demands merely an array in suitable numbers and in proper proportions of heavy guns, covered by parapets proof against shot and shells; the second demands inacessibility. As there is nothing in the first quality neccessarily involving the last, it has often happened, either from the little value of the position, or from the supposed improbability of a land attack, or from the want of time to construct proper works, that this property of inaccessibility has been neglected.

Whenever we have an object of sufficient value to be covered by a battery, we should bear in mind that the enemy will know the value of the object as well as ourselves. That it is a very easy thing for him to land a party of men for an expedition of an hour or two; and, unless we take the necessary preventive measures, his party will be sure to take the battery first; after which nothing will prevent his vessels consummating the design it was the purpose of the battery to prevent.

In general, the same fortifications that guard the water approaches will protect the avenues by land also, but in certain cases a force may be so landed as to evade the channel defences, reaching the object by a route entirely inland. Of course this danger must be guarded against by suitable works.

After the preceding exposition of our views on the general subject of the defences of the coast, it may not be out of place here to indicate the mode by which the system of fortifications on which we could rely can be manned and served without an augmentation for that particular purpose of the regular army. The force that should be employed for this service in time of war is the militia,

(using the term in a comprehensive sense;) the probability being that, in most of the defended points on the seaboard, the uniformed and volunteer companies will supply the garrisons needed. And it may be shown that it is a service to which militia are better adapted than any other.

The prominent defect of a militia force results from the impossibility of so training the men to field movements in the brief period of their service as to give them any confidence in themselves as manoeuvrers in the face of regular troops; the little they learn merely suffices to show them that it is but little; every attempt of the kind proving, by the disorder that they know not how to avoid, how much greater would be the disorder if in face of an enemy and under fire.

Without the knowledge to be obtained only by long and laborious practice, the militiaman knows that he is no match in the field for the regular soldier, and it is not surprising that he should desire to avoid an encounter.

But there is no such difficulty in the service of fixed batteries. The militiaman has to be taught merely the service of a single gun, than which nothing can be more simple. He must learn to use the rammer and the sponge, the handspike and the linstock, to load, and to run to battery, to trail and to fire; these are all. Each of these operations is of the utmost simplicity, depending on individual action and not on concert, and they may all be taught in a very short time. There is no manoeuvring, no marching, no wheeling. The squad of one gun may be marched to another, but the service of both is the same. Even the art of pointing cannon is, to an American militiaman, an art of easy attainment, from the skill that all our countrymen acquire in the use of fire-arms—“ drawing sight, or aiming," being the same art, modified only by the difference in the gun. The mode of applying this force may be illustrated by the case of any of our cities on the seaboard. The forts and batteries, being put in perfect condition, should be garrisoned, (at least the more important ones) by a small body of regular artillery, such as our present militrry force could supply, and sufficient for the preservation of the public property, and to afford indispensable daily guards; to these should be added two or three men of the ordnance department, especially charged with the condition of the armament and ammunition, and two or three engineer soldiers, whose sole duty it would be to attend to the condition of the fortifications; keeping every part in a state of perfect repair. In certain important works, however, that would be exposed to siege, or to analogous operations, it would be prudent, especially in the beginning of a war, to keep up a more considerable body of regular troops.

The volunteer force of the city should then be divided into detachments without disturbing their company organization, and should be assigned to the several works, according to the war garrisons required at each; from four to six men, according to circumstances, being allowed to each gun.

The larger works might require ten, fifteen, or even twenty companies; the smaller, one, two, three, or more companies; and, in some cases, even a platoon might suffice. Being thus assigned, each portion of the city force would have its definite alarm-post, and should be often taken to it, and there exercised in all the duties of its garrison, and more especially in the service of its batteries and in its defence against assault. The multiplicity of steamboats in all the cities would enable the volunteers to reach even the most distant alarm-posts in a short time.

In order that all these troops may become expert in their duty, one of the works most convenient to the city, besides being the alarm-post of some particular portion of the volunteers, should, during peace, be the ordinary school of drill for all; and in this the detachments should, in turn, assemble and exercise. Besides the mere manual of the gun and battery, there should be frequent target practice, as being not only necessary to the proper use of the battery, but as imparting interest and excitement to the service.

It might be necessary for a time to submit the volunteers to the drill of a competent officer or non-commissioned officer of the regular artillery; and, in particular, to conduct the practice with shot and shells under such instruction.

The portion of the military force of the city not stationed in the fixed batteries would constitute, under an impending attack, a reserve, posted either in one or several bodies, according to circumstances, ready to cover exposed points, to co-operate in offensive movements, or to relieve exhausted garrisons: this portion having connected with it the mounted force, the field artillery, and the heavy movable guns.

This appropriation of the volunteer force to the immediate defence of the city would operate in the most favorable way upon that force, superadding to the impulses of patriotism every feeling connected with family, property, and social and civil relations, and, while making military service the first of duties, reliev ing it of hardship and privation. It would be a peculiar feature in this kind of service that the governing motive in the choice of officers would be favorable to the condition of the troops, every man feeling that the safety of his dearest concerns depended on the efficiency and courage of his officers. The same motive would prompt him, moreover, to desire, and contribute to, the highest state of efficiency in the corps.

The organization of volunteer force here contemplated may comprehend the whole maritime frontier; and be applicable, also, at the more populous points upon the inland borders.

This arrangement, while it might be an enduring one, would be the least expensive by far of any that would be efficient.

The days of exercise, drill, and encampment should be fixed and invariable, in order that they may the less interfere with the private occupations of the volunteers. During an impending attack, greater or less portions should be constantly at these posts; but still the service would comprise but a very small portion of the year.

According to the value of the interest to be defended, and the extent of the works to be occupied, would be the rank of the chief command; which should be intrusted to an officer of the regular army, whose control might often be extended, advantageously, over a certain extent of seaboard to the right and left, constituting a maritime department.

In the tables to be presented at the end of this report, we shall give the whole number of men required for the complete defence of each of the works. We now proceed to examine the coast in detail; and, in order to conform to the Senate's resolution, we shall divide the whole sea-coast of the United States into two great portions: the first portion extending from Passamaquoddy bay to Cape Florida; the second from Cape Florida to the mouth of the Sabine. In our description we shall, without any other than this general acknowledgment, quote largely from a report presented to Congress in April, 1836, and to be found in the Senate documents of the 1st session 24th Congress, No. 293, vol. 4. This report contains an argument on the general subject, embodying many important considerations, which we have thought best not to repeat in this lengthened report, but to refer to as worthy of perusal.

We will conduct the examination geographically beginning at the northeastern extremity, and referring in every case to accompanying tables which exhibit the several works in the order of relative importance as to time.

COAST FROM PASSAMAQUODDY BAY TO CAPE FLORIDA.

The extreme northeastern section of this coast, extending from Quoddy Head to Cape Cod, is characterized by its serrated outline and its numerous harbors, and, at certain seasons, by its foggy atmosphere. The extent of this section, measuring from point to point wherever the breaks of the coast are abrupt, is

about 500 miles; while a straight line from one of the above-mentioned capes to the other is hardly half that distance. The eastern half is singularly indented by deep bays; the coast being universally rocky and possessing numerous islands surrounded by deep water, which islands not only increase the number of harbors, but cover, besides, an interior navigation well understood by the hardy coasters and measurably secured by its intricacies, and the other dangers of this boisterous and foggy region, from interruption by an enemy. The western half is much less broken; it is covered by few islands in comparison, but con

tains several excellent harbors.

The eastern harbors of Maine are exposed in a peculiar manner. They are not only on the flank of our line, but they are also quite near the public establishments of the greatest maritime power. They are, moreover, as yet backed by only a thin population; and are, consequently, weak as well as exposed. The time may not, however, be very distant when, becoming wealthy and populous, they will be objects of a full portion of the national solicitude. Works designed for these harbors must therefore be calculated for the future; must be founded on the principle that they must defend places much more important than any now existing there; that, being near the possessions of a foreign power, they will be in a particular manner liable to sudden and repeated attacks; and that, lying at the extremity of the coast, they are liable to be tardily succored. The works must consequently be competent to resist escalade, and to hold out for a few days. Feebler works might be more injurious than beneficial; their weakness would in the first place invite attack; and it being often a great advantage to occupy fortified places in an adversary's territory, the enemy could prepare himself to remedy the deficiencies of the forts after they should fall into his hands, by adding temporary works, by providing strong garrisons, and by aiding the defence with his vessels.

No surveys have been made of these harbors, and no plans formed for their defence. It may be well to observe here, once for all, that much confidence is not asked for the mere conjectures presented below, as to the number and cost of the works assigned for the protection of the harbors which have not yet been surveyed: in some cases there may be mistakes as to the number of forts and batteries needed; in others, errors will exist in the estimated cost.

Eastport and Machias may be mentioned as places that will unquestionably be thought to need defensive works by the time, in the order of relative importance, the execution of them can be undertaken by the government. There are several small towns eastward of Mount Desert island that may, at that period, deserve equal attention; at present, however, the places mentioned will be the only ones estimated for; and $100,000 will be assumed as the cost at each.(Statement 1, table F.)

Mount Desert island, situated a little east of Penobscot bay, having a capacious and close harbor, affording anchorage for the highest class of vessels, and easily accessible from sea, offers a station for the navy of an enemy superior to any other on this part of the coast. From this point his cruisers might act with great effect against the navigation of the eastern coast, especially that of Maine;: and his enterprises could be conducted with great rapidity against any points he might select. These considerations, added to the very great advantage in certain political events, of our occupying a naval station thus advanced, whence we might act offensively, together with the expediency of providing places of succor on a part of the coast where vessels are so frequently perplexed in their navigation by the prevailing fogs, lead to the conclusion that the fortification, in a strong manner, of this roadstead may before long be necessary. A survey of this island was begun many years ago; but the party being called off to other duties it was never completed. The project of defensive works has not been H. Rep. Com. 86—12

made. The entire cost may be, as assumed by the engineer department some years ago, $500,000.-(Statement 1, table F.)

Castine. It would seem to be impossible, on this coast, to deprive an enemy enjoying naval superiority of harbors, or prevent his using them as stations during a war-insular situations, which his vessels would render unapproachable, being so numerous; but it seems proper that such of these positions as are the sites of towns should be secured. During the last war the English held the position of Castine for some time, and left it at their pleasure. It is probable a work costing about $50,000 would deter an enemy from again making choice of this position.-Statement 1, table F.)

Penobscot bay. Upon this bay, and upon the river of the same name flowing into it, are several flourishing towns and villages. Of the many bays which intersect the coast the Penobscot is the one which presents the greatest number of safe and capacious anchorages. As before observed a large portion of these harbors must, for the present, be left without defences, but the valuable commerce of the bay and river must be covered; and to afford a secure retreat for such vessels as may be unable to place themselves under the protection of the works to the east or west of the bay, the passage of the river must be defended. The lowest point at which this can be done without great expense is opposite Bucksport at the "narrows." A project has been given in for a fort at that position estimated at $150,000.-(Statement 1, table D.)

St. George's bay, Broad bay, Damariscotta, and Sheepscut.-West of the Penobscot occur the above-mentioned bays, all being deep indentations leading to towns, villages, and various establishments of industry, and enterprise. The bays have not been surveyed, and of course no plans have been formed for their defence. $400,000 are assigned to the defence of these waters. The Sheepscut is an excellent harbor of refuge for vessels of every size.-(Statement 1, table F.)

Kennebeck river. This river (one of the largest in the eastern States) enters the sea nearly midway between Cape Cod and the mouth of the St. Croix. It rises near the source of the Chaudiere, which is a tributary of the St. Lowrence, and has once served as a line of operations against Quebec. The situation and extent of this river, the value of its products, and the active commerce of several very flourishing towns upon its banks, together with the excellence of the harbor within its mouth, will not permit its defence to be neglected. The surveys begun many years ago were never finished. The estimated cost of defences, as formerly reported by the engineer department, was $300,000. Positions near the mouth will permit a secure defence.-(Statement 1, table D.)

Portland harbor.-The protection of the town, of the merchantmen belonging to it, and of the ships-of-war that may be stationed in this harbor to watch over this part of the coast, or that may enter for shelter, (all of them important objects,) may be secured, as an inspection of the map of the harbor will show, by occupying Fort Preble Point, House island, Hog Island ledge, and Fish Point.

If the two channels to the west and east of Hog island can be obstructed at small expense (to decide which some surveys are yet necessary) there will be no necessity for a battery on the ledge, and Fish Point need be occupied only by such works as may be thrown up in time of war. The expense, as now estimated, of the works planned for this defence, will be $155,000 for Fort Preble, and $48,000 for House island; for Hog Island channel say, $135,000.— (Statement 1, tables A, D, E, and F.) In addition there must be repairs immediately applied to the old works at an expense of $6,600.

Saco, Kennebunk and York.-Small works comparatively will cover these places; $75,000 is assumed as the aggregrate cost.-(Statement 1, table F.)