At the same time, therefore, that there is the less liability to heavy attacks, there will be, in the batteries, the greater capacity of resistance to others.

It must not be urged, as a reproach to fortifications, that, in the case we are considering, they are obliged to call in aid from other sources, so long as these aids are cheap, efficient, and of easy resort. By the mode we have suggested, the defence will undoubtedly be complete, every chance of success being on the side of the defence; that is to say, if any confidence is to be placed in the lessons of experience. How, on the other hand, will the same security be attained by naval means? Only, as before shown, by keeping within the harbor a fleet or squadron, or whatever it may be, which shall be at all times superior to the

enemy.

In a naval defence there will be no advantage in obstructions of any sort, for there can be no lessening of the array of guns in consequence of such obstructions; because, if these obstructions are under the fire of the floating defences, the enemy will first subdue that fire, and then remove the obstructions at his leisure. If this fire prove too powerful for the enemy, the obstructions will have been unnecessary, and will serve only to shut up our own fleet, preventing the prompt pursuit of a beaten foe.

4. There is a fourth class, consisting of harbors, or rather bays or estuaries, of such expanse that batteries cannot be made to control the passage. These have been before spoken of. If the occupation of, or passage through these must be defended, it must be by other means than batteries upon the shore. The reliance must, from the nature of the case, be a floating defence, of magnitude at least equal to the force the enemy may bring. The complete defence of each of these bays would, therefore, involve very great expense; certainly, in most cases, greater than the advantages gained. The Chesapeake bay cannot, for instance, be shut against a fleet by fortifications; and if the entrance of the enemy is to be interdicted, it must be by the presence of a not inferior fleet of our own. Instead of such a system, it will be better to give up the bay to the enemy, confining our defences to the more important harbors and rivers that discharge into the bay. By this system, not only will these harbors be secure, but the defences will react upon the bay itself, and, at any rate, secure it from predatory incursions; because while Hampton roads and the navy yard at Norfolk are well protected, no enemy would proceed up the bay with any less force than that which could be sent out from the navy yard.

In certain cases of broad waters, wherein an enemy's cruisers might desire to rendezvous in order to prosecute a blockade, or as a shelter in tempestuous weather, there may be positions from which sea-mortars can reach the whole anchorage, although nothing could be done with guns. A battery of sea-mortars, well secured from escalade, would, in such a case, afford a good defence, because no fleet will lie at anchor within the range of shells.

In thus distributing the various exposed points of the sea-coast into general classes, according to the most appropriate modes of defence, we do not find that anything can be substituted for fortifications, where fortifications are applicable, and we find them applicable in all the classes but the last; and in the last we shall find them indispensable as auxiliaries. In this last class there are, no doubt, some cases where naval means must constitute the active and operative force; and it is probable that steam batteries may, of all floating defences, be the most suitable.

It must not be forgotten, however, that the very qualities which recommend this particular kind of force will equally characterize the steam vessel of the enemy; nor must it be forgotten that, whether steam vessels or sailing vessels, or both, are relied on, unless there are well-secured points on the shore, under which they can take refuge, they will themselves constitute an object inviting the superior force of an enemy;

If, for example, we were to deem one of the open harbors of such importance

as to assign eight or ten steam batteries for its protection, we should thereby place within reach of the enemy an object worthy of the efforts of a squadron, or twelve or fifteen vessels of the same description. Even, therefore, in the cases where naval means must be resorted to for defence upon the water, there should be works upon the shore behind which, if overpowered, they can retire. It has been before remarked that the steam batteries are in no way more formidable to shore batteries than sailing vessels are: armed with Paixhan guns they would be less so. And they would be less formidable, also, on account of their comparatively small number of guns; for there is no reason why the firing should be more accurate than from ships; and the chances of inflicting injury would be in proportion to the number of missiles.

The only material effect the introduction of this description of vessel can have upon a system of defence by fortifications is, that owing to their les draught of water, it will be necessary to secure channels that, not being navi gable by vessels of the line and frigates, might otherwise be left unguarded. Some of these channels may have the draught of water lessened by an artificial ridge of stones, so as to be impracticable even to steam vessels; and this may often be done at small expense, and without detriment to the harbors; others will need additional fortifications. But the instances are not numerous where any such shallow channels exist.

In opposition to an opinion not uncommon, that modern improvements in steam vessels will tend to lessen the necessity for fortifications, we here see thai the tendency is rather to increase their number.

Throughout this whole discussion the argument has turned on the relative efficiency of fixed and floating defences. The great relative economy of the former, we suppose, will be conceded. If not, we would ask, as conclusive, or at least as leading to calculation entirely satisfactory, that the following intor mation be obtained from authentic sources, namely: the first cost, when complete in all respects, of the frigates United States, Constitution, and Congress, and also the entire expense of each of said vessels up to this time; specifying, as to each, the year of the several expenditures and the amounts thereof, under the heads, as far as practicable, of first cost, repairs or rebuilding, and improvements and alterations; and distinguishing-1st. The expense bestowed upon the hull. 2d. The expense bestowed upon the masts, spars, sails, anchors. cables, and rigging. 3d. The expense bestowed upon the armament; and 4th. expense bestowed upon all other matters, (as boats, ballast, tanks, paint, &c.,) necessarily connected with the preservation or the ordinary service of the vessel.

The

Before we proceed to describe the several positions on the coast requiring for tifications, we have something still to say on the general subject, though on another branch. We now refer to the kind of fortifications, or rather to their magnitude and strength. That this particular topic should be embraced by our remarks is the more necessary since views hostile to the system of works now in progress have been urged from a high source.

The present system is founded on this principle, to wit: that the fortifications should be strong in proportion to the value of the objects to be secured. The principle will not, we suppose, be controverted, but only the mode of applying it.

There will hardly be a difference of opinion as to the mode of guarding the less important points. There being no great attraction to an enemy, works simple in their features, requiring small garrisons only, containing a moderate armament, but at the same time inaccessible to the dashing enterprises that ships can so easily land, and which can be persevered in for a few hours with much vigor, will suffice. Circumstances must, however, materially modify the proper ties of these works, even when the points to be guarded are of equal value. In one, the disadvantage of position must be compensated by greater power; in

another, natural strength may need little aid from art; in another, greater width in the guarded channel may demand a larger armament; and in a fourth, peculiar exposure to land attack may exact more than usual inaccessibility. But all these varieties lie within limits that will probably be conceded.

As to the larger objects, it has been contended that there has been exaggeration in devising works to cover these, the works having been calculated for more formidable attacks than they will be exposed to. It is easy to utter vague criticisms of this nature, and it is not easy to rebut them without going into an examination as minute as if the criticism were ever so precise and pertinent.

But let us look a little at the material facts. What is the object of an enemy? What are his means? What should be the nature of our defences?

The object may be to lay a great city under contribution, or to destroy one of our naval depots, or to take possession of one of our great harbors, &c. It was estimated that in the great fire in the city of New York, in the year 1835, the property destroyed within a few hours was worth upwards of seventeen millions of dollars, although the fire was confined to a very small part of the city, and did not touch the shipping. Is it easy, then, to estimate the loss that would accrue from the fires that a victorious enemy could kindle upon the circuit of that great city when no friendly hand could be raised to extinguish them? or is it easy to overrate the tribute such a city would pay for exemption from that calamity? Can we value too highly the pecuniary losses that the destruction of one of the great navy yards would involve, and the loss, beyond all pecuniary value, of stores and accommodations indispensable in a state of war, and that a state of war can hardly replace?

But what are the enemy's means? They consist of his whole sca-going force, which he concentrates for the sake of inflicting the blow. In the language of the critic: "From the nature of maritime operations, such a fleet could bring its whole strength to bear upon any particular position, and, by threatening or assailing various portions of the coast, either anticipate the tardy movements of troops upon land, and effect the object before their concentration, or render it necessary to keep in service a force far superior to that of the enemy, but so divided as to be inferior to it on any one point."

We have, then, objects of sufficient magnitude, and the means of the enemy consist in the concentration of his whole force upon one of these objects.

With the highest notion of the efficiency of fortifications against shipping, these are not cases where any stint in the defensive means are admissible. Having, therefore, under a full sense of the imminent danger to which the great objects upon the coast are exposed, applied to the approaches by water an array of obstacles worthy of confidence, we must carefully explore all the avenues by land, in order to guard against approaches that might be made on that side in order to evade or capture the works guarding the channels. But before deciding on the defences necessary to resist these land attacks, it will be proper to estimate more particularly the means that an enemy may be expected to bring forward with a view to such land operations.

History furnishes many examples, and the expedition to Flushing, commonly called the Walcheren expedition, may be cited as peculiarly instructive.

From an early day Napoleon had applied himself to the creation of a maritime force in the Scheldt, and, in 1809, he had provided extensive dock yards and naval arsenals at Flushing and at Antwerp. On his invasion of Austria this year, he had drawn off the mass of his troops that had before kept jealous watch over these naval preparations, relying now on forts and batteries, and on the fortifications of Flushing and Antwerp for the protection of the naval establishments, and of a fleet containing several line-of-battle-ships and frigates, and a numerous flotilla of smaller vessels.

The great naval establishment at Flushing, near the mouth of the Scheldt, and of Antwerp, some sixty or seventy miles up the river, with the vessels

afloat on the river or in progress in the yards, presented an object to England worthy of one of her great efforts.

The troops embarked on this expedition consisted of upwards of 33,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, more than 3,000 artillery, and some hundreds of sappers and miners-constituting an army of about 40,000 men. The naval portion consisted of 35 sail of the line, 23 frigates, 33 sloops-of-war, 28 gun, mortar, and bomb vessels, 36 smaller vessels, and 82 gunboats; making a total of 155 ships and other armed vessels and 82 gunboats. The guns, mortars, &c., provided for such bombardments and sieges as the troops might have to conduct amounted to 158 pieces, with the suitable supplies of ammunition and stores of every kind.

The idea of sailing right up to their object, in spite of the forts and batteries, seems not to have found favor, notwithstanding the power of the fleet. The plan of operations, therefore, contemplated the landing a portion of the army on the island of Walcheren, to carry on the siege of Flushing, while another portion proceeded up the Scheldt as high as Fort Bartz, which was to be taken, after which the army would push on by land about twenty miles further, and lay siege to Antwerp; all which, it was thought might be accomplished in eighteen or twenty days from the first landing.

The execution did not accord with the design. Flushing, it is true, was reduced within fifteen days, and in less than a week from the debarcation (which was on the 31st of July) Fort Bartz was in possession of the English, having been abandoned by the garrison. But it was twenty-five days before the main body, with all necessary supplies for a siege, were assembled at this point and ready to take up the line of march against Antwerp. Since the first descent of the British matters had, however, greatly changed. The French were now in force; they had put their remaining defences in good condition; they had spread inundations over the face of the country; and not only would there be little chance of further success, but the safety of the expedition, formidable as it was, might have been compromised by a further advance. It was therefore decided in council to abandon the movement against Antwerp. The troops accordingly returned to the island of Walcheren, which they did not finally leave till the end of December.

The failure in the ultimate object of the expedition is to be ascribed to the omission to seize, in the first instance, the south shore of the river, and capture the batteries there, as was originally designed, and which was prevented by the difficulty of landing enough troops at any one debarcation, in the bad weather then prevailing. The capture of these batteries would have enabled the expedition to have reached Fort Bartz during the first week; and, in the then unpre pared state of the French, the issue of a dash upon Antwerp can hardly be doubted.

The dreadful mortality that assailed the British army is wholly unconnected with the plans, conduct, or issue of the enterprise, as a military movement; unless, indeed, it may have frustrated a scheme for occupying the island of Walcheren as a position during the war.

Possession was held of the island for five months; and it was finally aban doned from no pressure upon it by the French, although, after the first six weeks, the British force consisted, in the aggregate, of less than 17,000 men; of which, for the greater part of the time, more than half were sick-effectives being often reduced below 5,000 men.

We see, therefore, that an effective force of less than 10,000 men maintained possession of the island, in the face of, and in close proximity to, the most for midable military power in Europe, for more than three months; and no reason can be perceived why it might not have remained an indefinite period, whil possessed of naval superiority.

The proximity of England undoubtedly lessened the expense of the expedi tion, but it influenced the result in no other way material to the argument.

We will allude to no other instances of large expeditions sent by the English to distant countries, than the two expeditions, each of about 10,000 men, sent in the year 1814 against this country: one by the way of Canada, the other to the Gulf of Mexico. United in a single force of 20,000 men against our sea-coast, the expense would have been less, and the results more certain.

The French, notwithstanding their constant naval inferiority, have found opportunities to embark in great undertakings of the same nature. In 1802, Leclerc proceeded to St. Domingo with 34 line-of-battle ships and large frigates, more than 20 small frigates and sloops, and upwards of 20,000 men.

We learn from these points in history what constitutes an object worthy of vast preparations; and it is impossible to resist the fact, that our own coast, and rivers, and bays, possess many establishments not less inviting to an enemy than Flushing and Antwerp.

We are taught, moreover, what constitutes a great expedition; in other words, what is the amount of force we must prepare to meet; and, more than all, we are taught that such an expedition, seizing a favorable moment, when the military arrangements of a country are incomplete-when the armies are absent, or imperfect in their organization or discipline-does not hesitate to land in the face of the most populous districts, and, availing of the local peculiarities, and covered and supplied by a fleet, to undertake operations which penetrate deep into the country, and consume considerable time.

It seems, therefore, that whenever the object we are to cover possesses a value likely to provoke the cupidity of an enemy, or to stimulate his desire to inflict a serious blow, it is not enough that the approaches by water are guarded against his ships; it will be indispensable to place safeguards against attacks by and also. A force considerable enough for very vigorous attacks against the land side of the fortifications may be thrown upon the shore; and if these yield, a way is opened for the ships, and the enemy carries his object.

In certain positions, the local circumstances would favor the land operations of an enemy; permitting him, while operating against the fortifications, to be aided by the fleet, and covered from the reaction of the general force of the country. In other positions, the extreme thinness of the population in the neighborhood would require the forts to rely, for a considerable time, on their own strength. In all such cases a much greater power of resistance would be requisite than in circumstances of an opposite nature. In all such circumstances the works should be of a strength adequate to resist an attack, although persevered in vigorously for several days. But when these land operations lead away from the shipping, or when the surrounding population is considerable, or the enemy is unable to shelter his movements by local peculiarities, then it will suffice if the works be competent to resist attacks, vigorous also, of a few hours

only.

The magnitude and strength of the works will depend, therefore, on the joint influence of the value of the object covered, the natural strength of the position, and the succor to be drawn from the neighborhood. We may introduce, as instances, New York and Pensacola. The former is as attackable as the latter: that is to say, it equally requires artificial defences; and, owing to its capacious harbor and easy entrance, it is not easy to place it in a satisfactory condition as to the approaches by water. But while an enemy, in approaching any of the principal works by land, could not well cover himself from the attacks of the concentrated population of the vicinity, the rapid means of communication from the interior would daily bring great accessions to the defence. A land attack against the city must, consequently, be restricted to a few days; and the works will fulfil their object, if impregnable to a coup de main.

Pensacola, an object, in many respects, of the highest importance, and growing