2d. Of four sail of the line, mounting 282 guns, and one frigate and two sloops, mounting 76 guns; making 358 guns. All these vessels lying in the channel before mentioned, and some of them near its mouth; they constituted the left of the Danish floating defences, and were thus posted to defend the entrance to the inner harbor or basin.

3d. Of a line of floating defences, of various kinds, moored near the edge of the southern shoal. They were eighteen in number, as follows, counting from the right or southern extremity: 1st, a block-ship of 56 guns; 2d, a block-ship of 48 guns; 3d, a praam of 20 gun; 4th, a praam of 20 guns; 5th, a block-ship of 48 guns; 6th, a raft of 20 guns; 7th, a block-ship of 22 guns; 8th, a raft of 20 guns; 9th, a block-ship of 62 guns; 10th, a small vessel of 6 guns; 11th, a raft of 24 guns; 12, a praam of 20 guns; 13th, a ship-of-the-line of 74 guns; 14th, a block-ship of 26 guns; 15th, a raft of 18 guns; 16th, a ship of the line of 60 guns; 17th, a block-ship of 64 guns; 18th, a " frigate" of 20 guns; total in this line 628 guns. These vessels were moored in a line extending south from a point outside and a little to the southward of the Three-crown battery; and the part of the line nearest the walls was not less than three-quarters of a mile distant.

Lord Nelson carried to the attack the Elephant, 74 guns; Defiance, 74; Monarch, 74; Bellona, 74; Edgar, 74; Russell, 74; Ganges, 74; Glutton, 54; Isis, 50; Agamemnon, 64; Polyphemus, 74; Ardent, 64; Amazon, 38; Desirée, 38; Blanche, 36; Alemene, 32; Dart, 30; Arrow, 18; Cruiser, 18; Harpy, 18; Zephyr, 14; Otter, 14; Discovery, 16; Sulphur, 10; Hecla, 10; Explosion, 8; Zebra, 16; Terror, 10; Volcano, 8; making a total of 1.074 guns, besides a few in gunboats. The Agamemnon did not get into action; which reduces the force employed to 1,010 guns. The Bellona and Russell grounded; but Lord Nelson says, "although not in the situation assigned them, yet they were so placed as to be of good service."

With this force Lord Nelson engaged the line of floating defences that was moored near the edge of the southern shoal. He approached from the south with a fair wind; and as his leading vessel got abreast of the most southern of the Danish line she anchored by the stern. The second English vessel passed on until she had reached the next position, when she anchored, also, in the same way; and thus, inverting his line as he extended it, he brought his whole force against the outer and southern part of the Danish force. His line did not reach as far northward as the Three-crown battery, and mouth of the channel; for, he says, in speaking of the grounding of the Bellona, Russell, and Agamemnon: "These accidents prevented the extension of our line by the three ships before mentioned, who would, I am confident, have silenced the Crown islands, (Threecrown battery,) the outer ships in the harbor's mouth, and prevented the heavy loss in the Defiance and Monarch."

Concentrating, as he did, the force of 1,010 guns upon a portion of the Dani-h array, not only inferior to him by 382 guns, but so situated as to be beyond the scope of succor, and without a chance of escape, Lord Nelson had no reason to doubt that signal success would crown his able arrangement. Every vessel in this outer Danish line was taken or destroyed, except one or two smaller vessels, which cut and ran in under shelter of the fortifications.

The vessels lying in the narrow channel could participate in no material degree in the action, because the British line did not reach abreast of them; and because, not being advanced beyond the general direction of the Danish line, but, on the contrary, retired behind it, they could not act upon any of the British vessels, except, perhaps, obliquely upon two or three of the most northern ships. But had all the Danish vessels that were lying in the narrow channel been mingled, from the first, with the line that was destroyed, the result would probably have been still more to the advantage of the assailants; that is to say, these vessels, also, would have been captured or destroyed; because, not only

would the aggregate Danish force of 986 guns have been inferior to the 1,010 guns of the British, but it would also have been without the ability to counteract the power of concentration possessed by the latter, whereby the whole force would have acted on parts of the Danish line in succession.

For the same reason that the squadron which lay in the narrow channel could not materially aid in resisting the attack made on the line of floating defences anchored along the edge of the shoal, the action of the Three-crown battery, and the guns on the shore must have been greatly restricted. Situated upon the shoal, the Three-crown battery was behind the Danish line, which consequently masked it, and also the shore batteries, from a view of the English line. Under such circumstances it is not conceivable that the batteries could be used with effect; and the commander of the Danish forces says expressly that the Threecrown battery "did not come at all into action;" and a chronicler of the times states that the fortifications of the town "were of no service while the action lasted; they began to fire when the enemy took possession of the abandoned ships, but it was at the same time that the parley appeared." In proportion as the Danish vessels passed into the hands of the English, as some were burnt, and others blown up, the scope of the batteries would enlarge, and their power be felt; but just as all impediment of this sort had been removed, Lord Nelson himself proposed the cessation of hostilities, and the action ceased. It might be profitable to discuss the probable consequences of a continuance of the action; to inquire why it was that Lord Nelson, after he had conquered two-thirds of the 986 floating guns opposed to him, did not pursue his advantage, and concentrate his 1,010 guns upon the 358 guns, which were all that remained of the floating defences of the Danes, especially as the wind was in favor of such a manoeuvre. But having already devoted too much space to this peculiar contest, we will suppose some dictate of policy, perhaps of humanity, induced him to close the contest, relying on the severe blow he had already inflicted, and the commanding tone it enabled him to assume for such a termination of the pending negotiation as the interest or policy of Great Britain demanded.

It is important, however, yet to notice that, as soon as the negotiation opened, Lord Nelson's vessels passed out of the reach of the Three-crown battery as fast as they could be withdrawn. Lord Nelson himself states that this battery was not silenced.

A British writer, speaking of this crisis, says: "It must not, however, be concealed that Lord Nelson, at the time he dictated this note to the Dane, was placed in rather awkward and difficult circumstances; the principal batteries, as well as the ships which were stationed at the mouth of the harbor, were still unconquered; two of his own vessels were aground, and exposed to a heavy fire; others, if the battle continued, might be exposed to a similar fate; while be found it would be scarcely practicable to bring off the prizes under the fire of the batteries. These considerations, undoubtedly, influenced him in resolving to endeavor to put a stop to hostilities, in addition to the instructions he had to spare the Danes, and the respect he might have felt for their brave defence.”— (Campbell's Naval History, vol. vii, p. 203.)

The circumstances above detailed show clearly:

1st. That the battle of Copenhagen was fought between an English fleet, mounting 1,010 guns, and a Danish line of floating defences, mounting 628 guns; and that all the latter were conquered.

2d. That the Danish line was attacked in such a manner that none of the fixed batteries in the system of defence could participate in the contest, which was carried on up to the surrender of the Danish line, almost exclusively between Vessels. It appears that a few of the smaller vessels, under Captain Riou, occupying the northern extremity of the English line, were under the fire of the Three-crown battery. The loss being very severe, he was obliged to retreat.

3d. That as soon as the batteries were unmasked and began to act the battle was closed, by Nelson opening a parley.

4th. That, consequently, it was in no sense a contest between ships and batteries, or a triumph of ships over batteries, and affords no ground for judging of their relative power.

5th. That it illustrates, strikingly, the advantage that a fleet possesses over a stationary line of floating defences. Lord Nelson was superior to the whole of his adversary's floating force; but not being disposed to run any unnecessary hazard he directed all his force upon a part of the Danish line, which was, of course, defeated; and had there been no other than a floating force present, so of course would have been the remainder, had it been of twice the strength it This example fully confirms what we have before urged on this topic. In estimating the respective forces above, we have set down the vessels of both parties at their rate: that is to say, a ship called seventy-four we have reckoned at 74 guns.

was.

We now proceed to examine a great instance of naval success, in which there is no room to doubt the extent to which fortifications were engaged; this instance is the attack on Algiers in 1816.

The attack was made by the combined English and Dutch fleets, mounting about one thousand guns, under the command of Lord Exmouth.

In the fortifications that looked towards the water, there are enumerated in a plan, supposed to be authentic, 320 guns; but not more than 200 of these could act upon the fleet as it lay. The ratio of the forces engaged, therefore, as expressed by the numder of guns, (saying nothing of the calibres, of which we know nothing,) was about as 5 to 2. The action continued from a quarter before three until nine, without intermission, and did not cease altogether until halfpast eleven.

It is very certain that the effects of the fire upon the Algerine shipping and town were very severe, because we know that all the shipping was destroyed, excepting some small vessels; and we know also that Lord Exmouth dictated the terms of the treaty that followed.

Honorable as this result was to the combined fleets, and happy as it was for the cause of humanity, there are, nevertheless, technical circumstances connected with it that excite doubts as to how much of the final result was due to physi cal chastisement, to moral effect, to inherent defects in the defences, and to ignorance in the use of these defences, such as they were. That the loss in killed and wounded in the city and works was great is probable, because we are informed that a very great addition had been made to the garrison, in preparation for the attack, under some impression, no doubt, that a landing would be attempted. For the service of the guns there were needed but 3,000 or 4,000 men, at the utmost. An accumulation beyond that number would add nothing to the vigor of defence, while, by causing an increase of the casualties, it would heighten the terrors of the combat. The depressing effect of this loss of life in the batteries, and of the burning of buildings within the town and about the mole, was of course increased by the entire destruction of the Algerine fleet, anchored within the mole.

We have no means of judging of the actual condition of the works; nor of their fitness for the task of contending with the heavy ships of modern times. The forts and batteries on the shore were probably too elevated to be commanded even by the largest of the assailing ships; and, provided these guns were covered with a proof parapet, they may be regarded as being well situated. But more than half of the guus engaged were in the Mole-head battery; and the mode of attack adopted, especially by the Queen Charlotte, of 110 guns, was calculated to test, in the severest manner, the principles on which this work had been planned. She so placed herself within "fifty yards" of the extremity of this battery, that she could either rake or take in reverse every part of it." If

she, at the same time, commanded the battery-that is to say, if, from her spar deck, she could look down upon its platform-then she must at once, with her grape and canister, have driven the garrison from that platform, leaving only the lower and covered tier of guns, if there were such a tier, for service. With our imperfect knowledge of the fortifications, all this must however, be left to conjecture.

But there are matters connected with the service of the batteries which are not conjecture. Not a shot was fired until the Queen Charlotte had anchored. What a different vessel, when she anchored, might not this ship have been, if the Mole-head battery had employed its fire of more than 100 guns in raking her, from the time she arrived within a mile and a half until she had anchored within fifty yards? How different might have been the condition of the fleet, generally, if they had been subjected, during the approach, and while assuming their stations, to the raking fire of all the 200 guns?

It does not appear that a single hot shot was fired from the batteries.

We might also rest on this fact, and assert that a defence which had failed to provide itself with this auxiliary means, must have been carried on in disregard, if not in violation, of all rules, all knowledge, and all experience; that it was probably without plan or combination, and, not less probable, without preparation in other particulars of importance scarcely inferior.

Before leaving this example it may be well to inquire what, after all, was the effect of these batteries upon the ships, compared with the effect of ships upon ships.

In the battle of the Nile, the French fleet, rated at 1,190 guns, caused a loss in Nelson's fleet of 895 killed and wounded; which is in the proportion of ten French guns to less than eight Englishmen killed and wounded. In the battle of Trafalgar the French fleet carried not less than 3,000 guns, and they caused a loss to the English of 1,587 killed and wounded; which is in the proportion of ten guns to less than six killed and wounded. In this affair of Algiers, with a force not exceeding 200 guns, the batteries caused a loss of 883 killed and wounded, being in the proportion of 10 guns to 44 men; and, if we take into account every gun that was pointed upon the bay, (say 350 guns,) the proportion will be 10 guns to 25 men; being an effect more than three times as great as that produced by the French ships at the battle of the Nile, and more than four times as great as that produced by the ships of the same nation at Trafalgar.

While reflecting on the circumstances of this battle the mind is not satisfied with any reasons that present themselves for the withdrawal of Lord Exmouth, the moment the land wind enabled him to do so. On the supposition of entire success on his part, it is not understood why he should feel the great anxiety he states himself to have been under that this wind should spring up. "Providence at this interval," (between 10 and 11 at night,) "gave to my anxious wishes the usual land wind, common in this bay; and my expectations were completed. We were all hands employed in warping and towing off, and, by the help of the light air, the whole were under sail, and came to anchor out of the reach of shells about two in the morning, after twelve hours incessant labor." Now, if anything had been decided by the action, it must have been one of two things: either the ships were victorious, or the batteries were so. If the ships were completely victorious, it would seem to have been judicious for them to remain where they were, in order, if there was to be any more fighting, to be ready to press their advantage; and, especially, in order to maintain the ascendency, by preventing the remounting of guns, repairing of batteries, and resupplying them munitions, &c.

Had the people possessed the inflexibility report ascribed to the Dey, and had they set zealously about the work of preparation for a new contest, it might not have been easy for Lord Exmouth, in the condition to which his ships are ac

knowledged, by authentic accounts, to have been reduced, to enforce his demands. It is not understood, therefore, why, if he had been so successful as to be certain that his end was attained, he should be so anxious to get out of gunshot, when, by so doing, he involved the issue in more or less doubt and hazard.

He relied on the effects produced on the people by his dreadful cannonade, and the result proves that he was right; but his anxiety to clear the vessels from the contest shows that there was a power still unconquered, which he thought it better to leave to be restrained by the suffering population of the city, than keep in a state of exasperation and activity by his presence. What was this power but an unsubdued energy in the batteries?

The true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount of injury done on the one side or the other-particularly as there was, on the one side, a city to suffer, as well as the batteries-as the relative efficiency of the parties when the battle closed at about eleven o'clock. All political agitation and popular clamor aside, what would have been the result had the fight been continued, or even had Lord Exmouth renewed it next morning?

These are questions that can be answered only on conjecture; but the manner the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts whether, had the subse quent demands of Lord Exmouth been rejected, he had it in his power to enforce them by his ships: whether, indeed, if he had renewed the fight, he would not have been signally defeated.

On the whole, we do not think that this battle, although it stands pre-eminent as an example of naval success over batteries. presents any arguments to shake the confidence which fortifications, well situated, well planned, and well fought, deserve, as the defences of a seaboard.

GIBRALTAR.

The attack on the water batteries of Gibraltar in September, 1782, by the French and Spanish floating batteries, is a well known instance of the power of guns on shore.

These floating batteries had been rendered, as was supposed, shot-proof and shell-proof, by several additional thicknesses of timber to the sides, and by covering the decks with a roof of sloping timbers.

They mounted 142 guns on the engaged side, with 70 in reserve to replace any that might be dismounted. They were anchored at the distance of about 1,000 yards from the walls, and were opposed by about 85 guns.

After a protracted cannonade, nine of the floating batteries were burnt by hot shot from the shore, and the tenth, having been taken possession of by the victors, was set on fire by them.

No material injury was done to the works of the town by their fire; and only eighty-five men and officers were killed and wounded by the fire from these vessels, together with a very violent cannonade and bombardment from the siege batteries.

BATTLE OF ALGESIRAS.

On the 6th July, 1801, the French Admiral Lenois was lying at anchor off the town of Algesiras with two ships of 80 guns, one of 74 guns, and one frigate. To the south of him, on a small island, was a battery called the Green Island battery, mounting seven 18 and 24-pounders; and to the north of him, on the main, another battery called St Jaques's battery, mounting five 18-pounders. There were, besides, fourteen Spanish gunboats anchored near, making a total of 306 guns afloat and 12 guns in battery-altogether, 318 guns.

Sir James Saumarez, hearing that Lenois was in this position, advanced against him from Cadiz with two ships of 80 guns, four of 74 guns, one frigate,