ber of sailing or steam vessels, armed with bomb-cannon, against which the thicker bulwarks of the floating batteries would avail nothing. He would, besides, hardly fail to provide himself with bomb-ketches armed with heavy seamortars; and as there could be no guarding against the effects of the long ranges of these, a few such vessels would, with great certainty, constrain the floating batteries to quit their position, abandoning every disposition approaching to a concentrated array. Not to mention other modes of attack which would seem to leave the chances of success with the enemy, it will be noticed that this kind of defence, whether by gunboats or floating batteries, has the same intrinsic fault that an inactive defence by the navy proper has; that is to say, the enemy has it in his power to bring to the attack a force of the same nature, and at least as efficacious as that relied on for defence; hence the necessity not of mere equality, but of superiority, on the part of the defence at every point liable to be attacked; and hence, also, the necessity of having an aggregate force as many times larger than that disposable by the enemy as we have important places to guard. Should we, for example, have ten such places, and the enemy threaten us with twenty ships-of-the-line, we must have in all these places an aggregate of gunboats and floating batteries more than equivalent to two hundred ships-of-the-line; for it will be hardly contended that these defences can be transported from one place to another as they may be respectively in danger. But what will be the relative state of the parties if, instead of gunboats or floating batteries, we resort to steam batteries? Although much has been said of late of the great advantage that defence is to derive from this description of force, we have not been able to discover the advantages; nor do we see that sea-coast defence has been benefitted in any particular by the recent improvement in steam vessels, except that, in the case before adverted to, where, from the breadth of the waters, defence from the shore would be unavailing, a more active and formidable defence than by gunboats and floating batteries is provided. It must be remembered that by far the greatest improvement in steam vessels consists in having adapted them to ocean navigation; and one inevitable consequence of this improvement will be that, if the defence of harbors by steam batteries be regarded as securing them from the attacks of ships of the line and frigates, or, at least, of placing the defence quite above that kind of attack, they will no longer be attacked by sailing vessels, but by steam vessels, similar in all warlike properties to those relied on for defence.

Not only is there no impediment to transferring these vessels across the ocean, but the rapidity and certainty of these transfers are such as to enjoin a state of the most perfect readiness everywhere and at all times, and also a complete independence of arrangement at each particular point; both the state of preparation and the independence of arrangement being much more important than when the enemy's motions were governed by the uncertain favor of winds and

weather.

It is not easy to conceive of any important properties belonging to steam batteries acting defensively that the attacking steam vessels may not bring with them, or, at least, may not have imparted to them on their arrival upon the coast, unless it should be thought proper to give to the former a greater thickness of bulwark than would be admissible in sea-going vessels.

But the peculiar advantage conferred by steam lies in the facility of moving with promptitude and rapidity; and any attempts to strengthen the harbor vessels by thickening their bulwarks considerably would unavoidably lessen their mobility, thereby partially neutralizing the advantage sought. At the same time, it is extremely doubtful whether any benefit would be derived from the thicker sides. It is probable that the best kind of bulwark for these vessels and all others is that which will be just proof against grape and canister shot fired from moderate distances; because, with such bulwarks, a shell fired from a bomb-cannon within a reasonable distance would pierce both sides; that is to

say, would go in at one side of the ship and out at the opposite, producing no greater effect than a solid shot of the same calibre, while, with thickened sides, every shell would lodge in the timbers, and produce terrible ravages by bursting.

In the practice with these missiles in this country it has been found difficult to lodge a shell in thin targets, even when the load of the gun was so reduced as to increase materially the uncertainty of aim. As it is probable, therefore, that the protection from solid shot afforded by massive bulwarks would be more than counterbalanced by the greater injury horizontal shells would inflict by means of these bulwarks, we may conclude that the harbor steam battery will not differ in this respect materially from the attacking steamships, and, if they do differ in having more solid and impervious bulwarks, that no advantage over the enemy will result therefrom. We come, therefore, to the same result as when considering the application of the other kinds of floating force to the defence of harbors; and this result is, that there is no way of placing the coast in a condition of reasonable security but by having at any point the enemy may happen to select a force in perfect readiness which shall be superior to that brought to the attack.

The reason of this coincidence of result is, that no peculiarity in form or details can disguise the difficulties or essentially modify the conditions inseparable from the nature of a floating force.

Buoyancy is a condition necessary to every variety of the force, and to observe this condition a common material must be used in each-a material that is combustible, weak, and penetrable to missiles. If the weakness and penetrability be in part remedied by an increase of the quantity of the material, it must be at the sacrifice of buoyancy, activity, and speed-properties of great value. If a small draught of water be desired, it can only be obtained at the expense of that concentration of power which is a great and almost characteristic quality of naval armament.

It might not be strictly true to say that as much would be lost in one respect as would be gained in another; but, though modifications of this floating force, made with a view to adapt it to peculiar services, will somewhat disturb the equilibrium of the several kinds, there will still be no great disparity when acting in their appropriate way, and a little superadded force to the weaker party will restore the balance. None of these modifications, it should be observed, touch, on the one hand, the means whereby injury is inflicted, nor, on the other, the susceptibility to injury. All are still timber structures, carrying

a common armament.

The necessity of having at each point a force at least equal to the attacking force will require large preparations on any supposition. With the navy proper, however, with gunboats and floating batteries, something has already been done; the existing navy will be an important contribution. Small vessels supplied by commerce would afford tolerable substitutes for gunboats, and from the class of merchant ships many vessels might be drawn for service as floating batteries; still there will remain great efforts to be made and great amounts to be expended to complete the defensive array. But a reliance on steam batteries would lead to expenditure vastly greater, because with them all has yet to be provided. Having at present no force of this kind on hand, (or next to none,) the preparation by the enemy of (say) twenty steam frigates would require the construction of two hundred of equal force on our part, supposing that we design to cover but ten of our principal harbors, leaving all others at his mercy.

Having shown that steam batteries cannot be substituted for shore defences, we will here add that they will, on the other hand, in certain cases necessarily increase the number of these defences, and in other cases augment their force. Channels which admitted only small vessels-of-war would, in peculiar positions, need no defence; in other positions their defence might be safely trusted to works of moderate force. The introduction of these vessels of small draught

and great power requires, however, that these passages should be defended and defended adequately.

We should not have gone so much at length into a branch of our subject wherein the general conclusions appear to be so obvious and incontrovertible, but for the prevalence of opinions which we consider not erroneous merely, but highly dangerous, and which, we think, must give way before a full exhibition of the truth. We do not anticipate any formidable objections to the positions assumed nor to the illustrations; but even should all these, in the form we have presented them, be objected to, we may still challenge opposition to the following broad propositions, namely:

1st. If the sea-coast is to be defended by naval means exclusively, the defensive force at each point deemed worthy of protection must be at least equal in porer to the attacking force.

2d. As, from the nature of the case, there can be no reason for expecting an attack on one of these points rather than on another, and no time for transferring our state of preparation from one to another after an attack has been declared, each of them must have assigned to it the requisite means; and,

3d. Consequently this system demands a power in the defence as many times greater than that in the attack as there are points to be covered.

Believing that a well-digested system of fortifications will save the country from the danger attending every form of defence by naval means, and the intolerable expense of a full provision of those means, we will now endeavor to show that such a system is worthy of all reliance.

There has been but one practice among nations as to the defence of ports and harbors; and that has been a resort to fortifications. All the experience that history exhibits is on one side only; it is the opposition of forts, or other works comprehended by the term fortification, to attack by vessels; and although history affords some instances wherein this defence has not availed, we see that the resort is still the same. No nation omits covering the exposed points upon her seaboard with fortifications, nor hesitates in confiding in them.

In opposition to this mode of defence much stress is laid on certain successful attacks that have been made by ships on works deemed strong. We have no doubt that all such results might be accounted for by circumstances independent of the naked question of relative strength; but at any rate, when carefully considered, how little do these results prove, in comparison with numerous other instances, in which there was an immense disparity of force in favor of vessels that have been signally defeated. These latter instances are those that should be received as a test of the actual relation between the two kinds of force; not certainly because they were successful, but because the smaller the work, its armament, its garrison, the less the probability that any extraneous influence has been in operation. A single gun behind a parapet, provided its position be a fair one, and the parapet be proof, need, as regards its contest with ships, owe nothing else to the art of fortification; and its effect will be the same whether the battery were fresh from the hands of the ablest engineer of the age, or were erected at the dawn of the art. The gun is in a position to be used with effect; the men are as fully protected by the parapet as the service of the gun will allow; they are brave and skilful, and there is nothing to prevent their doing their duty to the utmost. These are all conditions easily fulfilled, and therefore likely to be so. The state of things is not less just and fair toward the vessel; she chooses her time and opportunity; the battery goes not to the ship, but the ship to the battery; taking the wind, the tide, the sea-all, as she would have them; her condition and discipline are perfect, and her crew courageous and adroit. Nothing, under such circumstances, can prevent the just issue of battle but some extraordinary accident-possible, indeed, to either party, but easily recognized when occurring.

The contest between larger works and heavy squadrons may be much more

complicated affairs, the cause of disaster to the former being often traceable to potent, though not always obvious, influences. The fortifications may have been absurdly planned originally or badly executed, for there has at all times been in this profession, as in others, much scope given to quackery; they may have been erected at a time when the ships-of-war, against which they were provided, were very different things from the lofty line-of-battle-ships of modern times; a long peace or long impunity may have left them in a state wholly unprepared for the sudden use of their strength; the command may have been intrusted to persons ignorant alike of the amount of power in their hands and of the mode of exercising it; the garrison may have been undisciplined or mu tinous-the populace discontented or disloyal; the clamor of frightened citizens may have caused a premature surrender: all these, or any of them, may have produced the issue, leaving the question of relative power untouched.

While there can be no doubt that these and other deteriorating influences may have occasionally operated to the prejudice of fortifications, and that these were likely to be more numerous and more controlling as the works were more extensive, it is certain that there can be no influence acting in a reverse direction upon them; that is to say, none making them stronger and more efficient than they ought to be. There can be no favorable influence of such a nature, for example, as to make the simple one-gun battery before mentioned equivalent to a battery (say) ten times as large.

It must not be supposed, from what we have said in relation to larger fortifications, that their magnitude necessarily involves imperfection or weakness; nor, because we have considered small and simple works as affording the best solution to the question of relative force, must it be inferred that small works are suited to all circumstances. We speak here in reference merely to the judgment we are entitled to form of the relative power of these antagonist forces from their contests as exhibited in history. In instances of the latter sort there cannot, from the nature of the case, be any important influence operating of which we are ignorant, or for which we cannot make due allowances; while, in examples of the former kind, we may be in the dark as to many vital matters.

These observations have been deemed necessary because, in judging of this matter, it might not be so obvious that certain brilliant and striking results should not be adopted as affording the true test of relative power. It would be more natural to turn to Copenhagen and Algiers, as indicating where the power lies, than to Charleston and Stonington; and yet these latter, as indices, would be true, and the former false.

We will now turn to certain examples:

The name of Martello tower was adopted in consequence of the good defence made by a small round tower in the Bay of Martello, in Corsica, in the year 1794, which, although armed with one heavy gun only, beat off one or two British ships-of-war without sustaining any material injury from their fire. But this circumstance ought merely to have proved the superiority which guns on shore must always, in certain situations, possess over those of shipping, no matter whether the former are mounted on a tower or not. That this is a just decision will, perhaps, be readily allowed by all who are acquainted with the following equally remarkable, but less generally known fact, which occurred about twelve years afterwards in the same part of the world."

"Sir Sidney Smith, in the Pompée, an eighty-gun ship, the Hydra, of thirtyeight guns, Captain Manby, and another frigate, anchored about eight hundred yards from a battery of two guns, situated on the extremity of Cape Licosa, and protected from assault by a tower in which were five and twenty French soldiers, commanded by a lieutenan.

Pasley's Course, vol. iii.

"The line-of-battle-ship and the frigates fired successive broadsides till their ammunition was nearly expended; the battery continually replying with a slow but destructive effect. The Pompée, at which ship alone it directed its fire had forty shot in her hull; her mizen topmast carried away; a lieutenant, midshipman, and five men killed, and thirty men wounded. At length, force proving ineffectual, negotiation was resorted to, and after some hours' parley, the officer' a Corsican, and relative of Napoleon, capitulated. It then appeared that the carriage of one of the two guns had failed on the second shot, and the gun had subsequently been fired lying on the sill of the embrazure; so that in fact the attack of an eighty-gun ship and two frigates had been resisted by a single piece of ordnance."-(Journal of Sieges, by Colonel John T. Jones.)

The Corsican tower above mentioned, which had, in like manner, completely baffled a naval cannonade, was very soon found to surrender when attacked by land; not, however, before a small battery had been made [erected] to reduce it."-(Pasley's Course, vol. iii.)

Here are two examples:

1st. A single heavy gun, mounted on a tower, beat off one or two British ships. 2d. A barbette battery, containing two guns, beat off a British eighty-gun ship supported by two frigates.

It would seem that no exception can possibly be taken to either instance, as trials of relative power. There is no complication of circumstances on one side or the other; nothing to confuse or mislead; all is perfectly simple and plain. A small body of artillery, judiciously posted on the shore, is attacked by armed vessels bearing forty or fifty times as many guns; and the ships, unable to produce any effect in consequence, are beaten off with loss.

The cases present no peculiar advantage on the side of the batteries either as regards position or quality; for both works were immediately reduced by a land attack; that which the eighty-gun ship and two frigates were unable to effect, being immediately accomplished by landing two field-pieces, with a very small portion of the crew of one of the vessels.

On the other hand, there was no peculiar disadvantage on the part of the ships, as the time and mode of attack were of their own choice.

In order that there might be no unjust disparagement of the vessels, in the manner of representing the affairs, the language of British military writers (the ships being British) had been exactly quoted. (See Pasley's Course of Elementary Fortifications, vol. ii, and Journal of Sieges, by Colonel John T. Jones.) Had the representation of these actions been taken from the victorious party, the result would have appeared still more to the disadvantage of the ships. The circumstances attending the attack and defence of Copenhagen, in April, 1801, seem to have been the following:

On the northeast side of the city (the only side exposed to attack from heavy ships) there lies a shoal spreading outward from the walls, about three-quarters of a mile in the narrowest part. Through this shoal there runs, in a northeast and by north direction, a narrow channel connecting the basin, in the heart of the city, with deep water. Were it not for this shoal, vessels might approach even to the walls of the city, on a length of about one and a half mile; as it is, they can get no nearer, in any place, than about three-quarters of a mile, without following the channel just mentioned. As the edge of the shoal lies nearly north and south, and the channel passes through it in a northeast-by-north direction, the great mass of the shoal is to the southward, or on the right hand side of the channel. We will call this the southern shoal. The "Three-crown battery" is situated upon this southern shoal and near the channel.

The Danish defences consisted

1st. Of the fortifications on this side of the city, including the Three-crown battery; Nelson estimated the batteries supporting the Danish vessels at about ninety guns.