ing batteries and steam-rams in aid of the forts; and also, in times of danger, to anchor rafts entirely across the channels leading into the harbors, or close them with chain cables. The rafts, properly placed, would arrest the progress of hostile vessels when in front of the forts under the direct fire of their guns. Thus detained, the ships must retire or consent to be destroyed; for it is not at all likely that a ship can be constructed possessing as much power as can be given to a first-class fortification.-(See extract of report of engineers on means of obstructing harbors, hereto annexed.)

Possibly an entirely new system of defences may be found best; this, however, is scarcely to be expected, even in this age of wonderful mechanical contrivances. Being purely a question of engineering, and the United States having a corps of engineers and of naval officers eminently worthy of confidence, the committee recommend the reference of the subject to them, with directions to devise a plan which, when fully executed, will enable the United States to exclude hostile fleets from all important harbors on our several water frontiers. The committee will not withhold an expression of opinion that powerful, perhaps entirely adequate, means of defence, original in character and simple in application, may be found to repel the most powerful fleets and armaments. We have reason to believe that this will be found to be true, though an allusion even to the nature and character of these plans, some of which are now under examination, would be premature.

IMPORTANCE OF SUITABLE DEFENCES.

Said Secretary Poinsett:

"We must bear in mind that the destruction of some of the important points on the frontier would alone cost more to the nation than the expense of fortifying the whole line would amount to; while the temporary occupation of others would drive us into expenses far surpassing those of the projected defences."

These reflections of this eminent man being sound, we cannot dispense with defensive works merely because of their expense. The only question really open to discussion is, what system of defences will be adequate to the end in view?

PRACTICABILITY OF CONSTRUCTING ADEQUATE NATIONAL DEFENCES.

It is objected that it is quite impracticable for thirty millions of people to provide defences which are truly invulnerable for frontiers so extensive as those of the United States. To objections of this class, Mr. Secretary Poinsett replied that—

"It would appear, on a superficial view, to be a gigantic and almost impracticable project to fortify such an immense extent of coast as that of the United States, and difficult, if not impossible, to provide a sufficient force to garrison and defend the works necessary for that purpose."

But, said Mr. Poinsett:

"The coast of the United States, throughout its vast extent, has but few points which require to be defended against a regular and powerful attack. A considerable portion of

it is inaccessible to large vessels, and only exposed to the depredations of parties in boats and small vessels-of-war; against which inferior works and a combination of the same means, and a well-organized local militia, will afford sufficient protection.

"The only portions which require to be defended by permanent works of some strength are the avenues to the great commercial cities, and to naval and military establishments, the destruction of which would be a serious loss to the country, and be regarded by an enemy as an equivalent for the expense of a great armament.

"It is shown, also, that the number of men required, on the largest scale, for the defence of the forts-when compared with the movable force that would be necessary without them is inconsiderable. The local militia, aided by a few regulars, and directed by engineer and artillery officers, may, with previous training, be safely intrusted with their defence in time of war.

"It cannot be too earnestly urged that a much smaller number of troops will be required to defend a fortified frontier than to cover one that is entirely unprotected; and that such a system will enable us, according to the spirit of our institutions, to employ the militia effectually for the defence of the country."

From three causes the number of important points open to attack has increased during the twenty-two years which have elapsed since the foregoing cogent reasons were presented; but, as our wealth and population have proportionably increased, his reply is as complete to-day as it was then. The points of attack have increased, first, by the springing up of new marts of commerce; second, by the acquisition of Texas and California; and third, cities in shallow harbors now need strong defences in consequence of the recent adaptation of vessels of light draught to the work of the largest ships-of-war. The iron-clad Monitor, though of light draught, can carry as heavy a gun as the Warrior, and can as safely run by any fort in her Majesty's dominions, anchor in the harbor beyond, and, in defiance of ancient means of prevention, commence the work of destruction. But though this altered condition of affairs lays open to attack several important points not heretofore considered exposed, still, as just remarked, our increased means fully equal the increased demands upon them. Our country is competent to the task of placing the frontier in a complete state of defence without being at all distressed by the performance of it. The sum of our present expenses would, probably in one month, far more than suffice to place our frontiers in a perfectly defensible condition. The Pacific frontier is, of course, excepted in the above remark. But if, on scientific investigation, the engineers and naval officers shall ascertain that adequate national defences cannot be constructed except at great cost, the works will yet have to be built, however unwelcome the burden; unless, indeed, the nation is prepared to renounce its time-honored maxims, and consent to owe the security of its frontier cities, and the security of a commerce which has become as wide-spread as the world, to the mercy and forbearance of its maritime neighbors.

Having shown that the first step to take to secure our water frontiers from the casualities of unexpected assault is to construct defences, permanent and floating, which are competent to resist any sudden attack that can readily be made with such means as are ordinarily in the possession of an enemy, your committee believe that the next step in importance is:

2. To provide such means of defence of the coast near the important harbors as will compel hostile vessels to seek for a point at some distance from the harbors at which to disembark troops; thus affording to us time to convey our troops to the point threatened in advance of the arrival of the enemy.

When our roads were few and bad the importance of compelling an enemy to land a day's journey from important points was not so striking as now, when troops can be placed in that space of time in large numbers between the point threatened and an invading army. Informed by the telegraph, and aided by the railroads, a commander defending a country possessing so many soldiers as ours can, in a brief period of time, confront with a superior force more armies than the entire fleets of any nation can transport in one voyage across a wide ocean. This is an advantage in the defence of a country of very great moment. To achieve it, a nation situated at a great distance from warlike and ambitious governments, would be justified in making very large expenditures. If, in addition to this, we maintain respectable fleets and armies, carefully drill a well-organized militia, and take care to keep on hand abundant munitions of war, the United States would be, practically, invulnerable.

The exceptions to the general remark, that an invading army, landing at any important point in the United States, could be confronted in a few hours with a superior force, are few, and can be found only in the Gulf and Pacific States, and in those bordering on Lakes Huron and Superior. These exceptions are rapidly lessening in number, and in a few years will disappear. It is a matter of just pride and great national consequence that no country of the size of one of our largest States has such facile and as extensive lines of water and railroad communications as the United States. No system of defence, therefore, would be perfect which is not so planned as to render available, to its greatest extent, this power of concentrating forces rapidly upon any assailable point-a power which our country possesses in so extraordinary a degree. No large country, either in ancient or modern times, ever possessed such ample and reliable means for rapidly transferring large bodies of men from one distant. State to another as our own; and because the great power of such means has never been effectively exhibited in a great war of a defensive character is not a reason for us to disregard it. Its inherent value and power in a country where, as all nations well know, the sudden seizure of a few places, however valuable, cannot endanger its integrity or seriously cripple its movements, are obvious to the humblest understanding. Seizures, achieved at great risk, and promising no decisive results, are rarely attempted by able leaders. Thorough defences, constructed with direct reference to a full develop. ment of the usefulness of our interior communications, will go far to insure our country even against attempts to invade it, and such a result is the highest aim of a system of military defences.

The location and character of the works necessary to prevent the landing of a hostile force on the coast near important harbors can only be determined by engineers, and to them it should be referred, with instructions to erect them.

DEFENCES OF THE NORTHERN FRONTIER.

3 and 4. How can the northern or lake frontier be successfully defended, especially as the United States are prohibited, by treaty

from building war vessels on the lakes? On the shores of these lakes the United States have many cities and villages, and upon their waters an immense commerce; these are unsheltered by any defences worthy of special notice, but they are as open to incursion as was Mexico when invaded by Cortez. A small fleet of light-draught, heavilyarmed, iron-clad gunboats could, in one short month, in despite of any opposition that could be made by extemporized batteries, pass up the St. Lawrence into the lakes, and shell every city and village from Ogdensburg to Chicago. At one blow it could sweep our commerce from that entire chain of waters. Such a fleet would have it in its power to inflict a loss to be reckoned only by hundreds of millions of dollars, so vast is the wealth thus exposed to the depredations of a maritime enemy. To be able to strike a blow so effective, Great Britain constructed a canal around the great Falls of Niagara. this single work the entire chain of lakes was opened to the entrance of all British light-draught ocean vessels. Perceiving our ability to erect fortifications on the St. Lawrence that might command its channel, and thus neutralize all they had done, Great Britain dug a canal from the foot of Lake Ontario, on a line parallel to the river, but beyond the reach of American guns, to a point on the St. Lawrence below, beyond American jurisdiction, thus securing a channel to and from the lakes out of our reach.

By

Occupied by our own vast commercial enterprises and by violent. party conflicts, our people failed to notice, at the time, that the safety of our entire northern frontier had been destroyed by the dig ging of two short canals. Near the head of the St. Lawrence, (at the foot of Lake Ontario,) the British, to complete their supremacy on the lakes, have built a large naval depot for the construction and repair of vessels, and a very strong fortress to protect the depot and the outlet of the lake-a fort which cannot be reduced, it is supposed by them, except by regular approaches. They have also strong defences of the St. Lawrence at Montreal, Quebec, &c., to make the all-important channel as safe as possible to the ingress and egress of their fleets. As things now are, a British fleet could sail from the ocean into the lakes, devastate the cities upon the shores, seize the commercial vessels on their waters, and then, in a few days, appear off Boston, New York, or New Orleans, to aid in operations against us on the ocean frontier. To place our frontier in like good condition, the United States must possess as good an inlet to the lakes, and must possess the means to follow an enemy's fleet from one lake to another with like ease and certainty. We must have a naval depot of corresponding extent, as well secured, and as judiciously located for commercial as well as warlike purposes. In addition to these we should have defences at the entrance of each lake which will effectually command them. On the St. Lawrence should be fortifications (aided by floating batteries if necessary) competent to control the channel, however numerous the hostile fleet.

To defend the northern frontier, the United States should be able to place a strong fleet on the lakes as soon as an opponent. We should have adequate means of transportation at command to be able

to speedily concentrate on the St. Lawrence a force of acknowledged competency to take possession of the canal and of Montreal, and hold them. The possession by the United States of the outlets of Lake Ontario, and of Montreal and its communications, would cut off all supplies from the Canadians, and leave them to an unsupported and hopeless conflict with all our forces. Such a conflict could be neither protracted nor dangerous.

MILITARY CANALS.

Can the United States have a navigable channel from the ocean to the lakes of an equal value with that possessed by Great Britain? Undoubtedly; and a better one. The Erie and Hudson canal can readily be so enlarged as to allow of the passage of a vessel of fifteen hundred or even of two thousand tons burden. When completed, a vessel could enter Lake Erie sooner from New York harbor than from the mouth of the St. Lawrence, and without the delay and danger arising from rapids, rocks, and ice. The Illinois river and Lake Michigan canal can be still more readily and cheaply enlarged than the Hudson and Erie, and would allow an ocean vessel from New Or leans to enter the lakes a month earlier in the spring than one entering by the way of the Gulf of St. Lawrence. A canal around Niagara falls can be readily built of any desirable capacity. Neither of these channels would be within reach of British guns, whereas a right to plant American guns upon the banks of the St. Lawrence, the only British channel to the lakes, belongs to the United States.

MILITARY ADVANTAGES OF CANALS FROM THE LAKES TO THE GULF OF MEXICO, AND TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC.

In the absence of ships-of-war on the lakes, and of all means to convey them there from the ocean, the United States, upon the breaking out of war, would, without navy yards and suitable docks, have to commence the building of a fleet upon Lake Ontario, and another on the upper lakes, one British fleet answering for both. The United States could not leave the valuable cities and commerce of the upper lakes undefended, nor could it allow the British war vessels to dominate Lake Ontario, where the bulk of the British commerce, wealth, and military and naval resources are to be found. Hence, two fleets would be indispensable. So long as the British can hold Lake Ontario and its outlets to the ocean, so long is Canada invulnerable, and so long can land expeditions be sent against our cities from Buffalo to Utica, and naval ones to every port on the upper as well as lower lakes. And so long as the British ocean fleet can, alone, enter the lakes, by what means could ship yards on our shores be so protected from their gunboats as to make it safe to build vessels within them? Would not the cost and defects of hasty building, and of thorough protection of ship yards from the attacks of iron-clad fleets, and the loss of towns, and of commercial vessels, and the pay and support of extra bodies of troops along the whole frontier, greatly exceed, in three months, the entire cost of three canals?