HamiltonW. Blackwood and sons, 1882 - 268 pàgines |
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Frases i termes més freqüents
absolute actual Airdrie alleged antinomies apprehended belief Brown Brown's doctrine Cadder causality cause ceive cognition conceive conception contradiction contradictory criticism Descartes distinction ditioned Edinburgh Review elements ence existence experience extension external facts of consciousness faculty feeling Fichte finite generalisation ground Hamil Hamilton Hamilton's doctrine Hegel holds incognisable inference infinite infinite regress intelligence intuition intuitive knowledge irrelative Kant known law of thought laws ledge limitation logical matter means mental Metaphysics method Mill Mill's mind mode modifications necessarily necessary necessity negation ness non-Ego notion organism perceived perception percipient permanent phænomena phænomenon philosophy philosophy of Perception positive possible primary qualities principle psychological question realised reality reason regarded Reid Reid's relation relative representation Representationalism represented sciousness sensation simply space sphere subject and object substance supposed theory thing tion transcendent truth ultimate uncon unconditioned unity universal University of Glasgow unknown wholly
Passatges populars
Pàgina 150 - That is to say, the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things without me.
Pàgina 104 - The first problem of Philosophy — and it is one of no easy accomplishment — being thus to seek out, purify, and establish, by intellectual analysis and criticism, the elementary feelings or beliefs, in which are given the elementary truths of which all are in possession...
Pàgina 120 - Memory strictly so denominated, — that is, the power of retaining knowledge in the mind, but out of consciousness ; I say retaining knowledge in the mind, but out of consciousness...
Pàgina 143 - I have frequently asserted that in perception we are conscious of the external object immediately and in itself. This is the doctrine of Natural Realism. But in saying that a thing is known in itself I do not mean that this object is known in its absolute existence — that is, out of relation to us. This is impossible, for our knowledge is only of the relative. To know a thing in itself, or immediately, is an expression I use merely in contrast to the knowledge of a thing in a representation or...
Pàgina 111 - ... the law of substance, and still more in the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. There is another necessity, when it is not unthinkable that the deliverance of consciousness may possibly be false, but, at the same time, when we cannot but admit that this deliverance is of such or such a purport. This is seen in the case of what are called contingent truths, or truths of fact. Thus, for example, I can theoretically suppose that the external object I am conscious of in perception...
Pàgina 126 - These are really one, as each involves the other (for we apprehend only as we judge something to be, and we judge only as we apprehend the existence of the terms compared), and as together they constitute a single indivisible act of cognition; but they are logically double, inasmuch as, by mental abstraction, they may be viewed each for itself, and as a distinguishable element of thought.
Pàgina 129 - ... and that something different from me exists. In this act, I am conscious of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an external reality as the object perceived ; and I am conscious of both existences in the same indivisible moment of intuition. The knowledge of the subject does not precede nor follow the knowledge of the object ; — neither determines, neither is determined by, the other.
Pàgina 132 - ... other, that these distant objects are those really represented in the mind. Nothing can be more absurd : we perceive, through no sense, aught external but what is in immediate relation and in immediate contact with its organ ; and that is true which Democritus of old asserted, that all our senses are only modifications of touch. Through the eye, we perceive nothing but the rays of light in relation to, and in contact with, the retina ; what we add to this perception must not be taken into account.
Pàgina 84 - We may lay it down as the most general characteristic of consciousness, that it is the recognition by the thinking subject of its own acts or affections.
Pàgina 253 - Fichte, he calls the Intellectual Intuition, there exists no distinction of subject and object, — no contrast of knowledge and existence ; all difference is lost in absolute indifference, — all plurality in absolute unity. The Intuition itself, — Reason, — and the Absolute are identified. The absolute exists only as known by reason, and reason knows only as being itself the absolute.