ment of the different armies; but the strength and resources of the country were wasted in puny and unsuccessful efforts, without use or object, on extensive and distant frontiers, and we presented the singular spectacle of a powerful nation with more than a million of men capable of bearing arms, with resources vastly exceeding those of any other nation of equal population, with two hundred thousand men actually under arms, invaded and defeated at all points, several of our posts captured and held by the enemy, our capital taken, our credit destroyed; and all this effected, too, by a petty province, aided at no time by more than twenty-five thousand men from the mother country, including the whole force that assailed us on every frontier. This is a picture, it must be acknowledged, by no means flattering to our national pride; but it is a true picture; and the time and the occasion require that the truth be told.

One great moral advantage certainly was gained by the war; and it is, perhaps, full compensation for all our misfortunes. We demonstrated, that we have, among the body of the people, men with capacity for every exigency; and we settled the question in regard to the permanency of our institutions, by proving that they were strong enough for war. But what, let me ask, would have been the character of the country, under its accumulated defeats, but for the victories on the ocean, achieved by officers who were masters of their profession, and those gained on land, either by men who had forced their way forward from the old corps, or who had been formed during the war, partly in the militia, and partly in the regular service, and had qualified themselves to lead to victory by the practice of two campaigns.

Had there been the requisite military information in our councils at the commencement of the war, that policy which pressed like a nightmare on the nation, and paralyzed all its energies, had been avoided; and, in place of being compelled to close the war, not only without having gained a single object for which it had been declared, but by conceding to the enemy the right of retaining a part of his conquests, to which he asserted a claim, and of making stipulations in favor of the Indians within our territories, whom he had chosen to designate as his allies, we had been able to dictate the terms of peace. History was open before us, and we had only to profit by its lessons to strike our enemy in the most vital point. The statesman, or the military man, accustomed to trace the current of human events through the history of the preceding century, could not but have observed the astonishing rise of the French naval power, and its rapid decline; and, if in the habit of tracing effects back to their causes, he must have perceived that this power rose with the possession, and declined with the loss, of the northeastern coast of this continent, and the islands adjacent to it. That coast, and those islands, are as important to Great Britain as they were to France; they formed, when war was declared, as they form now, the principal pillar of British naval power; they were within our grasp; we could have reached the more important parts of them without naval force; and had timely preparations been made for war, and the national energies been properly exerted, the first campaign must have placed them in our possession, with as little difficulty as a single campaign has placed Algiers in the possesRep. 40-5

sion of France. It is hardly possible to estimate the effects of so important an acquisition on the character and events of the war, or its influence on the negotiations for peace.

The length to which this paper has run admonishes me that it should be brought to a close; but I deem it due to myself to add, that, although I deprecate the reduction of the officers of the army proper as a measure fraught with the most injurious consequences to the national interests, I am not to be understood as including my own case. I leave it to others to determine the importance to the public of the station which I hold, as well as the value of the services which I perform; for I could not, consistently with a proper self-respect, be induced, on this or any other occasion, to offer a single argument as to the necessity for any office on which my official existence may depend. I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

TH. S. JESUP,

Brig. General, and Quartermaster General.

Hon. J. H. EATON,
Secretary of War, Washington City.

A.

15 regiments.

33d CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 2d Session.

ACCOUNT BETWEEN U. S. AND STATE OF MARYLAND. [To accompany Senate bill No. 305.]

JANUARY 30, 1855.

Mr. HIBBARD, from the Committee of Ways and Means, made the fol

lowing

Ꭱ Ꭼ Ꮲ Ꮎ Ꭱ Ꭲ .

The Committee of Ways and Means, to whom was referred Senate bill No. 305, entitled "An act to direct a re-examination of the account between the United States and the State of Maryland," report:

That during the last war with Great Britain, the State of Maryland borrowed, on interest, certain sums of money, to be applied to the purchase of arms and ammunition, and to the equipment and pay of the militia called into service for the defence of the State. Soon after the close of the war, the State presented her claim against the government of the United States for the moneys so borrowed and applied. The claim, amounting to $436,000, was filed in the Treasury Department, investigated, and audited by the proper accounting officers.

It appeared, that between the 19th of June, 1813, and the 15th of August, 1814, inclusive, sums to the amount of $436,000 were, at different times, borrowed by the State, on interest, at the rate of six per cent., pursuant to a resolution of her legislature, passed May 29, 1813. The resolution was silent as to the purposes for which the money was to be raised. Of the sums so borrowed, it was evidenced, to the satisfaction of the department, that $279,626 54 had been expended by the State for the use and benefit of the United States. This sum was allowed to the State of Maryland. The residue of the claim not being shown to have been expended for purposes of the United States, was rejected. Interest on the sums appearing to have been thus expended, and on which the State had paid interest, was sought to be recovered, but was disallowed on the ground, then generally assumed by the government, that the United States would not pay interest except in cases where they had expressly contracted so to do. The amount found due was refunded to the State by instalments, commencing in October, 1818, and ending in December, 1821. It was allowed and paid in extinguishment of the principal, and was so received by Maryland. It may here be remarked that the State, though she complained of the rejection of the balance of her demand for the principal debt, has not since made, and does not now make, claim upon the United States for any part thereof as such.

It also appeared, that on the first day of January, 1817, the State