CHAP. III. Power of the Crown to retain Militia. 49 men was driven from the coast of Devon by the Volunteers, and when the enemy had landed in Pembroke they were captured within a few hours by the Militia, under the command of the Lord Lieutenant.1 2 Crown to re Militia in 54. An important question remains to be considered, in relation to the power which the Crown has of continuing Power of the Militia in a state of embodiment. In 1815 the tain the Militia Force was permitted to remain embodied, after embodiment. a definitive treaty of peace had been signed. In the previous November, Sir Samuel Romilly raised the constitutional objection, that the Crown had no power to retain the Militia in service after the war or insurrection-for which it had been embodied-had absolutely ceased. It has been noticed in a previous paragraph (37) that the Act does not impose any limit upon the period of embodied service; and it was argued by the law officers of the Crown that this silence was indicative of an intention to leave to the Crown an unlimited discretion-subject to control by the House of Commons refusing to pass the estimates, and by Ministerial responsibility-as to the period when the embodied militia should be released from further service. The House of Commons upon two divisions, one in November and the other in February, 1815, supported the Government; but, within a few weeks after the last division, all doubt was removed by positive enactment,3 as a bill was brought in, and became law, authorizing the Crown to hold the Militia in Embodied Service. ing into the 55. Whether the men of the Militia should be permitted to join the Regular Army under any circumstances, and Militia enlist upon what pecuniary terms, has been a fruitful subject Army. of controversy. The policy of the Militia Act, 1802, was one of absolute prohibition; and while the militia is raised by ballot, it either weakens the defensive force or brings another man under the operation of the conscription. If both forces are 1 39 Ann. Reg., p. 881. VOL. I. 2 29 H. D. (O, S.), pp. 5C3, 1090. 3 31 H. D. (O. S., p. 267; 55 Geo. III. c. 77. E Volunteer forces, then it is a question of finance-until a national emergency, as in the years 1812 and 1813, obliges the Crown to disregard every other consideration than that of finding recruits for the regular army. A single or double bounty (one earned in each service) may put recruits into the ranks of the Army upon unequal terms; and if one has gained this latter advantage by evasion or violation of the law, the evil is increased. 56. In the Peninsular War, Parliament, from urgent necessity, gave encouragement to the Militia, in certain proportions, to change their character from a Defensive serve abroad. force to that of an Offensive one, and as Militia to join the Army in Portugal. In the Crimean War recruits from the Militia were freely accepted in the Army, and voluntary offers to serve the Crown in foreign stations were sanctioned by Parliament, but the Militia, as such, did not join and serve with the Army in the Crimea. The policy of each of these measures was at the time warmly discussed. Militia in war permitted to A.D. 1867. Militia Reserve Act. 3 57. The recent Act, which enables the Crown to make conditional engagements with a portion of the Militia "to serve in the army as soldiers in the event of war,' is no doubt a most valuable power to have in reserve; that is, in the event of war, or upon its apparent approach, -without waiting, as heretofore it has been necessary to do, for the previous assembling of Parliament and the passing of a special Act—to put this Act in operation, and then to makɔ such engagements. But to use such a power under other circumstances is a matter of doubtful expediency. A certain annual cost is incurred for an uncertain result. All the advantages will have been given by the Crown in time of peace, for service to be given by the man in time of war. He may join the regular army, and do so in health and unmarried, or he may desert, or be maimed, or married. The experiment is not without danger -in other aspects than the financial one. It is based upon one or other of these assumptions, which may be fallacious,that men will as readily join the Army in War time for a past 1 54 Geo. III., c. 1. 2 This was done without express statutory sanction, and the discipline of the Militia was broken down. (See the Acts passed in 1803-13, collected, p. 227 of 1 CHAP. III. Militia Reserve Act. 51 bounty (which they have spent), as for a present one, which they are to receive; or that they will as readily join the Army, in war, for Foreign service, as the Militia for home service. Experience does not confirm either assumption, and it may turn out that the Crown has wasted both money and opportunity before war arises, and be embarrassed by the failure of the Act, after it has been declared.1 So long as the present high bounty for re-enrolment in the Militia is given, it is not probable that men will very freely enlist in the Militia Reserve. The whole question is deserving of reconsideration. CHAPTER IV. THE ARMY (THE GUARDS AND GARRISONS) BEFORE THE Parliament of Charles II. resolved against a standing army. REVOLUTION OF 1688. 1. BOTH Houses of Parliament throughout the reigns of Charles II. and James II. were resolutely determined and James II. upon having no Standing Army' within the Realm. The necessity of maintaining garrisons in the various fortified places was admitted, and a guard to the sovereign had not been unknown to the people, since the Yeoman of the Guard and Gentlemen-at-Arms2 had been raised by Henries VII. and VIII.; and though the Commons protested 3 against a guard being raised for the security of King Charles I.,* yet at a later period, when the king had surrendered to them, they declared an infantry force to garrison the fortresses, and a cavalry force of 5,500 men, to be necessary for the security of the kingdom or for their own protection. Army dis 5 3 2. After the Restoration, the Convention Parliament proceeded at once to disband the army. The King conbanded. sented, at the instance of his Chancellor (Hyde,) upon these arguments:-"That they were a body of men who had cut off his father's head; that they had set up and pulled down ten several sorts of government, and that it might be his own turn next, and so (continues the writer) his fears prevailing over his ambition, he consented to disband them." The people 1 Lord Coke assures us that Henry VIII. promised to strengthen the kingdom with the perpetual maintenance of 40,000 men as a standing army, if the abbey lands were granted to him by Parliament. What would have been the fate of this kingdom had he kept his word, and the 40,000 men been maintained, solely dependent on the Crown? Constitutional liberty would be now overthrown. 2 See Appendix for an account of these corps, Note E. 32 Parl. Hist., p. 1238; 2 Com. Journ., p. 600. 4 Com. Journ., pp. 90-128, 91-141. 5 12 Car. II., c. 9, 15, 20, 27, 28. 4 Coke Inst., p. 44. 6 History of Standing Armies, vol. ii. State Tracts, p. 661. CHAP. IV. Army disbanded. 53 were heartily glad to get free of them. "So long," said Sir W. Morrice (and the same sentiment was re-echoed throughout that period by other members), "as the soldiery continued, there would be a perpetual trembling in the nation, for they are inconsistent with the happiness of any kingdom."1 3. At this period of our history, the Crown, for a stipulated annual sum-which was usually granted at the accession of each Sovereign for life-contracted to defray the whole expenses of the state. The King was therefore allowed to apportion this sum according to his own judgment, without any definite parliamentary responsibility attaching to his ministers. The Act of disbandment sanctioned the continuance of "Guards and Garrisons." The "Garrisons" were to Except be re-established and placed in the same condition garrisons." they were in in the year 1637,3 and out of the residue of soldiers, including some regiments that were in Scotland, the King was to be at liberty to retain, as a guard," "such of them or any other as his Majesty shall think fit otherwise to dispose of and provide for at his own charge." "guards and unlimited. 4. This Act, therefore, gave an authority to the King which was easily abused, as, unfortunately, it was silent on Numbers that point upon which all Parliaments subsequent to the Revolution have justly laid such stress, viz., the number of men to be retained in pay as soldiers; the only limit, as it will have been noticed, being the King's ability to maintain the troops, using as he might do any revenue he could so appropriate. Throughout the reign of Charles II. the retention of these troops in the employ, and nominally in the pay of the Crown, for they were too often left at free quarter, was a grievance to the people, and very many substantial reasons existed, as it will be seen, for making it so. 5. With the exception of the troops that were appointed and commissioned to particular garrisons—as for the Isle of 1 4 Parl. Hist., p. 115. 3 As to the Guard of the Sovereign, see Appendix F. 4 Sir James Mackintosh; 34 H. D. (O. S.), p. 537. 2 12 Car. II., c. 15. 5 See War Office Com. Bk. 1255, containing entries from 13th Oct., 1660, to the 19th May, 1684, pp. 3, 7, 28, 64. |