CHAP. XIV. Defence by Armed Citizens. 279 CHAPTER XIV. THE RESERVE FORCES. 1. INDEPENDENTLY of the Navy-the defence of the realm been defended Citizens. has mainly rested-both in theory and in fact, upon The Realm the people acting as armed citizens under and in sup- has always port of the authority of the Crown against Foreign by its Armed Enemies on Invasion, or against Traitors on Insurrection. Our National security has hitherto rested upon this solid basis, that the people, as a race, brave, enduring, and loyal, are able and willing at all times to defend themselves and their country though the world be in arms against them. essential to strength. 2. Hitherto it has been of the very essence of our National policy in Military affairs to uphold this element of our This policy national strength, but now that large armies are kept our National on foot by all European nations, including our own, it is vitally important, both for defensive and political reasons, to maintain our Volunteer Force. The tendency of a Standing Army is to invite security and to draw the people off from the duty of Self-protection. "A standing mercenary army in any free country," said Lord Carteret, "necessarily destroys the Martial spirit and Discipline of the rest of the people, and all histories show that a cowardly people must soon become slaves to a foreign or to a domestic army.”1 2 The Conscrip tion Laws of France train all Classes to the use of 3. The ranks of foreign armies are filled by Conscripts; those of the British Army by Volunteers. The operation of the two principles may lead to widely different results. Into the ranks of the North German army Prussia takes annually 100,000 men out of a popula- Arms. tion of 30,000,000; and France,3 in like manner, into her own army, takes nominally 100,000, but actually 70,000 men out of a population of 37,000,000. These citizens-the Conscription 2 Appendix P. 3 Appendix Q. 110 Parl. Hist., p. 494. In England but for the Volunteer System the Poorer Class acting on rich and poor alike—are trained to the use of arms for a certain number of years, and then discharged into the civil population. By these measures, not one only, but all classes, are trained to arms. The whole mass is leavened, and there is no political danger-which must sooner or later arise —where a monopoly of military skill is given by the State to one-if not to the lowest class of its citizens. Without the Volunteers, such would be the condition be trained by of England-but even with that Force would it be safe to eliminate, as some desire to do, the Aristocratic element from the Regular Army, by giving the command-as at the Commonwealth-to men raised from its ranks, and then to trust the wealth and Liberties of England to the defence of the Army? only would the State to the use of Arms. Military Crown now 4. The policy of the State before the Crimean war, was to recognise and act upon the principle of counterpoise,' Power of the which appears now to be wholly ignored. It was Concentrated. deemed not prudent to trust the power of the sword, either in men or matériel to one Minister only, or to one Commander only, or to form all the Military Forces into one Mass or Confederation. Power was divided, and the Army could not become politically dangerous under such arrangements; for without the concurrence of several responsible Ministers and as many Officers, the entire military power of the Crown could not be used against the liberties of the people. Consequences of the System. 5. In recent years, as a matter of fact, not only have the Military Forces of the Crown been vastly increased in the several branches - but the Administration and Command of them concentrated. Therefore, as a consequence, so far as the people are concerned, the military power is not under the same Constitutional restraint, nor so politically innocuous as in the last century. However, leaving tial for our this ground and looking at the aspect of Europe, no one can doubt that the continuance of a large Volunteer Volunteer National Security. 1 The Government naturally objected to the maintenance of an army regarded as a counterpoise to their own. They demanded the surrender of the weapons retained by the Volunteers, and succeeded, as far as they went, in obtaining them ; but they are apparently either aghast at the bloodshed incurred or afraid to continue the experiment, and the last state of Spain is so far worse than the first." See Times,' of 14th Jan., 1869. CHAP. XIV. Local Reserve under Lord-Lieutenant. 281 Force on foot, is essential to render the authority of the British Crown, both at home and abroad, safe in that measure of security which, for the honour of these realms, it is the pride of every Loyal Subject to see attained. (Local) are Lord-Lieu tenant. 42 Geo. III., 6. All the Reserve Forces of the Crown (except the Pension Force, to be referred to hereafter) are now and always All Reserve have been held under the Command of the Lord- Forces Lieutenant of each county. The responsibility for under the their efficiency and discipline rests solely with him, holding, both by Constitutional usage and Statutory authority, the place of Chief Command. The appointment and the displacement' of officers devolve upon him; the c. 90, sec. 5, Ministers of the Crown have only the power of vetoing an improper person should such be named by a Lord-Lieutenant. And it has been laid down by statesmen on both sides of the House, that Political motive should never interfere with such a function-indeed, in the view taken of it by the late Sir Robert Peel, "the spirit of the law" "is to deprive the Crown of the power of negativing the appointments of Lords-Lieutenant, on the ground of political disagreement alone.” "2 tinct Offices as Lord-Lieutenant and lorum held by same person. 7. I have before observed that two Non-Political offices of totally distinct import are often found United in the same person. As Custos Rotulorum-the appointee is Totally disthe Civil functionary responsible in a sense for the Preservation of Order and the due Administration of Custos RotuJustice in his County, and in that capacity properly communicates with the Home Office. As Lord-Lieutenant he is essentially a Military officer, and his communications as such are to be made, not to the Home, but to the War Office; for obviously the interference of a Military officer-either the Commander-in-Chief of the Militia in each county, or the General of the Army in each district-with the Administration of Justice or Civil police, would be unconstitutional. 1 Appendix LXXI.; Dickson v. Combermere, 3 Fos. and Fin., p. 348. 2 Sce Lord John Russell's and Sir Robert Peel's views stated 29 H. D. (3), Pp. 294, 295. Office of Lord-Lieutenant is purely Statu 8. The office of Lord-Lieutenant is essentially statutory, and his appointment by the Crown as Lieutenant (and not as Custos Rotulorum) is by Patent granted under the tory. authority of the Militia Laws. Like every other Military officer, he is liable to dismissal at the pleasure of the Crown, and though fortunately the necessity for the exercise of this prerogative seldom presents itself, yet instances of such dismissals are upon record. His status are those of a 9. His official relationship towards the Sovereign is that of a General3 of a district-reporting to the Crown and function through the Secretary of State for the War DepartGeneral in ment. Such communications are therefore of a confidential nature, and the Ministers have refused to district. lay them before Parliament, unless a case of the strongest necessity can be made out to justify or require their production.* Command of a Military As to the Reserve Force. Divided into 10. The Original Establishment in Charles II.'s reign, aud the subsequent Reorganization of the Militia in 1786, Militia as a have already been shown, but before dealing with the Volunteer Force, some additional information must be given with reference to the Militia, since it has been placed in the position of a Reserve Force secondary in importthree periods. ance to the Standing Army. This will be done by furnishing the reader with a very brief outline of the subsequent statutory enactments arranged in three periods. 1st. From the outbreak of the Revolutionary War with France to the Peace of Amiens; 2nd. During the second French and Peninsular War until the decline of the Militia Force; 3rd. From the 1 14 Car. II., c. 3, sec. 2; and 42 Geo. III., c. 90, sec. 2; see Appendix LXXII. 2 As to the dismissal of Lords Carmarthen and Pembroke in 1780, see 21 Parl. Hist., p. 226; and of Earl Fitzwilliam in 1819, see 2 Ann. Reg. (1819), p. 109; 41 H D. (O. S.), p. 15; Sidmouth's Life, vol. iii., p. 270. 3 The Lord-Lieutenant may act as Colonel Commandant under certain circumstances (42 Geo. III., c. 90, sec. 72). An Officer holding the rank of Honorary Colonel, introduced in 1854, stands in relation to his Regiment in a position analogous to that of a General Officer who is the Colonel of a Line Regiment, 135 H. D. (3), p. 905. 4 50 H. D. (3), p. 1330. CHAP. XIV. Militia Force. 283 re-establishment of the Militia in 1853 upon the Voluntary principle. I. As to the first Period: 11. Under the Militia Act in force, upon the breaking out of the French Revolutionary War,' the statutory quota of A.D. 1792-3. the Militia for England and Wales was fixed at 30,740 Militia Force. men, to be raised by ballot, or by the parish officers procuring volunteers at a bounty (not exceeding 67.) to be paid out of the rates. The Militia was forthwith embodied; and to provide against the destitution that might arise to the wives and families of the married Militiamen, Parliament, in recognition of their claims to a special Provision, passed an Act granting them relief by Parish Officers, though the money expended was principally charged upon the County Rate.2 12. In March, 1794, the 34 Geo. III., c. 16,3 was passed for augmenting the Militia, by enabling the Crown, A.D. 1794. through the Lords-Lieutenant, to accept from persons Augmented. qualified according to the Militia laws, offers of raising one or more companies of men, to be added to the Militia, as Volunteers, and to confer upon them temporary rank (not above the rank of a Lieutenant-Colonel). The Act also authorized the churchwardens, with the consent of the Vestry, to increase the bounty to Volunteers enrolled under 26 Geo. III., c. 107, to a sum of 10%. 13. In June, 1795, another Act' authorised men to volunteer from the Militia (in the proportion of 1 to 10) into A.D. 1795. the Artillery or Navy; their vacancies being supplied by ordinary recruiting, at a bounty of ten guineas into the per man. 1 26 Geo. III., c. 107. Allowed to volunteer Regular 2 See the first Act (33 Geo. III., c. 8). The Law was consolidated in 1803. See 43 Geo. III., c. 47, and later Acts, and especially 5 & 6 Wm. IV., c. 70, sec. 60. The Wife or Child of a Militiaman appears to have no special Claim to relief over that possessed by the Wife or Child of a Soldier. See Rules of the Poor Law Commissioners; Arch.'s 'Poor Law,' p. 327; and 138 H. D. (3), p. 180, and 144, ib, p. 947. 135 Geo. III., c. 83. 3 31 Parl. Hist., pp. 83, 206, 211, 233. |