gal Government, in 1790, assessed
the whole of the Zemindary of
Khuruckpore, including certain
Ghatwally lands, at a fixed jumma.
This Settlement was made perpe-
tual in 1796, under Ben. Reg. I.
of 1793, at the same fixed jumma.
In 1838, the Government set up a
claim to resume, for the purpose
of revenue assessment, the Ghat-
wally lands in this Zemindary.
Such claim dismissed, by reason,-
First. That the Ghatwally lands were
part of the Zemindary of Khuruck-
pore, and were included in the
Permanent Settlement of the Ze-
mindary, and covered by the
jumma assessed on that Zemin-
dary; and

Second. That lands of Ghatwally

tenure were not liable to re-
sumption under cl. 4, sec. 8, Ben.
Reg. I. of 1793, as included in
allowances made to Zemindars for
Tannah, or police establishments.
[Rajah Lelanund Sing Bahadoor v.
The Government of Bengal]

RIVER.

101

The East India Company, as repre-
senting the Indian Government,
have a freehold in the bed of
navigable rivers in India, and to
the land between high and low
water mark. [Doe dem. Seebkristo
v. The East India Company] 267

SECURITY.

After an appeal had been asserted
from a decree of the Sudder Court
at Madras, the Appellant applied

to that Court under sec. 4, of Reg.
VIII. of 1818, and the Circular
Order of 21st September, 1826, for
an order calling upon the Respon-
dents, who had been in possession
of the estates in dispute before the
institution of the suit, to give
security as prescribed by that
Regulation. The Sudder Court
refused the application as not being
within the provisions of the Regu-
lation. Upon petition, the Judicial
Committee declined to interfere,
as there was no allegation of waste
by the Respondents in the petition.
Quære: Whether there is any juris-
diction in the Judicial Committee
under sec. 4, of Mad. Reg. VIII.
of 1818. [Nagalutchmes Umma!
v. Gopoo Nadaraja Chetty] - 309

SEQUESTRATION.

A sequestrator in possession is not to

be disturbed by a claimant, without
leave of the Court. The usual
mode is to apply for permission to
bring an action of ejectment, or to
examine, pro interesse suo.
Under a writ of sequestration the

sheriff seized a moiety of an estate
in the possession of 4.; A. pre-
sented a petition to the Court, en-
titled in a cause then pending,
claiming the land under a deed of
sale executed by the Defendant,
pendente lite, praying to be put in
possession, and to be allowed to go
before the Master and examine
witnesses, pro interesse suo. Pro-
ceedings were taken under this
petition before the Master, but

1. A., in the custody of the Sheriff,
and confined in the gaol at Bombay,
under a writ of execution issued
against him upon a judgment of
the Supreme Court at Bombay, was
permitted by the Sheriff, with the
sanction and authority of the judg-
ment creditors, by reason of illness,
to go out of prison, and temporarily
reside outside the precincts of the
gaol, upon the condition that he

should continue under the surveil-
lance of the Sheriff's officers, and
to which condition A. agreed, and
continued for a time to reside out
of gaol at a private house, where
he was constantly under such sur-
veillance. Upon 4.'s becoming con-
valescent, the Sheriff, at the in-
stance of the judgment creditors,
took him back to gaol. Upon an
application by A., to the Supreme
Court at Bombay, to discharge him

out of custody, on the ground that
the writ of execution was satisfied,
that Court held, that A., having
agreed to the condition imposed
on him by the judgment creditors,
of continuing in the custody of the
Sheriff's officers while out of gaol,
was estopped from saying that he
was out of the Sheriff's custody
when permitted to leave the
gaol, and that a change of the
place of imprisonment in such
circumstances did not amount to a
discharge out of custody. Such
judgment affirmed, upon appeal,
by the Judicial Committee.
Where an execution creditor is willing
to allow a debtor to go out of prison
for a temporary purpose, the cus-
tody continuing, the Sheriff may
refuse, unless ordered by a rule of
Court; but if, without any rule of
Court, all parties agree to the
debtor leaving the prison, and,
from a laxity of surveillance of the
Sheriff's officers, the debtor escapes,
it is a question of fact for the jury,
if the judgment creditor brings an
action against the Sheriff, whether
the judgment creditor did not him-

self contribute to the escape.
If the Sheriff alone, on the ground

of a debtor's ill-health, makes any
relaxation of the imprisonment, by
letting the debtor reside out of
prison, it would be an escape.
[Haines v. The East India Com-
pany]

467
2. A., by four deeds, conveyed certain
real estates near Dacca, in bena-
mee, to S., his mistress, by virtue of
which she took possession. By a

Will made subsequent to the date
of the conveyances, A. appointed
G., his illegitimate son, executor,
and after satisfying certain charges
thereby created, which would ex-
haust his whole estate, gave G. a
life estate in the residue. A. was
involved and in pecuniary difficul-
ties, and an action was brought
against him in the Supreme Court
at Calcutta by some of his creditors,
which action was pending at the
time of his death, and was revived
against G. as A.'s heir, and judg-
ment obtained against G. without
reference to his character as ex-
ecutor of A. Under an execution
sale in satisfaction of this judg-
ment, the Sheriff sold "the right,
title, and interest" of G. to V.
(whose interest afterwards became
vested in B.) for a nominal sum.
Ejectment by B. founded on the
title under the Sheriff's Bill of
sale, against S. and G., to recover
possession of the real estate in S.'s
possession, impeaching the con-
veyances made to her by A. as void
as against 4.'s creditors. The
Court in India decreed possession
to B. on the ground of the con-
veyances being fraudulent. Decree
of the Sudder Court reversed by
the Judicial Committee by rea-

son,-

First, that the title of S. to the lands

under the conveyances was esta-
blished.

Second, that in the circumstances of

G. having only an uncertain right
in unascertained property, it was
not such an interest as could be

Bill,quia timet, by reversioner against
the daughter of an intestate Hin-
doo in possession of personalty,
dismissed.

A Court of Equity will not interfere,

unless it is shown that there is
danger from the mode in which the
tenant for life in possession is
dealing with the property.

The mere fact of the tenant for life

keeping in hand, for about three
months, part of the corpus for the
alleged purpose of an eligible in-
vestment does not amount to waste,
nor is in derogation of the rights
of those entitled to reversion.
[Hurrydoss Dutt v. Sreemutty Up-
poornak Dossee]

See "WILL," 2.

UNDIVIDED HINDO0

FAMILY.

433

The presumption of the Hindoo law,
in a joint undivided family, is, that
the whole property of the family
is joint estate, and the onus lies
upon a party claiming any part of

A wager contract in India (before the
passing of the Legislative Act,
No. 21, of 1848) upon the average
price opium would fetch at a future
Government sale, held legal, and
an action thereon maintained.
The Plaintiff and Defendants, by
contracts in writing, wagered as to
the average price to be obtained for
opium "of the 30th of November,"
"of the first lelaum, or public Go-
vernment sale of opium." At the
time when these contracts were
entered into, the first Government
sale had been advertised for the
"30th of November, 1846." The
sale on that day was prevented by
a combination of opium speculators
interested in similar contracts.
The Government sale was again ad-
vertised, and took place on the 7th
of December following, when opium
of the quantity and description ad-
vertised for sale on the" 30th of
November" was sold. Held: first,
that the date mentioned in the con-
tracts, the 30th of November,"
was a description of the period when
the first public Government sale
of opium usually took place, and
formed no part of the risk contem-
plated by the wagers, the subject

of the contracts, and was immate-
rial; and, secondly, that according
to the true construction of the con-
tracts, the first actual public Govern-
ment sale which took place next
after the date of the contracts
satisfied the terms of the contracts;
and upon a certain average being
realised thereon, the event on
which the Plaintiff had wagered
was determined in his favour, and
he was entitled to recover the dif-
ferences under the averages. [Rug-
hoonauth Sahoi Chotayloll v. Ma-
nickchund]

WAIVER.

-

251

2. Rules for construing Wills of Hin-
doos.

Primarily, the words of a Will are to
to be considered. They convey the
intention of the Testator's wishes;
but the meaning to be attached to
them may be affected by surround-
ing circumstances, among which is
the law of the country in which the
Willis made and its dispositions
are to be carried out. If that law
has attached to particular words a
particular meaning, or to a parti-
cular disposition a particular effect,
it must be assumed that the Testa-
tor, in the disposition he has made,
had regard to that meaning, or to
that effect, unless the language of
the Will, or the surrounding circum-
stances, displace that assumption.
A Testator by his Will made an ab-
solute gift of his real and personal
estate to his five sons (an undivided
Hindoo family) in equal shares; and
in a subsequent part of his Will,
in the event of any of his five sons
dying without a son or son's son,
there was a gift over to such of

his sons or sons' sons as should be
alive. After the death of the Tes-
tator, the sons lived together, and
no partition of the joint estate was
made, the surplus income and the
increment being kept with the
common stock. Upon the death
of one of the sons without leaving
a son or son's son, his widow, who
was entitled to a life interest in her
husband's estate, claimed her hus-
band's share of the accumulation of
income, and the increment thereon.
Held, upon a construction of the
Will, that in the absence of any
direction of the Testator that his
sons should continue a joint family,
such an intention could not be im-
ported into the Will, and that the
Testator's intention was, that his
sons should enjoy during their lives
the interest of their respective
shares of the property; and there-
fore, that, although the deceased
co-sharer's share went over to the
survivors, the widow of the de-
ceased was entitled to one-fifth of
the surplus income which had ac-
cumulated since the Testator's
death, and during her husband's
lifetime, and the increment arising
out of such accumulations. [Sree-
mutty Soorjeemoney Dossee v. De-
nobundoo Mullick]

See "HINDOO LAW," 4.

526