1. A deed of arrangement and release
in the English form, between mem-
bers of a Hindoo family in respect
of certain joint estate, claimed by
a childless Hindoo widow of one
of the co-heirs, in her character of
heiress and legal personal repre-
sentative of her deceased husband,
declared that she was entitled to
the sum therein expressed, as the
share of her deceased husband,
"for her sole absolute use and
benefit."

Held, (reversing the decree of the
Supreme Court at Calcutta,) that

those words were not to receive
the same interpretation as a Court
of Equity in England would put
upon them, as creating a separate
estate in the widow; but that the
deed must be construed with refer-
ence to the situation of the parties
and the rights of the widow by the
Hindoo law, and that, as the deed
recited that she claimed and re-
ceived the money as her husband's
share in the joint estate in her
character as his heiress and legal
personal representative,such words
must be construed to mean, that it
was to be held by her in severalty
from the joint estate; and as a
Hindoo widow she had only a life
estate in the corpus, the same at
her death devolved as assets of her
deceased husband upon his personal
representative in succession. [Sree-
mutty Rabutty Dossee v. Sibchun-
der Mullick]

1

2. Where a purchase of real estate is
made by a Hindoo in the name of
one of his sons, the presumption
of the Hindoo law is in favour of
its being a benamee purchase, and
the burthen of proof lies on the
party in whose name it was pur-
chased, to prove that he was solely
entitled to the legal and beneficial
interest in such purchased estate.
Purchase of a talook in Bengal by a

Hindoo in his eldest son's name,
the conveyance, though in the
English form of lease and release,
held to be a benamee purchase, and
the son in whose name it was pur-
chased declared to be a trustee for
the father, and the talook part of

the father's estate. [Gopeekrist
Gosain v. Gungapersaud Gosain]

53

3. By the Hindoo law a verbal grant
or real estate is good, if followed
by possession by the grantee.
The grantors of real estate were Hin-
doos, and the grantees, the East
India Company. Held, that as
the Hindoo law which governed
the grantors' rights allowed a ver-
bal grant, the law of the grantees
regulated the matter, and, as there
was possession under the grant by
the grantees, the grant was valid.
[Doe dem. Seebkristo v. The East
India Company] -

4.

- 267

A will by a Hindoo, without male
issue, kinsman or coparcener, after
providing for the maintenance of
his widow, daughters, and female
relations, devised ancestral as well
as other real and personal estate
to trustees upon certain charitable
trusts; was impeached by reason,
first, that the Testator had author-
ised his widow, in an event which
happened, to adopt a son, which
act would have rendered him in-
competent to exercise a testamen-
tary power; secondly, that at the
time of the execution of the Will
the Testator was not of sufficient
mental capacity to make a testa-
mentary disposition; and thirdly,
that the Testator being a Hindoo,
had no power by law of devising
ancestral estate by Will.
Upon appeal,-(Held, affirming the
decree of the Sudder Court in India,)
First, that although, in the absence

of male issue of the deceased, there

was a strong presumption, arising
from religious considerations, in
favour of a delegation by the de-
ceased to his widow, of authority
to adopt a son for him, yet that
the evidence entirely failed to
prove that fact;

Secondly, that the evidence established
his mental capacity at the time of
executing the Will; and
Thirdly, that by the Hindoo law
prevailing in Madras, a Hindoo
in possession, without issue male,
kinsman, or coparcener, had power
to make a Will disposing of an-
cestral as well as acquired estate.
[Nagalutchmee Ummal v. Gopoo
Nadaraja Chetty]

309

A party in possession under a fraudu-
lent deed, to defeat the claim of
creditors under a sequestration, is
not entitled to any allowance for
sums expended by him for im-
provements upon the estate. [Mu-
sadee Mahomed Cazum Sherazee v.
Meerza Ally Mahomed Shoostry]

27

INHERITANCE.

1. Upon the death of the Ghatwal
last seised, the lands descend
entire to a male heir, as Ghatwal.
[Rajah Lelanund Sing Bahadoor
v. The Government of Bengal] 101
2. Family usage for fourteen genera-

tions, by which the succession to
the Raj zemindary of Tirhoot had
uniformly descended entire to a
single male heir, to the exclusion
of the other members of the family,
upheld.

A custom for the Rajah in possession,
in his lifetime to abdicate and
assign by deed the Raj title and
domain to his eldest son, or next
immediate male heir. Held good,
and a deed so assigning the Raj
to an eldest son (provision being
made for Baboo allowances for the
younger sons), sustained. [Baboo
Gunesh Dutt Singh v. Maharaja
Moheshur Singh]·

-

164

2. By the Act, No. XXXII. of 1839,
extending the provisions of the
Statute, 3rd & 4th Wm. IV., c. 42,
sec. 28, to India, it was enacted,
"That upon all debts or sums
certain, payable at a certain time,
the Court before whom such debt
or sums may be recovered, may, if
it shall think fit, allow interest to
the creditor, at a rate not exceeding
the current rate of interest, from
the time when such debts or sums
certain were payable, if such debts
or sums be payable by virtue of
some written instrument at certain
time."

An instrument, in a nature of,
though not strictly, a Bond, was
executed in 1833, which provided
for the liquidation of the amount
therein specified by instalments,
but no provision was made for the
allowance of interest. The con-
dition for payment not having been
performed. Held, in an action
brought in 1849, to recover prin-
cipal and interest upon the Bond,
that the Act, No. XXXII. of 1839,
was retrospective in its operation,
and authorised the allowance of
interest, although it was not pro-
vided for by the Bond. [Rajah
Bommarauze Bahadur v. Ranga-
samy Mudaly]

232

3. Upon the adjustment of an account
of the principal and interest due
upon a Bond, a Kararnamah, or deed
of agreement, was entered into by

the parties, in which, besides the
original sum, a further sum for
interest accrued thereon was de-
clared due, and agreed to be paid
off by instalments before a given
time. Payments were made at
irregular periods, which payments
the Bondholder claimed to appro-
priate to keeping down the interest
upon the whole sum composed of
both the original principal sum as
well as the sum mentioned in the
Kararnamah, as accrued thereon for
interest. Held, upon the con-
struction of the instrument, that
the principal sum alone carried
interest, and that all payments
made in pursuance of the stipu-
lations were to be applied in the
first instance to satisfy such in-
terest, the excess of the payments
only being appropriated towards
the liquidation of the principal
sum due. [Bamundoss Mookerjea v.
Omeish Chunder Raee]

IMPRISONMENT.

289

Change of place of confinement.

See "SHERIFF,” 1.

JUDGMENT DEBT
(Sale of, by Sheriff).

See "SHERIFF," 2.

JURISDICTION.

1. Quare: Whether there is any juris-

diction in the Judicial Committee
under sec. 4, of Mad. Reg. VIII.
of 1818, to call for security from
the Respondent when put in pos-
session. [Nagalutchmee Ummal v.
Gopoo Nadaraja Chetty]

- 309
2. The Bombay Charter of Justice
(Dec. 1823) gives the Supreme Court
"full power and authority to admi-
nister and execute, within and
throughout the town and Island
of Bombay, and the limits thereof,
and the factories subordinate there-
to, &c., upon all persons so de-
scribed and distinguished by the
appellation of British subjects, as
aforesaid, there residing, the Ec-
clesiastical law, as the same is now
used and exercised in the Diocese
of London, in Great Britain, so
far as the circumstances and occa-
sion of the said town, island, ter-
ritories, and people shall admit and
require."

Suit on the Ecclesiastical side of the
Supreme Court at Bombay by wife
against husband for restitution of
conjugal rights and for main-
tenance. Protest by the husband,
that the parties were Parsees pro-
fessing the religion of that sect,
and that the Court had no juris-
diction to administer towards them
the Ecclesiastical law as at the date
of the Charter was used and exer-
cised in the Diocese of London.
Upon appeal, Held, (reversing the
judgment of the Court below, and
maintaining the protest,) that the
Supreme Court of Bombay, on its
Ecclesiastical side, had no juris-
diction to entertain such a suit, as

there existed such a difference be-
tween the duties and obligations of
a matrimonial union among Par-
sees from that of Christians, that
the Court, if it made a decree, had
no means of enforcing it, except
according to the principles govern-
ing the matrimonial law in Doctors'
Commons, which were in such a
case incompatible with the laws
and customs of Parsees.
Quære: Whether, in such circum-
stances, the Supreme Court can,
on its civil side, give relief to the
wife. [Ardaseer Cursetjee v. Pe-
rozeboye]

See "APPEAL," 6.

LIEN.

348

2. In proceedings by the obligee of a
Bond before the Collector's Court
in 1844, upon an application for a
sequestration of the obligor's es-
tates, the obligor filed an account
of his liabilities, in which the Bond
in question was entered and certain
payments mentioned. Held, that
such acknowledgment took the
Bond out of the operation of the
Mad. Reg. of Limitation, II. of
1802, sec. 18, cl. 4. [Rajah Bom-
marauze Bahadur v. Rangasamy
Mudaly]
232

3. C. a Hindoo, by his Will, appointed
G. and others executors, and there-
by gave and devised the residue of
his estate to his daughter, H., the
wife of G. All the Executors
proved, but G. alone acted in the
trusts of the Will, G.being largely
indebted to C.'s estate; and in 1831,
he by deed conveyed to H. part of
C'.'s real estate as security for his
debt. In 1833, G. was declared
insolvent under the Statute, 9th
Geo. IV., c. 73. H. entered into
possession of the property so con-
veyed to her, and continued unin-
terruptedly to hold the same till
the institution of the suit by the
official assignee of the Insolvent
Court, a period of twenty-two years.
Held, in the absence of any proof
of fraud in the transaction of 1831,
or unfairness against II. in obtain-
ing possession, so as to bring the
case within the exception in cl. 1,
sec. 3, of Ben. Reg. II. of 1805,
that the possession by H. for more
than twelve years was, by Ben.
Reg. III. of 1793, sec. 14, a bar to