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to the other. The power in question, however, can only be exercised when the blow is directed against the state constitution and authority, or when it incidentally or indirectly affects the Government of the United States. Where the violence is immediately directed against the Federal authority, the General Government is invested with power to suppress it, independently of any requisition of the state government. But insurrections against the state governments will rarely require Federal interposition, unless the number of those concerned in them bears some proportion to the friends of the state constitution; and it will then be much better that the violence should be suppressed by the superintending power, than that even a majority in a state should be left to maintain its cause by a bloody and obstinate contest. The existence itself of the right of the General Government to interpose will, however, generally prevent the necessity of exercising the power; and In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, no better umpire could be desired in a state quarrel than the representative authority of the Union, who would be free from the influence of local interests, and from participation in local or personal animosities.

VII. The power of Congress to "propose amendments to the Constitution, and call conventions for the purpose," is the last to be referred to in this class of the Federal powers.

That useful alterations would be suggested by experience, could not but have been foreseen by the framers of the Constitution. It was requisite, therefore, that a mode for introducing amendments should be provided; and that which was adopted guards equally against that extreme facility which would render the Constitution too mutable, and the extreme

difficulty which might perpetuate its faults. The article in question provides that "Congrèss, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to the Constitution; or, on the application of the legislatures of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by Congress: provided that no amendment, which may be made prior to the year 1808, shall in any manner affect" the previous provisions respecting the importation of slaves, and the proportional imposition of capitation and other direct taxes; " and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate."

Thus the General and State Governments are equally enabled to originate amendments, as their necess sity is pointed out by experience; and I have already had occasion to remark that those proposed or adopted since the ratification of the Constitution were few in number. They consist only of three: first, that which declares "that the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state;" second, that which changed the mode of balloting for President and Vice-president by the electors; and, third, an amendment ordaining that, " if any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive, or retain any title of nobility or honour; or shall, without the consent of Congress, accept or retain any present, pension, office, or emolument of

any kind whatever, from any emperor, king, prince, or foreign power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them, or either of them."

The previous and more numerous amendments were proposed by some of the states as conditions of their accession to the Constitution. They all operate as general restrictions upon the powers of Congress, and are, for the most part, affirmative either of the inalienable rights of individuals, or of the civil and political rights and privileges substituted in their stead, as explained in our review of the fundamental principles of the government; and they were manifestly adopted from superabundant caution, inasmuch as those rights were already sufficiently guarded by the state constitutions and bills of rights. The following, however, may be enumerated as exceptions, viz. :

1st. That which prohibits Congress from making any law respecting a religious establishment, prohibiting the free exercise of religious worship, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.

2d. That "the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." And,

3d. That "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."

The second of these amendments was intended to prevent any perverse or ingenious misapplication of the maxim that “an affirmation in particular cases implies a negation in all others." The one last specified is merely an affirmation of a necessary rule for the interpretation of the Constitution; which, being an

instrument of limited and enumerated powers, what is not conferred by it is withheld, and retained by the state governments, if vested in them by their constitutions, and if not so vested, remains with the people, as a part of their residuary sovereignty. This amendment, however, does not confine the Federal Government to the exercise of express powers; for implied powers must necessarily have been admitted, unless the Constitution had descended to the regulation of the minutest details of legislation. It is a general principle, that all bodies politic possess all the powers incident to a corporate capacity, without any express declaration to that effect; and one of those defects of the Confederation which led to its abolition,. was its prohibiting Congress from the exercise of any power "not expressly delegated."

It could never, therefore, have been intended by the amendment in question to abridge any of the powers granted under the new Constitution, whether express or implied, direct or incidental. Its man

ifest and sole design was to exclude any interpretation by which other powers should be assumed beyond those granted. All the powers granted by the Constitution, whether express or implied, direct or incidental, are left by the amendment in their original state, while all powers "not delegated" (not all powers "not expressly delegated") and not prohibited are reserved.

In these, and all the other restrictions on the legislative powers of the Union, the two great objects were to secure the rights of the people, and to preserve the Federal system.

LECTURE XI.

OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS UPON THE POWERS OF THE SEVERAL STATES.

THE fifth class of provisions in favour of the Federal authority consists of restrictions on the powers of the several states. These may be distinguished by their character as two sorts: the first comprehending those limitations which are absolute; and the second, such as are qualified.

I. The former prohibit any state from entering into any treaty of alliance or confederation; from granting letters of marque and reprisal; from coining money, emitting bills of credit, or making anything but gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts; from passing any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; and from granting any title of nobility.

1st. The prohibition against treaties, alliances, and confederations was contained in the articles of the former union of the states, and copied in the new Constitution. If every state were at liberty to enter into treaties, alliances, and confederacies with foreign states, or with other members of the Union, the power confided to the National Government in regard to the former would be rendered nugatory, while the Constitution itself might be subverted by the exercise of such a power among the states.

The prohibition of letters of marque and reprisal was also a part of the old system, and adopted, but with some extension, in the new. According to the former, they might be granted by the states, after a declaration of war by Congress; under the latter,

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