ishment is, that "no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted." Corruption of blood, in common with many better things, we derive again from the common law. It signifies that an attainted person can neither inherit land from his ancestors, retain that of which he is in possession, nor transmit it to his heirs; and that he is, moreover, incapable of ransmitting a title derived by descent through him, even from a remote ancestor. This is visiting the

sins of the fathers upon the children with a vengeance, as it is not confined to the third and fourth generations, but extends to a man's latest posterity. The doctrine is founded upon a legal fiction; and is equally at variance with the liberal principles of modern times, and the very elements of justice. And in carrying this power into execution, Congress has humanely stopped short of their constitutional authority; for, in affixing the punishment of death to the crime of treason, it has declared, that "no conviction or judgment shall work corruption of blood, or any forfeiture of estate," thus acting upon a construction of the Constitution which assumes a discretion in omitting the latter as a part of the punishment of treason, even during the life of the offender himself.

IV. The fourth power of a miscellaneous nature vested in Congress is that of "admitting new states into the Union."

No provision of this kind was made in the Articles of Confederation, and great inconvenience, and much assumption of power, were the necessary consequences. With great propriety and advantage, therefore, the new Constitution supplied this defect. But the power was not granted without restriction; for "no new state" can" be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state; nor can any state be form

ed by the junction of two or more states, without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned, as well as of Congress." These precautions, which prevent either the partition of a large state, or the junction of small ones, without their consent, were necessary to allay the jealousies existing on the subject, both in the more powerful and in the weaker members of the confederacy.

Upon the purchase of Louisiana by the United States, some doubt was entertained whether the power of the General Government to admit new states into the Union extended to territories not comprised within the boundaries of the United States at the adoption of the Constitution. This question, although never presented in a form for judicial decision, was, however, decided in the affirmative by large majorities of both houses of Congress, on the several occasions of admitting different parts of that province into the Union, as the separate States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Arkansas; which acts were severally approved by successive chief magistrates of the Union. It must therefore be considered as practically settled, and it would savour too much of the spirit of controversy, and betray too much self-confidence, to offer, at this time of day, any argument in support of the negative side of that question, and to assert that such a measure required not only the consent of the inhabitants of the territory, but an amendment of the Constitution to render it valid. All doubt, indeed, seems long since to have subsided, and public opinion has sustained the government in this exercise of the power in question, on the ground of constitutional right, as strongly as it has been declared in favour of its policy.

V. The 66 power to dispose of and make all needful regulations respecting the territory or other prop

erty belonging to the United States," is the next one comprehended in this class.

It was required that this power should be vested in Congress, by considerations similar to those upon which rests the propriety of its possessing the power next preceding it; and it is accompanied by a condition, not only proper in itself, but which was probably rendered absolutely necessary by the jealousies and controversies that existed concerning the Western territory, and which provides that "nothing in the Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice claims of the United States, or of any particular state."

any

The authority, thus restricted, is adapted to all the territorial rights of the Federal Government, beyond the limits of any of the states; but is not applicable, it seems, to a fortress which has never been actually ceded to the United States; nor to any land occupied by the General Government for any similar purpose, with the tacit consent of the state, although the title to the soil may have been conveyed to the United States. It is under this power that Congress claims authority to legislate for the Territories, erected in provinces, acquired, like Louisiana and the Floridas, since the adoption of the Federal Constitution. But if the Federal Government possessed authority to purchase them, there seems no necessity for resting the right of legislation in regard to them on such narrow and insufficient grounds, for the power of governing a territory is the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire and hold it.

VI. The guarantee by the "United States to every state in the Union of a Republican form of government; to protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of the executive, when the Legislature cannot be convened,

against domestic violence," may also be classed among the miscellaneous powers of the Federal Government, as it gives to it a right of interference to effect the objects of the guarantee.

Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a Federal coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature. In a confederacy founded on Republican principles, and composed of Republican members, the paramount superintending government created by it ought certainly to possess the authority to defend the whole sys· tem against innovation; and the more intimate the union, the greater the interests of its members ir the separate institutions of each other, and the greater the right to insist that the respective forms of government under which the general compact was entered into should be substantially maintained. But a right implies a remedy, and nowhere else could an effectual remedy be found in such a case than where it is actually deposited by the Constitution. The mere stipulation, without the power to enforce its observance, would be of little value; hence the term“ guarantee" indicates that the United States are authorized to oppose, and, if possible, prevent every state in the Union from abandoning the Republican form of government. But the authority extends no farther, and it presumes the pre-existence of governments of the form guarantied. So long, therefore, as the Republican forms existing at the time the Constitution was adopted are continued by the states, they are guarantied by the Federal Government, and the Federal Constitution imposes no other restriction upon the alteration of the respective state constitutions than that they shall not vary from the Republican form. Whenever a state may choose to substitute another Republican government in place of that pre

viously existing, it has a right so to do, and is equally entitled to claim for it the benefit of a Federal guarantee.

Protection against invasion is due from every society to the members composing it, and the latitude of the expressions used in the Constitution secures each state, not only from foreign hostility, but against the ambitious or vindictive enterprise of its more powerful neighbours. The protection against domestic violence is added with equal policy and propriety, as it affords the means of enforcing the guarantee before provided for, whenever a faction or minority in a state endeavours by violence to subvert the Republican form of its Constitution. It is by no means, however, confined to that particular case, nor that particular object, but extends to protection against the acts even of a majority of the people of a state, when directed to any object of unconstitutional violence. For, although it may at the first view ap. pear inconsistent with the Republican theory either that the minority will have the power, or that a majority have not the right to subvert the government, yet mere speculative reasoning must in these cases, as in all others, be qualified by the lessons of practice and experience.

Unlawful combinations for purposes of violence may be formed by a majority of persons in a state, especially in a slaveholding state, as well as by a majority of a county, or other subdivision of a state; and if the authority of the state is bound in the latter case to protect the local magistracy, the Government of the Union is equally bound in the former to protect the state authority. Besides, there are certain parts of the state constitutions which are so interwoven with the Federal compact, that a violent assault cannot be made on the one without injury