GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY,

THE scene which we are engaged in, and the duty which I am not merely privileged, but appointed by the authority of the court to perform, exhibits to the whole civilized world a perpetual monument of our national justice.

The transaction, indeed, in every part of it, as it stands recorded in the evidence already before us, places our country, and its government, and its inhabitants, upon the highest pinnacle of hu. man elevation. It appears, that upon the 15th day of May last, His Majesty, after a reign of for. ty years, not merely in sovereign power, but spontaneously in the very hearts of his people, was openly shot at (or to all appearance shot at) in a public theatre in the centre of his capital, and amidst the loyal plaudits of his subjects, YET NOT

A HAIR OF THE HEAD OF THE SUPPOSED ASSASSIN

WAS TOUCHED. In this unparallelled scene of calm forbearance, the King himself, though he stood first in personal interest and feeling as well as in command, was a singular and fortunate example. The least appearance of emotion on the part of that august personage, must unavoidably have produced a scene quite different, and far less honorable than the court is now witnessing; but His Majesty remained unmoved, and the person apJarently offending was only secured, without injury or reproach, for the business of this day.

Gentlemen, I agree with the Attorney General (indeed, there can be no possible doubt), that if

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the same pistol had been maliciously fired by the prisoner in the same theatre, at the meanest man within its walls, he would have been brought to immediate trial. and, if guilty, to immediate execution. He would have heard the charge against him for the first time when the indictment was read upon his arraignment. He would have been a stranger to the names and even to the existence of those who were to sit in judgment upon him, and of those who were to be the witnesses against him; but upon the charge of even this murderous at*tack upon the King himself, he is covered all over with the armor of the law. He has been provided with counsel by the King's own judges, and not of their choice, but of his own. He has had a copy of the indictment ten days before this trial. He has had the names, descriptions, and abodes of all the jurors returned to the court; and the highest privilege of peremtory challenges derived from, and safely directed by that indulgence.— He has had the same description of every witness who could be received to accuse him; and there. must at this hour be twice the testimony against him as would be legally competent to establish his guilt on a similar prosecution by the meanest and most helpless of mankind.

Gentlemen, when this melancholy catastrophe happened, and the prisoner was arraigned for trial, I remember to have said to some now present, that it was, at first view, difficult to bring those indulgent exceptions to the general rules of trial

within the principle which dictated them to our humane ancestors in cases of treasons against the political government, or of rebellious conspiracy against the person of the King. In these cases, the passions and interests of great bodies of powerful men being engaged and agitated, a counterpoise became necessary to give composure and impartiality to criminal tribunals; but a mere murderous attack upon the King's person, not at all connected with his political character, seemed a case to be ranged and dealt with like a similar attack upon any private man.

But the wisdom of the law is greater than any man's wisdom; how much more, therefore, than mine! An attack upon the King is considered to be parricide against the state; and the jury and the witness, and even the judges, are the children. It is fit, on that account, that there should be a solemn pause before we rush to judgment; and what can be a more sublime spectacle of justice than to see a statutable disqualification of a whole nation for a limited period, a fifteen day's quarantine before trial, lest the mind should be subject to the contagion of partial affections!*

From a prisoner so protected by the benevolence of our institutions, the utmost good faith would, on his part, be due to the public if he had consciousness and reason to reflect upon the obligation. The duty, therefore, devolves on me,

There must be fifteen days between arraignment and trial

and, upon my honor, it shall be fulfilled. I will em. ploy no artifices of speech. I claim only the strictest protection of the law for the unhappy man before you. I should, indeed, be ashamed if I were to say any thing of the rule in the abstract by which he is to be judged, which I did not honestly feel; and I am sorry, therefore, that the subject is so difficult to handle with brevity and precision. Indeed if it could be brought to a clear and simple criterion, which could admit of a dry admission or contradiction, there might be very little difference, perhaps none at all, between the Attorney-General and myself, upon the principles which ought to govern your verdict; but this is not possible, and I am, therefore, under the necessity of submitting to you, and to the judges, for their direction (and at greater length than I wish), how I understand this difficult and momentous subject.

The law, as it regards this most unfortunate infirmity of the human mind, like the law in all its branches, aims at the utmost degree of precision; but there are some subjects, as I have just observed to you, and the present is one of them, upon which it is extremely difficult to be precise. The general principle is clear, but the application is most difficult.

It is agreed by all jurists, and is established by the law of this and every other country, that it is the REASON OF MAN, which makes him accountable for his actions; and that the deprivation of reason acquits him of crime. I his principle is

indisputable; yet so fearfully and wonderfully are we made, so infinitely subtle is the spiritual part of our being, so difficult is it to trace with accuracy the effect of diseased intellect upon human action, that I may appeal to all who hear me, whether there are any causes more difficult, or which, indeed, so often confound the learning of the judges themselves, as when insanity, or the effects and consequences of insanity, become the subjects of legal consideration and judgment. I shall pursue the subject as the Attorney-General has properly discussed it. I shall consider insanity, as it annuls a man's dominion over property; as it dissolves his contracts, and other acts, which other wise would be binding; and as it takes away his responsibility for crimes. If I could draw the line in a moment between these two views of the subject, I am sure the judges will do me the justice to believe, that I would fairly and candidly do so; but great difficulties press upon my mind, which oblige me to take a different course.

I agree with the Attorney General, that the law in neither civil nor criminal cases, will measure the degrees of men's understandings; and that a weak man, however much below the ordinary standard of human intellect, is not only responsible for crimes, but is bound by his contracts, and may exercise dominion over his property. Sir Joseph Jekyll, in the Duchess of Cleveland's case, took the clear legal distinction, when he said, "The law will not measure the sizes of men's capa» "cities, so as they be COMPOS MENTIS."

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