SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, BART., LL.D., CORPUS PROFESSOR OF JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. VOL. XLI. 1834-1836. 3 MYLNE & KEEN 1 YOUNGE & COLLYER-2 ADOLPHUS LONDON: SWEET AND MAXWELL, LIMITED, 3, CHANCERY LANE. BOSTON: LITTLE, BROWN & COBRARI 1899. OF THE NEW YORK SAW INSTITUTE OF THE NEW YORK LAW INSTITUTE PREFACE TO VOLUME XLI. WE have here several decisions which are important or even leading cases in their respective lines. Armstrong v. Armstrong, p. 10, on agreements in evasion of the law; Murray v. Barlee, p. 52, on the nature of a married woman's "engagements" affecting her separate property (a doctrine not yet quite supplanted by the Married Women's Property Acts); Kennedy v. Green, p. 176, on constructive notice of fraud; Hipwell v. Knight, p. 304, on the circumstances in which time is of the essence of a contract in equity; Prosser v. Edmonds, p. 322, on the intricate subject of champerty; Green v. Button, p. 818, on slander of title-these are all exceedingly well known. Flight v. Booth, p. 599, is a considerable authority as to misrepresentation on sale of land. It is curious that the head-note, as it stands in the original report, omits the only fact that makes the case interesting or arguable in the eyes of a conveyancer, namely, the existence of a condition that errors of description should not annul the sale. The point of the decision consists in limiting the effect of such a condition to errors not amounting to such substantial misstatement as will mislead the purchaser as to what he is really buying. In Doorman v. Jenkins, p. 429, the position of a gratuitous bailee is discussed, and we meet, in the judgment of Taunton J., with the opinion that "gross negligence" is not a distinct kind of negligence known to the law, but only negligence in an aggravated degree. This opinion was afterwards fortified by the high authority of the late Willes J., and has on the whole prevailed. There is an unconscious fitness in the name of Philpott v. Jones, a case on the "Tippling Act" (p. 371). Ball v. Cullimore, p. 699, exhibits, in full accordance with older authorities, the feebleness of a tenant at will's estate. A lessor for years cannot convey by livery of seisin during the term, having neither immediate possession nor the right thereto. But if a lessor at will enters for the purpose of giving seisin, the entry is itself a determination of his will and of the tenant's estate, and there remains nothing to hinder his intention from taking full effect. Tenants at will are not common nowadays (in fact, the relatively modern decisions on them are due to the want of power to recognize equitable interests in |