POSITION OF RAMGERH TURNED. 39 CHAP. I. 1814. ridge. The Gorkha right rested upon the fort; BOOK II. the left about two miles distant, upon a strongly stockaded hill; and stockades protected the intervals along their front. After a careful examination of the position of the Gorkhas, it appeared to the cautious and experienced judgment of the British commander that the nature of the ground precluded an attack in front; and, having received information that the northern face of the range was less broken and precipitous, he resolved to turn the left of the enemy, and assail their position from the rear. He, therefore, moved to the heights of Nahar, an eminence seven miles northeast from Ramgerh, commanding a complete view of the Gorkha lines. As this seemed to be the most assailable point of their defences, General Ochterlony determined to erect batteries against it. A road over the hills for the conveyance of the heavy ordnance from Nalagerh was constructed with great labour; in accomplishing which, twenty days were consumed. When the battery opened, it was found to be too distant to fire with effect, and a position more within the range of the guns was therefore to be sought for. A small party under the engineer officer, Lieutenant Lawtie, sent to explore the ground nearer to the stockade, had selected an elevation fit for their purpose, and were on their return to camp, when they were surrounded by a numerous body of Gorkhas, by whom their movements had been observed, and who came down in great strength to intercept their retreat. Availing themselves of a small stone enclosure, the party defended themselves with steady resolution until CHAP. I. BOOK II. the failure of their ammunition compelled them to give way: some reinforcements, sent from the bat1814. tery, shared in their discomfiture; and the whole were routed with much loss before their retreat was covered by a strong detachment dispatched to their succour from the camp.1 The affair was of little moment, except from its tendency to confirm the confidence, and animate the courage, of the enemy. Notwithstanding the check thus sustained, General Ochterlony persisted in his plan of carrying the stockaded works of Ramgerh, when news of the second repulse at Kalanga arrived; and anticipating the moral effects of this disaster, both upon his own troops and those of his antagonist, he considered it prudent to suspend offensive operations until his 'Lieutenant Williams commanding the reinforcement was killed; seventy Sipahis were killed and wounded.-Nepal Papers. Prinsep says the whole party was surrounded, and obliged to cut their way through the enemy. Transactions, &c., i. 107. According to Fraser, the chief cause of the disaster was the defective construction of the cartouch-boxes, by which they could not be turned so as to render the cartridges in the under part of the box available when those in the upper part were expended. A cessation of the firing being thus caused, the Gorkhas rushed in and put the Sipahis to the rout.-Tour in the Himalayas, 18. The author of Military Sketches of the Gorkha War, an eyewitness, attributes the defeat to the misconduct of the troops. According to him, the party, having reached a neighbouring eminence without molestation, came suddenly upon a breastwork, from which a heavy fire was opened upon them. The men, in obedience to the commands of their officer, rushed forward and dislodged the Gorkhas with great gallantry; but when the latter were reinforced, and "came back in superior numbers, the Sipahis could not be prevented from wasting their ammunition by keeping up a useless fire. The upper layer of their cartridges being expended, some vorces called out for a retreat, alleging that they would not have time to turn their boxes. The place appeared tenable with the bayonet; the Gorkhas were, however, now at hand, and arguments, threats, and entreaties proved equally vain; our men broke in confusion, and turned their backs; the enemy, plunging among the fugitives, cut to pieces all whom their swords could reach. At this time a small reinforcement, all that could be spared from the battery, was ascending the hill, under Lieutenant Williams of the 3rd N. I. It appeared the intention of that young officer to throw his party between Lawtie's and their pursuers, but he had the mortification to see his Seapoys turn about and join the flight, just before he perished himself."-Sketches, &c., p. 9. GENERAL OCHTERLONY REINFORCED. 1814. 41 strength should preclude the possibility of failure. BOOK II. He therefore applied for reinforcements, and, while CHAP. I. awaiting their arrival, employed himself in extending his information, and improving his means of offence. The mountain countries forming the first steps of the Himalaya range, had hitherto been unvisited by Europeans; and scenes, destined at no remote period to become their peaceable and familiar haunts, were now for the first time to be explored by them for the purposes of war. It was of indispensable necessity to ascertain the topography of the adjacent regions, the base on which the movements of the Gorkha general rested, the sources whence his supplies were drawn, and the expedients by which the latter might be cut off. Roads were also to be made practicable for artillery, as well as for troops; and something like organisation was to be given to the irregular levies of the adherents to the British cause. In these occupations a month was advantageously spent; when, the force being joined by the 2nd battalion of the 7th N. I., with a train of field artillery, and by a Sikh levy, General Ochterlony immediately resumed active operations. On the day following their junction, Colonel Thompson was 27 Dec. dispatched to prosecute the plan of spreading along the enemy's rear, and intercepting his communications with Arki and Bilaspur, by occupying the Dibu hills, a low range on the north-east of Ramgerh. A lodgement was effected; the consequences of which being distinctly comprehended by the Gorkha general, he made a desperate but a fruitless effort to drive the detachment from its new position. CHAP. I. 1814. BOOK II. The division was attacked at dawn of the 28th with so much impetuosity, that some of the enemy forced their way into the camp. The difficulties of the ground, however, impeded their concentration; and the resolution with which the attack was received, completed their discomfiture. They returned to their position in connection with the fort of Ramgerh, but changed their front so as to oppose the British, now upon their north; their right, as before, resting upon the fort. On the other hand, General Ochterlony, leaving a division under Brigadier Arnold to watch the enemy's movements, marched in a direction which was to place him on the north of the last range of hills between Malaun and the Setlej. On the 6th of January he ascended the bed of the Gambhira river, and, crossing the mountains on which Malaun was situated, took post at Battoh, on the north bank of another mountain stream, the Gamrora, nearly opposite to the centre of the range, sending forward two thousand Hinduris under Captain Ross to occupy the heights above Bilaspur. This movement effected his object. Amar Sing, alarmed for the security of the communications upon which his being able to maintain his mountain posts depended, withdrew his main body from Ramgerh, and, leaving a garrison in the fort, concentrated his force on the ridge of Malaun. Colonel Arnold, in consequence of his retreat, moved round the opposite extremity of the ridge to co-operate with General Ochterlony on its northern base; and after marching through a very rough country, in which he was further delayed by a heavy fall of snow, he turned the north-west MALAUN INVESTED. 43 CHAP. I. ern extremity of the line, and there received the BOOK II. submission of the Government of Bilaspur, as well as possession of the fort of Ratangerh, divided only 1814. by a deep and extensive hollow from Malaun. A detachment, under Lieut.-Colonel Cooper, dislodged the Gorkhas from Ramgerh and other posts which they had continued to hold to the south, and then advanced to co-operate with the main body. These subsidiary movements, with the state of the country, and the severity of the season, prevented the completion of the investment of Malaun until the 1st of April. In the mean time, the armies acting at the eastern extremity of the line of operations had been engaged with the enemy, but had made little progress towards accomplishing the objects of the campaign. 1815. CHAPTER II. Operations of the Third Division. - March from Go- Operations of Advanced detachment under Major Bradshaw.-Gorkha posts surprised.-Parsuram Thapa killed.- Tirai conquered. March of main body delayed.-Outposts at Samanpur and Parsa,-surprised by the Gorkhas,-great alarm among the troops. General Marley retreats, |
